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Abstract 
Inflation has been the focus of numerous investigations in recent 
decades, both for developed and developing countries. Although there is a 
general understanding about the consequences of inflation, its causes and cure 
are still controversial issues among economists. None of the two cOlnpetitive 
views concerned with developing countries , Monetarism and Structuralism, 
provides a wholly successful theoretical model to explain price behaviour. This 
thesis attempts to suggest a synthesis for more appropriate modeling. 
Empirically, the most commonly used modeling strategy has been to 
adapt a monetary model subject to some modifications for the developing 
countries, reflecting structural elements, which may be named an analytical 
model. This investigation considers much empirical evidence and points out the 
shortcomings of the models used and the econometric procedures carried out. 
In particular, several recent studies of inflation in the Iranian economy are 
evaluated. This evaluation indicates that the single equation estimation and/or 
ignorance of integration and co integration in these researches are two features 
to be questioned. 
This thesis uses a simultaneous equations model originally made for 
four non-oil developing countries. Adapting the model for Iran, a major oil 
exporting country, leads to a model containing three behavioural equations 
(price, government revenue and income) and two definitional equations (money 
and expected inflation). This model, treating income, money and government 
revenue as endogenous, attempts to take into account the special structural 
features of the economy beside monetary elements. 
A vector autoregressive approach in a multiple cointegration context is 
the estimation procedure used in this study. The results generally confirm 
predicted price determination and indicate the importance of the oil sector in 
both government revenue and production. 
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1 Introduction 
l.1 ()bjective 
1.2 Plan 
Chapter 1.- Introduction 
1.1 Objective 
For decades, the debate on the causes of inflation has been important as 
governments in almost all countries, in the developed or the developing worlds. 
have had to confront the socio-economic costs of continuous price rises. Most 
significant an10ng them seeln to be the effects on economic growth and 
redistribution of incOIne fro111 the poor to the rich which have led. in many 
cases, to social unrest. It is broadly accepted that the developing countries 
(DC's) are more liable to experience. and have indeed experienced, a wider 
range of inflation rates than the developed countries. 
Despite general agreement about the consequences of inflation, when 
diagnosis of the problem and lneans of treatment come under scrutiny, inflation 
relnains a controversial issue anlong ecol10111ists. Intlation is treated as a 
nlonetary phenonlenon by nlonetarists for whom control of money supply is the 
n1ain policy prescription. By contrast. structuralists. whilst accepting that 
inflation is accompanied by money supply increases view it as an inevitable 
outcome of structural bottlenecks during the dc\'dopment process. 
Consequently, identification of the causes of inflation indicates the way to cure 
it. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The topic is vast and the literature voluminous. Concerning DC·s. 
several authors have tried to provide a monetarist explanation of inflation. 
Most famous aJnong them is Harberger (1963), whose nlodel of Chilean 
inflation has been applied in nUlnerous in\ estigations for Latin America and 
elsewhere. Vogel (1974) considered inflation in sixteen Latin American DC's 
indicating a nlonetarist explanation of inflation. Nevertheless. the researcher 
reported contradictory conclusions on the 1110netarist-structuralist debate from 
the findings of several other investigations. 
Edel (1969), using data of eight Latin American DC' s. examined the 
structural hypothesis and found evidence supp011ing the structuralist view. 
Apart from a few successful cases, most of the investigations which used pure 
nlonetarist or structuralist models to explain inflation phases in DC's failed to 
provide reasonable outcomes. Argy (1970) and Saini (1982) are two examples 
which used a structural model for 22 DC's and a monetarist one for six Asian 
DC's. However, there are IHany studies which apply an analytical model to 
exatnine the different structural or monetary hypothesises: for example Aghevli 
and Khan (1978). Bhalla (1981), Arize (1987), Montiel ( 1989) and Noorbakhsh 
(1990). 
Recently. there has been grow111g interest 111 newer econometric 
nlethods like cointegration to study inflation. Some examples are Alkhatib 
(1994). Ryan and Milne (1994), Moser (1995), Metin (1995) and Wang (1995). 
In these papers the model nests relevant factors (both structuralist and 
nlonetarist) characterizing the specific circUlnstances of individual DC's. These 
articles lend partial supp0l1 to both views on intlation. 
Many studies have also focused on causality between money supply 
and inflation to determine whether it is money which causes inflation (the 
nlonetarist view) or lnoney supply rise is caused by intlation (the structuralist 
view) ( Jones and Uri. 1987. Anderson ct aL 1988. Quddus et al. 1989. 
Makinen and \Voodward. 1989. Beltas and Jones. 199]. Kamas. 1995 and 
Ahumada. 19(5). There are a variety of results. but they appear to provide no 
strong evidence to confirm exclusively each CaInp of thought. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Regarding Iran as an oil-exporting DC. several researchers have studied 
the causes of inflation during the two recent decades. Although a pure 
nl0netarist approach seems partially to be able to explain innation in the 
Iranian economy in some studies (lkani. 1987). most researchers have found 
analytical models, which nest the 1\\'0 kinds of factors. more appropriate 
(Aghevli and Sassanpour. 1991. Tayyebnia. 1993. and Bahmanee-Oskoee. 
1995). These investigations used a single equation approach to estimate the 
nl0dels. However there are two investigations which have used simultaneous 
equation models (Makkian, 1991 and Tabatabaee- Yazdee. 1993). Although all 
of the studies result in more or less reasonable outcomes. there are some 
questionable issues: 
1. Most studies have been conducted ,vith a single-
equation approach (OLS). An assumption in this approach 
is that the explanatory variables are exogenous. However, 
they themselves might well be influenced by the dependent 
variable, leading to biased estimates. 
2. i\1akkian and Tabatabaee-Yazdee investigated the 
problem in a simultaneous equation context but they used 
the lllodel of Aghevli and Khan (1978), which is designed 
for non-oil-exp0l1ing countries. It seenlS that their work 
would have been more reliable if the authors had modified 
the model by characterizing the special features of the 
econOlllY of Iran. a major oil-exporting DC. All previous 
analyses have paid too little attention to the dominance of 
oil in the Iranian economy. 
3. Further (and probably more important) is that in 
none of the cases, except Bahmanee-Oskoee. do the 
authors apply the new econometric methodology regarding 
integration and cointegration. When a model deals with 
Inacroeconomic variables. estimation without integration 
and cointcgration tests may "ell kad to spurious 
4 
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regresSIOn. Bahn1anee-Oskoee' s \\ ork I s an ~ \ c c p t t ion. 
Howe\ er. besides employing a s i n g l e - ~ q L l a t i o n n approach. 
he did not carry out complete cointegration tests. 
Consequently it would be of interest to ree\amine the causes of 
inflation in the Iranian econOlny in a conte.\t which captures the following 
f e a t u r e s ~ ~
1. Establishing an analytical model focusin!.! on the 
. ~ ~
imp011ance of the role of the oil sector in the economy. 
which combines all relevant monetarist ~ l S S \\'ell as 
structuralist variables. 
2. Using a simultaneous-equation estimation method 
permitting all probable interrelatinns among the \ariables 
to be considered. 
3. Enlploying a complete set of integration and 
cointegration tests so as to a\oid an\' misinterpretation of 
the results. 
These are undertaken 1Il the hope that this study \\ill concentrate on 
aspects of time series analysis neglected in the pre\ious in\l'stigations. 
1.2 Plan 
The plan of this study is as f o l l o \ \ ' s ~ ~
Chapter 2 represents a major part of the theoretical core of the thesis, 
This chapter. after a broad introduction of different \ie\\ s on intlation. employs 
the quantity theory of money and money market equilibrium to derive a 
monetary forn1uJation of price generation. \\ l' sho\\ \\hy monetarists argue that 
inflation occurs when mol'll') supply gf(}\\ s taster than money demand. and also 
110\\ the expectation of inllation can aggnl\ ate this process, Like\\'ise. the 
central bank b ~ t 1 a n c e e sheet identity and the 1ll01ll') market equilibrium are llsed 
to highlight the role ur government budgdary rerronnance and the foreign 
assets l) f the central bank. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The next section of this chapter deals \\ith the structuralist perspecti\'e. 
First we provide a discussion about the lnain argument of this camp: the 
inevitability of inflation during the development process. Then an equilibrium 
analysis of the goods Inarket is used to establish a model illustrating the role of 
relative prices. This model indicates how structural bottlenecks can lead to 
relative price changes resulting in general price increases. Thirdly. the role of 
internal and external constraints are considered. Finally. the case of oil-export-
orientated economies is exanlined to point out that even \\-ith unlimited foreign 
exchange the structure of the econOlny may make it prone to inflation. 
Following on from this, a critical discussion to reconcile the two views 
is provided. This part of chapter 2 attempts to illuminate the sinlilarities and the 
differences between the two perspectives. in addition to their deficiencies. to 
explain DCs' inflation. This discussion leads to an analytical model combining 
relevant nlonetarist and structuralist factors. Chapter 2 ends with empirical 
work lending support to a synthesis of the two approaches. 
The background part of the thesis is presented 111 chapter 3. This 
describes the Iranian economic outlook, focusing on inflation. The government 
budget and such relevant characteristics as banking performance. foreign trade 
and production are considered. The role or positive and negative oil pnce 
shocks is emphasized. Likewise. dividing the period into pre- and post-
revolution eras. some attempts have been made to point out the function of the 
socio-political situation and in particular. the long lasting Iraq-Iran war. The 
conclusion shows that the Iranian economy has suffered from an oil/non-oil 
dualism. in addition to 1110dernltraditional duality, An inlportant consequence 
of these circumstances was a severe dependence of government revenue and 
foreign requirement of production on oil export proceeds. This high degree of 
dependence on the oil sector has made the econOl11) prone to inflation. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to addressing model selection issues. This begins 
with a typical analytical model. a single equation expanded from a 
conventional money demand function. Its shortcomings are then discussed. 
leading to a simultaneous equation model. Then. six of the latest studies 
6 
(hapler 1: Infrodllcliol1 
concen1ing inf1ation in the Iranian t:conomy art: c r i t i c ~ l I l ) ) considL'red. The ncxt 
part describes the rnodel of Aghe\li and Khan (I 97X) from \\'hich the model 
used in this investigation is derived. The fillal sedion of this chapter provides 
the procedure used to derive the equations of the model based on the relevant 
theories and the special features of the Iranian econom). rhe selected model 
consists of equations for prices. mcome. government re\enuc. money supply 
and expected inflation. 
The econometric work in the thesis is set out in chapter 5. Folll)\\"ing an 
introductory discussion about the nature or the tinw series. the database under 
consideration is described. Data definition, derivation of quarterly data from 
annual figures for a few series and m i ~ , s i n g g observations are discussed. 
Expected inflation is discussed in the next part. Then. \\ e conduct the tirst 
necessary step in time series analysis, stationarity tests. Di Ilerent tests for units 
root and seasonal features of the series arl' accomplished. There folh)\\"s a 
discussion of long-run vs short-run features of the mudel \"ith respect to 
cointegration. I n this section the error correction mechanism and difTerent 
procedures for cointegration tests arc described. l.i kL'\\ise, different aspects of 
the Johansen approach for multiple cointegration tests arc discussed and 
conducted on the equations of interest. 
Follo\\ino on rrom these initial ksL,. the model is estimated by 3SLS 
b 
and 2SLS, using a VAR procedure. The last part of the chapter is devoted to 
interpretation of the findings. Chapter 6 concludes the stud) . 
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2 The Theory of Inflation 
in DeveiopiJ1g ('ollntries: 
A Critic(li Review of the 
_Literature 
~ . l l Introduction 
!. / Monetarv Vie\\s on I ntlation 
"' 
".3 Structural Vic\\'s on Intlation 
'l.-t Monetarisnl VS Structural ism: 
/\ Reconciliation 
Chapter 2.· T h ~ o r . \ \ ojln/latio}] in . 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter's objective is to pn)\ide a critical rnie\\" of the literature 
concerning the theory of inflation in developing countril.'s (Des). 
In the simplest terms , intlation is a persistent upward trend in the 
general level of prices (Jackman el at, 1981: 1). This means that the \alue of 
goods (including services), in terms of mone\ continuously rises. or 
equivalently, the value of a unit of money in terms of goods declines 
continually. Taking into account the different roles of money in the economy. 
the tight relation between inflation and mOllL'y can he seen. \10ney has three 
roles: a means for transactions, a store of value. and all accounting unit. .\ 
necessary condition for money being an a:,set or a store of \ · ~ d u e e is that it 
fulfills the exchange function. In nther \\ords. it is desirable as a means of 
transaction. Thus, if the value of mOllL'y f ~ t 1 l s s (intlation occurs). its 
effectiveness ~ l S S a store of value starts to \\ orsen. The third role. a unit of 
account is also 1inked "ith this. \\'hik intlation dccreasL's the value of money. 
it \\eakens the third role of money liS \\cll: consequentl). inllation has a serious 
impact on crl'dit markets because debt is ~ l c c O U l l l e d d for hy llhllle\ (Laidler and 
Parkin. 1975: 7 ~ ~ 1 L 
<) 
Chapler 2: Theory offllf/alion in 
Although inflation is not a ncw phcnomenon. in reccnt decades it has 
emerged as a persistent and world\\-ide prohlem. a problem \\-hich has become 
a major conccrn of governments of developed as \\ ell as developing countries 
(Ylaynard and Ryckeghem. 1976: 1). Table 1 displays the mo\'ement of a\'erage 
rates of inflation in the recent t \\ 0 d e c a d ~ ~ ~ . . for industrial and d e n ~ l o p i n g g
countries. This Table suggests that a clHlClusion ~ ) f f Kirkpatrick and :\ ixon 
(1987: 173) about the characteristics of in1lation in Des scems broadly 
acceptable. They conclude that: a) DC's are more liabk to int1ation. b) these 
countries experience a variety of inflation rates. and c) inflation fluctuates 
around the trend 1110re widely than in dc\doped countries_ 
Following Romer (1996: 389) a simple rramc\\urk or aggregate demand 
and supply curves can be used to identif\ possibk causes of intlation (Figure 
1). This diagram implies that c o n t r a c t i o n ~ i i of supply and 'or expansions of 
aggregate demand lead to a higher p r i ( ~ ~ lc\el. T h e s ~ ~ contractions or 
expansions can occur for many reasons. A reduction in labour supplied (at any 
given wage rate), negative technological shocks. rising I " ~ l a t i \ ' e e costs and any 
factors which shi ft the aggregate supply cun e l()\\ an.ls the left lead to inflation. 
Analogously. every right\vard shift of aggrL'gatl' demand c u r n ~ . . like a money 
stock increase. a money demand d e c r e ~ I S ~ ' ' or an increase in government 
expenditure, can cause intlation. Of course. many shocks h a \ ~ ~ impacts on both 
curves. 
Figun_' 1 : Aggregate Demand and Aggrcgate Supply Curvcs 
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Table1: Trends in Inflation, 1969-1988(0/0)1 
Average2 
1969-78 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Industrial countries 3 7.8 8.1 9.3 8.8 7.3 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.4 2.9 3.4 
Developing countries4 16.7 21.5 27.2 26.4 25.0 34.0 39.4 40.6 28.6 30.1 29.5 
By region 
Africa 11.6 16.7 16.4 21.9 11.4 19.5 20.3 12.8 14.8 12.6 10.5 
Asia 8.7 8.0 13.1 10.7 6.3 6.6 7.2 7.4 5.9 5.4 5.6 
Middle East 10.8 11.7 16.8 15.2 12.7 12.3 14.9 12.2 11.1 11.1 9.9 
Latin America 31.0 46.5 54.6 59.7 68.4 106.3 129.3 150.3 86.5 97.7 98.8 
By analytical criteria 
Fuel exporters 11.3 12.1 15.6 16.1 17.6 25.0 19.8 13.4 19.4 22.2 15.3 
Non-fuel exporers 19.0 25.7 32.5 31.3 28.8 38.9 50.4 55.9 33.1 33.8 35.6 
I As measured by changes in GNP deflators for industrial countries and changes in consumer prices for 
devclopi n ~ ~ countries. 
:2 ('nmpnund average rates of change. 
3 A v e r ~ l ~ e e o r p e r c e n t a ~ e e changes in (,NP deflators ror individual countries \veighted hy the average llS 
dollar value nftheir respective GNPs O\'er the preceding three years . 
4 Percentage changes of geometric averages of indices of consumer prices for individual countries \\eighted 
hy the a \ · e r a ~ e e lJS dollar \'alue of their respecti\'C GDPs o\er the preceding three years. Lxcluding China 
prior to 197X. 
SOl R( '/:".·1,\11< 'J'orld 1 ~ " c 0 J 7 ( } l 1 1 i c c Outlook 198- o17d 1996. "·oshing{o17. D.C .. l.\fF. TuhleA8 
Chapter ],' TheOfY of In/lation in , 
Inflation in developed countri('s IS ti-cLJuently attrihuted to monetary 
reasons. However. in the developing world. there arc n\ n ~ : o m p e t i n g g \ iews 
about inflationary causcs: common I v referred to as thl? monetarist and 
structuralist perspecti Yes. Monetarism. as l i hauk (199 )a: (6) sumnlari/es. 
treats inflation as a monetary phenomenon. and control or the money supply is 
a necessary and sufficient condition to clIre it. In contrast. Structuralism 
attributes inflation to certain structural fcatun:s of DC s, These particular 
characteristics nlake Des prone to inflation ll1 the process of their 
developlnent. Structuralists emphasise that treatment l If intlation. holding 
developlnent programme unchanged. reqUIres a removal of the structural 
bottlenecks that are the underlying 
inflation I, 
sources initiating and perpetuating 
Whatever the sources of inflation. questions ahout its effects and costs 
are inlportant. Inflation costs may he indcpcnc.knt of thc postulated causes. or 
course, when the cure or the problem is being discussed there are likely to exist 
close relationships between hypothesized causes and policy recommendations 
to remove the problem ~ A r t i s . . 1994: 1(7). L Ifccts or inllation on gro\\th. 
government revenue and redistribution of income li'om poor to rich, inter alia. 
are important. For a selecti\c revie\\ of inflation costs ~ ~ c e e 8riault ( 1(95), 
, , The renlainder of this chapter is organized as folluv,s: section 
explains Monetarist views on intlation. Then Structuralist opinions are 
considered in section 2.3. Part 2.4 compares and contrasts the t\\'O views and 
tries to reconcile between them. Finall). in section 2,:=; empirical evidence is 
pro\'ided. 
I Demand-pull and cost-push analyses to invcstiga1.? intlation in Des h a \ \ . ~ ~ been frequently 
criticized b ~ ~ economists. Demand-pull. associakd \\Ith the l \ . e ; ' I l l ' ~ i a l l l illtlationar;, gap model. 
is relevant to all ecollomv at or near full L'mploYIllCIlt and implicitly d""lIIllCS the economy ((1 
be fully elastic, \\hile I )('S are characterized \vith acuk unempl{)} IIK'nt. under-utilized capital 
stock .. and alsll \1, ith various rigidities, Analogollsly. the cnst-push or \\ age-induced 
intlatiollill'\ pnlccss does nllt S ~ l ' l l l l relevant to IX s \\ill.'l\,' a i i l r ~ c c proportion of labour \\orb ill 
a ~ r i c u l t l l r e e SL'llor and the i n d l i s t r i ~ l l i a b o u r r fOIT': is rardy \\ell orgaill/l'd ill trade unions due to 
t l ~ e e political intL'Il'st ot go\crIllllents, In such c i r c u m s t ~ l I l c , , ' ' ' ' ' \\agl' IIlCl'l'aSeS 10110\\ living costs 
rather than leading thcl11 (Ilossian. 1988: 56-571. I veil lor dc\ l'iolk'd countnes. Laidler and 
Parkin (197-:': l - l ~ ) ) in their cOlllprehensl\e survc} 'fil/d {he cwl-IJIIshdemuIlJ-puli distll1cllOll 
( 1 I 7 a ~ \ ' l i c ( / / ~ l ' ' /lI/IIL"/I//l/" in cl,lssih ing the dc\ elopmcnts ~ 1 " s ( H : i a t e d d \\ ith inlbtinn, T h e ~ ~ belie\ e 
IIltlation ttl be ;1 m;llT()CCI'110I11ic phellomellllil ,11 kcting. the \\ hl)lc l'Cl)JWI11;" 
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2.2 The Monetarist Perspective 
Monetarists view inflation as a completely 111 ( ,netary phenomenon 
perpetuated by expansionar) tiscal and monetary policies. These expansionar) 
policies are hudget deficits. loose credit policy and exchange rate policy. In 
consequence. a necessary and sufficient condition for C I ) P i l l ~ ~ with inflation is 
keeping the rate of money supply growth consistent \\ith money demand 
growth so as to stabilize prices. A reduction in the intlation rate requires the 
elimination of excess demand by the means ()f contractionary monetary and 
fiscal policies, wage control and abandonment of an o\er-\· .. tlued exchange rate 
(Kirkpatrick and Nixon. 1987: 177 and Ghat8k. I (9)a:l)()). 
Romer( 1996:390) argues that economisb usually underline just the 
money supply growth to explain the mo\'emcnt or pricl's 1)\ er the longer term. 
This is because other factors are unlikl'ly h) gelh.Tale cpntinllOUS rises in the 
price level. In other words. paying attention to Figure I. it seems obvious that a 
continuous increase in prices requires either continuous rise in aggregate 
demand or repetitive contractions in aggregate supply. Repeated falls in 
aggreg3tc supply. given progress in tl'l:hnology. Sl'em improbable. Aggregate 
demand can rise repeatedly due to many bdors \\ith most of them some\\hat 
limited like ILL\: r e d u c t i o n s ~ ~ but money supply can \ L ! T ~ ~ at almost any rate, from 
large increases observed in hyperinflation eras to dranlatic decreases 
experienced during def1ation. A.lthough mOl1l'y growth influences pnces as 
directly a ~ ; ; other factors do. empiric.ll evidence sUt-'-gests that most of the 
variations in aggregate dem8nd can be explained by I1wney gro\\1h variations. 
Figure 2 depicts the correlation bL'l\\Cl'l1 the tl\cragc annual gro\\·th rate or 
money supply and prices for 65 countries in 19XOs. 
2.2.1 The Q u a n t i ~ ~ Theory of Money 
1\'lonctarisl11. as C;)gan( 1992:7.20) s t ~ l k s . . stcms from the quantity theon' 
of nhJney. \\'hich rdates nominal a g g l \ : g ~ l k ' ' l,,-penditun: (demand) . consisting 
of both output and price k \ ' l ~ 1 . . to m o n l ' ~ ~ s t ( ) d ~ ~ and till.' \'cloeity of circulation of 
mone\. In the 1()ng-rul1. \ d o c i t ~ ~ l ' \ p ~ ' r i e n c ~ ' s s rather small c h a n ~ l ' s s induced 
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partly by prior nl0ney stock changes. Likewise, Q\'er the long-run. physical 
output is detennined by non-monetary factors. Thus. it is mainly prices that are 
influenced by changes in the money stock. The e\'ident long-run relationship 
between moneY and prices suggests that nhmey oyer-expansion results in 
inflation which can be cured by appropriate: reductions in money supply 
!;!rowth. 
'-
Figure 2: Correlation Between \Joney and Inflation 
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In Friedman's (199:2: 2.+8) expression or the quantity theory of money. 
what holders of money are concerned with is the r ~ a l l amount rather than 
nominal quantity of money. And also C\'er: body prefers a certain quantity of 
rcal money. Starting from a desired quantity of real money. :.1n unexpected rise 
in the nOlninal money stock increases the cash h:.1lances held by indi \·idu:.1ls 
more than the amount that they prefer to hold. Then the: try to return to their 
desired real balance by paying out a larger amount of money hy purchasing 
goods, services and securities or repayment oj" dehts. But the communit: as Ll 
whole fails becausl' what one man spends another earns. \e\"ertheless, these 
efforts to dispose of the undesired haLlIlccs \\ill hd\l' signiticant outcomes. 
\\'ith tle:-.:ible prices and incomes. these attempts increase nominal spending. in 
turn leading to higher prices and p r ( ) b ~ l b l : : ~ 1 1 1 1 incrl.:ase in physical olltpUt. \\ hile 
if customs or gl)\'Crnments ti:-.: prices. the e \ ~ e s s s Il10I1l'\ balance \\i II either 
1.+ 
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cause the output to nse or generate shortage., and (flle'lIeS: this in turn. 
increasing effective prices. ultimatel\ enforces a change in customary or 
authoritative prices. I ~ r i e d m a n n argues that it is ~ \ l C l l s i \ e l y y recognized that 
expansionary monetary and tiscal policies arc. ~ l t t best. a temporary stimulation 
of economic a c t i v i t i e s ~ ~ if. ho\\e\er. they continue the\ \\'ould be mirrored 
primarily in inflation. He concludes: 
" ... il?jlaliol1 i.)' uz",vuys and eveITH'hen.' (/ 1110J1('/({!")' phcl7omcnon in the 
sense that it is und can be produced OJ1/Y hy (/ more rapid increase in 
I he quan/itv (?/money than in the outpUI . . \ IUIlY phenomcnll can prodllcc 
lemporary/illctuations in the ra/c oj in/lalioll. hlll flu!,r can have las/ing 
effects only in.w?lar as they alfi.'cf the rate O/111011t!ILII"Y grOlt'th " 
(Friedman. 1992:261) 
In symbols. this discussion can be illustrated as I"ollo\\s: the identity 
for the quantity of money is : 
MV=PY 
where M = non1inal money stock 
V = number of times per period. on a\crage. that the stock is used to 
pay for tinal goods and services 
P = general price len.'l 
Y = real income loutput) 
Taking logarithms. then ditferentiation "ith respect to time gives: 
InM + InV == lnP + In\' 
dln1\:1 din V dlnP din Y 
._-- + == -'-- + -----
d/ £it £if ell 
dl\ll/dt (Nldt (II> dl dY!dt 
---- + --'---- - -- - --_. -+- -'---
t\1 \' 
[> == \ ~ ~1 + \' - \' 
\\Ill're the dot oycr the letters rcfers to the rat\...' of change 0\ cr timc. 
There are three p r o p o ~ i t i o n ~ ~ on \\'hieh thc monetarist "ie\\' is hased: 
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1. The stability2 of the velocity of circulation. V. 
2. Although monetary factors may affect real incOlne in the short-run. 
in the longer-term real factors such as technology and population 
determine the level of real incOlne. 
3. The Inoney supply is exogenous and is under gp\'ernment control 
(or, at least different factors determine it). 
Proposition 1 implies V is constant, so V = O. According to proposition 2, in 
the long-run income is near or at full employment. hence its implication is that 
y = O. In consequence, there is just one exogenous variable controlled by the 
government, the nloney supply, which deternlines the price level (Jacknlan ef 
aI, 1981:114-5). In the short-run (characterized by \1= 0 and Y:;c 0). the 
desired inflation rate can be achieved by increasing the money supply growth 
such that its discrepancy frOl11 the income growth target equals the int1ation 
rate, as the equation below inlplies: 
P - M Y 
2.2.2 Money Market Equilibrium 
Money market equilibriunl can also be used to sho"v the inlportance of 
the Inoney supply in intlation determination. The real money demand function 
is specified as an increasing function of income and decreasing function of 
interest rates. This is because when output rises the real amount of money 
needed for transaction purposes increases and if the nominal interest rate rises 
the opportunity cost of money holding will increase. so individuals decrease 
their real cash balances. l'vloney supply. M ~ , , is determined exogeneously. so for 
equilibrium we require: 
(M/Pf = M 
P 
L = LU. Y) L, < n. L, > 0 
:! Stability. as Monetarism claims. means that . sucC('SSI\'c! rl'slLllili/ amrs are genera/fl' 
o j J . ~ ( ' l t i l 1 g g and do not accl/lIllila/e, .. (Cagan. 1992: 7 2--1) 
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(M/P)S == L 
M 
p=L(i.Y) 
P= M 
where M = nominal money supply 
P = price level 
L = demand for real money 
i = nOlninal interest rate 
Y = real inconle 
L(i. Y) (2.2) 
Defining the real interest rate as the difference between the nominal 
interest rate and the expected rate of inflation (r == i-it) and bearing in mind 
that in equilibriurn the real interest rate and income are constant. it will be seen 
that: 
or in growth rates : 
M p=-----
L(r + TC • Y) 
P = 1\11 - .1 InL 
(Romer. 1996: 199, 392)3 
L;r. < 0 
This equation implies that the rate of inflation increases at the same rate at 
which lnoney supply grovnh exceeds the rate of desired real money balances. 
Since with increasing anticipated inflation individuals decrease their real 
balances to econonlize their money wealth. a higher rate of expected inflation 
leads to higher actual inflation. at any given rate of money supply growth. 
2.2.3 Major Monetary Sources of Inflation 
The nloney supply detinition and money market equilibrium condition 
nlay be used to explain some inlportant aspects of the \lonetarist view of 
:; Even if the real interest rate is independent of c'pcclt:d illtlatioll ill some circumstances, the 
nominal rate, and consequently. the demanded realmolh:Y balance ... IS affected by expectation" 
(McCallum, 1992: 402). 
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inflation. including the government budget deticit and changes in the current 
account. 
The money supply, MS, is defined as the product of the money supply 
nlultiplier, m which reflects the behaviour of banking system and holders of 
assets, and high-powered money. H : 
The stock of high-powered Inoney or monetary hase consists of the 
international reserve stock in terms of domestic CUlTeney. eR. and net domestic 
assets of the central bank, D: 
H =eR+ D 
where the international reserve stock. R, is in terms of foreign cUlTency. so it is 
nlultiplied bye, the exchange rate, in order to be in domestic CUlTency value-l. 
therefore: 
(2.3) MS = m (eR -+- D ) 
Substituting 1\1[S from (2.3) into equation 2.2 entails a long-run equilibrium: 
(2.4) P L(i, Y) = m ( eR -+- D) (Blejer and Frenkel, 1992: 725) 
Assuming an economy with a fixed exchange rate and at or near full 
employment, several implications emerge from this equation: 
• Govermnent financing by money creation and/or easIng of credit 
policy increases the money supply through rises in D. central bank 
assets. If this increase is not offset by an equal reduction in foreign 
reserves, eR, the price le\'el will increase5. 
• An increase in foreign reserves via international aid (or cheap 
foreign credit) or an export cOl1lIl1odity boom ( in particular, in oil 
4 The exchange rate is defined as the price of one unit of foreign c u m : n c ~ ~ in terms of domestic 
currency. 
5 The national income identity (injection = leakage) can be lIsed to show that at a given level of 
income. constant net saving. and constant price. the budget ddicit may be financed only by 
current account deficit (or foreign reserve reduction) : 
G + I + (X -M) ::c. S + T 
(G - T) = (S - I) + (M - X) 
Budoet deficit = net saving + current account deficit. (Fi<;cher and Lasterl). 
o -
1990: 129. Also see Mirier. 1989: 217) 
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exporting developing countries) increases Inone)" supply and leads to 
inflation 6• 
• As Fischer and Easterly (1990: 133) state. although the use of foreign 
exchange reserves or external borrowing to tinance a budget deficit 
appreciates the domestic currency and l()\\"crs monetary expansion. 
which itself squeezes the int1ationary process. it worsens current 
account difficulties and usually leads to devaluation and consequent 
inflationary pressure. 
• Purchasing po\ver parity implies: 
or 
e = P / P* 
. - p. I'>' e - -
where e is defined as above. P and P * stand respectively. for 
donlestic and foreign price levels. With fixed exchange regime 
( e = 0). the domestic price level relates directly to world inflation 
while with flexible exchange rates. an increase in world inflation 
should be offset by an increase in the exchange rate and/or domestic 
inflation ( Jackman et al. 1981: 136/. Thus. another implication of 
equation 2.4 is that in a fixed exchange regime world inflation 
increases donlestic inflationary pressure (depending on the share of 
imports in the domestic market) cmd with a flexible exchange rates. 
it atIects domestic inflation directly and via the expansion of money 
supply. 
Blejer and Frenkel (1992:726) state that although this model (eq. 2.4) 
p011rays the long-run characteristics of the economy effectively. with a 
sluggish intenlational capital flow and a high share of non-tradable goods in 
GNP. the adjustlnent speed of foreign reserve to monetary imbalances will be 
reduced. This in t u n l ~ ~ leads to an excess nloney supply. which in the short-run 
affects prices, output and the interest rates. The importance of these effects 
h For a typical oil economy discussion in this context see Hag.en ( 1 9 7 ~ ; ) . .
"7 Jackman et al define the exchanc rate inversely. 
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varies due to various factors such as the degree of openness of the economy. 
the exchange rate regime, the share of tradable and non-tradable goods in GNP. 
the degree of resource utilization, and the degree of rigidity of nominal and real 
wages. 
According to Kirkpatrick and Nixon 1.1987: 184). this new version of the 
I1l0netary approach pays more attention to price adjustment and distinguishes 
between tradable and non-tradable goods in considering price changes. It more 
realistically accepts that surplus demand induced by an initial Inoney supply 
increase (an increase in domestic credit creation) is accon1n10dated partly by 
changes in domestic production. Bearing in mind that output is at or near the 
full elTIployment level. non-tradable goods prices rise. which in turn leads to 
reallocation of resources from the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector. 
reducing the supply of exports and worsening the current account. If the 
increase in the price of non-tradable goods ends up as an increase in wages. the 
upward pressure on the general level of prices will be greater. Although these 
descriptions of the process by monetarists are new. the policy prescription is 
the old one: inflation and the external deficit will be removed by a reduction in 
nloney supply via reduction in domestic credit creation : a purely monetary 
treatment. 
2.3 The Structuralist Perspective 
StructuralislTI steIns fron1 Raul Prebisch' s idea about the essential 
difference between the structure of production in developed countries and 
developing countries. This idea views the developed economy as homogeneous 
and diversified and the developing economy as heterogeneous and specialized. 
By heterogeneity and specialization he means that the economy of the 
periphery is cOlnposed of a relatively advanced enclave export sector with few 
backward and forward linkages and other sectors \\ hich operate at 10\\ 
productivity. This important structural difference lies behind the different 
functioning of the two kinds of economics (Palma. 1987:529). 
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In fact. as Bevan, et al (1990: I) emphasise. the structures of 
developing and developed countries are so ditferent that applying modem 
m a c r o e c o n o m i c s ~ ~ originated mainly in the United States. for Des poses severe 
problems. In Des, there is no notable financial market. the economIes are 
s m a l l ~ ~ open and periodically depressed by transitory shocks. while most of 
them are heavily controlled by government regulations. characteristics 
completely unfamiliar in developed countries. in particular the United States. 
Structuralists. as Wachter (1976: 4) states. \'iew some fundamental 
structural factors as responsible for the inflationary process, They believe that 
the basic source for inflation is generally ... the pres.Hlre oj" economic gro"l'lh 
on an underdeveloped social and economic strllcture ". 
2.3.1 Development and Inevitable Inflation 
Des are transfonning from an inefficient. mismatched and 
underdeveloped situation, nornlally depen<.knt on a prinlary product, to a 
diversified econOlny with reasonable intersectoral relationships. Thus, they 
need sustainable growth and structural changes. However. a developing 
country has some structural bottlenecks which make it prone to a continual 
inflation. As Kirkpatrick and Nixon (1987: 176) state, these bottlenecks 
characterize the fundmnental features of the institutional economic and socio-
political structure of the country which in di tlerent \vays prevent development. 
As a consequence, fundanlental changes are required for economic 
development. However these changes, contrary to developed countries, cannot 
be fulfilled by the price mechanisnl because markets are very ilnperfect with 
respect to resource mobility. Hence deticiencies and disequilibria emerge. The 
iJnportant bottlenecks addressed by structuralists are: 
1. Food supply inelasticity 
2. Fiscal constraints of the government 
3. Foreign exchange constraints 
Relative price changes are viewed as a main factor in the determination 
of intlation. The development progranlml'. d i r e c t ~ d d usually towards urban 
areas. increases incon1e and subsequently. demand for t{)od. These excess 
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demands must be met by more supply \'la either domestic production or 
imports or both. Otherwise, the price of food \\ill rise. But due to inelastic 
agricultural supp]y and foreign exchange constraints the relati\'e price of goods 
usually increases. As Natalegawa (1988: 11 ) describes. the downward rigidity 
of prices (and wages) prevents the upward movement of tood price from being 
offset with cOlTesponding decreases in other prices. therefore. the relative price 
rises and leads to upward pressure on the general level of prices. Natalegawa 
argues that the situation in factor markets is also the sameI'. Moreover, even in 
equilibrium in aggregate, sub-market inflation will arise and lead to whole-
nlarket inflation. The reason is that the market which faces excess demand 
cannot nleet needs due to the reasons Inentioned above and in the market with 
excess supply, stickiness prevents prices from f ~ t l l i n g . . In consequence, the 
generalleve] of prices increase. 
Canavese (1982:524) suggests a formalization which explains this 
process. Suppose goods are classified into two aggregates: agricultural and 
industrial goods and PR = p .. / PI refers to relative prices of agricultural to 
industrial goods. Assuming that the growth rate of demand for agricultural 
output (8) is greater than their supp]y growth rate (cr), l) > cr, and that industrial 
goods' prices are downwardly rigid, PI :2: 0 {dot refers to rate of change), 
equilibriunl analysis of the relative price time path drives the result. Equality of 
supply, S, and denland, D ~ ~ is a requirenlent for equilibrium: 
Partial derivatives with respect to time give: 
as dPR as aD dPR aD 
-_._-+- = -_.--+-
aPR dt at aPR dl al 
Multiplying both sides respectively by PR IS and PR 10 (bearing in mind that 
D=S) and rearranging: 
K There is no difference. whether the relative change occurs in the prices of outputs. production 
factors or outputs and factors. In any case an increase in relative prices in these circumstances 
leads to a net increase of the general price level (Olivera. 1979:549) 
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as PR dPR cS PR cD 1\ dPR aD p 
--.-._-+-.- = - . - . - - + - . ~ ~
aPR S dt at S ( ~ p pR 0 dt at 0 
In terms of the elasticities of supply of and demand for food (respectively E 
and 11) and the rates of aggregate growth. the rate of change in relati\"e prices is 
defined as : 
lS l dP L"ct R 
+ P ·_-=---11+ P 
R S til R 
dPR dt(E +rU=PR (8-a) 
dPR/dt (8 -cr) 
. (8 -u) PR =---(E +TJ) 
The definition of relative price gives: 
. . (8 -a) PA - PI = . (E + 11 ) 
(2.5) 
co/at 
o 
For simplicity, the general price index, p, is assumed to be a geonletric mean of 
the two prices : 
P = pa . p(l-u) 
,\ I 
. . 
7t = a . P t\ + (1 - a ) . PI 
. . -(2.6) 7t = a (P 1\ - PI ) + PI 
Finally the inflation rate. 7[, is defined by substituting equation 2.5 into 2.6 as: 
(2.7) 8 -cr . 7t = a( ) + PI 
E +11 
Equation 2.7 ilnplies that even with constant prices of industrial outputs ( PI = 
0). inflation will occur because 8 > cr, hence the first term on the right hand 
side is positive: this is due to relative price changes resulting from structural 
bottlenecks. 
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As a response to inflation, social groups try to nlaintain their real 
purchasing power, \vage-earning groups by readjusting their wages. salaries 
and benefits, profit-earning groups through price increases, and the government 
via an increase in the nominal budget by money creation (Sunkel, 1960: III ). 
These measures act as propagation elements9 and fuel a ne" rise in relati"e 
prices , and the process continues. The inlportant point is that monetary 
authorities have to increase the nloney supply to meet money market 
equilibrium during the process in order to sustain the gro\\1h rate of the 
econonlY and development progress. In fact. as Ghatak (I995a: 1 00) 
emphasizes, structuralists accept that a requirement for an inflationary process 
is an expansionary monetary policy. However. they argue that if the money 
supply is not expanded, the economy will experience e i t h ~ r r output reduction 
and higher unelnployment via increasing wages (and lower investment due to 
contractionary credit policy) or social and political problems because of rigid 
nonlinal wages. In fact structuralists argue that intlation can be influenced by 
nl0ney supply reduction. However. this remedy not only does not completely 
cure inflation, it nlay well postpone the elitnination of structural impediments 
which initiate and perpetuate inflation. Thus. although they accept the 
ilnportance of the nl0ney supply in the innationary process, they consider the 
structural features of Des as requiring an increasing money supply during 
development progress. 
2.3.2 Budgetary Constraints 
F or DC governments. it is difficult to maintain a balanced budget while 
public sector involvenlent in econonlic activities increases during the 
development process. This is because if the goverl1l11ent does not increase its 
investnlent (or at least holds it constant in real terms) there will not be enough 
infrastructural elelnents to fuel the development engine. Furthermore, imperfect 
lnarkets provoke governments to intervene more in the economy. inducing 
I) A propagation clement is a mechanism \vhich does not bring about inflation by itself. . .. 
however, it causes inflation to continue and even intensities It (Sunkcl. 1958). "Perpetuatlon 
seems more appropriate to describe this situation. 
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more expenditure. However. even with a balanced bud!.!ct. when inflation 
'-
begins a budget deficit nearly always occurs. Although it is often said that 
budget deficit causes inflation, the budget deficit may be high due to inflation. 
as Dornbusch and Simonsen (1992: 1 01) argue. They state that lags in tax 
collection cause the real revenue of the government to decrease in the 
inflationary period, a phenomenon often called the Olivera-Tanzi effect. The 
amount of erosion of the government real revenue depends upon the tax 
structure 10. In Des with an insufficient tax base. inefficient (even corrupt) tax 
administration and the impossibility of a high tax burden due to political 
difficulties, the lags in tax collection and the inflation rate will be higher. as 
well the erosion of government real revenue (Tanzi. 1978:417. 444). Present 
value formulation can be used to illustrate the impact of various lag lengths and 
inflation rates on tax revenue : 
TR= 1 (1 +rc)11 
where TR is a unit of real tax revenue gained today assessed n n10nths ago 
while prices increase by the monthly rate ;c. It is clear that with longer lags 
(greater n), and higher rates of inflation (larger rc), real tax revenue will be 
smaller (Tanzi, 1977: 157). 
As a result of this structural characteristic and the fact that the 
government can not easily decrease its expenditures. it faces (increasing) 
budget deficits. However. open market operation cannot be used to finance the 
budget deficit because another structural bottleneck is an inetlicient and lin1ited 
capital Inarket, which leads goverrunents to finance deficits by money creation 
(Ghatak, 1995a: 101). Absence of central bank independence makes this 
possible for govermnents (a structural characteristic of banking system in 
Des). This passive monetary factor n1ay act as a perpetuation element for the 
initial inflation. 
One ilnportant feature of the budget structure in Des. in particular in oil 
exporting countries. is the role of the export sector in government revenue. 
)(1 See also Dornbusch and Fischer (1986: 4). For a detailed disclIssion abollt the structure of 
tax system in Des. ~ e e e Ghatak (1995b: 134-144). 
Chapter 2: Theory olln/lation in .. 
Export revenues usually expenence fluctuations due to exogenous factors. 
These fluctuations may worsen budget deficits as \ \ ' t ~ l l . . This Inatter is studied in 
section 2.3.4. 
2.3.3 External Constraints 
Meier (1989:221) states that based on the ., t\\'o-gap" approach. 
development depends on investment which needs domestic saving. However. 
this requirement is not adequate to guarantee development process. This means 
some goods and services frOln abroad are possibly necessary to complement 
those available at hOIne. In fact the economic structure of most DCs is so 
simple. such that if it relies exclusively on internal resources. a limited range of 
output will be produced. This means domestic saving may well not meet all 
necessary resource requiren1ents f(Jr the investment process. A DC may not 
have the capability to produce the cen1ent, steel or machinery required for 
different projects, though it may make adequate financial savmgs by 
contracting consu111ption. Development progress can only be made if the 
saving can partly be used to buy overseas equipment. In consequence. in the 
development process, foreign exchange requirements may make for balance of 
payment difficulties. 
In dual-gap modeling. that characteristic has been taken into account. 
The algebric forn1 of the two-gap analysis, as Ghatak (1995b: 154) suggests, is : 
c + I + .X = Y + Al 
C+S==Y 
S + FR == / 
A1==X+FR 
where C, I. S. Y, X. M, and FR are respectively consumption. investment 
saving, income. export, imp0l1 and net foreign resource inflow. This model 
ilnplies that the domestic saving is investible if there is a complementary 
foreign inflow, which represents external deticit as WCli ll . 
II An assumption of this model is balanced budget. Ifwl', more rcali"llcall;.. take existing 
budget deficits in Des into account. the national income account a ~ ~ a i n n reflects the external 
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Actually, high rates of population growth and industrialization in a 
situation characterized by structural imbalances, technological restrictions and 
imperfect mobility in factor markets, increase the demand for imports during 
deve10pent process (Kirkpatrick and Nixon. 1987: 176). However. due to 
relatively low incOlne elasticity of demand for imports of prinlary products (the 
export of most DCs) in developed countries (Todaro. 1994: 417). it is probable 
that foreign exchange receipts grow insufficiently. External deficits appear and 
lead to devaluation and consequent inflationary pressure. The oLltcomes will be 
worse when the price elasticity of demand 1()f imports in DCs is low 
(Kirkpatrick and Nixon, 1987: 177). 
Balance of payment difficulties are not the only external structural 
constraint contributing to domestic inflation. As Parkin (1992: 397) states. 
international trade and capital market international transactions sizably 
influence its inflation and also a tixed or flexible foreign exchange regime 
ilnportantly affects inflation perfonnance. There are several factors. more and 
less associated \vith structure of the economy in Des. which may influence 
domestic inflationary process: 
1. A rise in prices of some goods with high \veight in total import. for instance 
fuel and capital goods. Analogously. a rise in general level of imported 
goods. 
2. An increase In costs of invisible imports such as the interest rate on 
international borrowing (Griffith-Jones. 1985: 10). 
3. An increase in the prices of export creating a windfall. These may magnify 
domestic spending . and push up the prices of the domestically produced 
outputs. Foreign aid or easy foreign financing usually has the same effects 
(Griffith-Jones and Harvey, 1985: 336). It influences the general price level 
because it increases foreign reserves if not compensated by extra inlports (or 
other kinds of capital outflow') (Kirkpatrick and Nixon. 1987: 186). 
constraints: 1+ G + X == S + T + M or (Ci - T', == (S - I) + (M - X). rhis implies fiscal deficits 
can be offset bv trade deticits if there is not a saving gap. An insufficient saving worsens the 
external c o n s t r ~ i n t s s and the economy faces three gaps. For ~ l l lhrce-g.ap model discussion see 
Bacha (1990). 
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However, this development depends on the p o l i c ~ ~ choice of a DC's 
government. How they use the new receipts. and when. determine the effects 
of the windfall (see points 1 and 2 in p. 32-33 and also footnote 21). 
4. Restoration of a declining real exchange rate either \'ia devaluation which 
increases import prices, or import control (licensing. exchange controL 
quota systenl ... ). Both decrease aggregate supply. which in the absence of 
monetary contraction, leads to inflationary pressure. 
5. A sharp decline in exports via, for example. stagnation in trade partners' 
economies or drastic fall in exports prices. This in turn decreases 
government revenue frOln the external sector. Since the persistent 
commitment of the government can not be easily cut. budget deficits 
increase. Likewise. the fall of export receipts decreases ilnport capacity 
which contracts aggregate supply (Griffith-Jones and Han'ey. 1985: 336). 
6. Fluctuations in export receipts with downward rigidity of (sonle) prices. 
which in the long-run. tend to cause upward movement in the general level 
of prices (Natalegawa, 1988: 18). 
7. hnport substitution or export promotion policies. raising average costs in 
associated sectors. affects the inflationary process indirectly (Kirkpatrick 
and Nixon, 1987: 186) 
Although some of the above points seem to be contradictory. they may lead to 
inflationary pressure in ditIerent circumstances. Griffith-Jones and Harvey 
(1985: 337) argue that an inflationary process initiated or stimulated by 
external factors becomes so institutionalized that it becomes very difficult to 
reverse. 
2.3.4 The Case of Oil Exporting DCs 
Since oil exp0l1ing DCs seem not to have balance of payment 
problelTIS, at least as severe as other Des. it is worthwhile to consider some of 
their characteristics separately. Hagen (1973: 76) portrays a typical oil 
eCOn0l1ly12 with five parts as : the Fount. the farm. the Market the Bank and 
12 By oil economy he means the oil exporting countries or an economy supported by long-term 
foreign aid. 
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the Rest of the World. The first part. the Fount. produces \·cry productively, a 
commodity for the Rest of the \Vorld. Productiyity in the second and third parts 
is very low. The Fount transacts its foreign exchange receipts at the Bank 
(state-owned or private) to obtain domestic currency. These local earnings are 
spent in the Market via govenunent expenditure or directly. The Market spends 
a part of its incOlne on foreign exchange at the Bank in order to import goods 
and services frOnI the Rest of the World. So long as the Fount increases its 
expenditure, nOlninal income rises, accompanied b\ inflation 13, without a 
significant improvement in technology. 
The Hagen description is not the end of the story. Oil receipts usually 
affect the inflationary process, both when an oil exporting developing country 
obtains a windfall created by a positive shock, or when it faces a sharp cut in 
export proceeds after a negative shock. Moreover, the fluctuation in export 
earnings is another problenl. The structural characteristics of DCs play an 
ilnportant role in this context. 
Regarding a windfall, its effects depend on where it occurs. They vary 
between economies with well linked sectors and an 'enclave' economy. A 
windfall created by a resource discovery or export price jump in a developed 
economy affects resource allocation via tv\"o channels: in the labour market. 
the bOOlning sectors attract more factors to build up its production. influencing 
other sectors (resource-lnovement effect) (Cuddington. 1 9 8 9 ) ~ ~ and in 
commodity Inarkets, via relative prices (spending effect). These effects lead to 
resource reallocation to restore efficiency at a ne\N equilibrium point. The result 
of the two effects on resource allocation depends on the economy" s structure 
(Neary & Wijnberger. 1986)14 . 
With respect to economies with an enclave sector. like most oil 
exporting ones in DCs, there is little competition between the boollling sector 
and the others for productive factors. I n fact. sllch a sector needs skilled 
workers and sophisticated technology which could hardly be met by other 
I:: Owing to the existence of some rigidities and bottlenecks. 
14 See \Veymen . .I. & Thomas. (,. (1986) for North S ~ a a oil disum:ry and it:; d k ~ t t on the UK econom) 
as an example. 
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sectors. That means it has its own markets for labour. capital and technology. 
'--
In this case, the outcomes occur only via "spending the windfall". 
The relative price of tradable and non-tradable goods (known as real 
exchange rate) is the main variable to be atfected h\ windfalls. Dividing 
domestic products into tradable (excluding oil) and non-tradable goods 
(included services and construction ). relative price is detined as : 
p=e.PT/P" 
where: e = nominal exchange rate 
P T = price of tradable goods 
PN = price of non-tradable goods 
In this equation three important points are retlected by p : Firstly, the 
national income increase bui Ids up the demand for the two kinds of goods. 
Tradable goods are available at a constant world prices (the country is snlall). 
However, excess delnand of non-tradable goods causes their prices to rise. 
Market clearing and full-enlployment are fulfilled I:' . As a consequence. the 
price of non-tradable goods rises relative to that of tradables, and intersectoral 
reallocation in the non-oil part of the economy \\"ill occur. That means more 
non-tradable goods are produced at the expense of the lower-valued tradable 
d . 16 pro uctIon . 
Second, p. also called real exchange rate (RER). retlects the changes 
in external trade. A fall in real exchange rate encourages people to increase 
consumption of ilnported goods instead of domestic output. In fact the 
proportion of import and internal production in total spending is determined by 
the real exchange rate. Thus the current account balance might be explained by 
changes in the RER (Dornbusch 1980 : 58). Finally. the relative price defines 
the price of dOlnestic goods in terms of foreign output. Therefore, it retlects 
competitiveness in the world market. 
1-" A more r e a l i s l i l ~ ~ assumption for developing colilltril.!s i ~ ~ that 111I:ir PWdlll:lioll could not adjust q u i c k l ~ ~
10 excess demand hecause of institutional conslrail1b. 
It. Duleh Disease. deinulistrializatum and deagricullurl/alion arl.' difkn:nt names for this. 
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Using a diagram sinlilar to Salter's (] 959). the spending effect can be 
explained clearly. In Figure 3 the horizontal axis represents nontraded goods 
and the vertical axis traded goods. PoP is the production possibility curve. The 
line Do represents the relative price of traded to n o n t r a d ~ d d goods. Before the 
windfall, Do also represents the expenditure line of the community ( based on 
the assumption of full emploYlnent ). Henct.:. the initial equilibriunl point of 
production and consumption is at A, where the slopes of the production 
possibility curve and social indifference curve are equal to that of the relative 
price line, Do. At this point the community produces and consumes No and To of 
nontraded and traded goods. 
Before price adjustillent, the w i n d t ~ t l lL as an exogenous transfer. does 
not change nontraded output, but increases consumption possibilities in traded 
goods. Therefore the PoP curve shifts to PIP. which represents the new budget 
constraint (Nontraded output is dependent on relatiyt.: prices, which remain 
unchanged, but consUlnption depends also on the real income increased by the 
windfall). At point B production and consumption of nontraded goods relnain 
on No and the shortage of tradable goods (To T' )will be offset by imports. 
However, even with unchanged prices. desired consumption is at C I ' 
the point of intersection of the relative price line Do and the income 
consumption curve (ICC). At this point excess demand for nontraded goods 
(No N I) makes thenl dearer and their production \'v"ill be more profitable than 
that of tradable goods. In consequence, the production point nloves from A to 
F. I\10re output of nontraded goods and less delnand due to high prices may 
cause the adjustment to continue until point C, \vhere the new relative price 
(real exchange rate) line, D, becomes the common tangent of PI P and the 
highest attainable social indifference curve 12" 
Now the consumption of tradable and nontradable goods become 
respectively Tc and N 2• The corresponding production point is E, where the 
output of the two kinds of goods become TI, and ]\; '. The N"N2 increase in 
nontraded goods is secured at the expense of T"TI' decrt.:ase in home production 
of tradable goods. The windfall is used to import the quantity of TpTc of 
II 
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tradable goods. It can be seen that the spending effect and the subsequent 
relative price change (real exchange rate appreciation) change the domestic 
T 
PI 
T 
Tt 
'fC 
Po 
To 
Figure 3 : Spending Effects of ~ l l Windfall 
No Nt P 
output structure and increase the dependence on imports. 
N 
Although it seen1S that the welfare ilt the new equilibrium point IS 
higher. this is not the end of the process. Dutc h Disease has some costs which 
are usually caused by the temporary nature of the windfall in a commodity 
bOOln and also the cost of the nlovemcnt of the production point frOin A to E 
and consun1ption point from Co to C and their revcrse movement after the end 
of the windfall. So far it has been assumed that the \\ indtall is obtained by 
households exogenously. but if a government r e c \ . ! i n ~ ~ ~ the windtall directly or 
n10st of it fronl taxation. the economy faces new di fticulties: 
1. The duration of the windfall affects spending cHeets. Households usually 
treat the \vindfall as a temporary income and their consumption behaviour 
does not change much or very quickly. Thus the gap between the two output 
points (A and E) and thcir associated eosts \\i II be smaller. Ho\vcver. 
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governments often augment their expenditure quickly so the cost of 
production adjustment is higher. 
2. The consUlnption behaviour of governments and households is dissimilar. 
Governments usually accept new commitments after the windfall in order to 
provide more goods and services. v"hleh necessitates public sector 
expansion. Thus the demand gap for nontraded goods. N()N I' will be wider 
and in consequence the cost of movement from point A to E increases. 
3. Adjustment to the end of the windfall may create a range of difficulties. It is 
quite likely that households will adjust to ne\\ circumstances due to their 
prediction of the temporary nature of a \\·indfall. However. governments 
cannot always adjust their increased expenditure in order to avoid the 
undesirable social and political effects of expenditure reduction. As an 
improvement of the inefficient tax system is often neglected during the 
boom, when the windfall reduction occurs, the established commitments are 
financed by nloney creation via internal or external borrowing or both, that 
in turn result in more pressure on intlation. 
4. The windfall brings about more government intervention III economIC 
activities. Therefore, a sizable aIllOunt of resources are allocated by official 
decisions which is not as efficient as market allocation. This issue makes the 
government a rent distributor that in turn attracts many output factors to 
seek higher rent. rather than real production. After the windfall cut, there are 
two reasons why the production point cannot come back to point A (see 
Figure 3) and occurs probably at a point bel()\\ the production possibility 
curve Po P : firstly. the behaviour of factors who used to be rentiers. and 
secondly. deficit financing by money creation. 
In fact. the equation 2.3 : 
ilnplies that money supply increases in both eras: \\·hcn the country acquires a 
windfall. via increasing foreign reserve. R. ~ l I 1 d d aftcr an adverse shock. via the 
increasing budget deficit. D. Modifying the Canan::-;e structural model b, 
Chapter 2: Theory ojlntlaliol1 in ... 
substituting the price of non-tradable (P,,;) and tradable goods (PT) respectively 
with agricultural and industrial goods 17 , gi ves : 
(2.8) o -cr . 1t = a( ) + PI 
E + ~ l l
Equation 2.8 iinplies that even with zero world intlation (1\ = 0). an 
increase in prices of non-traded goods relati"e to those of traded goods in an oil 
economy with structural bottlenecks entails inflation. rvloreover. as described 
above. the high windfall leads to undesirable structural changes which may 
well diminish aggregate supply growth. cr. and the supply elasticity. E. while 
the rate of autonomous demand for goods and services. 6. increases due to a 
rising money supply induced lnainly by structural impediments. The situation 
will become worse when the economy experiences an adverse shock. In 
addition, thetluctuation of export proceeds have themselves a considerable 
effect on aggregate supply because the resulting uncertainty constrains 
investment and also directs it toward projects in which the fruition lags are 
small but the projects are not necessarily the most efficient. 
2.4 Monetarisnl VS Structuralisl11: Reconciliation 
Monetarisill. in the extreme form. assigns innation to an exceSSIve 
growth rate of the nl0ney supply relative to real income growth, whilst 
structuralism attributes the inflationary process to the operation of structural 
constraints during the developlnent process. Using a chart provided in Ghatak 
(1995a: 102), the similarities and differences between these two alternative 
perspectives can be pointed out. 
In part (a) a standard nlonetarist model is displa) ed. where money 
supply is the exogenous variable and intlation is caused by real income growth. 
expected inflation and adjustments to lagged values of money stock. In part (b) 
a possible structuralist framework is illustrated. A l 1 a l o ~ o l l s s to part (a). this 
I1lodel considers money stock. real income. expected intlation and lagged 
17 For similarity .. h e r ~ . . the relative price is defined as PR' 1\ ;P1' 
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adjusttnent as causes of inflation. Ho\\ c:\'er. the starting roint in the process is 
attributed to a structural event like an increase in relati\c.: p r i c ~ . . There are also 
two important feedback effects : tirst. the.: intlation-i nduced budget deficit 
which affects money growth: second. the inflation-induced \\age lIlcrease 
which affects money groVv1h directly and \ ia budget ddi·..:it. These feedback 
effects mean that the money supply is no lOI1Ll.cr exogenous. The latter is an 
ilnportant difference. 
Figure 4 : Flowchart of Monetarist and Structuralist Perspectives 
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(b) A structuralist model 
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Curing inflation. as Natalega\\'a (1988: 10) states. starts with finding the 
cause of the initiation nlechanism. Pure monetarism-based prescriptions 
emphasize money supply reduction as a core treatment of the problem. which 
usually implies some costs in terms of output and employment. It is also argued 
that structural conditions cause a solely monetary prescription to reduce output 
generally. On the other hand, structuralist remedies. arguing that inflation is 
initially a structural phenornenon. shift policy towards a long-run framework. 
which does not naturally generate short-term results. 
2.4.1 A Critique of Structuralism 
The 1110st important criticislll against Structuralism is the absence of a 
nlodel to test its argUlllents. Kirkpatrick and Nixon (1987: 180) after a 
favourable conlprehensive survey about structuralism state that testing the 
arguments is very difficult. I t is not easy to provide a correct specification and 
indicators which include the essential constraints. They conclude that: 
" ... the relevance of the strucUtralisl l7lodel q/ in/la/ion to individual 
LDes is not always obvious. and the attempt to generalize this model is 
not always s u c c e s . ~ r u l l. ., (p. 194) I R 
In addition to the weakness nlentioned above, Johnson (1984:641) argues that 
the structuralist view also suffers from theoretical problems. He suggests a 
nlodel which shows that even within a structuralist framework, inflation, in 
addition to structural factors. can be explained by excess demand pressure and 
cost-push factors (p. 638-39). 
Monetarists accept the existence of the constraints and bottlenecks in 
DCs and 1110st of them adnlit the social priority of devdopment, however. they 
have two arguments here. Firstly, they claim that these constraints are not, in 
essence, structural or autonomous, rather they emerge from the distortions of 
the mechanism of cOlTIlllodity and foreign exchange markets caused by the 
structuralist-based policies of the g ( ) n ~ r n m e n t . . For instance. food supply 
inelasticity is a result of the government elmtrol on food prices in favour of 
11\ Also see Ghatak (1995a: 102). 
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urban residents and prevention of wages increases. This in tum. disturbs 
market perfonnance. In other words. high relative food prices are necessary to 
stimulate supply, and if the money supply is controlled. these high prices are 
compensated by sonle reduction in the prices of other goods. Hence. the 
general level of prices will be stable and the l'conomy does not experience an 
inflation. Secondly, monetarists also argue that inllation is inconsistent with the 
development process and the constraints which inhibit groV\'th ,viII be removed 
only by inflation being first brought under control. It is also said that the 
pressure on prices is not an inherent phenomenon of growth because some 
countries in Latin America had high rates of gro\\th "ithout (high) inflation 
(Campos, 1964). 
Regarding balance of payment difficulties. mismanagement of 
nlacroeconOlnic policies is again alleged to be responsible for the problem. For 
example, a long-lasting overvalued exchange rate usually reduces the power of 
competitiveness of the country in world markets. imposing pressure on the 
export sector and consequently decreasing financial import capacity. 
One ]nay explain the instability of food supply as follows: firstly, price 
control policy is enforced after a supply side failure in spite of rising prices. 
Secondly, ilnperfect resource mobility does not allow the agriculture sector to 
increase output easily. Finally. downward rigidity of (some) prices provokes 
the general level of prices to increase as a result of food price increases even if 
1110ney supply renlains constant. In consequence, a government which wishes 
to avoid heavy social and economic costs of int1ation cannot rely wholly on the 
nlarket lnechanism. Of course, sonle recent structuralists. as Meier (1989:212) 
reports, recognize the disadvantages of interventionist pol icies in price controls 
and financial markets. and ilnport substitution pol icy. They argue that these 
kinds of policies have not only been unable to cure structural deticiencies. but 
have aggravated them. though they do not recommend a solely monetary 
prescri ption. 
'7 -, 
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2.4.2 A Critique of Monetarism 
The core of the monetarists' argument IS that there exists a stable 
relationship bet\veen money and n0l11inal income or the total expenditure on 
goods and services. Recalling the quantity theory of money. that means in : 
MV=PY 
or 
the velocity of circulation. V. relnains almost constant ( \j:::: 0). thus it is the 
change of m.oney stock that deternlines the le\'el of total expenditure. But in 
long-run, output is determined only by real iactors and the money stock change 
is translated into changes in the price level. 
However. as Kaldor and Trevithick (1992: 164-6S) point out even if 
such a relationship exists- "which is by no means universally accepted by 
econometricians"- it is not alone adequate to establish the major notion of the 
nlonetarists. At least three additional requirements are necessary to establish 
the monetary argunlent about inflation. rvlonetarists need : 
1. to illustrate that the Inoney stock is exogenous. and wages and prices 
are endogenous. not vice versa. 
2. to prove that a change 111 monev supply changes nominal Income 
proportionately. 
3. to show that changes in nonlinal income or total expenditure on 
goods and seryices mainly' influence prices rather than real output: 
put differently. the output level is generally assumed to be 
determined by real factors and independent of the level of money 
denland. 
The correlation between money and inflation emphasized by 
nl0netarists (see for exanlple. : Harberger. 1978 and Romer. 1996:392). does 
not prove any causality. According to Jackman ('/ (// ( 1981: 127). an obvious 
correlation between the intlation rate and the money growth rate can be 
explained in two ways: either it continns the monetarist approach. ( the growth 
of money causes inflation) : or it is ~ Y i d c n c c c that the authorities permit the 
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money supply to increase passively. which in turn means that inflation causes 
nl0ney to grow. The distinction is important because if the latter is true. it 
cannot be proved that a stable relation will continue after altering the monetary 
regIme. 
Some fanl0us monetarists accept a two-way causality. Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963a:693) argue that money affects income and pnces. but they 
also emphasize causality in the opposite direction: 
...... Mutual interaction, hut with monel,' rather clearlr the senIOr 
partner in long-run movements and in major crclical movements. and 
- . 
more nearly an equal partner with money income Lind prices in short-
run and milder movemenls- this is the g e J 1 e , . a l i ~ a l i o n n s l , , ~ g e s t e d d by our 
evidence . . , 
Friedman (1992:259) also stresses the retlex impact of intlation on the quantity 
oflnoney. 
The iUlpact of money changes on nominal income and the division of 
the inlpact between real output and prices is a more controversial issue in the 
monetarist and monetarist-structuralist debate. ivlonetarists distinguish between 
'-' 
the short-run and long-run effects of money reduction. In the monetary 
approach a change in Bloney stock changes nominal income. This affects prices 
gradually in the short-run. though prices respond fully in the long-term 
(Gordon. 1982: 1088). However. the way the total impact is divided between 
prices and real output is not a settled issue. It depends considerably on space 
and time and there is no theory that determines the factors which affect the 
division (Friedman. 1992: 261: Friedman ilnd Schwartz. 1982: 60: Gordon. 
1982:1113). Friednlan (1992: 260) accepts that in the short-run (which may be 
as long as 3 to 10 years) monetary changes primarily retlcct output but through 
decades nl0ney growth primarily intluence:; prices. In tile long-run output is 
determined by real factors like tirms. human ~ a p i t a l . . management (especially 
monetarv manal.!ement). structure of !!o\crnment and industry and the 
.. ~ ~ .... 
international trade enviromllcnt. Ho\vever. in the short-run 
Chapter 2: Theory oj1njlation in ... 
" the changed rate olgrowlh of nominal income (lpically shows up first 
in outpUi and hardly at all in prices. If Ihe rale of monetary growth 
increases or decreases, the rate olgrO\\'fh ol nominal income and also 
of physical output tends to increase or decrease ahollt six to nine 
months later, but Ihe rate olprice /"lse is utlecled l'elT Iiltle. The effect 
on prices, like fhat on income and OUlput. is dislr.ihufeJ o\'er time. hut 
comes some 1:1 10 18 mOnlhs laler. so Ihm the IOlal dela,v between a 
change in monetar..v grovl-'th and (I challge in the rate of injlalion 
averages something like two years. ThaI is \Ihy il ;s a long road to hope 
to stop an in/lation that has heen allowed 10 slatl. It cannot be stopped 
overnight. ., 
When money reduction in a period even as long as 10 years primarily 
decreases output. and the effect of money reduction on intlation appears after 
up to twice the time of that on output. it may be di fficult for Des to accept a 
nlonetarism-based prescription. [t is particularly difficult. when the division of 
the Inoney reduction effects between output and prices is not clear and it varies 
.. widely over space and time and there exisls no sali4clcfOfY theory thaI 
isolates the/actors responsihle/or lhe variahililY .. /1). 
This 111ay lead to an abandonment of the development process which 
nleans a continuing the lack of infrastructure. sectoral mismatch. and other 
structural impedilnents. factors which mav well make economic growth 
impossible. Furthernlore. in Des there are nearly ahvays some political 
circumstances in which a sharp money reduction as a cure for int1ation induces 
intolerable social difficulties. In tact. using a monetary shock. as Meier 
(1989:215) states. increases the burden on those segments of cOInmunity 
already seriously depressed by intlation. 
2 ..... 3 Concluding Rcmarl{: Reconciliatiun 
[s there an alternative view whidl combines the ~ l l h · a n t a g e s s of these t\VO 
competing ,"iews? This section tries to pro\'ide a possible suggestion . 
. " Friedman ( 1992: 260). Yates and Chapple ( I ')()6) using J c r o s s - , , ~ c t i o n n of ~ 3 3 countries. 
found that at lower rates of intlation. the intlation-oUtput trade-off is l J i ~ h e r . .
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\Ve begin by conlparing briefly once again the teatures of both theories: 
1. The coexistence of inflationary processes with money supply growth 
is accepted by the two schools of intlation theory. However. in 
considering the causation of intlation. as Addison el at (1980: 147-
49) discuss_ monetarists treat money expansion as a proximate cause 
for int1ation and ignore the fimdllll1enla/ causes of inflation which 
themselves lead to money supply increases. On the other hand. 
stnlcturalists are concerned with jimdamenlal causes20 . Althouoh 
. e 
some of them admit the proximateness of money_ they treat the 
increase in the quantity of money as a passin! phenomenon which 
results from fundamental factors associated with structural 
impediments. In addition to Addison l!! ar s description. 
structuralists argue the inevitability of money supply growth in the 
development process. Lahiri (1991 :752) says lhat monetarists have 
been sometilTIeS called structuralists in a hlfny because their 
description of 1110netary accommodation to intlation rarely passes 
beyond the prOXilTIate or mechanical causes of money growth (which 
are the authorities' decisions) to point out the fundamental structural 
factors causing the process. 
2. Monetarists ignore structural bottlenecks and focus only on the 
monetary variables determining inllation . As a consequence. for 
lTIi1ny Des the monetarist-base prescription cannot generate the 
desired results. This nlav be due to the costs of money reduction as a 
necessary and sufficient condition of treatmellt (in their view). In 
other \vords. monetary treatment in the short-run (in an economic 
sense) depresses output and extends unenlployment. and will be 
conlpletely etTective over a period \\hich is too long to tolerate in a 
socio-political sense. AlLhough monetarists argue that the alleged 
1(1 Addison el u/ ( 1980) call the competitive camp for monetarisll1 ,IS "neio-political analysis for 
inflation but the features refered to are almost the ' i a m ~ ~ as tlwsl: nf;lructuralisJ11. 
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bottlenecks are policy-induced21 • are mutable and can be eliminated 
or, at least. relieved by appropriate policies. they usually pay little 
attention to actual socio-political situations \vhich limit policy 
options. This linlitation results ti'om structural characteristics ... The 
concept qj"sfruc/llral constrain! CLlI1110/ he divorced/rom the specific 
social, political lind historical !rcll11el\,()rk lFilhin which it is 
operative" (Kirkpatrick and Nixon. 19X7: 195). It seems that the 
Inain defect of the monetarists' treatment lies in a tact emphasized 
by themselves: the lack of a theory which can be used to divide the 
impact of money reduction between output and unemployn1ent. and 
prices. Similarly to Friedman. Parkin (1992:399) stresses that: 
Ii Uncertainty surround,' hOlh rhe issue ol the impulse (or 
i m p u l s e . ~ ) ) that generate iJ?/laliotl (lnd other fluctuations and on 
the propagation mechanisms {hat Irans/aIL' those impulses into 
movemenl in output and the price le,'el. .. 
In a DC with the economic characteristics discussed above. a 
prescription with such uncertainty tends to induce socio-political and 
even economic problems which \-vill he probably more difficult to 
confront by the government than intlation. 
3. On the other hand. structuralists concentrate on sustained growth as a 
necessary condition for elimination of structural impediments, which 
inherently takes a long time. During the necessary process of 
profound economic changes . they implicitly accept inflation to 
continue as a consequence of growth. The painful repercussions of 
the neglect of inflation cause ne\\ distortions and deepen some of 
the present bottlenecks via for example further intervention of the 
government and its subsequent inctliciency in the economy. 
~ I I At least policies can leJd to the Jeepening ofsomc structural impcdimcnts in some 
circumstances. FIJI' instance. Dev31jan and deMelo (I')S-) ..,Ill)\\ Ih)\\ J different set of policies 
in spending a windfall in three African cOlilltric.!s with dose similantll" led to different results 
and structural changes. 
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Moreover, Ghatak (1995a: 98) points out another weakness of the 
structuralist approach. They. contrary to monetarists. introduce no single model 
to explain and estimate the role of different components of causes of inflation. 
rather they use a variety of methods to develop the idea that certain structural 
features may be treated as an initial cause of intlation. or to propose a 
propagating mechanism by which int1ation initiated hv some autonomous 
factors is built into the economy. 
A sunl1nary comparison of the two schools of intlation them'v is 
presented in Bevan et al (1990: 1). They state that monetarists22 tend to neglect 
different econonlic structures in studying Des. while in structuralist studies 
great attention has been paid to the particular characteristics of the economies 
studied. However, structuralists have not tried to illustrate rigorously how these 
characteristics influence the appropriateness of orrhodox theories. Ignorance of 
institutional features in the neoclassical procedure and the lack of feasible 
nlicro-foundations for the other theories have a tendency to nlake the 
exchanges between them possible ... " because hOlh ... (seem) right: theory mus/ 
he tailored 10 structure to be applicahle, hut an aLheoretic approach is 
inadequate. " 
The case studies demonstrate that it is often not easy to provide a 
nlonetarist or structuralist view of the world. This is because of complexity of 
underlying reasons for instability. which cannot easily be separated. It seems 
that there is an interrelation between excess demand. a budget deficit. an 
imbalanced current account and monetary growth (Ghatak. 1995a: 120). 
Perhaps the key to reconciliation lies in c0111bination of short-run and long-run 
interests. Although the monetary approach may bring intlation under control 
earlier than postulated in a structuralist approach. it tends to preclude the 
necessary long-run structural changes. But neglecting the role of money results 
in some new problenls in the short-run. introducing more obstacles to the path 
of the necessary structural changes in long-run. \ l o r e o v ~ r . . monetarists expect 
full results in the long-run, thus. the undesirable short-run effects of 
:!::: "Modern neoc:/assical mClcrr)('('onomisls" is their l!\prt!ssion. 
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nlonetarists' or structuralists' approaches must not be ignored. [n fact. as Dell 
and Lawrence (1980) emphasize: 
"A period l?f ac!iustment should be 110Ihing more than an episode in a 
long-run process. and it is Ihere.!ore indispensahle Ihal the categorical 
imperatives of the short-run should 1101 he al/ou'cd /() dominate and 
perhaps even overwhelm the requirements o(/hc long-run. .. 
In the absence of a robust and general theoretical model for explaining 
inflation in DCs, reconciliation may be possible by a \vider macro-analytical 
nlodel which pays enough attention to bottlenecks as well as to monetary 
factors. Such a reconciliation as Kirkpatrick and Nixon (1987: 196) conclude. 
nlust combine short-run tiscal and monetary policies and long-run efforts to 
achieve tllndalnental structural reforms. 
2.5 Empirical Evidence 
Inflation has been the focus of numerous empirical investigations 
through the decades, in search of evidence for competing schools of thought. In 
this section. tirst some efforts to seek support for monetary approach are 
reported, then attempts to tind evidence in favour of the structuralist view are 
considered and tinally the results of some analvtical models which tend to 
combine both views are provided. 
A fan10us nlonetary model used by many economists for DCs in a 
different way, is the model provided by Harberger ( 19(3) explaining Chilean 
int1ation. This 11lodel chose int1ation rate as the dependent variable and the 
current and previous rate of money supply. real income and a proxy for 
expectations (the previous changes in inflation rate). as explanatory variables. 
The OLS estimation of this model contirms the monetarists' view on Chilean 
intlation in the period under study. Vogel ( 1974). extending Harberger' s model 
to sixteen Latin American countries. tinds that a pure monetarist model can 
aln10st successfully explain intlation beha\'iour in t h e s ~ ~ countries. despite their 
diversity with respect to the variation or intlation and other parameters. 
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Nevertheless. he reports contradictory' outcomes of different researchers' 
empirical work about the same countries23 . 
Regarding structuralislTI. Edel ( 1(69) p r o \ ' i d ~ s s a comprehensive 
empirical investigation on structuralist hypotheses using data from eight Latin 
American countries. He considers the rok of scarce t()odstuffs as a major 
component of inflation and also examines the causes of agricultural production 
deficiencies in the countries under consideration. ti\'e of which experienced 
increasing relative food prices. The conclusion of the Edel's study generally 
confirms the structuralists views while evidence .. jails to uncover much 
support for the monetarist positions" (p. 138). Moreover. he demonstrates that 
there are no systematic relationships between agricultural sector performance 
and price control policies. This is unfavourable to the monetarist contention 
that governn1ent intervention to control food prices is -responsible for 
inadequate agriculture sector production (ch. 2). 
Leaving aside some occasional studies. there are not many papers that. 
applying a pure model from either monetarist or structuralist camp. provide a 
successful description of intlation in Des. An example of a structural tradition 
which failed to explain inHation in DCs is the study of Argy (1 (70) on 22 Des. 
He defines indices for fOllr structural hypotheses. namely : I) a delTIand shift 
2) agricultural b o t t l e n e c k s ~ ~ 3) export instability: and .. \.) foreign exchange 
shortages. After calculation of these indices for the all countries studied. during 
1958-1963. Argy uses regression analysis to examine whether these factors 
account for changes of intlation. The results sho\v that :-itructuralist variables 
are poor in describing intlation. Only the proxy of excess demand in agriculture 
is nearly significant. suggesting that in the countries with increasing relative 
prices of food to living costs. there is a tendcncy for higher rates of inflation. 
Ho\vever. adding monetary variables in the regressions improves the results 
considerably. Although Arg) himself acknowledges a tC\\ detects. like the 
period studied being too short to capture pronounced structural effects. the 
investigation does not generally support structuralist \'ic\\ s. 
~ : : Nugent and Glezakos (1979:433) consider (he shortcomings of \ ogel'" study. 
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On the other hand, Saini's (1982) investigation demonstrates the 
opposite result. He applies a Harberger-style monetarist model for six Asian 
Des with low and moderate int1ation and tinds that monetarist approach does 
not explain inflation in the countries uncler consideration. However, including 
imported int1ation as an explanatory variable into the monetarist model 
increases the explanatory power of the model. 
2.5.1 An Anulytical l\'1odel 
Since a pure monetarist theoretical model or a perfect structuralist 
econometric model has seldom explained price movements successfully, there 
is a tendency among researchers concerned wi th Des to set up analytical 
nlodels to eXaInine the role of different structural or monetary variables to 
account for inflation. Likewise. there are some attempts to consider different 
aspects of the two views separately. For instance. Bhalla (1 ()81) studies the role 
of monetary and non-monetary variables on domestic inflation in 12 Latin 
American, II Asian and 7 African countries which consist of primary 
producers, oil exporters and selni-industrialized cases. The period of study is 
1972-1975, when worldwide inflation appeared. This study tries to separate the 
direct effect of inlported int1ation from its dTect via money expansion as well 
as the impact of food shortages. The outcomes highlight that money growth 
systematically affects the price le\'el. At the same time. structural variables. 
food shortages and in particular import prices. are significant. There is also 
evidence for two further important points: lirstly. imported intlation accounts 
for almost half dOlnestic price level increase and secondly. an important 
channel for transfonnation of the external effect on domestic intlation is a large 
increase in foreign reserves either "ia an improvement in the trade balance or 
nlore iInportantly. by way of capital intlo\\"" These increases in foreign reserves 
tend to lead to unusual rises in money supply inducing int1ationary pressure. 
Arize (1987) uses a traditional monetary model augmented by the domestic 
costs of inlpo11s, reflecting both the foreign prices of imports and the exchange 
rate. This mixed model is applied to 1 I African countries. The period is 12-14 
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years starting in 1960. Enlpirical findings show that both the money supply and 
imported inflation have significant effects on local intlation. 
Another eXaInple of an analytical model is iVlontiel's (1989) work to 
investigate high-inflation episodes in Argentina (198213-198511), Brazil 
( l 9 8 3 1 1 - 1 9 8 5 i 4 ) ~ ~ and Israel (1983/2-198513) decomposing the role of fiscal 
constraints and balance of payment difficulties. The results of this study show 
that nominal exchange rate devaluation mainl: t r i g g ~ r r an acceleration of 
inflation. Regarding oil exporting DCs. Noorbakhsh ( I l)l)O I considers inflation 
in 12 oil exporting countries. using an analytic ti'amework consisting of 
n10netarist and structuralist variables. Both kinds of factors are significant. Oil-
... 
induced n10ney supply (treated as a monetary variable) is the most important 
explanatory variable, while ilnported inflation (a structuralist variable), helps to 
explain price changes. He also introduces a proxy for another structuralist 
factor. the absorptive capacity of the economy2-l to capture some bottlenecks in 
the economies. This factor. though significant. has a small effect on inflation. 
The researcher concludes that a combination of the two paradigm variables can 
explain inflation in the oil exporting DCs. It is noteworthy that although the 
researcher treated the oil-induced money supply as a monetary variable. it is 
not completely exogenous. Rather. it is related to structural imbalances of these 
economies. In other words. from a structuralist point at' \'iew. money supply 
growth in such circumstances cannot be isolated from the structure of the 
econon1y. Expressed differently, money supply is to some extent an inevitable 
outcome of such a heterogeneous and specialized economy. though it increases 
as a result of policy choice 2:; . Concerning these studies. the short span of the 
period considered is a matter of importance. It has already been noted that the 
short-run effects of monetary factors as well as structural elements difTer from 
2* .• Ahsorptil"e capacity relutes to the ahility to lise cup/Ilil /I/"{)duL'lm:.A .. lOtal /Ilvestment must 
not (mh' c()\'('r ils cust bur musl also l'ield tl 1\!dS()IUINe /I1C/"t'WL' 117 /lil'UII1(" while the capacity 
(0 ahs;wh capita' is a lim/ting facIO/", il ,:1I17, Wtfh,ll ,I lell I'L'Un /'c ,'h'pped IIp ... there ure. 
howe\'er, narru\1,'!imils to {he pace Lmd eXfent at IIhieh ({ CUlIlltIT" ,,/',\orptl\'e capacity can he 
expended ,. Rosenstein-Rodan (1961: I 08) 
25 For a brief discussion of Prebisch analysis of dualism in developing countries. see Palma 
( 1987b). 
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the long-run impacts. Furthermore, the traditional econometrics used does not 
distinguish between the two kinds of effect. 
Along this line, many recent investigations on individual Des apply 
newer econonletric methods. The analytical model used is frequently derived 
by an analysis characterizing the specific circumstances and features of an 
individual country. Alkhatib (1994) using a V AR model. in a non-monetarist 
context, considers interrelationships among p r i c ~ s . . output. nominal exchange 
rate and l110ney supply for the Jordanian economy in the period 1975-1991 
with quarterly data. His results confirm a significant role for the nominal 
exchange rate as a proxy for external shocks in determining domestic price 
changes. Ryan and Milne (1994) apply an analytical model to the impact of 
different l110netary and institutional variables on intlation for various earning 
groups in Kenya during 1976-1990. The results highlight a signiticant role for 
both money growth and structural factors. Lsing an error correction model and 
cointegration techniques. Moser (1995) examines the ueterminants of inflation 
in Nigeria in the period 1963-1993. The analytical model used consists of 
nlonetary variables. the exchange rate and climatic variables. All variables have 
a significant effect. The study shows that concurrent monetary and fiscal 
policies have a sizable int1uence on the etfect of exchange rate depreciation on 
int1ation. In Metin' s (1995) work on the Turkish economy during 1950-1988 in 
a cointegration context. pure nlonetary variables are included as well as 
variables related to labour market and external sector. Her study points out that 
nloney growth is the main factor in explaining intlation. though other factors 
are significant. Likewise. the effects of the t\VO kinds of variables of inflation 
and output in Mexico in 1980s are considered in Rogers and Wang (1995). 
Here. estinlation of a VAR model leads to the conclusion that inflation is 
deternlined by both groups of the factors. with most cllanges being due to 
fiscal and money grow1h. 
2.5.2 Causality Between Money and Inilation 
There are also numerous studies conct:rned \\ith a particular part of the 
structuralist or monetarist view. One important issue \\hich has attracted much 
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attention IS the causality between money and inflation. The econometric 
method used is a Granger. or Granger-Sims stvle causalitv test. or recentl\' 
developed cointegration tests. 
Jones and Uri (1987) use three econometric methods to consider the 
causality bet\veen money and inflation in the ljSA durinL! 1953-1984. They 
~ ~ -
failed to find a clear causal direction. Their mixed results show that the general 
nloney supply does not detennine consumer prices. though a causal 
relationship between prices and narro\vly defined money is suggested. 
Anderson et al (1988) reexamine Cagan' s model tor two hyperinflation cases. 
Greece and Hungary following the second world war. They tind evidence in 
favour of one-way causal ity from inflation to money growth. Chinese 
hyperinflation during 1946-1949 is the field of Quddus el ai's (1989) study. 
They find that in mainland China there was a two-vvay causality. However. for 
Taiwan and ~ [ a n c h u r i a a causal direction was from inHation to money. Makinen 
and Woodward (1989) consider hyperinflation and the stabilization program of 
Taiwan in the period 1945-1952, using Granger-Sims style causation tests. The 
empirical findings show that while the causality from money growth to 
inflation is rejected. causation in the opposite direction cannot be rejected. 
Lahiri's ( 1991 ) investigation 011 intlation in Yugoslavia suggests a two-
way causality between money and inflation. A similar paper on Algeria for the 
period 1970-1988 is Beltas and Jones's (1993). [n this case an unidirectional 
relationship ti'om money to inflation is reported. The authors also state that the 
results of di fferent studies on this matter in developing countries. as well as 
developed countries. are contradictory. Kamas (1995) tests the impact of 
nloney on inflation in a developing country \\ith a crawling. pegged exchange 
rate. Using a V AR lTIodeL she shows that money has little role in accounting 
for inflation. Cointegration techniques are used by Ahumada (1995) to 
reexanline a monetary model on monthly data of Argentina o\"er the period 
1978-1991. The results suggest a long-run relationship between money and 
inflation: however. in order to support the monetarist contention that money 
determines intlatioI1. weak exogeneit) tests are conducted. According to the 
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outcomes of exogeneity tests there is no evidence tor the monetary argunlent. 
This in tum means money appears to grow passiyely. In generaL empirical 
findings of di1Ierent studies tend to suggest that endogeneity of money supply 
can not be rejected. implying that governments often allow the money supply 
to act as an endogenous variable. 
The inlpact of contractionary monetary policy is another issue studied. 
For instance. Blejer and Khan (1984) studying 24 Des. conclude that tight 
nlonetary policies lead to a decline in economic growth '"ia an adverse impact 
on the level of investment by the private sector2(1 • Khan and Knight (1985) 
show that contractionary monetary perfOlmance has a significant etTect on 
output, in particular in the short-nm. such that each 10 percent reduction in 
growth of money supply in Des reduced by 1 percent the rate of output growth 
over 1 year. Blejer and Khan's (1984) investigation also highlights that a long-
run domestic credit reduction lowers the gro\\/th rate of the economy through 
reduction in investment. Corbo and de Melo ( 1(85). among others. point out 
that in the Latin An1erican countries where monetary stabilization programs 
have been ilnplen1ented. their economies faced a significant reduction in real 
production and employment. 
The empirical studies suggest that an analytical ml)del established in the 
light of the features of every individual country. consol idating appropriate 
factors of the t'vo schools of interest. is lhe best way to e:xplain inflation. Also. 
estimation of such a model in a multiple cointegration cuntext for a relatively 
long period. may lead to distinctive results for short and long-run effects. 
~ t > > Sec also Buffit:' (1984:306) 
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Chapter 3: The Outlook qlfhe Iranian Economy 
3.1 Introduction 
It is the purpose of the present chapter to propose an overall view of the 
Iranian economy focusing on intlation. In doing so, innation, government 
revenue and expenditure, and sLlch relevant characteristics as banking 
performance, trade and production will be considered. 
For years before the period being studied. inflation had not been a 
problem in the Iranian economy, however, after the oil price jump in 1973, a 
period with an accelerating inflation has commenced. During the 1960s the 
economy experienced a very low annual inflation rate averaging 1.5 percent per 
year. In the last years of the fourth development plan, between 1970-1972 the 
inf1ation rate increased to an annual average rate of 3.50/0. These average rates 
characterize the Iranian econOlny as a low-intlation economy. However, this 
figure increases considerably when the oil prices rise in 1973. such that the 
average rate jumps to 8.9(Yo as a result of expansionary monetary and budgetary 
policies during 1973-1975. 
Although the government cmnlnenced a prIce control programme in 
1975, prices continued to increase more sharply. at an average rate of 16.3% 
during 1976-1979. This rate also retlects the increasing \v( )rld intlation induced 
by the oil price shock in addition to dOlnestic t ~ l c t o r s . .
The post revolution era began with a reduction in the intlation rate but 
then. o\ving to the stat1 of the Iraq-Iran war in IlJRO and the revolutionary 
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environment, the rate of inflation commenced to increase dramatically. These 
circumstances provoked the government to enforce severe price control 
coupled with rationing of essential c01nmodities. l\lthough these policies 
retarded the upward price nlovement until 1985. the time of oil price collapse. 
the economy experienced accelerating inflation during the rest of the period 
such that its rate even reached 22.3% at the end of the period. Table 1 and 
Figure 1 show the path of consumer price (Cpn and wholesale price indices 
(WPI). Although the Iranian economy f ~ l c e d d a high inflation rate. compared 
with some Des, its inflation can be regarded as moderate. See Table 2. 
The most important developlnent which had a great ilnpact on the 
whole economy, was the oil price increase in 1973. This event coupled with a 
35% increase in the volume of crude oil exports between 1971 and 1974. 
increased oil export earnings 6.5-fold. This increase in foreign exchange 
revenue augillented the share of oi I exp011s in total export earnings from 91 
percent to 97 percen{!7 and the share of oil induced revenues of the government 
in its total general revenues from 60 to 86.4 percenes. 
In Iran, analogous to most oil producing DCs. the government directly 
acquires oil export earnings. These revenues are sold automatically to the Bank 
Markazy (the central bank) and the governmenfs account is credited 
accordingly, resulting in a foreign reserves increase and subsequently a high-
powered money increase. The windfall allowed the pre-revolution government 
to increase its expenditure dramatically. The spending effect of the government 
expenditures led to higher rates of output and inflatioll. However. after a few 
years. when the ilnpact of the structural imbalances of the supply side of the 
economy appeared, the spending effect translated mostly into price increases. 
This process happened because the govermnent had spent inconsistently with 
the absorptive capacity of the economy21) which created persistent commitments 
to the governnlent. 
'7 
- IMF,IFS, yearbook. 1989. 
~ 8 8 Organization of Planning and Budget (OPR) (1994). "Data Colkcll'd: time series of national 
income, manetarv and fiscal data" . Tehran 
~ 9 9 .. 711e evidenc;' for Iran during Ihe posl-197 '1 period .'''ggl'.\/.\ " /cndCIIL)' olll)'ing to Jo 100 
much in 100 short a time" Loony (1985b:330). 
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Table 1 . Inflation Rate 1969-1990 
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1971 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
WPI 16.2 16.6 17.7 18.7 20.8 24.3 26.2 28.6 33.5 36.9 42.1 55.2 68.2 76.9 88.2 95 100 119 157 192 232 279 
CPI 14.3 14.6 15.2 16.2 17.7 20.3 22.9 25.4 32.4 36.2 40 48.2 59.9 71.1 85.1 95.8 100 118 152 196 240 258 
Inflation Rate (CPIO/O) 2 4.1 6.5 9.2 14.7 12.8 10.9 27.6 11.7 10.5 20.5 24.3 18.7 19.7 10.9 4.4 18.4 28.6 28.6 22.4 7.6 
f Source,' IMF, IFS, Yearbook 1989. Inflation rates are calculated by the author. 
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Table 2: Inflation Rates in Some Developing Countries 
1960-69 1970-72 1973-75 1976-79 1980-82 1983-89 1988-89 
Argentina 22.9 35.6 313.4 238.7 123.3 755.3 3079.8 
Brazila 45.9 19.7 28.2 44.3 95.4 415.7 1287 
f Cameron 2 6 17.2 10.9 14.9 7.4 4.3 ~ ~
t: Chile 25.1 42.4 413.7 94.3 27.4 213 15.9 a 
\..J 
l.t.l Colombia 11.2 9.8 22.7 23.9 26.2 22.3 27 
t: Costa Rica 2 4.1 c::s 20.9 5.7 53.3 17.9 18.7 ..... 
t: Cote d'ivoire 3.4 2.7 17.4 c::s 17.3 10.3 4 4.1 ~ ~
~ ~ India 6 4.9 22.8 2.4 12.2 8.4 7.8 
..s.:: 
...... Indonisia 100.6 7.7 35.8 13.8 17.1 8.1 2.7 ~ ~
~ ~ Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.5 3.5 8.9 16.3 13.8 15.9 22.3 'r, 
~ ~ 'r, 
a Kenya 1.8 3.9 18.5 12.8 15.4 8.9 9.1 -... 
...... 
~ ~ Korea Rep. 12 13.7 24.8 14.6 a 25 3.8 6.4 
~ ~ Mexico 2.7 5.2 17 20.1 80.3 82.5 20 ~ ~
Morocco 2.5 3.1 17.6 9.8 10.8 6.2 2.8 I'Y) 
lo.... Nigeria 3.5 11.1 ~ ~
...... 
29.1 17.9 20.8 27.5 525 
§- Pakestan 3.7 5.1 23.5 7.9 11.9 6.2 8.3 
..s.:: Serilanka 2.2 5 1 1 9.4 22.1 10.5 U 12.8 
Thailand 2.2 1.7 19.9 7.4 16.2 2.9 4.6 
Turkey 3.5 11.5 16.8 37.1 110.2 48.1 69.3 
Source: Little et al (1993), figures for Iran are calculated from Table 1 
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After the revolution in 1980. though oi I prices increased again. owing to 
reduction in volume of oil export (arbitrary or induced by the war). the 
government oil-induced revenues decreased. subsequently a period with 
increasing budget deficit began with nloney supply continuing to increase. 
while production suffered from inefficiencies induced Inainly by the 
intervention policies and performance of the goverment. The supply side of the 
economy experienced nlore difficulties during the \\ar. in particular. when oil 
prices decreased sharply in 1985. As a result of disequlibria in Inoney and 
commodity markets. the economy faced an accelerating intlation rate during 
the period. 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 discusses budget and 
budgetary policies of the government. The banking system is analyzed in 
section 3.3. The next section is devoted to describing the external trade and the 
exchange rate. Production. investlnent and elnployment are discussed in section 
3.5. Finally, the conclusion is provided in part 3.6. 
3.2 Budget and Budgetary Policies 
Just like nlost oil exporting Des. the Iranian govermnent possesses the 
entire oil revenues and uses these foreign exchange receipts as the main 
vehicle to finance her expenditures. As Table 3 indicates the share of oil-
induced revenues in the total revenues (of general budget) sharply increased 
after the windfall (by 86.4 percent in 1974). It then accounted for about two-
third of the total. though this share reduced to one-third after the adverse oil 
shock in 1985 when oil export earnings dranlatically decreased (Figure 3). The 
share of the governnlent budget in GNP illustrated in that table reflects the 
ilnportance of the government fiscal performance in the whole economy. This 
ratio was about 30 percent during the five-year period preceding the 1973 oil 
shock while it accounted for alnl0st half of the GNP for the remaining five 
years before the new political regime came to power in 1979. This share has 
since been declining in the post-revolution era (Figure:2). Howc\'er. if we take 
into account the total govermnent budget including state-owned 
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Table 3 :Shares of Oil-induced Revenue in Total Revenue and Total Expenditure in GNP 
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Oil-Induced revenue/Total revenue 45.4 46 .9 60 .1 59 
Government budget/GNP 28 .7 30 33 .9 33 .7 
S OUI C () OPf3(1995) 
Figure 2 : Share of Oil-Induced Revenue 
In Total Revenue, 1989-1989 
1973 1974 
66.9 66 .4 
30.7 50.1 
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1979 1980 
68 .1 65 .9 
33 .1 33 .8 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
58 .3 67 .1 63 .7 50.4 44 .2 23.4 
33 .7 30 27 .5 22 .7 21 .3 19 .5 
Figure 3 : Share of Government Budget 
In GNP, 1969-1990 
1987 1988 1989 1990 
347 31.8 24 .2 19 .8 
18 .3 19 15 .7 16.6 
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nearly half the GNP was made up of the government budget. In order to 
understand the role of the budget structure of the government in the economy. 
in particular in its inflationary process. the components of the revenue and 
expenditure and also the government performance in these fields must be 
examined. 
3.2.1 Government Revenues 
Total revenues of the government. showing a clear co-movement with 
oil-induced revenue, after a sharp increase in the tirst tC\\ years. experienced a 
fluctuating path during the rest of the period. A sUlnmary of the government 
revenues of general budgeeO is presented in Table 4 and plotted in Figure 4. 
The bulk of the revenues are acquired by oil receipts sold to Bank 
Markazi, the central bank, and correspondingly the account of the government 
at Bank Markazi is credited with money creation. In fact, cven in the absence 
of a budget deficit when an ilnp0l1ant portion of governnlent revenue is 
obtained via foreign exchange, budgetary perfoflnance plays an expansionary 
1110netary role. It can be seen in Table 4 that when oil prices increased in 1973, 
the oil-induced revenue of the governnlent almost doubled from Rls. 178.2 
billion in 1972 to Rls. 311.3 billion in 1973 and quadrupled again to Rls. 
1205.2 billion in 1974. This revenue was increasing for three following years, 
then experienced some reduction due to revolutionary condition of 1978 and at 
the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980. After increasing for a few years it 
sharply decreased owing to dranlatic fall in oil prices and also export limitation 
ilnposed by the war conditions during 1986-1989. 
Tax revenues contributed to the total revenues by one-third until 1973 
up to Ris. 131.3 billion. After the windfall although its absolute value 
increased, its share in total revenues dropped to 11.3 percent in 1974. Its peak 
in pre-revolution era was Ris. 465.9 billion in 1978. and accounted for 13 
percent of the total revenues. In post-rcvolution years its nominal amount 
10 The budget of government's enterprises accounted for between o n ~ - t h i r d d to half of total 
government budget during the period, h o w ~ \ ' e r r it is ('\e1uded becalhL' they are subject to 
different legal processes and based on different accounting. S) stem". 
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Table 4 : Government Revenues, 1969-1989 (Billion Rials) 
~ e a r r 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Total Revenue 155 182 258 302 465 1395 1582 1744 2127 1699 1792 1349 1821 2518 2794 2727 2691 1782 2211 2099 3181 
Oil-Induced 70 .1 85 .6 155 178 311 1205 1247 1329 1590 1013 1220 889 1056 1690 1779 1373 1189 417 766 668 771 
Taxes 60 .6 70.6 82.2 103 131 158 271 343 444 466 368 340 554 614 797 899 1034 1025 1030 987 1188 
Others 23 .8 26.2 20.8 213 22.5 31.9 64.5 72 92.8 220 204 120 211 214 218 455 469 341 414 445 1223 
Oil/Total(%) 45.4 46.9 60.1 59.0 66.9 86.4 78 .8 76.2 74 .8 59.6 6A .l 65 .9 58 .0 67.1 63 .7 50.4 44 .2 23.4 347 31 .8 242 
Tax/Total(%) 39.2 38.7 31.8 34 .0 28 .2 11 .3 17.1 19.7 20.9 27.4 20.6 25 .2 30.4 24.4 28.5 33 .0 38.4 57 .5 46.6 47 .0 373 
Others/Total(% 15.4 14.4 8.1 7 .1 4.8 2.3 4.1 4.1 4.4 13.0 11.4 8.9 11 .6 8.5 7 .8 16.7 17.4 19 1 18.7 21 .2 38.4 
Source : OPB( 1994) 
Figure 4 :Government Revenues 1969-1990 
a) Billion Rials b) Percent 
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peaked up Rls. 1187.9 billion in 1989 with a share 01'37.3 percent. Table 5 and 
Figure 5 show the components of tax revenues. It can be seen that almost half 
of the taxes are indirect taxes (the bulk being import duties) whose increase 
leads to cost push inflationary pressure. 
Direct taxes consist of firms' taxes, income taxes and wealth taxes. The 
bulk of direct taxes are gained from firms' profits collected after about a one 
year lag. An important point in this regard is that tax rates remain constant for a 
long period regardless of inflation rates. Income tax rates. as an example, can 
be viewed in Table 6. This causes real tax revenue to erode sharply frOIn 1976 
as Figure 6 displays. In addition to a collection lag and inflexible rates, actual 
taxable activities are limited. Oil-oriented govermnent revenue can be regarded 
as a obstacle for tax system reform. Comparing the share of tax revenues and 
oil revenues in total revenues (Table 4) confirms that the role of tax revenues 
are completely dependent upon oil export earnings caused by desired or 
adverse oil price shocks. In other words. as Shahroodi (1978:87) states. oil 
proceeds have been a mixed blessing. Although these revenues can contribute 
to the econOIllic developlnent of the country, they have deteriorated the tax 
effort (the ratio of actual tax revenues to GNP). An investigation about tax 
effort of fifty Des shows that while Iran has fourth highest taxable capacity, its 
tax effort was ranked 28th. This inefficient tax system makes individuals and 
agencies increasf: effective delnand in goods and services markets. 
Other sources of govermnent revenues like affiliated institutions and 
royalties Inet the third part of the total revenues. The share of other revenues 
decreased during 1970-1977 but began to increase from 1978, and this share 
has been rising considerably from 1984 when the government faced sizable 
reduction in oil export earnings and set a preferential exchange rate to fight 
foreign exchange shortages and to offset the reduction in its oil-induced 
revenues, resulting in cost push pressures. The contribution of this exchange 
hO 
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. -
tax to total revenues reached 38.4 percent in 1989. greater than oil-induced 
revenues (24.2%) or tax revenues (37.3%f'. 
3.2.2 Government Expenditure 
Government expenditure has played a signiticant role in the economy 
influencing national income and price changes.The m ~ j o r r portion of the total 
expenditure has been current expenditure. This share increased considerably 
after the revolution owing to problems arising from revolution and in particular 
the war. 
The anlounts of current and investn1ent expenditures and their share in 
total expenditure are presented in Table 7 and Figure 7. As these charts show 
1974 is the turning point in both the current and investment expenditures. A 
few months before oil price jump in October and December 1973, the Fifth 
Developn1ent Plan (1973-1977) comlnenced. The pre-revolutionary regime 
revised the Fifth Plan and doubled current and investment expenditures. Total 
expenditure including especially spending and investments abroad tripled in 
1974. In fact, " the revised version was in essence the uriginal F ~ f t h h Plan plus 
most of the prqjecls rejected for the originul plan as being 
uneconomical "(Loony, 1985a:65). This developnlent followed by increasing 
expenditure later on, established an inflationary budget. 
An increase in current expenditure of Inore than 120 percent in 1974 
followed by an average annual rate of 13.7 percent during 1975-1978 created 
persistent cOlnmitments for the government. Although after the revolution the 
new government scrapped some unnecessary expenditure chiefly related to the 
security and military systems of the previous regime. a sharp increase in 
salaries and wages in the first year after the r e v o l u t i o n 3 ~ , , more government 
intervention in econon1ic activities and the war requirclnents made current 
expenditure increase at an average rate of 8.4 percent in nominal ternlS for the 
31 The earnings from exchange taxes (induced by the preferentiall:\change rate) accounted for 
3.9,6.2 and 23.4 percent of the total revenues respectively in 1987. 1988 and 1989 (Rafati et 
al. 1993:75). 
~ 2 2 Minimum wages for government employees which was Rls. 12000 monthly in 1977, 
increased to Rls. 25000in 1979 two months at'kr the new reg.ime took over. 
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Table 5 : Tax Revenue Components (Billion Rials) 
Year OlreCt- -'---
Indirect 
Total 
Source : OPB (1994) 
1969 1970 1971 
21 .83 26 .56 32 .22 
38 .75 44 .06 50.4 
60 .58 70 .62 82 .62 
Figure 5 : Tax Revenue 
a) Billion Rials 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
41 .81 52 .93 72 .19 151 .9 
60 .8 78 .3 85 .1 119 
102 .6 131 .2 157.3 270.8 
1200 • l i r - - - - - ~ ~
1 0 0 0 0 -
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Year 
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Table 6 : Real Tax Revenues and Income Tax Rate 
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Income Tax Rate (%) 10 10 10 10 
CPI 14 3 14.6 15.2 16.2 
Tax Revenue(Blilion Rls.) 606 70.6 82.6 102.6 
Real Tax Revenues 4.24 4.84 5.43 6.33 
Saure . Tile Other Tables. 
" it 
c: 
~ ~
in 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
17.7 20.3 22.9 25.4 32.4 36.2 40.0 48.2 59.9 71.1 
131.2 157.3 270.8 342.9 443.6 466 368.3 340.4 554.1 613.9 
7.41 7.75 
14 
13 
12 
11 
10 
9 
II 
7 
6 
5 
11.83 13.50 13.69 12.87 9.21 
Figure 6 : Real Tax Revenues 
1969-1989 
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post-revolution years of the period. The number of public sector employees 
indicates the growing extent of the government activities. This figure increased 
from 849,000 persons in 1972 to 1.673.000 in 1976. then reached 3.454.000 
persons In 198633 • Since real expenditures have been decreasing after 1977 
(Figure 10) while the intervention of the government and the number of 
employees were increasing. current expenditure has quantitatively and 
qualitatively an inflationary effect. 
Investment Expenditure 
In Iran, analogous any other oil exporting economy. where the bulk of 
the national income is directly allocated to the government in the fonn of oil 
proceeds, planning has a 1110re significant role conlpared \vith non-oil exporting 
econonlies. The government has to dispose of its oil receipts and requires to 
spend therrl according to a planned framework)4. In such circumstances, the 
plans of expenditure crucially direct the \vhole econOlny and route private 
investnlents35 (Karshenas and Pessaran. 1995). Despite this important issue. 
planning process which was weakly carried out during the tirst four five-year 
plans, was abandoned in the revision of the Fifth Plan approved in August 
1974. Loony (1985a: 66) states: _. 1n effect. the revised F(fih Plan eliminated 
the planning process in 1ran .... T a r ~ e t s s and allocations were now increased 
without much thought and the current budget hecame far more important than 
the development budget. PlanninK authorities were reduced to 
macroeconomics model-makers with no input into Kovernment policy. In their 
place, budgetary authorities b e ~ a n n to control the expenditure process through 
yearly allocations lvith litde or no account taken of the longer-run 
r a m ~ f i c a t i o n s s of the stepped-up level of expenditure . .. 
Table 7 shows an increase in investnlent expenditure by 116 percent 
from Ris. 161.0 billion in 1971 to Rls. 348.7 billion in 1974. It then grew at an 
average annual rate of 38.5 percent for the following three years and peaked at 
~ J J Statistics C e n t l ~ r r of Iran, Slaliarica/ rear-hook. variolls \ ~ a r s . .
~ 4 4 If it does not save the rt'ceipts in foreign assets. 
,5 Of course, oil proceeds can be saved in foreign currenl.:} form or used to repay foreign debts. 
These cases may be included in the plan. 
64 
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RIs. 926.8 billion in 1977, the year before the re\'olution began. After a 
reduction due to the revolutionary condition and the war starting year. it 
improved at an average yearly rate of 26.4 percent until 1983 when it reached 
its post-revolution peak Rls. 1148.6 billion. Then. with a declining trend of the 
oil-induced revenue of the goverllnlellt (negative average rate of 38.4 percent 
during 1983-1986) the capital expenditure 1ell continllollsly with 10.7 percent 
average rate until 1987 when it reached the lowest level of Rls. 729.2 billion in 
the recent years of the period. An inlprovenlent can be seen in this measure 
during the last two years in response to oil-induced revenue increases. Figure 8 
displays hawaii-induced revenue and investlnent expenditure show co-
movement while current expenditure 1110VeS almost independently. Inspection 
of the shares of the two kinds of expenditure (plotted in Table 7 and Figure 7b) 
also suggests that point. Capital expenditure which accounted for about 30 
percent of total expenditure in pre-revolution episode. during recent ten years 
of the period (1979-1989) ranked fronl 31.3 percent in 1983 (best year) to 19.4 
percent in 1988 (worse year). 
Apart fronl the nlagnitude and distribution of expenditure for current 
and development purposes which themselves have tended to generate price 
increases, it is important to exanline the circumstances andlnethods of carrying 
out the investlnent spendings. Government investment as a part of expenditure 
increases aggregate delnand (inconle effect) and after a period it increases 
supply side capacity (capacity effect). A sharp increase of the government 
investment generates a high income dIect and usually leads to some delay in 
the completion of projects. Therefore, in these circumstances investment would 
be likely to increase the inflation rate without corresponding disinflationary 
capacity effect. In fact, as Looney (1985b: 330) emphasizes .• The evidence for 
Iran during the jJost-I 972 period suggests a tendency (?ltrying to do too much 
in 100 short a time. " 
As Tavakkoli (1993) points out a considerable portion of government 
investnlent has been directed toward uneconomic large ~ c a l e e and long gestation 
projects in the period. For instance the Organization of Plan and Budget (1983) 
reports that planned period of tilllt: to complete hospital projects have been 
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Table 7 : Expenditure Components 
Ypnr 
Totnl Expenditure 
Current 
Investment 
Current/Total (%) 
Investment /Total (% 
Source : OPB (1994) 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
1<)<1 221 1 3154 401 5 531 4 
111 124 5 1994 269 .7 370.2 
83 96 .6 116 131 .8 161 .2 
57 .2 563 63 .2 67 .2 69 .7 
42 .8 43 .7 36.8 32.8 30.3 
Figure 7 : Government Expenditure 
1969-1989, a) Billion Rials 
1974 1975 1976 
11744 1496 .2 1675.4 
8257 969 .4 1083 .8 
3487 526 .8 591 .6 
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29 .7 35 .2 35 .3 
4 5 0 0 ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~
4000 
3500 
3000 
2500 
2000 
1500 
1000 
500 
I • 
o iii Iii iii i i 
1969 1911 1913 1915 1911 1919 19111 1983 1985 1981 1989 
Vear 
---Current 
~ ~
Inve.tment 
-*-
Total 
1977 1976 1979 19110 1961 1962 1963 1964 19115 19116 19117 19l1li 19119 
2174 .9 2044 .2 2018 .2 2249 .3 2707 1 31663 3671 .7 3353 .6 33507 31568 36406 42106 431 fi 7 
1248 .1 1387 .1 1494 .9 1681 .2 2032.4 2251 .5 2523 . 1 2475 .6 2571 9 2410 .3 2911 4 33942 33852 
926.8 657.1 523 .3 568.1 674 .7 9148 1148 .6 878 778 .8 746 .5 7292 8164 931 5 
574 67 .9 74 .1 74 .7 75 .1 71 1 68 .7 73 .8 76 .8 76.4 800 806 784 
42 .6 32 .1 25 .9 25 .3 24 .9 28 .9 31.3 26 .2 23 .2 23 .6 20 .0 19 .4 21 6 
b) Percent 
-
Inve.tment 
BJ -.0 -.0 
Current 
Vear 
;....., 
r2 
o 
s;:: 
o 
~ ~
It.:l 
s;:: 
\J 
'-s;:: 
\J 
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
o 
o 
";::: 
~ ~
a 
~ ~
~ ~
fV) 
~ ~
~ ~
...... 
~ ~
6 
Table 8 : Oil-induced Revenue, Current and Investment E x ~ e n d i t u r e e 1969-1989 (Billion Rls.) 
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Oil-Induced Rev. 70.1 85.6 155 178 
Current Exp. 111 124.5 199.4 269.7 
Investment Exp. 83 96.6 116 131.8 
SOUICO . OPB (HHM) 
1973 1974 1975 
311 1205 1247 
370.2 825.7 969.4 
161.2 348.7 526.8 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1960 
1329 1590 1013 1220 889 
1083.8 1248 1 1387.1 1494.9 1681.2 
591.6 926.8 657.1 523.3 568.1 
Figure 8 : Government Expenditure and 
all Revenue, 1969-1989 
1981 1982 1983 
1056 1690 1779 
2032.4 2251.5 2523.1 
674.7 914.8 1148.6 
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prolonged to 11 years as against the standard period of 4 years. Official reports 
show that lTIanagement difficulties and shortages of capital goods were more 
important factors in making projects costly and inefficient. According to 
Shahshahani and Kadhim (1979: 6 9 ) ~ ~ this problem resulted from wasteful 
capital spending of the governnlent without paying attention to absorptive 
capacity of the econonly. Absorptive capacity' is inlportantly a function of time 
because some necessary factors for efficient utilization of capital cannot be 
obtained quickly owing to their interdependence and complexity. For example. 
skilled manpower requirenlent necessitates the education system to change 
while even with enough tinancial resources it cannot be achieved in short-run. 
" Thus, the abandoninJ? ofa .'pending poli(v in fClvour ( ~ l l immediate 5pending 
of oil revenues as they accrue appears to have heen a 111qjOl' mistake. Excessive 
.\pending produced a hi?,h rate of inflation. " (p. 70) 
Budget Deficit 
In spite of large magnitudes of oil reyenues in the first years of the 
period which were repeated again during 1981-1984, failure to restrain 
governnlent expenditures in the face of the declining government revenues led 
to a significant widening of the fiscal deficit and thus creation of further money 
for the whole period. The budget deficit, which fluctuated almost entirely with 
oil earning shocks, peaked at Rls. 21 11.7 billion. more than 50 percent of the 
total budget and near 10 percent of GDP in 1988. Table 9 presents 
expenditure, revenue mld deficit of the govermnent and Figure 9a plots their 
paths. As Table 9 and Figure 9b show an increasing portion of these deficits 
have been financed by central bank credit or equivalently by money creation. It 
is COiTIlnonly accepted that a main part of the inflationary process of the Iranian 
economy has been due to this persistent deficit and the subsequent money 
supply increase. Moreover. as discussed above the oil-oriented budget of the 
governnlent has essentially an expansionary structure. In fact. oil-induced 
revenues unlike tax revenues do not reduc(' disposable income: rather, their 
spending donlestically is equivalent to further cn:ation of money. In 
consequence, sOlne researchers like Aghevli and Sassanpour (1991: 88) and 
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Table 9 . Government Budget, 1969-1989 (Billion Rls.) 
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Revenue 154 .5 182.4 258 ,3 302,1 465 1395 1582 
Expenditure 194 221 ,1 315.4 401 ,5 531.4 1511 1776 
Oeflclt(1 ) 39,5 38 ,7 57 ,1 99.4 66.4 116,3 193 ,8 
Borrowing from Centrol Bnnk(2) 30 10 
2/1 (%) 25 ,8 5 ,2 
Source .' OPB (7994) 
Figure S : Government Budget, 1969-1989 
a) Expenditure, Revenue and Deficit 
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Chapter 3: The Outlook ( ~ l l h e e Iranian Economy 
Tayyebnia (1994: 262) take into account the discrepancy between expenditure 
and non-oil revenues as budget deficit to consider the monetary effect of the 
budget. However, the import requirenlents of government and private sector 
induce a repayment of expanded nloney to the central bank. though the lag 
between monetization of oil dollars and import denland and also net foreign 
reserve of the central bank increase inflationary p r e s s u r e - ~ ( l . . In consequence. the 
structure of the budget induces Inoney supply being partly an endogenous 
variable in the Iranian economy. 
3.3 Banking System Performance 
An expansionary monetary policy mainly induced by budget structure 
and the government fiscal performance has been a notable cause for increasing 
inflation during the period of interest. High-powered money as a base for 
Inoney supply has increased chiefly due to foreign assets increases during 
1972-1979 \vhilc it is ll1ainly claims on the government that increases this 
figure during 1980-1989. 
3.3.1 Foreign Assets 
As mentioned above, oil export earl11ngs which make for nearly the 
entire foreign exchange receipts of the country are directly sold to the central 
bank by the governnlent. Consequently, the foreign assets of the central bank 
increase. This increase Inay be offset by a reduction of central claims on the 
govermnent. otherwise, liabilities and assets of the central bank being the same. 
the governnlent account must be credited. \Vhen the govcrl1lnent uses deposits 
to nlake paYlnents. the central bank creates new nloney. increasing high-
powered money37. Such increases in high-powered money raise money supply 
(M I) allowing commercial and specialist banks to otTer new credit which 
_ ~ 6 6 Even if we accept this definition of the monetary expansionary d"kct of the budget. it seems 
that the arguement of Khan and Aghevli (1978) and Ghatak ~ ~ 1 9 9 ~ a _ _ 1(1) about Des. is not 
strongly justified in Iran case that the expenditure in real terms dt!cn:ast!s almost similar to real 
domestic revenues in inflationary process as Figure lOb illustrates. 
~ 7 7 Foreign assets increase can be neutralized by s t ~ r i l i z a t i o n n operation of the central banks like 
selling bonds to the public (Sachs and Larrain. 1993: ~ 6 - l ) . . H o w e \ ' ~ r . . in Iran thl:re has been no 
active tinancial market, so that net government honds transaction during 1973-1978 was Rls. 
123.7 billion about 18.6 percent of the increase in net foreign .Issels during t h ~ ~ same period. 
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Table 10 : Real Tax Revenue and Real Expenditure 1969·1989 
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1978 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Namlnal Exp.(Bllllon Rls.) 
CPI 
194 
143 
221 1 
14.6 
315.4 
15.2 
401.5 
16.2 
531.4 1174.4 1496.2 1675.4 2174.9 2044.2 2018.2 2249.3 2707.1 3166.3 3671.7 3353.6 33507 3156.8 3640.6 4210.6 4316.7 
Real Expenditure 
Real Tax Rev. 
RTR(%) 
RE(%) 
17.7 20.3 22.9 
1357 15.14 20.75 24.78 30.02 57.85 
424 4.84 5.43 6.33 7.41 7.75 
14.15 1219 18.57 17.06 4.59 
11.63 37.02 19.44 21.14 92.70 
65.34 
11.83 
52.85 
12.94 
Source: OPB(1994) and OPB,Statiatic Center of Iran, Statistical Almanac, various years. 
Figure 10: a) Real Expenditures 
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Chapter 3: The Outlook olthe Iranian Economy 
increases broad money (M2). As Table 11 indicates, net foreign assets of the 
central bank sharply increased after oil price jumps in 1973 and 1974, so that it 
rose about 17-fold during 1971-1974 from Ris. 29.6 billion to Rls. 508.0 
billion. Whilst net domestic credits of the central bank (claims on the 
government and banks) decreased from Rls. 108.4 billion to 86.3 billion. 
Foreign assets of the central bank which increase up to Rls. 1047.7 
billion in 197938 then show SOlne Huctuation and stay around Rls. 700 billion 
during the last seven years of the period}'). 
3.3.2 Claims on Government 
Although during 1971-1978, before the revolution, the government 
acquired high oil revenues annually. it experienced an increasing fiscal deficit 
Cfable 9, Figure 9) mainly financed by nloney creation. Table 9 also shows the 
share of the central bank in meeting budget deficits. As Table 11 shows, claims 
of the central bank on the government aner a down\vard trend for a few years 
reaches Rls. 620.2 billion in 1978, about 7 times the first year of the period. 
The bulk of this liability of the pre-revolutionary government is due to 
budgetary perfornlance in the last year of the previous regime when it increased 
salaries and wages with the ainl of quietening the revolutionary movement 
while the revenues were decreasing considerably. This development increased 
the change in c1aiIn of banking system on public sector from Rls. 2l.1 billion at 
the end of sumlner 1978 to Rls. 295 billion two quarters later and made the net 
central bank's clainls on the govenmlent ahnost 5 times those of the previous 
year. This figure continued to increase at a relatively smaller rate averaged 
annually 24.6 percent for the rest of the period and peaked up to Rls. 10985.9 
billion in 1989. This increasing path of the claim of the central bank on the 
government has been the essential cause for monetary base expansion during 
post-revolution period. 
38 The sizeable increase of foreign assets in 1979 is due to .\ considerable decrease in imports 
while foreign exchange reciepts arc as lIsual. 
1<) Massoudnia (1983) examines the effect of the growth of forcig.n n : s ~ r v e e of the central bank 
on domestic inflation and finds a direct relationship bet\\een them through money supply. Also 
see Rahbar (1990). 
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T ~ b l e e 11 : Monetary Base Components, 1970-1989 .(Billion Rls.) 
Yoar 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Net Foreign Assets(1) ·88 296 703 142 .7 
Net Claims on Government(2) 106.8 939 96 .5 82 .6 
Net CLaims on Bancks(3) 15 .3 14 5 20.2 44 .6 
Net Other Assets(4) ·21 7 ·29 .3 ·45 .7 ·81 .6 
Monetary Base(5) 91 6 1087 141 .3 1883 
1/5(%) 96 27 .2 49 .8 75 .8 
2/5(%) 1166 864 68 .3 43 .9 
3/5(%) 167 13 .3 14 .3 23 .7 
4/5(%) ·23.7 ·27 .0 ·32 .3 -43 .3 
Source : CBlculBted from OPB (1994) 
Figure 11 : Monetary Base, 1970·1989 
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3.3.3 Claims on Ban ks 
Claims of a central bank on the banking system is palt of high-powered 
money. This segment of monetary base increased at an average annual rate of 
44.9 percent during 1971-1978 from Rls. 14.5 billion to 194.2 billion. These 
claims are created due to the easing of credit policy of the banking system. 
That sharp trend of increase then changed sizeably to a gentle rise averaging 
17.3 percent during 1978-1984 and reached its highest level of up to Rls. 506 
billion in 1984 and thereafter decreased and continued to stay around Rls. 300 
billion for the rest of the period. Components of high-powered Inoney and their 
contribution to increment of monetary base are illustrated in Table 11 and 
Figure 11. 
3.3.4 Money Supply 
As a result of monetary base expansion until 1978, supply of money 
(narrowly defined, M l) increased at an annual average rate of 40 percent during 
1971-1978 leading to huge resources for banking system, which encouraged 
the banks to offer easy credit to private sector's demand, so that the net claims 
of the banking system on the private sector increased at an average rate of 39 
percent during the Fifth Plan, 1972-1977. The trend of nl0ney supply (M l ), 
quasi-money and broad money (M2) can be viewed in Table 12 and Figure 12a. 
As discussed above, in this sub-period, the most inlpOltant cause of 
increasing monetary base is the foreign assets increase via the windfall of 
1970s and its budgetary consequences (See Figure lIb). [n Dadkhah's (1985: 
365) words, this fatal mistake occurred because the government neglected to 
differentiate its revenues and its expenditures in dollars from those of in rials 
after the windfall and also because of the failure of the central bank in 
conducting its responsibilities in banking system control. "Thus, the 
revolutionary government inherited an exp/osi\'c .\'i1u(l1 iOI1 in terms of hoth 
money supply and inflation" (pp. 378). 
The post-revolution government tried to decrease monetary expansion 
usmg selective credit policies and imposing credit ceilings. Of course. the 
74 
Table 12 . Money Supply (Billion Rls.) 
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Money(M1 ) 90.5 97.4 117 159 203 327 447 611 791 1237 1666 2203 2708 3484 3870 4558 4924 5811 1 67767 17'All St..1872 
Quasi-Money 115 138 179 241 313 483 699 982 1307 1342 1884 2305 2529 2947 3645 3409 4079 4911 .6 5891 4 79295 97661 
Broad Money (M2) 206 236 296 399 516 810 1146 1594 2097 2579 3550 4508 5236 6431 7514 7967 9002 10723 12668 15688 187SJ 
;:.., Inflation 2 4.1 6 .5 9.2 14.7 12.8 10.9 27 .6 11 .7 10.5 20.5 24.3 18.7 19.7 10.9 4.4 18.4 28 .6 28 .6 224 
~ ~ Change in M1 (%) 7.6 20.1 35 .6 27 .7 61.4 36.5 36.9 29.3 56.4 34.7 32.3 22 .9 28.7 111 17.8 8.0 18.0 16.6 14.5 15.8 
C 
~ ~ Change in M2{%) 14.5 25 .7 34 .8 29.1 57.1 41.4 39.1 31 .6 23 .0 37 .7 27.0 16.1 22.8 16.9 6.0 13.0 19 1 18.1 23 .8 1 (J 5 0 
\J Source,' OPB (1994) ~ ~
~ ~
c::s 
'-~ ~ Figure 12: Money Supply 
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central bank failed to keep pace with the approved limitations. hence, changes 
in private sector credits usually exceeded the ceilings Crable 13). Nevertheless. 
owing to uncertainty induced by the revolution. the war and interventional 
government economic policies. the commercial banks usuallv faced excess 
"' 
resources (Table 14) and net private sector debt increased at an average annual 
rate of about 14 percent during 1979-1989. However. a high budget deficit 
during this sub-period induced partly by the aforesaid reasons. in addition to 
Ineeting previous persistent commitments. caused the nlonetary base to 
increase. This resulted in a money supply increase. and its consequent 
inflationary pressure. Figure 12b shows money (I\1J) changes and inflation40 . 
3.4 Foreign Trade and Exchange Rate 
A vast government expenditure made possible by oil revenues or 
domestic borrowing increases imports directly or via relative price changes 
when a fixed exchange rate is operated. This erodes non-oil exports leading to 
Inore dependence on oil revenue. Consequently. when an adverse oil shock 
occurs the govemJnent is compelled to devalue the exchange rate in some way. 
resulting in higher irnports prices which contribute to domestic inflation. in 
addition to any contribution by world intlation. 
3.4.1 Exchange Rate 
Iran had experienced a fixed exchange system with quantitative controls 
before 1973. However, during 1973-1979 lax exchange policy resulted from 
the huge foreign exchange revenue from oil exports. In practice. there was no 
control and the capital market at an official going rate became active. Excess 
demand for exchange was nlet. in addition to non-oil export proceeds. mainly 
by Bank Markazy pouring up to 7 billion dollars into the free Inarket during 
that period (Bahranli, 1990:41). This exchange performance decreased the 
exchange rate in the free nlarket (the value of dollar in terms of domestic 
currency) for the first years of the period. After the revolution. in order to cope 
with the balance of paynlent problem. severe q u a n t i t a t i n ~ ~ exchange and import 
~ o o For a comperihensive study on money supply in the Iranian econolllY -;1:1: Nazarian (1990). 
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controls were implemented. In the recent years of the period. preferential rates 
have prevailed, though the official exchange rate. pegged to the SDR, remains 
almost intact (Table 15). 
An important issue in this regard is the free (black) market which has 
coexisted in parallel with the official market as in 1110st Des with similar 
exchange and inlport policies. The exchange rates in this market have been 
increasing since the revolution, so that it changed h! about 500 percent by the 
mid-1980s and increased at a sharp rate of over 2000 (Yo by the end of the 
period, 1989.t1 (see Table 15). 
This path of the black market exchange rate reflects a high 
overvaluation of the official exchange rate stemming from the oil price collapse 
and the subsequent sizable reduction in oil export proceeds while the exchange 
needs of the war econonlY were increasing. One important effect of this 
overvalued exchange rate is a higher rate of I ; ~ x p e c t a t i o n n of inflation resulting in 
higher inflationary pressures42 . 
3.4.2 Foreign Trade 
The Iranian econOlny has been closely tied to oil export during recent 
decades. Because of the negligible share of non-oil exports in total goods 
exports, oil is virtually the single source of foreign exchange. It has accounted 
for about 950/0 of total exports. Thus. it clearly determines changes in current 
account balance. The mnount of additional proceeds of the 1970s oil boom was 
very large. The average growth rate of Inerchandise export revenue (oil and 
non-oil) for three pre-boom years was 12.2 percent. Assuming that this rate had 
been constant for 1973-1977. the difference hetween actual revenue and the 
postulated proceeds would have been lllore than 65 billions of dollars43 • These 
huge incomes. in five years. for an economy which had been operated at an 
41 KarshenasandPesaran(1995: 10) 
42 Tayyebnia (1993: 266) using the ratio of black markd to official rates of exchange in 
Harberger's model for Iran. shows that each 10 percent chang\: in this \ariable changes 
inflation positively by 5.5 percent. In that estimation the coefficient of expected rate of 
inflation is not significant. This implies that the ratio used also rdlects expectation of inflation 
because of the multicolinearity between the expected rate or intlation and the exchange rate. 
~ ~ ~ Estimated by facts provided in: lMF. IFS. varioll ~ e a r " "
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Table 13 : Credit C ling Change 1981-1989(0/0} 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Approved 20 • • 10 10 9.7 7 8.8 18 
Actual 5.3 8.2 22 5.7 12.9 9.8 13.8 17.8 29.7 
Source: Bank Markazy, Economic Report and Balance Sheet, Various Years 
• Data Is not available. 
Table 14: Surplus Sources of Commer ial Banks 1979-1989 
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Free Source 508.7 2349 2588 3110 3123 3198 3611 4584 5829 7563 9525 
Surplus 226.5 257.2 322.3 718.1 34.2 44.8 371.2 790.9 1197 1966 1993 
Source: Bank Markazy of I.R.I., Economic Report and Balance Sheet, Various Years. 
Table 15 : Exchange Rate (Rials, period average), 1969·1989 
Yeilr 196 Q 1970 1 Q 71 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 198' I "H: I 'J R 1 
SDR 75.8 76 76 82.2 82.1 81.3 82.1 81.1 82.4 88.2 91 92 92.3 92.3 92 
Dollar (official) 75.4 76 76.4 76.4 69.1 67.6 67.6 70.2 70.6 70.5 70 71 78.3 83.6 8G 
Dollar (free market) 78.5 7978.776.569.967.986.7 73.4 73.7 84.6 127 138 150 250 350 
Source : TMP, IFS, 1 0 89 and March, 1993. Free market rate from the data center of Shaheed Beheshr-i 
ulliversity, Tehrall, IIAn. 
00 
r 
1 'J 81 19pc 19811 1987 1 'dlB 19f19 
92 92 92.3 92.1 92.3 92.3 
90 91 78.R 71.S 68.7 72 
550 611 712 991 1019 ] 217. 
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. -
average 3.5 billion dollars a year during the ti,e years prior to the first oil-
boom, was very significane". 
The spending effect of this windfall increased imports directly and also 
as a result of relative price changes. A pa11 0 f government expenditure is 
directed towards foreign goods and services. Income back to the private sector 
through government expenditure on home produced goods and services, creates 
some new demand for foreign goods and services. 1\1oreover. expenditures 
(public and private) on nontraded goods lead to higher prices while tradable 
goods are available at almost constant world prices. Table 16 shows the 
changes of the indices of the prices of goods domestically produced and 
consumed ( P n ) ~ ~ inlported goods (P t ), and exported goods (P,). Pn and Pt are 
used as proxies for respectively non traded and traded goods. Pt reflects 
imported inflation and increasing costs of imports. A reduction in relative price 
of traded to nontraded goods (the real exchange rate). with a fixed nominal 
exchange rate. encouraged nlore inlports. The relative price path is illustrated 
in Figure 1345 • 
Given the budget structure and budgetary performance of the 
government, an increase in inlports seemed inevitable. So import prOlnotion 
policies were conducted for sOlne years ailer oil boom in order to meet excess 
demand in the market of goods and services. Another purpose was to reduce 
l110ney market disequilibrium by selling foreign exchange as sterilization 
operations which Ineant that it decreased money supply. This development 
sharply reduced the current account surpluses fron1 8.5 billions dollars in 1974 
to almost zero in 1978(a 31 million dollars deticit). and doubled payments for 
ilnports of goods and services from 12.4 to 2.1.2 billions dollars in those two 
years. Table 17 and Figure 14 sho\\' the current account balance. A decreasing 
real exchange rate in these years, making imported goods cheaper for 
~ 4 4 Total imports (goods and services) during 1968-1972 were l7.5 billions of dollars (lFS. 
November 1975). 
~ ~ ~ Ebrahimi (1993) using WPI and CPI of USA as indicators ror tradable goods prices (PI) and 
CPI of Iran as that of non tradable (P1l)' considers the bdla,iour of real exchange rate (RER = E 
PI IPn) and points out that bilateral real exchange rate has deteriorated after the 1973 windfall. 
The multilateral real exchange ( using weighted average of WPI or ('PI of various trade 
partners) shows the same path. 
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Table 16 . Wholesale price indices and Real Exchange Rate, 1971-1989* 
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
P (WPI) 21.9 23 26 30.5 32.1 36.4 41.7 45.7 54.7 71.4 85.1 100 108 116 125 156 202 
Pn 20.8 21.4 24 28.4 30.1 35 40.4 44.2 53.6 71.5 83.3 100 108 118 126 154 196 
Pt 30.5 33.2 37.9 42.6 44.3 47.2 52.9 58.4 67.2 81.8 93.3 100 105 109 117 152 202 
Px 17.9 20.6 28.5 30.8 31.9 38.6 43.3 45 56.3 75.1 85.8 100 99.2 115 162 485 1008 
RER (Pt/Pn) 1.47 1.55 1.58 1.50 1.47 1.35 1.31 1.32 1.25 1.14 1.12 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.99 1.03 
Source: Bank Markazy Of I.R.I., Economic Report and Balance Sheet, Various Years. 
* Pn, Pt, and Px refer respectively to the price index of domestically produced and consumed goods, imported goods and exported goods. 
Figure 13: Real Exchange Rate 
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Table 17 : Current Account Balance (Million Dollars), 1970-1989 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Reclepts 1690 2733 3337 6232 20922 21972 24618 
Payments 2365 3015 3502 5887 12439 19058 21087 
Balance ·675 ·282 ·165 345 8483 2914 3531 
Source : Bank Markazy 0/ / R /, Economic Report and Balance Sheet, Various Years . 
Figure 14: Current Balance, 1970-1989 
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consumers, encouraged more imports. Continuing of the low import prices of 
1971-1977 would only have been possible if the trade sector's bottlenecks did 
not appear and high oil export revenues continued. However. from 1978 
onwards, except 1983 and 1984, inlports never reached the pre-revolutionary 
peak of 14.1 billions of dollar in 1977. In particular. at the tilne of oil price 
collapse in 1985, a sharply decreasing path of inlport started. This development 
ilnposed a serious pressure on prices in an econonlY which was becoming 
import-oriented, an issue shortly considered. Table 18 records foreign trade. 
The figures presented in this Table are in nominal ternlS, thus, inflationary 
pressure induced by iluport constraints is actually higher than these measures 
imply. Moreover, the higher rate of ilnpol1ed goods prices in the latter half of 
1980s can be understood if the preferential exchange rate system enforced for 
those years, is taken into account. 
As Table 18 indicates the non-oil exports, after a period of increase, 
decreased frOln 635 luillions dollars in 1973 to 542.8 in 1978 at an average 
annual rate of -3.2 percent. This undesirable path worsened after the revolution, 
such that it reached the lowest level of 284 millions dollars, about 1.4 percent 
of total exports. Later, when the oil revenues decrease started in 1985 
preferential exchange rates caused non-oil exports to increase, as Table 18 and 
Figure 15 illustrate. This desirable structural development, of course, 
contributed to inflation because it increased the price of exportable goods for 
domestic consumers. 
3.5 Production Structure 
In COlnmon with other DCs, Iran had sufTered frOln a traditional 
agriculture/ n10dern sector ( industry and services) dualisnl. In Des it is usually 
the agriculture sector which has to Ineet resources for industrial development 
while it increases its productivity. As Ranis's (1988) model of open dual 
econonlY implies, trade and capital nows generate new economic capacities to 
achieve higher technology. Theoretically, this can lead to the solving of 
dualisnl, though in practice, there is a tendency to disregard the agriculture 
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sector in the development process. This will be worsened if there is a natural 
resource revenue to fuel the development engine. In such cases. neglecting the 
scale of the country's economy. a costlier industrial growth can then be 
followed. 
In fact, the Iranian economy_ with an important oil sector. has been 
characterized by an oil/non-oil dualistic feature as well as an 
agriculture/industry dualisln. Oil domination in production and foreign trade is 
portrayed in Table 19 and Figure 16. Before the 1973-1974 oil boom, the oil 
sector's contribution to GDP was nearly 50 percent. For the rest of the years 
until the revolution, this share shows a declining path. as Shahshahani and 
Kadhim (1979: 62) state. However this resulted essentially from exogenous 
factors and cannot be regarded as a consequence of national attempts to reduce 
reliance on the oil sector. Indeed the share of domestic-oriented agriculture 
sector during the SaIne period was declining like that of the oil sector in favour 
of oil revenue-intensive sectors: industry and services, the leading sectors 
which accounted for about 50-60 percent of GOP, This can be seen in Table 20 
and Figure 1746 . 
During 1970-1978 nearly 90 percent nf oil production was exported 
(ahnost entirely in crude form). hence, there was no notable forward linkage 
ilnpact. The share of this sector in the labour force during these years remained 
less than 1 percent. This, coupled with high technology used in this sector, also 
ilnplies a weak backward linkage. E r t e t ~ l e e e (1974), using time series analysis 
and input-output analysis. points out that the spill-over effects frOID oil sector, a 
dynanlic growing enclave sector. on the rest of the Iranian economy have been 
of negligible signiticance. While forward linkages of oil sector on 
manufacturing as well as backward ones. are \ ' e r ~ ~ weak, the latter have been 
deteriorating. 
Kalantaritard (1980) indicates that the oil revenues during 1952-1976 
had been spent in a \vay that led to an undin:rsitied economy. so that the 
econonlY which could survive almost \vithout oil revenue in 1952. after 25 
~ ( , , In order to highlight the importance of the eCOIlOIll ic pt:rforrnalh:c in the first yt:ars of the 
period. the isslles are considered during two subpcriods prc and po,,( revolution in many ca"l'" 
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years, was entirely dependent on oil proceeds and could only last for about 
forty days if oil revenues were ruled out. His argument can be supported if the 
changes of the share of intermediate inlported goods in GDP. as a dependency 
index, is considered. As Table 21 points out. this index increases annually at 
7.3 percent during 1972-1977 (duration of the Fifth De\clopment Plan). Unlike 
a developed economy with well-nlatched intersectoral relationships, in Iran. 
the boorning sector, which made the w i n d t ~ t l lL has no notable complementary 
link with other sectors47 • Moreover, and probably more importantly, the 
production of OPEC's members is determined by a set of factors. excluding oil 
prices, which often does not change in the short-run. Thus. even with a well-
linked econonlic structure. Iran as a member of this organization might not 
have been allowed to increase its oil production after the oil price increase. 
Hence, the windfall had no resource mOVelllent effect. Table 22 shows that in 
spite of the boonl, oil production has not increased: rather there have been a 
slight reduction. In consequence, the \vindfall atlectcd the economy vIa a 
spending eflect accoll1plished by government expenditure. 
Since the government has obtained all the oil revenues, and these 
revenues have been distributed among the private sector via government 
expenditure, the governnlent has had a large role in forming the spending effect 
of the windfall and the following resource reallocation. Thus, the 1110st 
significant question is, what the best time. means and measure of windfall 
expenses were. Another ilnportant question is about the appropriate trade 
and nl0netary policies. According to Devarjan & de Melo (1987) the effects of 
the 1970s COnl1TIoditv boom on Cameroon, Cote d'Iviore. and Senegal. three 
menlbers of a Monetary Union, which have a similar economic structure, show 
how various budgetary and commercial policies result in significantly different 
outcOlnes. In Iran's case the government's responsibility is heavier because of 
its nl0nopolistic role. Broadly speaking. the windhtll injection into the 
econonlY during a short period almost quadrupled nominal gross national 
income (ONI), reflecting purchasing power of the people. ti"om Ris. 930.7 
~ 7 7 See section 2.3.4 for theoretical discussion. 
X4 
f 
o 
s:::: 
o 
~ ~
s:::: 
\l 
.-S 
~ ~
~ ~
....s;:: 
-~ ~o 
~ ~
o 
~ ~;::s 
a 
~ ~
~ ~
t"t') 
~ ~
~ ~
'5 
c5 
Table 18 : Foreign Trade (Merchandise, $ Million), 1970-1989 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Non-Oil Export 283 334 440 635 581.5 592 540 625.2 542.8 818.8 645.2 339.5 283.7 356.6 
011 Export 1268 2114 2460 4945 18654 19074 20671 20904.7 18115.6 19829.1 19315.7 14320 20050 20457 
I m ~ o r t t 1677 2061 2570 3737 6614 11696 12766 14626 10372 9695 10844 13515 11845 18103 
source: Bank Markazy of IRI, Economic Report and Balance Sheet, various years. 
Figure 15: Foreign Trade, 1970-1989 
Million Dollars 
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Table 19: Oil Share in Oil Production and Total Export, 1970-1989(0/0) 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1 <)86 1987 1988 1989 
Oil Export/Oil productio 86.5 87 .6 88 89.5 88.8 87 .8 87 .7 86.2 81 .3 ' 83 .5 60.6 63 .3 69 ,6 77 .9 70.6 62 .9 57 7 62 8 C4 4 63 9 
011 Export/Total Export 82.3 78.6 77 .8 82 97.4 97 .3 98 ,1 97 .8 97.5 96.2 82 .1 96.2 98 .6 98 .5 98.3 97.7 9'3 4 984 9 1 1 953 
Source : Bank Markazy of I.R.I, "National Income Account 1338-1353/ and 1353-1366" and "Economic Report and Balance Sheet", various years . 
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Figure 16: 011 Sector Role 1970-1989 
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Table 20 : GDP Components 1970-1989(0/0) 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Oil 45 .7 48 46.8 48 .9 
Agricuture 17.5 15.2 14.7 13 .9 
Industry 11.5 11 .5 11.7 12 .7 
Services 26.6 26.5 28 .3 26.2 
Source : OBP(1994) 
1974 
44 .9 
13 
13.3 
3 1.4 
1975 
37.8 
13.6 
15.1 
36.5 
c: 
It 
() 
;; 
Q. 
1976 1977 
36.4 34 .3 
13 12.8 
17.9 18 .1 
35 .3 37 .5 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
27.5 23.4 9.4 9.8 18.8 17.4 
15.3 17.1 20.7 21.6 202 19 
18.4 16.4 20 .3 20 .8 18.2 19.6 
42.3 45 .8 52.6 49.9 44 44 .6 
Figure 17: GOP Components, 1970-1989 
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1989 
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19.5 
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billion to Rls. 3362.7 billion during 1971-1974 while the impact of lTIOnetary 
expansion, induced by the windfalL on real output (real GOP) was only a 53.6 
percent increase during that time. This gap highlights the subsequent 
inflationary process48 • 
Regarding the governnlent budget. consumption expenditure 
accumulated rapidly. so that the rate of change in real consumption reached 
65% in the year immediately following the boom. The indices of real 
consulTIption indicate that during 1973-1977 this itenl increased 2.4 fold and 
the share of govermnent and private sector altered in favour of the former. This 
led to both expansion of commitments and a rise in wages49 • Real capital 
formation was much more significant. Its annual growth increased constantly 
so that governrrlent gross fixed capital formation at the end of the period 
extended seven-fold in comparison with the pre-boom year. 
With regards to the Ineans of the governn1ent's expenditure. the largest 
portion of government investment concentrated on capital intensive, high cost. 
low benefit and long gestation projects. This has in turn caused an mcome 
effect on denland vvithout a consistent output capacity effect on supply. 
Government spending is transferred to the private sector in three ways: 
provision of productive services. alteration in demand and its relative price 
consequences, and through the labour market and other transfers. as refered to 
by Bevan et al (1992). IncOIne going back to the private sector through 
government expenditure. induced almost the same development for this 
sector's expenditure : natnely a substantial rise in consumption and capital 
formation, in 1977, relative to 1972. an increase of 2 and 5 folds respectively. 
These facts arc shown in Table 23 and Figure 18 . 
Now we can see how the necessary adjustlnent of the goods market 
influenced by high dOInestic absorption appreciated the real exchange rate. 
New excess demand coupled with impertect elasticity l'f domestic production 
induced ITIOre expensive non-tradable goods rclatin? to tradable merchandises. 
48 Sec Cuddington (1989) for a disclission i.lboat the el'kct of a \\ indlall on GNI and real GDP. 
49 Cuddington ( 1(89) looking to the hoom ing l'conomy in man! d ~ \ \ doping countries shows 
that overspending is common. 
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Table 21: Dependency Index 1972-1977 
Year 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Intermediat Import (Billion Rls., 1974= 1 00)(1) 166.5 191 288.5 393.8 
GOP (Billion Rls., 1974= 1 00)(2) 1233.8 1423.8 1630.3 1885.6 
Dependency Index [(1/2)*100] 13.5 13.4 17.7 20.1 
Source: IMF, IFS, 1989 
Table 22: Indices of Oil Sector 1969-1978 (1985 = 100) 
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Oil Price 5.4 5.4 6.7 7.4 9.9 39.3 38.9 41.4 
Oil Production 155.1 176 208.7 231.6 269.4 276.8 245.9 271.2 
Oil Export 10.3 11.8 17.7 22.2 31.6 115.5 107.6 133.1 
Source: IMF, IFS, 1989. 
1976 1977 
412.9 442.7 
2145.3 2304.2 
19.3 19.2 
0-
z; 
1977 1978 
45.6 45.6 
260.3 246.4 
137.7 127.1 
Table 23 : Public and Private Consumption and Capital Formation, (Billion Rls., 1982=100) 
IVear 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Consumption 3139.1 3695.7 4092 .6 4613 .6 5549 .3 7132 .6 7349 7629 .7 7777.4 7792.4 
Private 2549 2918.1 31174 3544 3792 .9 4986 .7 4969 .6 53226 5430 .5 5615.1 
Share(%) 81 .2 79 .0 76.2 768 68 .3 69.9 67.6 69.8 69.8 72.1 
Public 5901 777 .6 975.2 1069.6 1756.4 21 45.9 2379.4 2307 .1 2346.9 2177.3 
Share(%) 18.8 21 .0 23.8 23 .2 31 .7 30.1 32.4 30 .2 30.2 27.9 
Capital Formation 8669 1013.4 1249.4 1404.9 1633.8 2453 3328 .8 3231 .9 2623 1815.8 
Private 412 462.4 644.2 673 .8 695.5 1203.9 1424 .8 1451 873.1 898.7 
Share(%) 47 .5 45 .6 51.6 48 .0 42 .6 49.1 42 .8 44 .9 33.3 49.5 
Public 454 .9 551 605.2 731 .1 938.3 1249.1 1904 1780.9 1749.9 917.1 
Share(%) 52.5 54.4 48.4 52.0 57.4 50.9 57.2 55.1 66.7 50.5 
Source Bank Marka;:y of 1.R. 1., National Accounts of Iran, 1338-1356, 1353-1366 and 1367-1369. 
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Figure IS : :\) Public and Private Co nsumption 1970-1989 
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since with a fixed nominal exchange rate the tradable prices for domestic were 
constaneo. The faB in the relative price or real exchange rate, RER, affected 
project evaluation, in such a way that the capital opportunity cost was taken 
into account incorrectly. This causes a negative l:apitai return5l • In fact, in this 
circumstance the projects with more foreign exchange nt:eds are more attractive 
because they cost less cOlnpared to the others. The benetit of the projects are 
evaluated based on these low costs. While if the opportunity cost of the foreign 
exchange was accounted for, the inefficiency of many projects would be 
realised. Relative price variation coincided with official appreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate (cheaper foreign exchange in terms of domestic 
currency). This subsequently exacerbated RER as discussed in 3.4.2 (See 
Figure 13). The RER would have taken another path if the government had 
avoided high consulllption and capital formatioll in implausible projects. An 
ilnportant implication of the RER is for the determination of lllanufacturing 
competetiveness. Although dOlllestic manufacturing found it difficult to 
compete in world markets because of quality issues. the RER appreciation 
diminished Iran's potential for competetiveness. 
As the 1110del provided in 2.3.4 implies, the fall in the relative price of 
tradable goods to non-tradable ones (RER appreciatioll) caused by more 
demand for non-tradable goods, transfers more resources to this sector in order 
to meet the new excess denland. Thus, construction and services sectors dilate 
at the expense of a contraction of agriculture and m a n u t ~ l c t u r i n g . . Although the 
agriculture sector contracted relatively. as the model implies, the 
lllanufacturing sector expanded after the windfall. analogous to the experience 
of the l l u ~ j o r i t y y of oil exporting developing countries (World Bank, 1984). In 
fact, since industrial production cannot compete qualitatively in world markets. 
governments with an import substitute policy had no choice but to impose 
quotas in order to protect dOlnestic production. lienee. this output might vvell 
~ o o . Variations due to world inflation are ignored. h e r l ~ . .
SI • See Cuddington ( 1989) for negative effect of RER appreciation on export diversification. 
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be treated as semi-nontradeable goods and their prices also go up relative to 
tradeables52 • 
With this modification the sectoral changes in the Iranian economy 
might be explained. As governnlent expenditure was channelled towards urban 
areas rather than rural, industry (including construction and excluding mining) 
and services sectors expanded at the expense of agriculture. While the average 
rate of agriculture sector real growth during 1971-1977 was 6.6 percent, 
industry and services grew respectivly by 18.5 and 16.9 percent annually. The 
share of the agriculture sector in real GDP decreased from 15.2 percent in 1971 
to 12.8 in 1977 while those of the two others increased respectively frOtTI 11.5 
and 26.5 to 18.1 and 37.5 (Table 20 and Figure 17). 
With real exchange rate appreciation. investnlent nloves towards 
capital-intensive activities due to cheap foreign exchange. This went as far as 
the gross fixed capital formation in industry sector (including oil and gas) 
increased faster than that of agriculture. The services sector (as a well-linked 
sector with industry and ·with high capital gain) also experienced a rapid 
growth in capital formation. It seems straightforward that even distribution of 
government expenditure between rural and urban areas coupled with 
appropriate RER policy \'Vould have constrained the undesired reallocation 
process. 
The revolutionary Islanlic government used a bureaucratic arrangement 
to try to correct resource mis-allocation. Emphasizing agriculture and 
attempting to reduce the reliance on oil led to a change of the share of the 
agriculture sector in GDP ti-OlTI 15.3 in 1978 to 25.4 percent in 1989. Likewise. 
the oil sector showed a downward trend and relnained around a mean of 16 
percent (Table 20 and Figure 17). However. the share of industry remained 
almost constant at around 19 percent. though that of sen·ices decreased from 
'2 Fardmanesh (1990) proposes another rcason for this phenomeJloJl. H ~ ~ states that an increase 
in the world price of manufactured goods relative to ~ \ g r i c u l t u r a l l ~ o o d s s after the oil boom. 
increased the price of manuLlcturcd goods in oil e\porting cOlilltries which are price takers. 
thus this sector's output increased like nnntraded g.oods at t h ~ ~ l.!\penSL' of the agricultural 
sector. 
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52.6 percent in 1980 to 38 at the end of the period. such that the sum of 
foreign-oriented sectors (industry and services) reduced in favour of domestic-
oriented production (agriculture). In other words, while agriculture grew at a 4 
percent average annual rate during 1979-1989. the industry and services growth 
rate were respectively 1.7 and -1.8 percent. Despite this structural success. 
overall production showed a declining path \\"ith some boosts in the high oil 
earning years. There are several reasons explaining the low and costly 
production in this subperiod. 
1. The Islamic government inherited an economy with significant imbalances 
which started appearing some years before the revolution and inlposed 
thenlselves on the economic movement of the country. in particular when oil 
revenues dropped acutely in mid 1980s. The oil-dependency of the 
econonlY, aggravated during 1972 -1977. continued in foreign trade such 
that the share of oil export proceeds in total foreign exchange receipts 
renlained around 97 percent until the end of the period. This characteristic 
caused serious difficulties when the economy faced a fall in oil revenues 
due to export difficulties inlposed by the war or oil price collapse. This fall 
translated directly in current non-oil production (excluding agriculture) and 
also transferred straightforwardly to govermnent investment, with a budget 
constraint and to private investment. with a foreign exchange constraint. 
These reductions in investJnent would lower necessary productive capacity 
in the future. Those ilnbalances also generated severe balance of payments 
problenls leading to nlore intervention by the govermnent and some 
undesirable consequences (discussed below). 
2. The protracted Iraq-Iran war attracted considerable resources from 
productive activity to defense requirements. Additionally, some pill1 of 
productive resources were out of work either because of the occupation of a 
pill't of the country by the enenlY or the war situation itself. 
3. Establishment of an otlicial distributive mechanism for resource allocation 
and of a highly regulated economy led to a more inefficient and costlv 
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production process. Most notable amonl! them was official distribution of 
..... 
foreign exchange sold at a fixed rate. 
4. Overvaluation of the exchange rate resulted in a very high premium in the 
parallel free market. This prenlium and also other subsidized and cheap 
inputs and credits distributed by the govern111ent brought about considerable 
rents for their recipients. Such rents made rent seeking activities attractive. 
Thus a sizable seglnent of scarce resources were channeled toward 
inefficient activities with negligible social product. 
5. Unclear property rights, war conditions, unexpected and alnl0st arbitrary 
intervention by the government, acute discrepancy between official and 
black Inarket exchange rates, and increasing inflation all led to notable 
uncertainty influencing the amount of private investment (See Table 23 and 
Figure 18) as well as the investnlent behaviour of the private sector, so that 
investment had a tendency toward projects where the gestation lags were 
slnall but not necessarily efficient from the national production view point. 
6. Government intervention and some other factors mentioned above generated 
more inelasticity on the supply side of the economy. One indicator of this 
low elasticity was excess unused capacity in various sectors while there was 
an increasing inflation rate. For eXaInple, the unused capacity in agriculture, 
industry and electricity sectors were respectively 44, ~ 9 9 and 36.2 percent in 
1982 with boosted oil revenues (OPB, 1986). 
In consequence, GDP which depends on governnlent policies and 
budgetary performance, and oil sector operation, reflects several imbalances of 
the economy influencing inflation. Therefore. it may be regarded as a proxy for 
the structural bottlenecks of the economy. 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
The Iranian economy has been a douhle dualistic economy with 
traditional/modern sector aIld oil/non-oil segments. The agriculture sector has 
grown almost independently of modern industrialization while the oil sector 
has worked with negligihle spill-overs to the non-oil Sl'ctor. The government 
alone acquires oil export earning so that thl' largest portion of its revenues 
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comes from the oil sector while this sector is the only earner of foreign 
exchange and a main contributor to domestic production. In other words. the 
oil sector has played the determining role in the Iranian economy. 
In this situation the governn1ent earned a windfall induced by the oil 
price jump in 1973. There were two choices for the government: either to 
increase its expenditure as the revenues were acquired. or to adapt its 
expenditure in line with the absorptive capacity of the economy leading to a 
smooth and persistent balanced growth. What actually happened was the 
former. which produced high rates of inflation and worsened structural 
ilnbalances which in turn aggravated the inflationary process, in addition to 
other undesirable economic and social problems. Most important among them 
was higher dependency on the oil sector;" . 
The post revolution government 111 a war and revolutionary 
environment, tried to overCOlne this deep-seated characteristic of the economy. 
However, the eCOnOlTIlC inheritance coupled \vith the interventional 
performance prevented the government from achieving a balanced growth path. 
When oil earning decreased as a result of war or the oil price reduction of 
1980s, the monetary expm1sionary feature of the budget worsened due to an 
increasing fiscal deficit. Moreover, the foreign exchange constraint directly 
affected production and investn1ent. which themselves have been suffered from 
high costs and inefticiency mainly due to the official resource distribution 
lllechanism. This envirolm1ent perpetuated the intlation. ret1ecting the impact 
of n10netary factors in the persence of structural bottlenecks. 
~ J J .. The import-sllhsillllion il1dllstriali=alioll {'(J/iCIL'S pursued hy thL' Iruniun R(}vernmenl 
during the 1963-1979 period had the paradoxicul C//l."l'1 O/II1L'1"I..'W:I1.1!. Ihe L'conomy's 
J e p e l 1 d e l 1 C . ~ l ' ' on Ihe oil sector . .. Karshenas and Pesaran ( 199)). ThiS well-articulated paper 
compares the pre and post revolution economic performance of the gl)\\:rnmcnt in Iran. 
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4.1 Introduction 
According to Nugent and Glezakos (1979). a conventional money 
demand function of the forn1: 
(4.1 ) 
is usually applied to derive a standard nl0del for analyzing inflation and 
estiInating its determinants in a monetarist context. In this function M, p, y, 
and C stand respectively. for n10ney supply, prices, real income, and the 
opportunity cost of holding money. e is an error term. Taking logarithms, then 
ditTerentiation with respect to time and realTanging for prices gives: 
.. . . (4.2) P=M+y,Y+y::!C+v 
where YI = - (1 +a), y ~ ~ = b and v = e'lI, and dot refers to the rate of change over 
time. In the monetary approach the price equation retlects the long-run money 
demand relationship. In other words, these models neither explain the 
dynrunics of the inflationary process nor the transformation mechanism 
whereby a rise in money supply increases inflation. I n order to solve these 
weaknesses researchers typically accept some lagged responses, and proxies for 
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non-monetarist factors are often included to achieve better specification. A 
typical expanded model can be as follows: 
where Xit stands for different cost-push and/or structural variables like rate of 
changes in wages, import prices. and relative prices: and other variables are 
defined as before. With regard to these attempts. there are several defects of 
which the two major ones are: 
• The money demand function, retlecting long-run relationship, 
reqUIres a proper measure of incOlne, that is permanent income 
rather than actual income used in practice. Moreover, the actual 
measure of income is usually treated as exogenous variable, while 
various theories, Keynesian, monetarist and others suggest that in 
sh011-run income can be affected by money supply, and thus can not 
be regarded as exogenous. 
• The second shortcoming concerns the ad hoc combination in model 
4.3 in which feedbacks are ignored when it is estimated as a single 
equation. Single equation estimation of such models when variables 
in reality have sinlultaneous feedback ( for instance from prices 
towards money or wages) leads to specification biases ... Therefore, 
a c a r e f u l ~ v v . ' p e c ~ f i e d d simulLaneolfs equation model in which 
feedbacks bOlh ways are recogni::<!d would seem the only way" 
(Nugent and Glezakos :433). In other words, as Laidler (1993: eh. 
9) states. the variables on the right hand side of the demand for 
nl0ney function. say, income or opportunity cost. may not be treated 
as exogenous because they themselves are influenced by money 
supply in short-run. thus, the problem of simultaneous equation bias 
arises llld a single equation estimated by ordinary least squares is not 
an appropriate method and some proper procedure to tackle the 
probleln such as two-stage least squares must be used. 
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During recent years several investigations have been conducted to 
analyze inflation in the Iranian econon1Y and to estimate its determinants. 
These studies usually suffer from the above sh0l1comings. In order to avoid 
these defects, the model used in this study is Aghevli and Khan's (1978). 
nlodified to be lnore appropriate for Iran's case. Aghevli and Khan's model 
which has been applied successfully to four developing countries, consists of 
five behavioural or definitional equations estimated by a two-stage least 
squares procedure. The lnain difference between their model and the model 
used here is that they treat income and governn1ent expenditure respectively as 
exogenous and endogenous while in this research. based on the reasons 
provided below, national income is treated as endogenous and government 
expenditure as an exogenous variable. This chapter is organized as follows: 
section 4.2 reports some previous work about inflation in the Iranian economy. 
Aghevli and Khan's model is considered in section 4.3. Finally. the model used 
in this thesis is examined. 
4.2 Empirical Record 
Inflation has been an ilnportant issue in the Iranian economy during 
recent decades and has attracted lnany efforts from which the six latest studies 
are reported here. In assessing these enlpirical attelnpts some common features 
can be noted: 
1. All researchers except Makkian (1990) and Tabatabaee-Yazdi (1991) 
use a single-equation approach. The \vork of Aghevli and 
Sassanpour (1991) involves a n1acro tnodel with 6 behavioural 
equations (including price) and 3 identities, but as can be seen below 
the method is again ordinary least squares. Such works. as discussed 
in the introduction, may well not lead to reliable estimates. The two 
exceptions are the investigations of Makkian (1990) and Tabatabaee-
Yazdi (1991) in which the model of Aghc\'li and Khan (1978) is 
cstitnatcd for Iran using the three-stage least squares method. 
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2. The importance of cointegration tests on macro yariables undertaken 
in recent macro-econometric studies. ilnplies another question 
regarding the studies reported below. Since macro variables for the 
Iranian econonlY usually have unit root(syq. ordinary least squares 
estimates before testing for integration and cointegration may result 
in the problem of spurious regression. Bahnlani-Oskooee's study is 
the only exception which conducts the associated tests: however. the 
tests are not accomplished cOlnpletely. an issue considered shortly. 
3. All but one use a nlonetary-based model which includes some lagged 
variables and a few structural factors. 
4. The data used are annual obsenrations for at most 31 years. 
The following are the summary results of the recent studies. 
Ikani (1987) analyzes inflation and estimates components In the 
nlonetarist and structuralist context. for the period 1960-1977. Firstly, he uses a 
Harberger-style lnonetary model in which the consUiner price index, CPI is the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables are money supply (narrowly 
defined), M 1, real income (GOP), y, the opportunity cost of holding money 
(previous rate of inflation) A, and a lagged value of M I' The estimated equation 
IS: 
" p, = 5.79 + 0.29 MIl + 0.2 J/I' __ I - 0.91y, + O.46A, 
(2.9) (4.09) (3.09) (-4.9) (1.93) 
DH' = 1.42 
where brackets show t-ratios. All coefficients but that of the opportunity cost. 
A, are significant. The adjusted detennination coefficient is quite high and the 
OW statistic shows that the null of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected55 . 
Although econo111etrically the model seems satisfactory, it is not consistent 
with the nlonetary argument that the change in money supply changes prices 
proportionally because according to the results, celeris parihus. each percent 
increase in Inoney supply only raises prices by 0.5 percent. Then Ikani 
)01 As shown in the chapter 5 and in the work of Bahlllani-Oskooec ( 19(5). 
~ ~ ~ The author also estimates the equations. here and in the structural form. with two other 
detinitions of income. The results are almost the same. 
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develops a structural model in which 1110ney. income. relati\'e food prices (F). 
the nominal wage index for the construction sector (\\' I. and the wholesale 
price index for imported goods (Q), are explanatory \'ariables. Estimation of 
the new model results in: 
" p, = 3.8 + 0.11 M I , - 0.65 y, + 0.41 F, -r 0.271[,: + 0.63Q, 
(2.6) (1. 3 ) ( -4.0) (1 .4 5 ) (3 .5 ) ( 2 .9) 
R = 0.837 DW = 1.91 
All variables have theory-consistent signs and are significant, except money 
and relative food prices. The latter is significant at the 100/0 level. The 
determination coefficient and DW statistic seem satisfactory. The researcher 
concludes that a set of structural imbalances coupled \vith cost and demand 
pressure led to an inflationary process in Iran in the period of interest. 
Tayyebnia (1993) tests both the monetarist and the structuralist 
approach to explain inflation during 1960-1991. He initially uses a standard 
nlonetary model within which price is deternlined by the money supply 
(broadly defined as M2), real inconle {y), and the expected rate of inflation as a 
proxy for opportunity cost (A). In order to derive the rate of expected inflation 
he constructs a regression in which price is regressed on its past value. The 
author also uses an adaptive expectation approach to estimate another series 
that is sinlilar to the first. The findings are as follows: 
p, = 9.55 + 0.22 A1 l , + -0.48,"', + OJ >1, 
(3.38)(0.13) (0.16) (0.33) 
R2=0.39 R = OJ 1 DH' = 1 . 1 ~ ~
where standard errors are in brackets. N iether nloney nor expected inflation has 
a significant coefficient. and the explanatory power of the model is very low. 
There is also positive autocorrelation56 . Adding a dummy \'ariable for the year 
that the new lslmnic government came to pov-;cr. impro\cs the estimation: 
(4.4) P, =3.1+(O.21+0.51D)!\f?1 -0.15.,", -rO l )2.··l, 
(2.8) (0.09) (0.11) (0.1'+) (0.28) 
R"2=0.69 R = 0.63 DI". = 1.57 
5<> This model with two lags for money is also cstimatl.!d but l a ~ g e d d \ allies were not significant 
and t h ~ ~ test for their being redundunt is not rejected. so t h ~ ~ ~ are l1l11itkd. 
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Now only income's coefficient is insignificant. Comparing the two models. 
Tayyebnia states that the role of the money supply in explaining inflation 
clearly increases after the revolution. However. in both cases a monetary 
approach cannot successfully decribe the inflationary process. Tayyebnia tries 
to examine a monetary assumption that real output is not influenced by the 
money supply. To do so, he supposes a role for money in increasing real 
income and develops an ecoonometric model based on an equilibrum condition 
for the money market. Then he estimates this equation simultaneously with the 
price equation (eq. 4.4) using 3-stage least squares. The price equation 
estimated in this lTIodel shows no considerable difference fi'om the single-
equation estimation. In consideration of the structuralist view, Tayyebnia 
includes several non-monetary variables separately in a Harberger-style model 
along with money and income. According to these estimates. wages (the wage 
index for the construction sector. Vv'). inlport prices (the imported goods price 
index. IMPP), relative food prices (F), the ratio of the budget deficit to GNP (k) 
as a proxy of public sector inlbalances, and the ratio of the free market price of 
foreign exchange to the official exchange rate ( prem) as a proxy of external 
constraints, all have a significant role in explaining domestic prices. The 
equations estilnated are listed below. Of course, the author does not introduce 
any reason for special combination of these hlctors. Other possible 
combinations may well lead to different results. 
P, = -0.05.i', + (0.04 + 0.54 D) ,\:, 11 + 0.S4 ':', + 0 . 3 4 ~ ~
(0.11) (0.09) (O.OS) (0.24) (0.11) 
Rl = 0.77 Dll' = 2.17 
P, =0.5S-0.08.i'l + ( O . l 4 + 0 . 2 9 D ) 1 ~ f 2 1 1 +0.25,·1/ +0.54IMPP, 
(1.83) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (O.IS) (0.10) 
Rl = 0.88 R ~ ~ = 0.86 Dll·= 2.41 
P, = -0.19 - 0.09.1>, + (0.19 + 0.24D) X1 2, + 0.23,··', + o.s7 IJIPP, + 0.17 F, 
(1.741 (0.OS5 (0.06) (0.09) (O.17) (0.()9) (0.08) 
Dl·f/ == ! 11 
----
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P, = -O.2l.i:, + (0.29 + 0.41D) Ad:!, + O J 5 . ~ l , , + 0.55preln, 
(0.11) (0.05) (0.11) (0.23) (0.19) 
R2 = 0.79 R 2 = 0.755 DJr = 2.37 
Makkian (1990) studying the effects of budget deticits on the money 
supply and the level of prices, uses Aghevli and Khan"s ( 1978) model for the 
period 1966-1986. He estinlates the equations of the model simultaneously 
using 3-SLS and reports these results for prices (P). go\'ernment expenditure 
(G), governnlent revenue (R) and money supply (f\1) : 
log P, = O.lS - 0.205 log ~ ~ + OJ 77n , - 0.80910g( .\1 / P) ,_I + log M, 
(0.39) (-2.64) (1.61) (-18.49) 
R2 = 0.993 S.£. = 0.063 
log G, = 3.49 - 0.06 log ~ ~ + O.5Slog( G / P) ,_I + log ~ ~
(3.51 )(-0.32) (4.08) 
} 
R-= 0.938 \.' £' - 0 ,( ...., ,). . - ._)-
log R, = 0.84 + 0.51(log y ~ ~ + log J ~ ~ ) + 0.27 log R'_I 
(2.02) (4.S1) (2.17) 
} 
R- = 0.901 S. E. = 0.324 
log Ad, = logm, - 0.19 + 2.81ogG, - 2.4 log R, + 0.55 log E, 
(-0.28) (9.12) (-10.09) (5.08) 
R2 = 0.982 S.E. = 0.184 
where Y. 1t. III and E are respecti\'ely income. expected rate of inflation. the 
nloney multiplier. the lagged yalue of high-powered money plus current high-
powered money lninus claims on the go\'ernment (t-ratios are in brackets). The 
unit coefficient of log M, in the price equation and log m, in money equation 
are imposed not estilnated. 
It can be seen that all coefficients are significant except the coefficient 
of expected inflation in the price equation and on income in the government 
expenditure equation. It seenlS that income has Ill) rok in explaining 
government expenditure. Although tvtakkian. applying a simultaneous 
approach. avoids biased estimation. the results are not r ~ l i a b l e e because he did 
not conduct integration and cointegration tests. I f IlL' applied those tests he 
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would find that the model consists of I( 1) and 1(2) variables. thus the model 
should not be estimated in levels57 • 
Tabatabaee-Yazdi (1 991) al so uses Aghev Ii and Khan' s model. There 
are three differences between her work and the Makkian' s study. First. she 
emphasizes inflation expectations and applies \'arious fOrIn of expectations. 
two definition for money. and two indices for prices. Second. in addition to the 
3-SLS, iterative 3-SLS is also used (the period is longer than the previous 
study). Finally, a causality test between money and inflation, resulting in a two-
way causality. is conducted. Although the results for the price equations vary 
with various assumption of expectation formation. in the other equations the 
estimations show similar outcomes in different models. The inlportant point is 
that the results arc considerably different from those of Makkian' s work. The 
estimates using adaptive expectation formation are as follows (p. 137-138) : 
In ~ ~ = 1.109 - 0.l821n y, + 0.0091t, - 0.941In( At} / p) ,_I + In M, 
(2.22) (-2.59) (2.58) (-23.23) 
2 R = 0.994 
In (;, = -1.296 + 0.231n J: + O.735In( Ci / P) ,_I + In p, 
(-1.51) (l.92) (11.61) 
R2 = 0.935 
In R, = -0.l19 + 0 . 3 6 6 ( 1 n } ~ ~ + In ~ ~ ) + 0.5861n R'_I 
(-0.52) (4.33) (6.2) 
R2 = 0.951 
In MI = Inm, .- 0.331 + 1.928 In G, - 1.549 In R, + 0.62 In E, 
(-2.08) (9.56) (-8.61) (13.63) 
R2 = 0.996 
1t, = 0.58 ~ ~ In PI + 0.-l2 7t1_1 
The unit coefficient of In M\ in the price equation and In m, in tnoney equation 
are imposed not cstitnated. 
~ 7 7 All the variables are integrated of degree I (discussed in eh. 5) L'\l'qH M:? which is integrated 
of degree 2. 
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Aghevli and Sassanpour (1991) define the domestic price level. P as a 
weighted average of the price of nontraded goods. pI! and traded goods, pt: 
In P = w In p" + (1-\\) In pI 
Assuming the exogeneity of pt (determined in the world market). they provide 
the following mechanism for adjustment of pll for domestic commodity market 
to equilibrunl: 
* where M/P stands for actual real balances, In indicates its desired level and ~ ~
shows changes. This equation implies that any increase in money supply more 
than the desired mnount will raise the price of nontraded goods. and a relative 
rise in traded goods prices will increase the price of nontraded goods because 
it increases the demand for and decreases supply of nontraded goods. They 
assume that desired real money denland is only a simple linear function of 
income and derive inflation equation as: 
They estilnate these equations with 4 other equations related to: government 
expenditure. governnlent domestic revenue. real private expenditure and the 
volunle of illlports. 
Their empirical findings related to prices are: 
I n } ~ ~ = 0.01 + 0.53 In P," + 0.521n P'I 
(0.3) (7.3) (7.6) 
R2 = 0.99 DvV = 1.48 
~ ~ In P," = 1.16 + OJ 71n( AI I P) 1_\ - 0.45 In }; + 0.60 In( pi I P") I_I 
(1.7) (2.4) (2.1) (3.6) 
Rl = 0.64 DIY = 1.87 
According to these results the domestic price is determined almost 
equally by traded and non-traded goods. where the latter is itself explained by 
real nloney supply (positively). real income (negati\'e1y) and relative price 
(positively). Concerning these results. there seem to be two important defects: 
First. despite the use of a silllultaneous equation model. the OLS estimation 
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nlethod is used, which clearly leads to biased coefficients. This weakness is 
nlentioned in the paper and the reasons ot1ered are that a full-information 
maximum-likelihood or two-stage least squares methods \ycre not applied so as 
to avoid a specification problem with a small sample. Second. the time series 
under consideration have unit root and the OLS method may lead to spurious 
regreSSIOn. 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1995) applies a model \vhich is basically a 
nl0netarist one and includes import prices and the black (free) market exchange 
rate: 
log CP I, = Clt) + a l log lv/] ,+ a ~ ~ log) " + a ~ ~ log P. \,TV, + a-l log BEX, 
where CPl, Mz, y, PXW and BEX stand respectively for conSUlner price index. 
broad money, real income. world export price (as a proxy for illlportS prices), 
and finally the exchange rate (units of Rials per one unit of dollar) on the black 
(free) market. His study is conducted in a cointergration context using Engle-
Granger and Johansen procedures with annual data for 1959-1993. The Engle-
Granger nlethod shows that there are two long-run relationships among the 
variables which define price and exchange rate. According to the cointegrated 
vector estimated by nonnalizing for CPL the long-run relationship between 
prices and the variables of interest is: 
log CPI = 5.17 + 0.0 I t - 0.3 D + 0.52 log 1\t/: - 0.71 log CDP + 0.26 log BEX 
+ 0.04 log P XW 
R2 = 0.99 DJfI = 1.05 
where t is a time trend and D stands for a dummy reflecting the revolutionary 
situation. 
Since the Engle-Granger method sutlers from some deficiencies in 
nlultivariate cases (see ch. 5), like this case. the researcher also used a Johansen 
procedure. This leads to inconclusive results, i.e. that the inclusion of different 
lags and dUllllnies and using different test statistics leads to various number of 
ranks being significant. Although the author makes his conclusion based on the 
result of Engle-Granger tests. in fact there is no reliable outcome because the 
ilnportant uniqueness test of the Johansen procL'dure is not conducted (or at 
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least not reported}. According to Bahmani-Oskooee sumnlation. inflation in the 
Iranian economy is determined by the money supply, Rial depreciation and the 
rate of gro\\1h of import prices. 
4.3 The Model of Aghevli and Khan 
Aghevli and Khan (1978) use a model consisting of three behavioural 
and two definitional equations to consider inflation in four developing 
countries: Brazil. Colombia, Dominican Republic and Thailand. There are at 
least three features in this study that Inake it preferable to the other 
investigations: first, it takes into account some feedback from inflation to 
nl0ney via government budgetary performance. thus reflecting some public 
sector imbalances. Second, by including a money supply equation. Inoney is 
not treated as an exogenous variable, so this 1110 de I allows foreign reserves to 
affect the money supply, reflecting SOlne external constraints. Finally, the 
nlodel is estilnated by 2-stage least squares. leading to unbiased estimates. 
Although the model of Aghevli and Khan is in the monetarist tradition, it 
seeks the reasons behind the authorities decisions for implementing monetary 
accolnmodation to in11ation. 
In other words, the two-way linkage between money and inflation is 
shown initially. Then a luodel is set out to reflect explicitly the impact of 
government budget deficits on inflation. Moreover. this work considers a set of 
countries which experienced high as well as nloderate inflation. The model 
introduces five equations respectively for: prices. goverl1lnent expenditure, 
government revenue. the Inoney supply and the expected rate of inflation. The 
price equation in this nlodel is similar to the traditional monetarist model 
derived from money demand function and lIsed by Harbcrger (1963) (with the 
ditTerence that the nloney supply has been supposed to be endogenous) so as to 
exanline the hH1-way causality hypothesis bet\veen money and inflation. 
However. income is regarded as exogenous. implying a full-employment 
assunlption. The cOluplete model is: 
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log P, = -A8 o - } .. 8 I log Y, + A8 ~ 1 t , , - (1 - A) 10gLH / P),_I + log M, 
log G, = ygo + ygl log Y, + (1-"r ) loge G / P) I_I + log P, 
log M, = logm, + Ko + KI logG, - K'}.logR, + K ~ E , ,
where: 
P: dOlnestic price 
Y: real income 
1t: expected rate of inflation 
M: nominal money stock 
G : governnlent expenditure 
R : govenUl1ent revenue 
In: money multiplier 
E: the remaining elenlents of high-powered money consisting of: 
change in the central bank clainls on private sector, international 
reserve change. lagged value of high-powered money and error item. 
A: adjustnlent coefficient of real money demand 
gl: real income elasticity of govermnent expenditure 
y: adjustnlent coetlicient of governnlent expenditure 
t: adjustment coefficient of governnlent revenue 
The main hypothesis in this 1110del is that governnlent expediture 
increases with inflation but the real revenue of the govenUl1ent has a tendency 
to move behind it. In other words. the adjustment coetlicient of the government 
revenue is less than that of expenditure due to tax collection lags (i.e. t < y). 
Money creation to tinance this inflation-induced deticit increases the money 
supply. leading to further intlation. This implies a lwo-\vay causality between 
Inoney and intlation. 
~ I t t It ~ c e m s s L\\og P'"I is correct because when we are predicting It,_ P, i-; not <1\ ailable. 
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Applying this tnodel to the sample leads to the results shown in Table 1. 
The model is defined so that the adjustment coeHicients can be found within 
estimation, shown in Table 2. The estitnation findings confirm the hypotheses 
that the lags of revenue are sizeably longer than that of the expenditure. 
generating higher deficits in the higher inflation periods. The countries with 
longer lags experienced higher inflation. 
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Table 1 : Structural Equations E s t i m a t i o n ~ W W
Brazil : I 964/Q3-1 97 4/Q4 
log PI = -0.077 -0.248 logY, + 0.502 1tr - 0.737 [log M'_I -log Pt- / ] +log M, 
(-0.53) (-3.65) (2.81) (-11.02) 
R2 = 0.995 s.E. = 0.047 
log G, = -1.682 + 0.886 log Y, + 0.046 [log G'_I - Ipg P'_/] -+- log P, 
(-3.44) (7.23) (0.43) 
') 
R- = 0.970 S.E. = 0.170 
log R, = -1.656 + 0.654 [log Y, -r log PI] + 0.372 log R'_I 
(-4.61) (6.98) (4.53) 
R2=0.984 s.£. =0.135 
log MI = log m, + 0.115 + 0246 log G, - 0.205 log R, + 0.952 log EI 
(1.54) (13.63) (-6.67) (34.38) 
R2 = 0.999 S.£. = 0.010 
1t, = 0.9 !:llog PI + 0.1 1t1_1 
Colom bia : I 9611Q3 - 1974/(14 
log PI = -3.031 -0.487 logY, + 0.627 1t, - 0.552 [log j\1,_1 -log PI-I] +log M, 
(-4.38) (-4.S2) (3.93) (-5 .21 ) 
R2 = 0.992 s.E. = 0.040 
log G, = -4.683 + 1.278 log r, + O.OSO [log G'_I - lpg PI-I] + log PI 
(-8.77) (7.22) (0.48) 
R2 = 0.948 S.E. = 0.176 
log RI = 2.S63 + 0.723 [log Y, + log PI] + 0.360 log Rr_1 
(7.10) (6.80) (3.94) 
, 
R- = 0.982 S.£. = 0.103 
log A4, = log /11, + 0.037 + 0.331 log Cil - 0.314 log R, + 0.981 log £1 
(2.18) (37.82) (-25.32) (95.4S) 
R} = 0.999 S. E. = 0.0 I 0 
1t, = O.8S!:llog P, + O.IS 1t,_1 (I:ontinucdonthc next pagcl 
"" Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Dominican Republic: I 9611Q3 - 1974/Q4 
log P, = 0.183 -0.260 logY, + 0.668 rt, - 0.879 [log '\{'-I -log P'_/] +log AI, 
(2.17)(-2.19) (1.96) (-11.06) 
R2 = 0.817 S. E. = 0.065 
log G, = -1.412 + 0.779 log Y, + 0.087 [log G'_I -lpg P,-d ~ ~ log P, 
(-7.12) (5.95) (0.8]) 
R2 = 0.799 S.E. = 0.172 
log R, = -1.805 + 0.835 [log YI + log PI] + 0.236 log R'_I 
( -4.91 ) (7.61 ) ( :2 . 50) 
R2 = 0.867 S.£. = 0.138 
log M, = log m, + 0.010 + 0.497 log G, - 0.419 log R, + 0.934 log E, 
(0.53) (37.04') (-27.92) (l05.00) 
R2 = 0.999 S.£. = 0.010 
Thailand: 1961/Q3 - 1974/Q4 
log PI = -0.201 -0.447 logY, + 0.551 1t, - 0.675 [log :\1/'_1 -log P'_/] +log M, 
(-3.73)(-3.44) (1.54) (-7.(6) 
R2 = 0.935 .\'. E. = 0.037 
log G, = 4.836 + 1.088 log Y, +0.080 [log G'_I - log P,_/] + log PI 
(61.60) (17.08) (1.03) 
R2 = 0.91 9 S. E. = O. 143 
log R, = 4.250 + 0.843 [log r, +- log PI] + 0.145 log R,_I 
(-6.47) (6.31) (1.10) 
R2 = 0.944 S.£. = 0.105 
log fly!, = log m, + 0.097 + 0.369 log Ci, - 0.336 log R, + 0.961 log E, 
(1.55) (44.94) (-14.54) (43.82) 
R2 = 0.999 S. E. = 0.010 
7t, = 0.9 ~ ~ log P, + 0.1 1t,_1 
Source: AKhevli and Khan (1978) 
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Table 2 : Individual Parameter Estimates 
Brazil 
0.263 
-0.293 
0.942 
l.910 
0.954 
-1.766 
0.930 
0.628 
-2.633 
1.040 
0.115 
0.246 
0.205 
0.952 
0.900 
Colombia Dominican I ~ e p . .
Price Level 
0.448 0.121 
-6.766 1.512 
1.087 2.147 
1.399 5.518 
Government Expenditure 
0.950 0.913 
4.917 -1.553 
1.342 0.857 
Government Revenue 
0.640 0.764 
3.998 -2.365 
1.128 1.094 
Mone}, Supply 
0.037 0.010 
0.331 0.497 
0.314 0.419 
0.981 0.934 
Expected Inflation 
0.850 0.900 
Source: A ~ h e v l i i and Khan (/978). 
4.4 The Selected Model 
Thailand 
0.325 
-0.618 
1.377 
1.697 
0.920 
5.271 
1.186 
0.855 
4.973 
0.986 
0.097 
0.369 
0.336 
0.961 
0.900 
As described in the previous chapter. oil export revenue has played an 
ilnportant role in the Iranian economy. Oil exporting developing countries are 
characterised by features somewhat different from other Des. Considering the 
individual features of the Iranian economy compared to the sample examined 
by Aghevli and Khan. some modifications to their model seenl necessary. 
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There are two modifications which characterise the nl0del used in this study 
compared with their original model. 
Aghevli and Khan assume that incOlne is an exogenous variable while 
government expenditure is determined endogenously. Their model is basically 
a monetary model in which it is assunIed that real inconle is exogenous. This 
nIeans that real incOIne changes are not influenced by other variables in the 
nI0del, implying that the economy operates at or near full employment 
capacity. Bhalla (1981: 18) states that this assUlnption might be acceptable for 
nIany developing countries where agriculture is the major sector, because 
agricultural production depends on exogenous factors like weather and the 
level of technology. 
However, in an oil-exporting country like Iran. where unstable oil 
earnings have a Inajor role in both government revenue and meeting the supply 
of intermediate and capital goods needed for production, the situation is 
different. As can be seen in the previous chapter. after the 1973 oil boom, 
government expenditure junlped several-fold in a way which did not reflect the 
absorptive capacity of the economy. This led to a worsening of the mismatched 
econonlic structure. As a result. government expenditure became an important 
factor influencing dOInestic income on the one hand and the dependence of 
dOInestic production on imports aggravated on the other. In consequence, real 
income has been influenced by the governnlent's real expenditure and the oil 
sector's output. Moreover, in the early years of the period. government 
expenditures increased sharply, due to political motives. creating extensive 
comnlitInents which could not be later elinliniated without giving rise to 
political difficulties. In fact this situation had prevented government 
expenditure from being a function of an acceptable growth rate like most Des 
as Aghevli and Khan (1977: 394) state. In particular. in the second part of the 
period (owing to the revolutionary situation and the \var). there did not exist a 
stable planned programme for growth. So government expenditure was 
determined by the need to meet existing commitments plus new needs due 
tothe war. Thus. here it seems more appropriate to assume government 
expenditure to be exogenous. 
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Regarding income, as a result of oil earnmg fluctuations and the 
inflationary situation. real income has experienced high variability. Here, the 
endogeneity assumption of income allows sonle supply side factors such as 
import capacity. cost-push elements and lack of efficient intersectoral 
relationships, to ilnpact indirectly on the variables of interest of the model. In 
fact, as Khan and Knight (1981; 13) state, \vhen we are interested in a more 
detailed analysis of the supply side, (for example \\-hen programmes designed 
for structural adjustment are implenlented) it is appropriate to allow income to 
be endogenous. Additionally, we emphasized the role of oil sector in 
determining inconle and government revenue. A part frOtTI these differences, the 
features of the model of this study are the same as that of the model used by 
Aghevli and Khan (1978). 
After these lTIodifications the lTIodel consists of five equations which 
determine prices, real income, govenmlent revenue, money supply and the 
expectation of intlation. The nl0ney supply equation is derived from an identity 
and the last equation is a definitional one. The data are transformed to the 
logaritluns because the stationarity of the difference of logarithms is more 
probable (Banerjee et ai, 1993: 28). Also elasticities can be directly obtained in 
logaritlunic functions. 
4.4.1 Price determination 
Following much empirical work. a traditional money demand function 
can be used to determine the price equation. This function, as Deutsch and 
Zilberfarb (1994) state, associates the desired level of real money balance with 
real inCOlTIe and the expected rate of inllation in a semi logarithmic form6o : 
(4.5) . , log (MIP) I = ao + (lJ log}, - a _ ~ ~ 1[, 
where Al = nominal money stock 
/1(1 Frenkel (1977) examines both double logarithmic and semilogarithmic forms of demand for 
money function for the German case and finds no clear difference_ In this study, like Aghevli 
and Khan ( 1978), this form is prefered because inflation rate in SOlllt' quarters is negative. 
Likewise. among others, these authors usc the same form: :\::!hevli and Khan (1977), Aghe\'li. 
ct al (1979). Khan and Knight (1981), Arilt: (1987). F i d d i n ~ ~ (1994) and Deutsch and 
Zilberfarb (1994). 
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P = price level 
Y = real income 
1t = expected rate of inflation 
and * refers to desired level. 
Using the expected rate of inflation rather than interest rates in the 
nloney demand function for Des has a long record in the literature. The main 
reason is the lack of an efficient market61 for money and Inonetary assets in 
DCs. 
As Khan. M. (1980) states. the nloney market is very litnited in DCs. 
Also, due to banking restrictions (e.g. interest rates being controlled by the 
authorities), interest rates do not affect nloney demand where credit is 
available. In fact in such a situation interest rates cannot reflect Inoney market 
behaviour and Meier (1989:212) points out that. in such circumstances. a 
negative real interest rate is a prevalent phenOlnenon. Expressed differently. 
regulated interest rates are no longer a proper proxy for the opp0l1unity cost of 
holding money, rather they Inay be regarded as a proxy for monetary 
restrictiveness (Harris. 1995: 14). Interest rate data are lilnited and exhibit very 
little variation over titne (Khan and Knight. 1981 :9). In sunl, as Ghatak 
(1995a:25) states, in Des the wealth holders can either hold money or real 
physical assets like buildings and durable goods. Therefore. the expected rate 
of int1ation plays the role of interest rate in money demand. 
Iran exhibits the common features discussed above. Additionally, in the 
first few years of the period the government usually had a budget surplus and 
there was no active asset nlarket. Ivloreover. in post revolution years. owing to 
interest rate prohibition, in confonnity with Islamic law. the inactive market 
has almost been shut do\\'n. In the money demand function. empirical work 
related to Iran usually uses the int1ation rate (expected or actual) instead of an 
interest rate62 . Nezamzadeh (1983: 135). considering the effect of interest rates 
hI For a discussion on this matter sec Todaro (1994:-l1l) and Cihatak ( 1 9 9 ~ b : : I 19). 
112 In addition to the work mentiocd bd'ore. also s ~ . ' e e P e s ~ ) J ' a l l l ( 1 9 9 ~ ~ :201. 
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on demand for money in the Iranian economy. finds no significant role for it63 . 
Income in the price equation is actual income rather than a permanent income 
measure. U sin g actual income is also supported by N azemzadeh . s study. 
Equation (4.5) determines the target or long-run aITIount of real 
balances. It can be assumed that individual agents determine their target money 
balance according to this equation. In practice, they nlight be far from their 
target value63 /1 • Therefore one may argue that individuals face two kinds of 
costs 
1. As they depart from target amount holdings. they h a \ ' t ~ ~ lower utility than 
otherwise. 
2. Attempts to get back to equilibriUlTI necessitate new transactions which are 
not costless. (Laidler, 1993: 121). 
Following Hwang (1985:690) and Deutsch and Zilberfarb (1994), a quadratic 
loss function is used to show total costs: 
TC = u, [log (l'dIP)·, - log(A1IP),f + u} [log (lvIIP), - log(MIP),_,]2 
Agents try to control their money holdings so that these costs are minimised. 
The optimal amount of money holding can be derived by taking the derivative 
ofTC with respect to (MfP)t which is under the control of private agents: 
... 
-2u, [log (M/P) , - 10g(MIP),] + 2u.? [log (AIIP), - log(MIP)t_'] = 0 
• 
U2 [log (AIIP); - 10g(AIIP),_,] = (1., [log (AUP) , - log(A1IP),] 
adding u, [log (MIP)t - 10g(MIP)t_'] to both sides and rearranging gives: 
(4.6) log (lYl/P), - log(A1IP)t_' = _(1.--:1_ [log (.\1/p/, - 10g(.\1IP),_/] 
(1.1+0. 2 
('3 Although with respect to DC's. llsing inflation rather than interest rale for this purpose is a 
common tradition, Khan, A ( 1982) considering si, Asian countries. rinds some cases with 
scnsilive interest rates and conclude.) that the cases must be individual h checked. 
/) l/ I d' h . d h' I dO. . d 
. In this case an also 111 t e Income an rcVt'nue ( a s ~ . . , , t e partlll a Justment process IS use 
to derive the equations. In the partial adjustmcnt process it is assumed that agents partiall) 
adjust any differl'nces from the optimal position in each paiod. II j-; due to the cost of full 
immediate adjustment. 
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• Substituting 4.5 in 4.6 for log (MlP) I and denoting 
Hence: 
__ Cl_,_ as t ~ ~ we obtain: 
a,+u 1 
Sinlilarly, if we aSSUlne that the actual changes of stock is proportional to the 
difference between desired real money demand and real lnoney balances in the 
previous period : 
'" ~ ~ log (MIP)I = Jv [log (]v!/p) , - log (H/P),_,] 
where A specifies the adjustment coefficient. then substitute equation 4.5. the 
same result is obtainable. 
4.4.2 Real Income 
Based on theoretical analysis in the previous chapter. it is presumed that 
planned real income depends on real government expenditure and real oil 
sector income: 
(4.7) 
where OY denotes the real oil sector income. The actual change in real income 
can be defined as a proportion of the difference between the planned figure and 
the previous actual anlount: 
(4.8) ~ l o g g Y,= B [ log Y/ - log r,_,] 
where e is the coefficient of adjustment (8 < I). Introducing }/ from 4.7 into 
4.8 and solving for real income yields: 
log Y, =0 h(/ + e h, log or, + 8 h]log CJ, - 8 h_, log P, +(1-8 ) log YI _, 
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4.4.3 Government Revenue 
Since in Iran during the period considered. about 90 percent of the total 
government revenues are accounted for by oil-induced revenue and taxes on 
national i n c o m e ~ ~ it is supposed that governnlent revenue is defined by these 
two factors. AssUlning desired goverrunent nonlinal revenue (R d) is a function 
of oil-induced revenue (OR) and nOIninal income. we h a \ ' t ~ : :
(4.9) Jog R," = t()+ 1 J log OR, 7 '] ( log J', + log p,) 
It is expected that the revenue elasticities ( I, ' 1;) \\ill be positive. Actual 
revenue changes proportionally with the difference between desired and actual 
revenue of the previous period: 
(4.10) d L\ log R, = 't [ log R, - log R,_,l 
where 't is the coefficient of adjustnlent. I > T > O. To obtain the nominal 
revenue equation. Rd frOll1 equation 4.9 must be substituted into equation 4.10: 
As in previous chapters there is theoretical and empirical evidence for 
sluggishness of the response of the government revenue to an increase in 
nominal incOlne. This point is supported by Aghevli and Sassanpour (1991 :92) 
for Iran, so it can be expected that the adjustment coefficient. 't, is small. 
4.4.4 Money Supply 
Money supply, M, is defined by multiplication of the money multiplier, 
In. and high-powered Inoney, H : 
Changes in the money stock depend on changes in the claim of the central bank 
on the governnlent ( . ~ C G ) . . changes in net foreign assets and changes in the 
central bank's claim on the banking system. If the last two are shown as a sum 
(L\OA). L\H can he written as: 
/j,f1, = !1CG, + !1()A, 
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or 
Since the government has financed its deficit through borrowing from the 
central b a n k ~ ~ changes in the central bank' s clain1 on the government reflects the 
budget deficit. so : 
H, = 0, - R, + E, 
where 
Thus. the equation for the Inoney supply is : 
(4.11 ) M, = n1, (G, -R, + £,) 
Rewriting equation 4.l1 in logarithmic forn1 makes it non-linear. To 
nlake the model tractable we use an approximation of this equation which is 
log-linear. This new fonn is attained by linearizing around sample means. This 
gIves us : 
10gAl( = log 111, + ko + k, log <.I, - k2 log R, + kl log E, 
The paranleters ks are detennined by functions of sample Ineans of logarithms 
of G, Rand E. such that : 
ko = 10g(eiOgli _e logU +elog/:') _________ x 
l ( l ~ ( i i 10gU log/:' 
e' -e +e 
[e log(i .10gO - e ll•g /( .Iog R + e logl .Iog E] 
10" (i (' r:-
kl = --------
IOI! (i 101' U log h' e - -e <' +e 
e
logU 
k, = --:::::::=----=---
101' (j lo!.! R log I: 
e '" -e - +e 
log I:" 
e k. = --=------
, loge; log Il + IIlI! r e -l' e -
where log 0 . log R and log E are the sample means. The parameters can be 
calculated directl y. 
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4.4.5 Expectated Inflation 
By an adaptive expectation approach the rate of expected inflation is 
defined as: 
I>P>O 
where I:l log p'-J shows the previous inflation rate and P stands for the 
adjustment coefficient. 
4.4.6 Complete Model 
( 4.12) 
( 4.13) 
(4.14) 
( 4.15) 
( 4.16) 
Now the whole model can be characterised as follovvs : 
log Pt = - Aan - I ... a, log Y, + Aa'}. 1t, - (1- A)log (AIIP)'_1 + log Mt 
log Yt =8 bo + e b l log OY, + 8 h'2 log G, - 8 h:! log P, +(1-8) log Yt- I 
log R, =t 10+ t 'I log OR t + t 12 log V, + t t2 log P,+ (l-t) log R'_I 
10gMt = log mt + ko + kJ log Gt - k ~ ~ log R, + k ~ ~ log E, 
~ 1 t , , = 13 [ ~ ~ log Pt- I - 1t t_/] 
where OY and OR stand respectively for real oil sector income and nominal 
oil-induced revenue of the government and the other variables are as defined in 
Aghevli and Khan's Model. All the variables are endogeneous except OY, OR 
and E determined exogeneously. 
The systelTI 4.12 to 4.16 can be used to explain the oil-oriented 
inflationary process in Iran. Initial1y the windfall of the 1973 oil boom 
increased E through net foreign assets and made it possible for government to 
extend its expenditures beyond its revenue. Consequently. the lTIOney supply 
increased through equation 4.15. tvloney supply increases raised prices through 
equation 4.12. The level of prices is also affected by incon1e, which increased 
after the windfall via oi I sector income rise and the government expenditure 
increase (as equation 4.13 implies). Increasing prices led to rises in government 
revenue. However, since the government found it ditlicult to increase its 
revenue to meet all the requirements of persistent commitments and the war. 
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the budget deficit has been increasing. This in tunl. led to an increase of money 
supply again, and the process repeated itself. 
Regarding dependence on oiL equations 4.13 and 4.14 reflect some 
aspects of the structural problelns. lt can be seen that the system is sensitive to 
oil income. Every adverse shock influences the economy in both monetarist 
and structuralist ways. After the oil price fall in 1985. the real production of the 
oil sector reduced sizably. This decreased real income through equation 4.13. 
With regard to nloney, this event decreased government revenues via equation 
4.14. Bearing in Inind that government expenditure was not \'ery flexible due to 
persistent commitments and the war. the Inoney supply increased. as equation 
4.15 confirms. Uncertainty. induced by several factors mentioned in the 
previous chapter, aggravated the process by atlecting expectations through 
equation 4.16. The money increase and output fall caused the price level to 
increase considerably from equation 4.12. 
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5,1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to evaluate the model via empirical evidence. In 
doing so, it deals with Time series econometrics, its ditliculties and solutions. 
Time series in econonlics, as Doornik and Hendry (1994a: 188) explain. are 
generated by extremely general as well as cOlllplex processes. The reason is 
that they are the result of millions of individual behavioural interactions. The 
results of econOlnic activities are 111easured by different levels of accuracy, 
"but rarely perfectly and sometimes not rel:V ll'ell ". The nlerging of the 
nlechanism of econonlic performance and the system of measurements is called 
the Dala Generation Process (DCP). tv10delling the main characteristics of the 
data generation process is the purpose of econOllletrician. This is carried out in 
a silnplitied representation, based on real observation and in association with 
theoretical economic analysis. In this conection chapter 4 dealt with a part of 
this process and the remainder will be considered in this chapter. 
This objective will be achieved in the following order. Firstly the 
database will be discussed: data collection, data definitions, dealing with the 
lack of quarterly data for one or two variables. and also tilling a few gaps are 
covered. Then the nonstationary nature of the time series is considered.Tests 
for unit root(s) and seasonal features of the data are conducted. Thirdly, the 
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procedure of estimation of the unobservable variable of the model, the expected 
rate of inflation, is provided. In section four. the long-run relationship among 
the variables of the model is discussed. A brief conceptional review of 
cointegration and the proper tests to obtain the long-run relationships as well 
as the resulting evaluation are provided. Finally, the whole model is estimated. 
The preferred estimation method is described and the results are evaluated. 
5.2 The Database 
All relevant data, in Iran. have been published regularly smce 
1959/1960 (1338 in the Iranian calendar). \Vith the exception of price index 
which is reported m o n t h l y ~ ~ others are usually announced amlually in most 
statistical sources. Fortunately, as far as this research is concerned, the majority 
of the necessary data in quarterly figures are available in a quarterly publication 
of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran called "Majalleh-e- Bank-
e Markazy" (The Magazine of the Central Bank). National output and its 
components are exceptions: only their annual figures are available. 
As for data accuracy, although weakness in economic data is normal in 
developing countries, and Iran is not an exception, the ITIOnetary data have been 
reported at relatively sophisticated levels. The same is ahnost true about the 
budgetary data. Of course, earlier in the period there were sonle difficulties 
about the goverl1lnent expenditure and its components oW'ing to changes in data 
definition and sources of record. This problem was solved with the help of the 
record of the Treasury of the Finance 1\1inistry. 
5.2.1 Data Definition 
For sOlne variables of the model like Inoney supply and prices, there are 
various nleasures which could be used as their proxies. Here the reasons for 
preferences are described. \Vith regards to price. the conSUlller price index, 
CPt is preferred. As ShanlslIi Alam and Kamath (t 986) explain, both the 
consumer price index and the wholesale price index. \VP1, may be used to 
constract an intlation rate. However. the prices of sen'ices are 110t reflected in 
the WPI. On the contrary they are ret1ected in the CPI . thus the WPI cannot 
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show perfectly the general level of prices. Moreover. it retlects to some extent. 
government regulated prices, so, its appropriateness relies upon the extent to 
which formal prices approximate the prices in the free market. In fact. with 
strict government control on prices, the l11ajority of the quotations included in 
WPI are fonnal quotations, which are in turn further frOin actual free market 
prices. Thus the CPI, which is closer to actual prices. is considered more 
appropriate for obtaining the inflation rate. 
Some argue that using the GNP denator is better because it includes 
nlore commodities than the CPI. However. this does not seem acceptable due 
to several reasons: First of alL the GNP deflator only takes account of the price 
of goods and services produced currently. this means that it excludes second-
hand goods prices \vhich are in1portant in the markets of the developing 
countries, while the CPI covers both. Secondly. unlike the CPI, the GNP 
detlator is derived as an aggregate. This means that. sonle components of it are 
inputs. Thirdly, in practice, the quarterly GNP deflator is not available in 
developing countries! (like Iran) whereas the CPI is in hand even in monthly 
figures in these countries. 
With regard to n10ney, the definition is not clear. This is a subject of 
long debate in the monetary literature64 . A survey about the money demand 
functions carried out by Laidler (1977) results in a narrow definition of money. 
MI. including currency and delnand deposit which 111ight be appropriate for 
quarterly data and either MI or a broader defined nloney, M2, is preferred for 
annual data. Nazemzadeh (1983) comparing the appropriateness of M I and M2 
for money demand functions in Iran. Nigeria and Venezuela. shows that M I is 
slightly perferable. Thus in this study ~ 1 1 ' ' is used as a proxy for nloney. 
Govermnent expenditure and revenue excludes those of public firms. 
institutes and state-owned banks. Although the increasing share of these 
excluded parts in the total government budget has reached more than half in 
recent years. the measure of general budget of the government approved 
64 Which is why Gordon ( 1993: 444) says .. tile M2 definitiol/ of money includes a 
hodgepodge of different jinancial instruments ... ". 
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annually by the parliament [Majles-e-Shora-ye-Eslmny] is used. This is due to 
lack of the quarterly data of the other part. As there is no significant difference 
between the gross domestic product and gross national product, the former is 
applied. 
5.2.2 Conversion of GDP from Annual to Qual'terly Figures 
The National income account is as yet estimated annually in Iran. The 
nlodel in this study deals 'with quarterly data for ,'ariables, so that of the GOP 
(Y) and oil GOP (OY) are required as well. Therefore a way to transfer the 
annually data to quarterly figures is needed. As nothing is known about the 
quarterly seasonal pattern of GOP and oil GOP process, assuming a smooth 
trend, the simple method provided by Lisman and Sandee (1964) has been 
applied to obtain the quarterly estimation of the data. This method is applied 
when there is no infonnation about the required quarterly figures and no 
assumption can be made about actual movement or some seasonal patterns in 
the quarterly data. Thus one is only able to assume that the quarterly figures are 
placed in a smooth trend. Dividing the annual totals Xl (t=1,2, ... ,n) by 4 (xt 
, 1/' 
=114 Xl)' and assuming the quarterly figures Yt l (L;=I Y; = 4x/ ) are a weighted 
sum OfXt_l' Xl and Xt+l , they construct the equations: 
I a e d Yt 
y!1 b f x t _1 c 
y!lI - x t c f b 
y!V d xt-rl e a 
They used 6 different coetlicients instead of 12 based on a logical 
symmetry in time. Calculation of the Inatrix of coefticients enables us to derive 
the quarterly figures from annual ones. Then assun1ing the changes in the 
quarterly data. y ~ ~ ,to he a quarter of the changes of annual amounts, Xl ' and 
that the trend is a sinusoid, they calculate the coeflicients as: 
a = 0.291 b = -0.041 c = -0. 166 
d = -0.084 e = 0.793 f== 1.207 
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Now constructing y ~ ~ equations leads to the required data. Table 1 shows the 
first ten figures. 
Table 1: Some Illustrations of Quarterly Data 
1971 1972 1973 
QI 02 0 3 Q4 01 O2 O ~ ~ 04 QI Q2 
Y 6672 6932 7157 7440 7781 8138 8472 8765 9016 9265 
Oy 3107 3297 3462 3603 3821 3933 4083 4272 4512 4734 
5.2.3 Filling a Few Scattered Gaps 
11 quarterly observations for three \'ariables: expenditure, revenue and 
oil-induced revenue of the govemnlent, in the early years of the period were 
not obtainable, hence, they have to be estimated. So far as is apparent, there is 
no empirical work to fill some scattered gaps in a data process. Lack of 
stochastic seasonality in the data generation process and simplification permits 
their estinlation, based on the assUlllption of existence of a fixed deterministic 
seasonal pattern. The estilnation model can be forn1lllated as : 
.\ 
}'t = L Y I 'Z,t + U t 
./=1 
-1'" T t ,_..... 
where ~ j j = 1 in season j, but zero otherwise and Yj are the coefficients of dummy 
variables (Harvey. 1993:137). Using 14 observations of each time series under 
discussion close to the missing ones, the above equation is estimated. The 
coefficients estinlated are used to calculate the share of each quarter in the 
annual figure. Finally, the formula: 
I _ y IZj *",,-l 
,} t - ",,4 L..I YI 
L..I)' .I 
is used to calculate the missing figures from the annual data. A comparative 
table of ~ s t i l l l a t c d d figures and actual values among gaps are provided in 
Appendix 1. 
5,3 Estiluatioo of the Expected Rate of Inflation 
The first equation of the model which determines prices involves the 
expected rate of inflation. 1t : 
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It is assumed that the expected rate of int1ation is formed by an adaptive 
expectations. Estimation of this unobservable variable is the topic of this 
section. 
As Granger and Newbold (1986: 140) state. the behaviour of 
individuals is usually a response to the future rather than the present and/or the 
past. In other words. they often make decisions according to an anticipation of 
the future. Variation of anticipation covers from an intuitive prediction based 
on near-to-hand information without analysis to a COll1plicated forecasting 
nlodel. As a result, econometric theories frequently involve expectations. 
Although expectations are affected by subjective information which is not 
quantifiable, economists and econometricians have introduced some models to 
show how individuals form their expectations of the future using quantifiable 
information from the past and present tinle. One popular model is the adaptive 
expectations nlodel : 
X ·'+1 = ~ h , , + (1- P)x', 
This is a fractional error learning mechanism as Azariadis (1994: 25) states. 
* This nlethod del110nstrates that if the prediction of x for time t, Xl 
(anticipated at t-l) is different fi"om the actual value, XI ' individuals adapt their 
'" predictions about tilne t+ 1 by a proportion of (XI - XI ) such that: 
(5.6) 
P is an arbitrary tixed fraction which satisties 0 < P < 1. This constant measures 
the speed of learning. In other words. it describes the individual's reactions to 
the error. Progressive substitution in (5.6) entails a model to calculate the 
• 
unobservable variable x 1+1 using its present and past values: 
~ ~
X ·'+1 = P L (1- P)' x,_, 
1=11 
This is an infinite lag distributed model in which the weight of lags. going 
towards the past. decl ines geometrically. Since t h ~ ~ intinite past values of XI are 
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not observable, the expectation can be approxilnated using a model suggested 
by Cagan (1956). 
Cagan introduced adaptive expectations for a continuous variable as : 
dx· . 
- = ~ ( X , , - X I) 
dt 
and for discrete variables suggested a model which approximately defines 
expectations as: 
1 -p I 
• - e "'"' I ~ I I
X 1+1 = Iii ~ x l e e
e /=--1 
where x * 1+1 stands for expectation of time t+ 1 fonned at tinle t. Xi stands for 
actual values, ~ ~ is the coefficient of expectation and -Tis an arbitrary time 
before which prices were almost constant, so it can be reasonably supposed that 
the expectation was zero at time -T. 
There are two problems associated with r ~ ~ . the coefficient of 
expectation. The first is the assumption of I ~ ~ being constant through time. In a 
study concerned with inflation, Khan (1977) points out that the expectation 
coefficient is sensjtive to the level and variability of the actual rate of inflation. 
That nleans individuals revise the coefficient of expectation itself. Expressed 
differently, in a hyperinflation era or at least in a situation of a relatively high 
level of inflation and long inflationary process. agents respond to a discrepancy 
between predicted and actual inflation more quickly than in a situation with 
moderate inflation ( S i l v e i r a ~ ~ 1973). The second problem is the arbitrariness of 
P . Obviously each arbitrary ~ ~ generates a new series of expectations while it 
seems there is no theoretical preference65 . N e \ ' l ~ r t h e k s s , , this method of 
expectation is conlnlonly applied and the conclusion of Blanchard and Fischer 
(1992: 618) can be accepted when they report Frenkel's( 1(75) judgement: 
.. In the absence ( ~ f f a more close(\' spec(fied model of 
expectations. there is no general hasis fin' assllming one fiJrm rather 
65 Also see Aghc\'li and Khan (1977) and Oiz (1970)_ 
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than the other. or indeed more sophi.\licafed expectations hypotheses 
such as the adaptive-regressive fhrmal ion. .. 
Similar to nlany Des, in Iran during the period. econOlnic information 
was not easily available for individuals and also sophisticated forecasting 
methods were not prevalent, so agents relied on past actual information for 
expectation, rather than rationally using the available infonnation to predict the 
future without any systematic mistake (Dornbusch and Fischer. 1994: 475). As 
a result an adaptive expectation tnodel is used. 
Concerning this empirical work. in \vhich inf1ation was moderate in 
DCs standards, making B a constant seems acceptable. In selecting a proper 
size for p, the Cagan (1956) approach is used. Cagan attributes a sequence of 
0.1, 0.2 .... , 0.9 to P and conlputes the related series of the expected rate. Then 
using these series in estimating the underlying regression model (in the Cagan 
case the nloney balance equation) he derives different residual sum of squares. 
RSS. He chooses the P yielding minilnum RSS. 
In our case the prices before the begining of the sample period did not 
vary considerably (the average quarterly rate of inflation during a decade 
before 1971 was 0.37% or 1.50/0 annually). Therefore. it is assU1ned that -T = O. 
and the model is : 
1 - ~ ~ 7(, 
_ - e '"' i ,\1, 
7t ,+1 - II' ~ ~ ,( 
e ;=0 
where I and 7t represent respectively the actual and expected rate of inflation 
and P determines the coetlicient of adjustment. This model is used to 
calculate different series of expected rate of inf1ation. Finally these series of 7t , 
are applied to estimate the equation: 
log P, = --Allo - Aa l log >; + A02-:T., - (1- A) log( ;\1/ P),_I + log M, 
Different P s and the associated RSS are set out in Tahle 2. ,\ccording to these 
results based upon the Cagan approach ~ ~ ~ = O.t) is p r d ~ r r e d . . After this. the 
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related series of expectation can be used in the I1ll h.kl. I n the con1puter output. 
'" provided in Appendix 2. P stands for 1L 
Table 2 : ~ ~ ~ s and Associated RSS 
P 0.1 0.2 0.3 04 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
RSS n.245 0.232 0.219 0.210 020-i 0.200 0.198 0.197 0.196 
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5.4 Stationarity and Nonstationarity 
Exposition of the concepts associated with lime series analysis seems to 
be useful to perceive the work conducted in this chapter. It will be detailed to 
certain extent to which time series is connected with this thesis. 
Most statistical methods, as Granger and Newbold (1986: 1) explain, are 
built to be applied to a series of data originated by independent experiments or 
survey interviews. The data set, or sanlple. is regarded as representative of 
some population. Statistical analyses try to extrapolate the population 
properties from the sample. In these kinds of data. the order of the sample data 
is not important. However, with time series the case is completely the opposite. 
A time series is a sequence of numbers in which each of thenl is related with a 
particular moment or interval of time (Maddala, 1992:525) so the data order is 
now very important. Each observation in tinle series Xl' t = 1. 2, ... , n. is 
supposed to be a realization of random variables Xl' t = 1. 2, .... n respectively. 
This finite sequence is also assunled to be a part of an infinite sequence. This 
sequence is known as a stochastic proces.\,I'i6(Judge et aL 1988: 676). Noting 
the difference between a randonl variable and its observed value, each 
observation in series XI is a sample of size 1 of related XI (Maddala,1992: 527). 
However, by analogy. in tinle series analysis the concept of realization and 
stochastic process are considered equivalent to sanlple and population in 
classical statistics. The time series analysis attempts to infer the properties of a 
stochastic process from the features of the observed series. The final purpose is 
to build a model frOln data which it is hoped can represent the data generation 
process or the stochastic process (Granger and Newbold.1986: 2). 
Econ01netric modelling. in its traditional sense. tends to formulate a 
regression equation with explanatory variables suggested by economic theory. 
to explain or forecast the behaviour of time series data. Moreover. it is 
ilnplicitly assUlllcd that the stochastic properties of the data are invariant with 
respect to time. Time series analysis on the other hand. tries to describe or 
66 "The word stochastic has II Greek origi1l and meallS 'per{(Jilling w chance . .. Maddala 
(1992: 527) 
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forecast the behaviour of a variable by using only its past values neglecting any 
economic theory. In addition, based on the fact that the majority of economic 
time series do not hold fixed stochastic properties through time, time series 
analysis provides new nlethods to deal with data generation process 
modelling67. The univariate time series nlode} can be presented in the simplest 
autoregressive of order one form, AR( 1), in which the variable Yt is affected 
only by its previous value and a random white noise process which explains the 
effect of excluded variables from the l11ode!. By white noise we mean that it is 
a stochastic process with zero mean and constant variance distributed 
independently: 
Another sil11ple form is the moving average of order one 1'ornl, MA( 1) : 
A more general form is : 
where £t is again identical independently distributed error. This model is known 
as an autoregressive-moving average of order p. g, abbreviated ARMA(p,g). 
U sing lag operation notation ARMA(p.g) model can be c0l11pacted as : 
A(L)Yt = 8(L) £, 
where A(L) and 8(L) are polyn0111ial operators; 1 - 0 1 L - O 2 L2_ ... - 0 p LP , 
and 1 + 8 1 L + 82 L 
2 
-1- ••• + 8q L '-I, respectively. such that LP Yt = Yt-p and £t is 
white noise. (Judge et aL1988: 675. Kennedy.1992: 247 and Harris,1995: 3). 
In this kind of ARMA model no econonlic information is used to build 
the Inodel. However when the (causality) relationship between different 
variables is examined univariate ARTvlA model is not useful to apply. 
Therefore AR( 1) can be expanded to compnse other stochastic and 
detefll1inistic variables. For instance: 
67 These two chracteristics of time series analysis clearly show the importance of time order 
and the dynamic nature of this type of econometric approch. 
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where X t can be defined as (for exanlple) : 
") 1/·1 < 1 and Ut - IN (0 , (j"") 
As with the univariate case this simple instance may be generalized to obtain 
an autoregressive distributed lag nlodel, ADL : 
A(L)Yt = B(L) XI + EI 
Replacing Yt and Xt by Yt and Xt, vectors of variables. leads to a general 
nlultivariate model (Harris.l995: 4). In 111ultivariate time series analysis the 
relationships among a set of time series are dealt with. In this case assuming 
that the exogenous variables are generated by ARMA process, each 
endogenous variable in the econometric model may be considered as a 
univariate ARMA tllodel (Kmenta,1986 and KennedyJ 992: 249). 
An important question arises from these descriptions : when a time 
series is a set of values which are samples of size 1 of an unknown stochastic 
process, how would one estimate the nlean and the variance (or covariance) of 
the time series? Granger and Newbold (1986: 3) point out that theoretically it 
is possible only if SOll1e assumptions are imposed about the way that the mean 
and the covariance change over time and introduce stationarity as a restrictive 
but useful assunlption. As Inentioned above the basic feature of time series 
analysis is the reliance on past values of a variable to explain the present or 
forecast the future. So, the values of a variable over tinle are not independent, 
this means the covariances must exist and the structure of the data generation 
process nlust be considered fixed (also see Mills,1993: 8). In fact, when one 
associates stationarity with a stochastic process, it means that the data 
generation process is itself invariant with regard to time so that the form and 
the value of paralneters of the generation process do not change through time. 
Although obviously this assumption is not always realistic, it does empower 
econonlctricians to construct some basic theories (Granger and 1'\ewbold,1986: 
4. and Judge et al. 1988: (77). 
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The ARMA models provided earlier rely on the weak stationarity 
assumption (Mills, 1993: 31). A weakly stationary stochastic process Xl can be 
defined as a series with constant mean and variance. and a covariance invariant 
with respect to time, and depending only on lag length (CharenIza and 
Deadman,1992: 118)68. This means we have: 
') 
Var(Xt) = ()-
COV(XI ,XI+j) = ()j 
This type of stationarity is also called second-order or covariance stationarity. 
A series even with a constant mean around a detenninistic trend and a 
covariance independent of tinIe, can be asymptotically stationary (Spanos, 
1986 and Mills, 1993: 59). That means some stationary economic time series 
do actually comprise deterministic trends (Banerjee et a1. 1994: 84 and Mills, 
1993: 57). 
However, when dealing with macroeconomic tillle senes, a high 
111ajority of thelTI do not fulfil these assumptions. This llleans nonstationarity is 
an accepted characteristic for macroecononlic time series. In these 
circumstances, applying conventional nlethods like Ordinary Least Squares, 
OLS, Ina), well present misleading interpretations (Bhaskara Rao, 1995: 2). In 
fact classical estinlation nlethods with nonstationary variables might lead to a 
problem whic.h is well known as nonsense or ,\jn,rious regression. Mills 
(1993: 166) states that, according to the studies of Granger and Newbold 
(1974), if there are two cOlllpletely independent nonstationary time series )'t 
and XI ' the standard regression of)'1 on Xt : 
leads to rejection of the null hypothesis p = 0 on 76 per cent of occasions. The 
rate of rejection of the correct null of no relationship reaches even 96 per cent 
when five independent nonstationary variables are included as regressors. 
68 While weak stationarity requires only constant mean and variance (tirst two moments). for 
strict stationarity all existing moments of the stochastic process must be constant over time 
{Banerjee et a1.1994: 11), Thus. a strictly stationary process IS also weakly stationary but the 
opposite does not always hold (Mills. 1993: 9), 
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Thus, conventional econometric tests are biased seriousl y towards acceptance 
of existence of a relationship. Spurious regression is often accompanied by 
high R2 and low Durbin-Watson (high autocorrelation in error terms). A 
stationary series, as Cuthertson et al (1992) explain. has a tendency to revert to 
its mean and fluctuate almost inside constant bounds. In contrast, a 
nonstationary series \vould have various ITIeanS in passing time. This seenlS to 
be true about the variables of the underlying lTIodel as can be seen in Figure 1. 
Nowadays it is generally accepted that to avoid misleading inference of time 
series analysis, nonstationary features of the series must hI.;: relTIoved before any 
sensible regression is possible. 
5.4.1 Unit Root Tests 
A widespread and convenient lTIeanS to remove nonstationarity from a 
time series is first ditferencing of the levels of the variables (once, or more if 
necessary). A nonstationary series which by differencing d times transfers to a 
stationary one, is called integrated of order d and shown led) (Engle and 
Granger, 1987). Indeed, when a series Yt is integrated of order 1 it means that it 
is not itself stationary, but its changes (ditference. ~ Y t t ) are (Banerjee et al. 
1994: 6), so that the estimation can be carried out on the difference, ~ Y t . . To 
obtain the estimate of Yt it is necessary to integrate over (sum up) the estimates 
of ~ Y t t (Kennedy,1992: 248). Hence, getting rid of the nonstationary feature of 
the underlying variables, \ve need to knovv the correct degree of integration, d. 
The Dickey-Fuller (DF), and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests 
are very COlTInl0n simple procedures in determining the order of integration of a 
series (Maddala, 1992). In a study conducted by Dejong et al (1992) the power 
of different unit root tests are examined. They conclude that in practice, the 
ADF test is likely the most helpful. These tests. following Charemza and 
Deadman (1992), can be explained briefly as [ollo\\/s. Suppose the series has 
been generated by the simplest t y p ~ ~ of autoregressi n: model. AR( 1 ) : 
(5.7) Yt = r )'t-I + Et or 
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where Et is white noise (identically independent distributed with zero mean) 
and L is lag operator, LYt = Yt-I' The condition for stationarity of such a process 
is I p I < 1. The above test, which also called Unit Root Test69 , considers the 
hypothesis that p = 1. To do so, an equivalent equation: 
(5.8) 
is used. This can be rewritten as : 
(5.9) Yt = (1 +8) Yt-I T Et 
with p = 1 +8. Equations (5.7) and (5.9) are identicaL therefore the null 
hypothesis p = 1 in equation (5.7) can be changed to <5 = 0 in testing equation 
(5.9). The alternative hypothesis is 0 < 0 which implies that p <1 that in turn 
nleans the time series has no unit root and is stationary. 
It is probable that there is autocorrelation in the error term, Et in 
equation (5.8). In this case, the OLS estimator does not generate efficient 
results. Solving this problem the test can be conducted with the regression 
nlodel below which contains the lagged values of the dependent variable as 
regresssors called auglnented Dickey-Fuller test. ADF70 : 
k 
(5.10) ~ y , , =OY'_I + I ( 5 / ~ Y t - 1 1 +e, 
1=1 
Here again, stationarity can be accepted by the acceptance of negativity of (5 in 
equation (5.10). According to a general belief. in many macroeconomic time 
series MA tenns are contained after first di1Terencing. However. Harris (1995: 
34) says an AR(k) process can approxilnate an unknown ARMA(p,q) if k is 
sufficiently large to give approximately white noise error terms7 !. Keeping the 
principle of parsimony, the nunlber k has to be as large as necessary to solve 
the autocorrelation problem. Although this can be done by performing 
autocorrelation tests on the estimated residual of an AR(k) Inodel, model 
69 If the polynomial of lag operator, (I-p L) has a unit roOl, i. c. L = 1 P = I. it necessitates 
that p = I. Being time series stationary the root(s) of polynomial must be out of the unit 
circle, this means L = LV > I, so Ipl < I. 
70 It is equivalent to being)'1 AR(K) (Banerjee ct al, lYl)4: 106). 
71 See also Banerjee et al ( 1994: 107-108). 
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selection procedures may be applied simutaneously to determine the lag order. 
k, and to test for unit root (Banerjee et aL 1994: 1 07). In equation (5.9). as well 
as (5.1 0), assuming Yt is 10). an 1(0) variable regresses on an 1(1) variable. 
Hence, the standard t-statistic does not have its normal distribution and for each 
case the distribution and associated critical values should be calculated. 
Note that the data generation process representing a tinle series is never 
known precisely and an econometrician in an attempt to discover it, has to 
propose the best approximation of it (Gilbert, 1993). As Banerjee et al 
(1994: 1 00-1 08) explain, a data generation process underlying a time senes 
nlight well not be AR(1) or AR(k) without nuisance parameters. Therefore the 
regression model can be modified by adding a constant ternl (drift) and/or a 
deterministic time term to permit other possibilities for the data generation 
process. Regarding this important point. Harris (1995: 29-31) says that a 
condition, inter alia, for the validity of a unit root test using an AR( 1) model is 
that the initial value of the variable. Yo equals zero. However. usually the actual 
value of Yo is unknown. In order to remove this fault it is better to add a 
constant to the model used for unit root test. 
This in turn inlplies that testing stationarity of a series Yt. supposedly generated 
by an AR( 1) 1l10del : 
Y=PYI+E • t 1- t 
by: 
rather than equation (5.9) or the corresponding ADF modeL where 8 = P -
and Et is white noise. If the null P = 1 (8 = 0) can be rejected, the time series Yt 
can be treated as stationary around a constant (or zero. depending on Yo) mean, 
but there is no trend in the data generation process. 
Accordingly. if the data generation process lS assUlned to include a 
constant as follows: 
Yt= a. + P )'1-1 + l:\ 
the proper model to test for a unit root is : 
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~ Y t t = a + pt + 8 Yt-I + Et • b=p-l 
or the AOF nl0del: 
k 
~ Y t t = a + pt +8YI_1 + I 8 / ~ Y I - i i + (', 8=p-l 
1=1 
Of course, it is of particular importance to note that the distribution of test 
statistics achieved are determined not only by the data generation process, but 
also by the nlodel applied in investigation. Thus, for valid OF or AOF tests. the 
appropriate critical values of test statistic lnust be used. 
Harris (1995: 30) also points out that the critical values of OF test 
statistic increase in absolute value, when a constant. or constant and trend, are 
included in the model used to test unit root. So when a model used includes 
only a constant while the constant and trend is proper the hypothesis of 
nonstationarity is more likdy to be rejected (over-rejection). Obviously, it is 
also correct that if the appropriate rnodel is one in which only a constant nlust 
be entered, inclusion of an unnecessary deterministic tinle trend leads to under-
rejecting the null hypothesis. The reason is that in this case the corresponding 
critical value is greater in absolute value thus the probability of acceptance of 
nonstationarity increases. As the data generation process is unknown. the 
general model which contains all deternlinistic components is appropriate for 
the test because the risk of using this general form is under-rejection of a false 
null. So if this test can r ~ j e c t t the null it will be trusted and the test stops, 
otherwise the test can continue with a 1110re restricted fonn step by step (i.e. 
without trend, then even without constant and trend). The test stops whenever 
the null can be rejected. 
5.4.2 Seasonality Features 
Harvey (1993) points out that when quarterly (or monthly) observations 
are dealt with attempts should be made to consider the seasonality effects. 
There may be two kinds of seasonality: deterministic and stochastic. In the 
former the pattern in the series reiterates almost regularly year to year. while in 
the latter the pattern changes over time. Morco\er. Charernza and 
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Deadman (1992) say a shock in the deterministic seasonal time series has a 
transitory effect and dies out in the long r u n ~ ~ whilst the impact of a shock in the 
stochastic form is permanent. This means a shock in time 1. in addition of 
changing YI' has the same effect on Yt+s 'YI+2s , ... (s is the seasonal interval). 
Harvey (1990) states however. that the existence of a deterministic 
seasonality in a time series model creates no new problems in respect of 
estimation and specification. However. this is not the case \-"hen a stochastic 
seasonality exists. As Hylleberg et al (1990) point out most of the unit root 
tests like the OF and the AOF are based on the absence of stochastic 
seasonality. Thus, in order to achieve stationary, a test must be undertaken for 
checking whether or not a seasonal differencing, in addition to first 
differencing, is necessary. 
There is a test provided by Hylleberg, Engle, Granger and Yoo (1990), 
(hereafter HEGY test) which is more general than the OF and AOF tests 
because it detennines both the order of integration and the stochastic 
seasonality. A simple version of it from Fielding (1994) is applied to the 
variables under study. The Inodel is built as: 
J I 
(5.11) ~ 4 Y ' ' = J.l + pt + LY iQi + L A I Y,U-I) -/- e, 
I c= I I = I 
where Qi stands for quarterly dummy variables and } ~ j l l is detined as: 
YIt = Yt + YI-I + ."1-2 + .\'1-3 
Y2t = - J'I + YI-l- )'1-2 + J'1-3 
Y3t = - Yt + )'1-2 
Y4t = - Yt-I + )'1-3 
If AI and 1..2 and either 1..3 or 1..4 are signiticantly negative. the null hypothesis of 
the nonstationarity of.l't is rejected. If }-2 and either I." or 1-4 are significantly 
negative, the null hypothesis of stochastic seasonality can be rejected. Hence 
this model. which can be estimated by OLS. determines the necessary nunlber 
of first ditJerenccs. d. as well as seasonal differences, b. namely the seasonal 
integration of orders d and b, SI( d. b). Like other tests the critical t-values 
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differ. The corresponding t-values for 10/0. 2.50/0, 50/0 and 100/0 levels from 
Hylleberg et al (1990) are tabulated in Table 370 . Concerning the variables of 
this study included in the first three behavioural equations, the general and 
complicated tests of HEGY procedure are conducted. The detailed computer 
output for HEGY tests are provided in Appendix 3 and sun1n1arised in Table 4. 
To solve the error autocorrelation problcln the necessary lags of the left-hand 
side variable in equation (5.11) are added to its right-hand side (Charemza, 
Deadman, 1992). 
As Table 4 clearly shows, all variables are SIC l. (}). This lneans that the 
HEGY tests reject the presence of stochastic seasonality in the tilne series of 
the model and at the same time confirnl the integration of order one for all of 
them. We also conducted the OF and ADF tests. The results were the same 
except for price, government oil-induced revenue and income where 
stationarity cannot be rejected by these simple tests. This is, as Dickey et al 
(1995) state, a weakness of these tests in S01ne satnples. The nonstationarity of 
all the variables is also conf-irn1ed by the integrated Durbin-\Vatson (lOW) 
procedure (Charemza and Deadnlan. 1992: 130). All these tests show that there 
are no unit roots for the first differences of the variables. The results for the OF 
and ADF tests are reported in Appendices 4 and 5. According to the outcomes 
of the exhaustive tests of HEGY procedure the first differences of all our I( 1) 
variables are 1(0) and can be applied to estimate the modeL eliminating any 
concerns about nonsense regression problelns. Inspection of Figures 1 and 2 
which respectively plot the levels and tirst ditTerences of the variables suggest 
the saIne conclusions. 
70 This corresponds AI to Hylleberg et aI's 7t1 ' )'2 to 7 ' ( ~ ~ • ~ q q to 7t, and A ~ ~ to 7'(_' • T, sample 
size of the reported critical values is 48. 
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Table 3 : Critical \' aluc of i_s' t-statistics 
Coeficient 1 cYo -, -.Y. _ . ~ ~ 0 -CY. ~ ~ C) lO·Yo 
-
-4.46 -4JJ-l -3.71 ' '7 I-I 
--'.-' 
1·2 -3.80 -3.-+ I -3.08 ' T' --. -'
1-3 -2.75 -2.26 -I .91 -1.48 
A4 -4.46 -..)..02 <1.66 -3.28 
Table 4 : HEGY Test for Stochastic Seasonaliy and Integration Order 
I-vallie of' 
~ x x 'A I A 2 A 3 A ... Inference 
-D,J111 n.017 -5.972**** -3.359**** --LX92**** SI( 1.0) 
D4 P -2.400 -8.()2()**** ... O ~ , . , * * * * *-.). .) --+()56**** SI( 1.0) 
D.Jg -1.902 -3.122** -2.094** -.5.036**** SI(l,O) 
DJr -2.221 -2.840* ·-3.591 **** --+.207*** SI( 1 ,0) 
D.Jor -2.120 " 7--* - ~ . . )) ---+.215**** --+.-+9'4**** SI( 1,0) 
D l' 
.t. -2.928 - : ~ . 3 X H * * * * * -1.541* 3.23-+ SI( 1 ,0) 
D.toy -1.652 -6.61'3**** ---+ . . 5 0 0 ; ~ ~ * * * 1.722 SI( 1 ,0) 
-
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Figure 1 : Time Series of the Model 
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5.5 Short-run V s Long-run Relationships: C ointegration 
Granger (1 986) says that it is an applicable belief in advanced level 
economic theory that the path of certain pairs of variables should not diverge. 
at least in the long-run, though they Inay diverge in the short-run due to 
seasonal factors, for exanlple. However. if they continue to drift apart. market 
forces or government performance comlnence to cause them to converge 
again. Wages and prices, government expenditure and revenue, and prices of a 
commodity in different parts of a country are some examples. Such long-run 
relationships reflect equilibrium in which a system converges over time. In 
other words, a long-run relationship induces a methodical co-movement 
amongst some variables so that an exact economic system is exemplified in the 
long-run (Banerjee et aI, 1994: 2). In this case it can be also said these variables 
have a common trend. 
However, as described in the section above, to Jchieve an interpretative 
estimation the regressions are usually carried out on the first differences of the 
variables rather than the levels. This nleans, they have been detrended by 
ditIerencing before regression. The trend sho\vs the long-run movement of the 
series, hence the differencing operation omits the long-term relationship among 
the series. What can be done if one is interested in explaining the relationship 
between the trends of the variables?(Maddala, 1992) 
In other words. in the long-run. when the system is in a steady state of 
equilibriwn, the variables have no tendency to change, say Yt = Yt-I= ye (ye 
stands for equilibriUln) so ~ Y t t = 0 and if the regression is applied on the 
ditTerences of the variables the long-term relationship is not apparent. As Mills 
(1992) says although there may not be such relations, it seems of particular 
ilnportance to allow for their possibility when the time series model is being 
built. The cointegralion concept was devdoped in the 1980s to solve this 
problem and to test any argUillent about a long-run relationship hypothesised in 
econo111ic theory, as Granger ( 1986) eillphasises. 
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According to Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987) the 
cointegrated variables can be defined as follows: if X t and .,Vt are both I(l), then 
although any arbitrary linear combination of theIn, say: 
ZI = )'1 - ~ x / /
is generally integrated of the same order, I( 1), it is not ilnpossible that ':t is 
stationary, 1(0). In this case the variables cannot nlove divergently and are 
called cointegrated of order one . CI( 1.1). In this circUlnstance estimating a 
cointegration regression, Yt = ~ X t t -+- Zt leads to a superconsistent ~ ~ estimate. 
Consequently, the relationship: 
)'t = ~ X , ,
may be viewed a long-ternl relationship between x and y. In such a case , ~ . . is 
called the co integration coefficient and vector ( 1 . - ~ ~ ) I1aJned the cointegration 
vector, which can prameterize an equilibriunl relationship proposed by an 
economic theory. Miller (1991: 141) notes that in the bivariate case, ~ ~ must be 
unIque because another cointegration coefficient, say for exrunple a = ~ ~ + 8 
brings about a new ternl (-8x t) which is by definition nonstationary. 
Consequently 
is now a combination of stationary (Yt - axt) and nonstationary (8xt) terms, so 
not stationary any more. That nleans that integrated variables can have unique 
long-run relationships in a bivariate context if they are cointegrated (obviously 
the order of integration of the variables must be identical ). In fact, as Harris 
( 1995: 23) says, conventional regression dealing with nonstationary variables 
can nlake sense and provide useful infonnation about long term relationships if 
they are cointegrated, othenvise the problenl of a spurious relationship will be 
faced. Mills (1992) points out that in these circumstances interpretation can be 
conducted on Inodels estimated in levels otherwise the analysis should be 
applied on their differences (p. 271). 
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5.5.1 Error Correction Mechanism 
Monte Carlo investigations, as Kennedy (1992: 254) says, indicate that 
the cointegration regression estimates in small samples have sizeable bias, 
though they have superior properties in large samples. These studies imply that 
the estimation of the long-run relationship combined with the short-run 
dynamic, error-correction mechanism (ECl\1), is better than to individual 
estimation of each. Inder (1993: 53,68) explains that although the Engle and 
Granger OLS approach to modelling the relationship among cointegrated 
variables is easy and straightfonvard, in finite samples the elimination of 
dynamics may generate sonle problems. His Monte Carlo studies suggest that 
encompassing the dynamics within a long-run coefficient estimation (ECM) 
gives a more powerful procedure with 1110re reliable results. 
With a stable equilibrium Yt = ~ X t ' ' the deviation , Yt - ~ X t } } obviously 
contains helpful infonnation because the system will nlove towards the 
equilibrium point unless it is already there. So that (Yt-I - ~ X t - l ) ) shows the 
magnitude of previous disequilibrium, the error of yt from its long-run path. 
For instance, a positive (Yt - ~ X t ) ) confirms that Yt is high relative to its trend 
of growth. Thus the error tenn, (Yt - Bxt ), can be a beneficial explanatory 
variable for the future direction of the path of Yt and can be incorporated in 
dynamic regressions (Banerjee et at 1994: 5) 
The en-or correction Inechanism as an adjustment process, incorporates 
the dynamic movement of two (or more) variables to their long-run 
equilibrium, in other words, the change in Yt is explained by the change in Xt 
and the disequilibrium in the past period, thus it has a close relation with the 
cointegration concept (Lutkepohl, 1991). In fact, as Banerjee et al (1994: 6) 
renlark ..... error correction heha\';oul" on the part oj' economic agents will 
include coinlegralion relationships among fhe corre.\ponding time series and 
vice versa ". Given the previous I( 1) variables Xt and YI ' with a long-run 
relation defined as Yt = J3 XI' the ECM can be formulated as: 
t5.12) L'l,Yt = a ~ X t t + Y CVt-1 - ~ x ' _ 1 1 ) + c( 
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As L\Yt and Llxt are 1(0), assummg et to be white nOIse. the regression of 
equation (5.12) has an interpretable result if the variables are co integrated with 
the co integration vector (L-ft) (Holden and Perman. 1995) because in this case 
all variables have the same order of integration. In fact as Charernza and 
Deadman (1992) point out, the ilnplication of two (or more) co integrated 
variables is that there is some process which adjusts the error in the long-run to 
prevent it becoming increasingly large. To include more cOlnplicated dynamic 
processes, this simple ECM can be extended to a general form: 
A (L) ~ Y t t = B(L) flx, + 8( Y,_I -P x,_I) + E, 
where A(L) and B(L) are lag operators and Et is a white nOIse error term 
(Harris, 1995: 25). 
5.5.2 The Cointegration Test 
A widely used test to examine the existence of cointegration among a 
pair (a group) of variables is the test provided by Engle and Granger (1987). 
This test is described by Holden and Perman (1995) as follows. 
Regression of Yt on xt , supposing there is one cointegration vector. is 
called cointegation regression: Yt = pX t + Ut . In order to examine whether the 
long- run relationship exists, it is enough to consider the existence of a unit root 
in the residual of the cointegration regression. This means that the null 
hypothesis, nonstationarity of the residual. is tested against the stationarity 
alternative. In other words, null hypothesis rejection means the variables are 
cointegrated. T'his resenlbles the question of stationarity of the variables Yt and 
Xl' hence it seenlS that the proper approach is the OF or the ADF test. The 
problenl here is that the residual Ut is not observable. Therefore the estimated 
values ii, are used. Engle and Granger (1987) also consider Durbin-Watson 
statistic for cointegration regression (CRD\V) and show that a "ery low CROW 
(near zero) rejects the existence of cointegration and an estimate close to 2 
confirnls it. Of course they prefer the ADF test. 
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Cointegrated nonstationary variables can also be applied to formulate 
and estimate an ECM model. To do so. first the cointegration coefficient(s} is 
(are) estimated by running an OLS cointegration regression. say 
A 
After confirmation of Yt and X t being cointegrated. P can be used to estimate 
the ECM as: 
A 
In consequence, a and Y. the coefficients estimated by OLS in the equation 
above show the share of current changes in the explanatory variable, Xt. 
and the adjustment process, ( Yt-I - ~ X t _ 1 1 ). in the changes in Yt. The rationale 
of OLS is, as described above, the cointegrated feature of the variables which 
Inade their linear combination (Yt - ~ ~ X l ) ) an 1(0) process, similar to other 
variables in ECM above ( I ~ Y t t and &.) as Charemza and Deadman (1992) 
explain. As noted above the lags of ~ h h and L1Xt can be added to the model 
ensuring et is white noise. 
According to Phillips and Loretan (1991). there is another approach to 
estimating a long-run relationship (cointegration coefficient P) like 
autoregressive distributed lag nlodeL ADL. The unrestricted ADL(n) 
representation for the variable Yt and X t can be formulated as: 
/I " 
Y, = Ia IY'-I + I P 1 X 1-/ + e, 
1=) 1=0 
this equation might be estimated by OLS rather than the above static equation 
of cointegration regression. It is wOl1h noting that in this case the long-run 
coefficient, P* must be calculated by : 
p' = L : : ' . , , ~ , ,
I " . 1- (l. 1=1 ' 
Then P* as an estimator of r ~ ~ will be used to estimate the [eM model. 
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5.5.3 Multiple Time Series Cointegration 
Although the itnplementation of the Engle-Granger procedure is 
straightforward, some problems are confronted. First. in this procedure. the 
ordinary least squares nlethod is used to estimate the co integration vector. In 
conducting this estimation it is necessary to assume one variable of the 
underlying model as the regressand, and the other( s) as regressor( s). This 
arbitrary normalisation, as Hafer and Jansen (1991: 158) and Kennedy (1992: 
259) say, will affect the estimation results. Following Enders (1995: 385) this 
defect can be described as follows. Where there are two variables in the modeL 
for example, the Engle-Granger test may be conducted by using the residuals 
estimated fronl either of two long-run regressions: 
or 
X/ = P 20 + P:2 J.,V / +e:'. ( 
In the very large sanlple (t ~ ~ O() asymptotic theory shows a unit root 
test on elf tinle series amounts to one on e2t. However. this property may not be 
applicable in small sanlples. Researchers do not often have large samples and it 
is not surprising that by changing the left hand-side variable the results differ. 
In other words, while the unit root test on el: indicates Yt and X t are 
cointegrated. that of e'2/ shows they are not. This is an unacceptable property of 
the procedure because the cointegration test must be invariant to the selected 
variable for normalisation. 
The second defect is associated with the two step estitnation of the 
Engle-Granger procedure. In the first step it is assunled that the two (or more) 
/(1) variables have a long-run relationship (or are cointegrated) in order to 
estimate the coetlicient{s) of the long run relationship and the residual 
sequence. Then in the second step these estimates are used in the co integration 
test (or ECM). In such a circumstance. as Dickey el al ( 1995: 13 ) say, rejecting 
the null hypothesis of nonstationary is ditlicult. Alternatively stated. the tirst 
stage generates the residual ternlS e, \vhich is then llsed in the regression 
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!le, = 8 e,_1 +... to estimate the coefficient 0 and its (-statistic for the unit root 
test. Thus, any errors created in the first step of the research carryover into the 
second stage (Enders, 1995:385). Dickey et al ( 1995: 14) emphasise that only if 
the cointegration vector(s} is (are) fully specified by econon1ic theory. would 
conventional unit root test be appropriate for the cointegration tests. 
The third problem associated with the Engle-Granger procedure is that 
this method of cointegration test does not discern whethere there is one or lnore 
than one cointegration vectors (Hafer and Jansen. 1991: 158). In fact. when 
there are more than 1\vo variables in the lnodel (n variables) there may be (n-l) 
linearly independent combinations of them cointegrated and only if n = 2. will 
the cointegration vector be unique (as lnentioned before). As such. it might not 
be possible to recognise the differences between the behavioural relationships 
and those that have no economic interpretation (Enders. 1995: 359). 
Finally, Harris (1995: 62) points out that even with the existence of 
only one cointegration relationship, a single equation estilnation potentially 
leads to an inefficient result. This lneans that the procedure does not derive the 
smallest variance relative to the other procedures. In other words, when there 
are more than two variables in the model. there may be more than one set of 
co integrating parameters, which n1eans that it is possible that lTIOre than one 
disequilibrium int1uences the dynamics in the EC!\'1 (Kennedy .1992: 259) . 
The Inost popular procedure used to tackle these defects is one 
developed by Johansen and Juselius(l990). Here a Vector Autoregressive 
Model (V AR) such as: 
(5.13) y, = A ,),,_, + ... + A"Yt-k + II, ' II,-IN(O,L) 
is used, \\There)', is nx I matrix of variables. This is similar to the autoregressive 
distributed lag model. ADL introduced in section 5.4 and a similar 
refornlulation leads to the Vector-Error Correction t\10dd (VECM): 
(5.14) ~ ) ' , , = n, ~ y ' _ 1 1 + ... + 11,,_1 I ~ Y d + ' ' + fly,. 1 -+ II, 
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wheren;=-(I-A I -··· -Ai}' i=L2, .... (k-l)andO=-( I-A J - ••• -A k }. The 
model (5.14) is only a first difference of VAR model which contains an extra 
term nY/-I· The procedure concentrates on matrix n to investigate whether or 
not it includes the infornlation about a long-run relationship among the 
variables y,. The centre of the issue is the rank of the matrix n. the impact 
matrix. The hypothesis of the presence of cointegration vectors amounts to 
reducing the rank of the matrix fl. The estilnation method is the Maximum 
Likelihood procedure. Likewise. the precise number of co integration vectors is 
tested by likelihood ratio tests. This test is also used to examine the linear 
hypothesis suggested by economic theory about the long-run relationship and 
their weights (Johansen and Juselius, 1990: 206). The reason for preference of 
these estimation nlethods, as Johansen (1988) says. is that they take into 
account the structure of the underlying tinle series neglected by the regression 
estimates. In other w o r d s ~ ~ their procedure considers the cointegrating issue in a 
Inultivariate nl0del, enabling a test of the number of cointegration vectors 
explicitly, and does not depend upon arbitrary normal isation. Finally. it 
examines the restrictions provided by economic theory like the magnitudes and 
sign of the esti111ated coetlicients (Hafer and Jansen, 1991: 157 and Enders. 
1995: 385). 
Although there are sonle cOInpeting procedures. Gonzalo( 1994), 
comparing tive of the 1110St widely used methods in empirical research, points 
out that Maximunl Likelihood in a fully specified error correction model by 
Johansen generates the nl0st reliable results when there are lnore than two 
variables in the model. This study shows that the estimates of the coefficients 
are distributed sYlnlnetrically with unbiased rnedian, and standard aSYlnptotic 
chi-squared tests might be ilnplemented for the hypothesis tests. The other 
111ethods do not have these properties. In addition. although these properties 
rely on aSYlnptotic theory. this comparison. \'ia i'v1ontc Carlo experimentation, 
suggests that the same is true of finite srunplcs. 
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The Johansen Procedure 
As mentioned above. in the Johansen procedure attention is focused on 
the rank of the impact n1atrix, I1 in a VECM like equation (5.14). Actually. the 
model used by Johansen and Juselius( 1990) . contains an intercept and other 
deterministic components: 
(5.15) ~ Y t t = [] 1 ~ Y t - I I + ... + rIk_1 ~ Y ' - k + + 1 -+- I1 ),,-1, + <l>D, + E, 
or compactly: 
where YI is a matrix of the I( 1) variables. I1 i• I1 and £1 are as defined in equation 
(5.14) and D t is the Inatrix of deterministic variables. Using Enders (1995:367) 
description, relationships between the rank of the l11atrix I1 and cointegration 
vectors can be revealed. Rearranging equation (5.15) gives: 
11Y'_k = ~ ) ' , , - ~ I 1 i i ~ Y ' - i i - <l>D, - E, 
Supposing all variables in )'t are 1(1) and the equation (5.15) represents a 
VECM, the left-hand side factor of the above equation must be a set of 
stationary linear cOlnbinations of the variables because all the right- hand side 
factors are 1(0). It is said that I1 is a Inatrix of constants. so the rows of I1 are 
cointegrated vectors of YI' As an exan1ple. the first linear stationary 
combination of non stationary variables iny, is ( [1IIYI(I-I)+- n 12 )'2(t-I) + ... + I1 ln 
Yn(/-1) ). There are three possibilities with three key points: 
1. The rank of Il is zero. which in turn means that nii equals zero for all 
i-j= 12, ... ,n. Thus there is no ilnpact of the deviation of each Yit from its 
long run path on ~ Y i " " In other words, there is no cointegration vector and 
also the V E C ~ 1 1 changes to a traditional V AR. 
2. If the impact matrix is of full rank, this n1cans that r = n. and there are n 
independent linear cOlllbinations which are stationary. Since an n dimension 
space is defined by at n10st n independent Ycctors therefore in this instance 
every linear cOlnbination of the variables in YI is stationary. in other words. 
these n independent vectors ,\pan the \vhole space or J',. This Ineans that 
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every other vector is only a linear conlbination of those n independent 
stationary vectors. hence they definitely must be stationary (Hafer and 
Jansen, 1991: 158). This is impossible unless all variables in y, are stationary 
which violates the initial assumption of nonstationarity of the variables. 
3. The alternative case is 0 < r < n, which. with satisfaction of the assumptions 
of I( 1) for the variables and the representation of the VECM (existence of 
long-run relationships) means that, there JTIust be at least one and at most ( n 
- 1) independent cointegration vectors. In other vvords. only when n has 
reduced rank can the long run relationships between I( 1) variables be 
acceptable. 
In other words (Harris, 1995: 79). for the error terms E, in equation 
(5.15) to be white noise, 1(0), it is necessary that nY,_k also be stationary. Only 
in three cases this condition is met. First when Y, contains only stationary 
variables, which is not consistent with the initial assumption. As such. there is 
no spurious regression problem, the model (5.15) is not appropriate and the 
estimation can be conducted on levels in a V AR. The second case is when there 
is no stationary linear C0111bination ofy, which implies there is no cointegration 
vector at all. This in turn inIplies that n is a nxn matrix of zeros. In this 
instance the proper nlodel is V AR in first differences not involving long-run 
terms. The third and interesting case in the cointegration context is the 
circUlnstance in which there exist up to (n-l) cointegration vectors, in1plying 
that the rank of n is r ~ ~ (n-l ). 
Once this is the case, the nxn Inatrix of cointegration vectors may be 
written as: 
n = a ~ ' '
where a and p are both reduced fom1 of (nxr) such that a reflects the speed of 
adjustnlent to disequilibriUJn and P contains the long-run coefficients so that 
p'Yt introduces up to (n-l) co integrated combinations of the \'ariables in the 
multivariate model which guarantee the convergence of the nonstationary 
variables of the JTIodd to their long-run equilibrium l analogous to y and (I. -
P). respectively in the single equation case. (5.12)\. 
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After all, it must appear that f1y,-k in equation (5.15) can onlv contain 
the cointegration vectors in p , otherwise it cannot meet stationary condition. In 
fact, p has r columns which make r independent linear combinations and (n-r) 
columns which form 1(1) comlnon trends. In consequence. the last (n-r) 
columns of a must be zero in order for fIY,_k to be stationary in equation (5.15). 
Therefore, in order to know the precise number of cointegration vectors the 
rank of TI should be known, which mnounts to the number of independent 
columns of p to be determined and this corresponds to testing how many 
columns of a are zero. In order to deternline the rank of fl, the number of its 
characteristic roots or eigenvalues should be ascertained. Eigenvalue of an nxn 
Inatrix TI, can be defined as A in : 
Ily,=AY, 
where y, refers to a nx 1 non-zero matrix. Rearranging. I being an nxn identity 
Inatrix, gives: 
( fI - AI ) y, = 0 
A non-zero y, entails the nlatrix ( n - AI ) to be singular, then its determinant 
01USt equal zero, I fI - AI 1= O. This introduces an equation of degree n which 
gives n roots for A. For each non-zero A there is an independent row (column) 
in matrix fl. As the rank of the matrix. say r . is detined as the number of the 
independent rows (columns) of the matrix. the number of non-zero AS 
introduces the rank r and for each (n-r) remaining dependent rows, A equals 
zero (Enders, 1995: 412). 
Now, the test of reduced rank can be introduced. Actually solving the 
determinant equation I II - AI 1= 0 derives 11 roots ~ ~ I > / ~ ~ 2) ... ) ~ ~ /I .Testing the 
hypothesis that at most r rows (columns) of ilnpact matrix n are independent. 
in other words, there are at nl0st r cointegration v ~ c t o r s . . is equivalent to testing 
~ ~ to be zero for the renlaining (n-r) nonstationan' processes: 
I • 
A 
Ho: AI = 0 for i = r +1. .... n. 
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This restriction can be set for different r (Harris. 1995: 87). The testing 
path is specified by Enders (1995: 390) as follows. Assume the n eigenvalues 
of the matrix n are obtained and ordered as i. I > i. 2 ) ••• > i. /I • The variables in )" 
being not cointegrated necessitates that the rank of n equals zero and in tum 
~ ~
all i s will be zero. As In( 1) = 0, each of the terms In( 1 - /" I) equals zero for 
all i if Yt does not contain cointegrated variables at all. Analogously. if the rank 
~ ~
of n is r • that means 0 < Ar < 1. and the tenns 111(1 - A I ) for i = 1.2 .... ,r will 
be negative but all A corresponding to (r+ 1,1, ...• n equal zero. This means ln(l 
A A 
-AI'+I) = ... = In(1-"-I/) = O. 
Checking the nU111ber of eigenvalues which are significantly different 
from zero can be implemented by the two test statistics: 
II 
AtraccCr) = - T I ~ ~In(l - A I) 
,,,,-+1 
~ ~
Amax(r, r+ 1) = - T In( 1 - / ... r+1 ) 
" 
where"- S are the estimates of eigenvalues gained fron1 the estimated nand T 
is the nU111ber of observations. If A; = 0 it is clear that Atrace will equal zero . 
.... 
However. In( 1- A;) will be 1110re negative if the estilnated characteristic root is 
further from zero, in consequence. the magnitude of Alraee will be larger. 
Comparison of this "-trace with its corresponding critical value provided in 
Johansen and luselius (1990) cOlnpletes the test. If the estimated value is 
greater than the critical value the restriction rank( n) = r is rejected and the 
next test is conducted. The Atraee statistic tests the null that there are less than or 
equal to r distinct cointegrating vectors against a general alternative. This 
means that rejection of the null runounts to concluding that the rank of the 
impact Inatrix \vill be r + 1. or r +1 ..... or 11. The other statistic (maximal 
eigenvalue. I"max) . tests the null hypothesis that there are r cointegration vectors 
against the explicit alternative (r + 1). Similarly. 1. IlL1 \ \vill be small \vhen the 
estimated values of the characteristic roots are close to zero. Note that. as 
Harris (1995: 89) states. some !\1onte Carlo studies sho\\ that the trace test 
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statistic is more powerful than the use of } ~ m a x ' ' Ne\'cI1heless. Enders (1995: 
393) says that j"max is usually preferred in order to clarity the number of the 
cointegration vector(s) via its explicit alternative. 
Lag Length and Non-nlodelled Components 
There are some noteworthy issues associated with this procedure. First 
the Johansen procedure aSSUlnes that the error terms in equation (5.15), Et , are 
Gaussian. That m e a n s ~ ~ they are normally distributed and are not autocorrelated. 
Hence the proper lag length of Yt Inust be set. This subject is itself related to 
the presence of the variables in the n10del which only int1uence the short-run 
Inovement of the variables under consideration. This lneans that the 
component(s) of Dt in model (5.l5) should also be detern1ined when the length 
of lag is being examined (Harris. 1995: 81). 
Enders (1995: 396) states that the outcomes of the test can be sensitive 
to the length of lagged variables due to the fact that maxilnum likelihood 
estimation used in this procedure is based upon the multivariate normality 
assumption. However. Holden and Perman (1995: 83) are of the opinion that 
this assurnption is not necessary in asymptotic argunlents. The Johansen 
procedure fratnework is intended to introduce suflicient lags to make sure that 
the error tern1S behave well. 
To ascertain the proper lag, the V AR n10de I (equation 5.14) is 
commonly used. Enders (1995: 396) suggests that the VAR model with the 
longest lag which seems appropriate is estimated tirst then repeated estimation 
determines whether the lags can be shortened. Harris (1995: 81) states that lag 
order determination is affected by the existence of weakly exogenous variables 
in Dt in model (5.15), which though not significant in long-run relationship, are 
iJuportant in the short-run. In other words. in son1e circlllnstances there may be 
some 1(0) variables which have an eiTect on the sh011-run path of the 
underlying variables so that the model can he conditioned on them. 
Incorporating variables in the model enables one to take account of the impact 
of short-run shocks like policy intervention and some other transitory events 
such as the two oil-price jumps in 1970s. In Johansen and luselius (1992) the 
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changes in oil prices have been included in their model for PPP using UK data 
and show that this conditioning makes the model residual close to normally 
distribution. In addition to such 1(0) variables. Dt may include intercept, trend 
and seasonal dunlmies as well. Seasonal dummy \'ariables are centred to 
guarantee that they totalize to zero through tinle and hence do not influence the 
asymptotic distributions on which the tests rely. Harri s (1 995: 81) states that 
including any other dUlnnlY variable can change the distribution of the test 
statistic, which in turn changes the critical values relating to the number of 
these kind of variables. In this situation the critical values reported in Johansen 
work are only indications, though they are used for testing in this procedure. 
Another relevant issue is the inclusion of a constant and time trend in 
the tTIodel, or into cointegration space. Adding a constant in the tHodel (5.15) 
permits the data generation process to have a linear time trend. Since in the 
long-term ny! = 0, it is expected that each l\Yit equals aOi (the constant 
associated with ith variable in the systenl). Summing all such changes through 
tinle entails the deterministic term uOit (Enders, 1995: 387). It is also possible 
to restrict the constant to be included only in co integration space. Once this is 
done, the linear tilne trend will be elinlinated from the system YI (Holden and 
Perman, 1995: 83 and Enders, 1995: 387). \Vith respect to the tilne trend, like 
the constant it can be sho\\'11 that the existence of a time trend in the model 
such as equation (5.15) leads to a quadratic trend in the process in long-run 
which does not seem possible. Thus the trend usually is restricted to lie only in 
the co integration relationship, restricting the system to contain at most a linear 
deterministic trend as a result of the existence of an unrestricted constant term 
(Doornik and Hendry, 1994b: 73). 
So far the issues relevant to estimation of the rank of the impact matrix 
have been considered. Before discussing an inlportant subject concerning the 
uniqueness of cointegration vector(s) it seems useful to propose a model 
introduced by Harris (1995: 96). This model enables one to consider the 
number of the rank and a constant and trend which might be included in short 
and / or long-run jointly. For simplicity it is assumed that k = 2 and Dt does not 
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compnse other variables except constant and trend. Therefore. the VECM 
(equation 5.5) can be rewritten as : 
(5.16) 
where Y -t-2 = [Yt-2 1 t]. Now four models can be examined: 
1. There are deterministic terms neither in data generation process nor in the 
cointegration space, which nleans /-1) = ~ l 2 2 = 6) = 82 = O. Of course, Harris 
(1995) emphasises that this is unlikely to happen in practice (Modell). 
2. There is no tendency in the level of the data to move upward or downward: 
that means there is no linear trend and in turn the first difJerenced sequence 
has a zero [nean, J.l2 = 01 = 02 = O. Therefore. the constant J.l1 is restricted to 
the cointegration vector(s) (Model 2). 
3. There is a drift tenn (linear trend ) Il1 the nonstationary data but it is 
assumed that the constant in the cointegration space is cancelled by the drift 
term in the short-run lTIodeL so 0, = 02 = 0 and in the estimation, J.l2 
incorporates J.l1 (Model 3). 
4. There is no quadratic trend in the level of the data which means the short-
run model does not include a tilne trend. However there is sonle unknown 
long-run exogenous gro'vv1h which is not explained by the nlodel. Thus a 
time trend is restricted to the cointegratioll space. So in this case 02 = 0 and 
the constant of cointegration vector(s). J.l1 is cancelled out by J.l2 ' the 
intercept of the short-run lTIodel (Model 4). 
Apart frOill the lllodel 1 which is unlikely to occur. all models 2-4 are 
estimated and the estinlates of Atrace and Ama\. are ordered from the most 
restricted alternative which is the case of r = 0 and Iv10del 2. to the least 
restrictive case. which nleans r = (n-l) and Model 4. Then the results are 
compared with the cOlTesponding critical values and the test stops only when 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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The Uniqueness Test 
As Doornik and Hendry n 994b: 75) state the Johansen approach 
estimates a set of cointegration vectors representing cointegration space. Thus 
any linear combination of these estinlated vectors makes a new cointegration 
vector . However, the l11atter of interest is to determine a unique set of 
cointegration vectors associated with an econOlnic theory. Otherwise, the 
estimated cointegration vectors as HalTis (1995: 95) points out. do not provide 
any information about the long-run economic relationships. Alternatively 
expressed, in order to interpret the cointegration vectors there must be a unique 
set of estimates for any individual colUlnn in p. Since the reduced rank 
regression approach only determines the nUlnber of unique stationary 
combinations which span the space of cointegration. and any linear 
combination of these stationary combinations is itself stationary . the 
interesting cOlnbination(s) can not be obtained straightforwardly. In sum .. 
the Johansen approach only provides in/iJrmatioJ1 on the uniqueness of the 
cointegralion .\pace, it is necessary fo impose restriclions motivated by 
economic arguments to obtain unique vectors (ving within that 5pace." ( 
Harris, 1995: 110). In fact, in this procedure, the rank of up', the impact 
111atrix, can only be deternlined while identification of specific elements of a 
and p requires the imposition of arbitrary constraints (Dickey et al , 1995: 24). 
Following Harris (1995: 98) the implications of inlposing restrictions 
on a and p can be indicated. As has been discussed above. n = ap' contains 
two kinds of infornlation; while p consists of the coefficients of the long-run 
relationship, a shows the speed of adjustlnent from disequilibrium. Moreover, 
it has been also shown that when r ~ ~ (n-1 ) cointegration vectors exist in p , this 
amounts to the existence of up to (n-l) zero columns in u. In consequence. the 
problem of detelmining r, number of cointegration vectors, is equivalent to 
examining how many COIUnlJlS of u are zeroo 
Based upon this description. the role of non-zero columns of a can be 
c l a r i f i e d ~ ~ each non-zero colunln of a shows wohich (ointegration vector affects 
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which short-run path and how fast is the speed of effect. For example. if r = 1 
and: 
then: 
because other (n-r) = 2 columns of a will be zero. Consequently. there is a 
single long-run relationship represented by ( ~ I I Y l t - 1 1 T ~ 2 1 Y l t - 1 1 + P:"Xt_l) and a21' 
for instance, corrresponds to the cointegration \'ector in modelling ~ Y 2 t : : this 
variable adjusts to disequilibrium with the speed of a21' As an another 
example, the case r = 2 and k = 2 can be also explained in full VECM model: 
~ Y l t t ~ Y I I - I I all (II:! [ ~ ~ " P 21 ~ , , ] ] Y 11-1 ~ Y 2 t t =r l ~ Y 2 t - 1 1 + a 21 an Y ~ t - I I + Et ~ ~ 12 ~ 2 2 2 P \ ~ ~~ X t t ~ X t _ 1 1 a:>1 a I:! x t _1 
If a31 = a32 = 0 then neither of the two cointegration vectors enter into the 
equation for ~ X l l so it contains no information abollt the long-run relationships. 
t\10re generally, the existence of all zero aij , j = 1. 2 ..... r. for row i shows that 
the long-Iun vectors are not included in ~ Y i t . . In such a case. weak exogenity to 
the system is acceptable for ~ Y i t t and this variable can be transferred to the 
right-hand side of VECl'v1. Not modelling ~ Y i l l does not lead to loss of any 
inforn1ation. though it relnains in cointegration space. 
Regarding p. what is interesting fi'OlTI an economic theory point of view 
is that SOlne particular relation bet\veen variables in long-run can be examined. 
for example proportionality or a special size or sign of the coefficients 
lllotivated by theory. Restrictions such as PII = - P21 and P ~ I < < 0 are two cases in 
point. 
Enders (1995: 393) believes that the most attractive view of the 
Johansen approach is that it permits the restricted 1()l'n1S of cointegration 
vector(s) to be tcsted straightforwardly. The important point to understand. is 
that inlposing constraints must not decrease thc number of stationary 
combinations of the variables. In other words. if r cointcgration vcctor(s) exist 
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the restrictions do not jeopardise the stationarity of these r combinations and all 
remaining linear combinations stay nonstationary. Consequently. if the 
restricted fonn is estimated. the corresponding eigenvalues are ordered 
"'. "". "". ....." A. j,,)A 2 )···)Ar and the unrestricted eigenvalues i , , > / . ~ > >... >i'-r' then (for the 
validity of the restrictions) all values of In( 1 - ~ : ) ) should be insignificantly 
.... 
different from In(1 - Ai)' The statistic: 
asymptotically has a X2 distribution. The degrees of freedom are equal to the 
number of constraints imposed on p and a. The null hypothesis is the validity 
) 
of restrictions. which can be rejected if the estimated x- statistic exceeds the 
corresponding amount of the critical value. 
5.5.4 Seeking a Long-run Relationship in the Model 
Based on the analysis in the previous section. and bearing in mind the 
whole model, three long-run relationships may exist among the variables as far 
as the cointegration test is concerned: 
1. Corresponding to the price equation (4.12). since in the long-run (mt_l- Pt-I) 
= (n1t - Pt) a cointegration relation Inay exist among real Inoney stock, real 
income and the expected rate of inflation: (m - p). y. 7t. 
2. Regarding the income equation (4.13). for the sanIe reason there may be a 
long-run relationship bet\veen real income . real oi I income and real 
governn1ent expenditure: y. oy. (g - p). 
3. With regard to the governnlent revenue equation (4.14). as R and OR are in 
nonlinal tern1S ,md (log Yt + log Pt) is also nominal income. dividing the two 
sides by price. there may be a long-run relation bet\veen real government 
revenue. real oil-induced govermnent revenue and real inC01ne: rr, ror. y. 
Concerning the money equation and the ~ q u a t i o n n for the expected rate 
of intlation (eqs. 4.15 and 4.16). the former is d e r i \ ' ~ d d lI'om the definition of 
the money stock and is an identity. and the latter is specified by the 
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assumption of adaptive expectations. Thus. it does not need to be tested for 
existence of a long-run relationship. 
The first stage of the cointegration test is identification of the order of 
integration of the variables. In the previous section we saw that all the variables 
are 1(1). Given this, the tests continue for possible long-run relationships 
among the three sets of variables n1entioned above indi\'idually. We do not use 
one big V AR to seek cointegration relationships because the associated tests 
would have very low power. 
Long-run Relation(s) Among y, (g-p) and oy 
First, the existence of cointegration vector(s) between real income. real 
oil income and real governn1ent expenditure is considered. The model is treated 
as a system represented by a VAR with five lags on each of y. oy and (g-p). 
plus a constant ilTIposed onto cointegration space: equation (5.15) with k = 5 
and Dt contains only an intercept imposed onto cointegration vector(s). In other 
words, the model is represented by equation (5.16) with P2 = 8, = 82 = O. This 
SeelTIS appropriate because there are linear trends in the level of the data; in 
other words, the first-differenced data have a zero mean (Figure 2). This is the 
first practical model according to Harris (1995: 96). The length of lag is 
selected by starting at eight lags on every variable and testing sequentially from 
the highest order conducted until k = 4 to be sure about lag specification. In 
other words, in a sn1all sample over-rejection is a problem in Johansen 
approach which \vorsens vvhen the order of lag increases (Reimers, 1992). thus. 
the parsimonious principle has to be adopted. 
The well-behaved residual of the model with five lags implies it is 
probably specified correctly (but an autocorrelation problem appears with k = 
4). However. the cointegration test indicates there is no long-run relationship 
between the variables, in other words. r = O. which means all three vectors are 
nonstationary. Inspecting the plots of these variables (depicted in Figure 3) 
suggests there might well be a structural break around 1976. There are some 
analytical reasons which confirm this suspicion. ,\fter the \\indfall induced by 
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oil price jump in 1973, government expenditure and imports sharply increased. 
These increases were not consistent with the absorptive capacity of the 
economy. Consequently, after two or three years increasing prices reversed the 
path of government expenditure. Bottlenecks and shortages of infrastructure 
began to constrain production. In addition, world price increases, affected by 
the oil price rise, reduced oil income which in turn. put new pressures on 
production. Likewise, the increase of world prices aggravated domestic 
inflation, worsening government real revenue. which had started to decrease 
earlier. For the first time in the period the governnlent experienced a sizeable 
budget deficit (which has continued thereafter) because the decline of revenue 
was faster than that of expenditure. 
Figure 3 : Structural Break in some variables of the model 
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In accordance with this analysis. supp0l1ed by the plots. appropriate 
dummies will enter into the lTIodel. Analogously to the \\'ork of Perron (1995) 
in unit root test context, the VECM changes to : 
(5.17) ~ y , , = 2::=1 n, ~ Y I _ ' ' + nY,_5 + 8 DV, + A DT, + E, 
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where DU = 1 and DT = t - T I, if t > T I and are zeros otherwise. T I is the 
break time, the second quarter of 1976, Yt = [Yt (g-p)t 0Ytr and [] contains 
constant terms. Encompassing these dummies leads to the cointegration test 
sho\ving the expected relationship. Estimating equation (5.1 7) and using 
diagnostic checking generate the results sunllnarised in Table 5. These tests 
have been conducted because before the cointegration test the residuals being 
white noise must be demonstrated. 
The diagnostic tests involve F-test for the null that the coefficient of the 
i-period lag (Fk=i) is zero; that there is no error autocorrelation (Fall' frOln lag 1 
to 5); that there is not autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (Farch' from 
lag 1 to 4); that there is no heteroskedasticity ( F h e t ) ~ ~ and finally a X2 -test for 
normality. The results for the system are labelled as "multivariate tests". Fun-
statistics also show the significance of the regressors in D t . 
Table 5: Model Evaluation Diagnostics: y, g-p, oy 
Statistic y (g-p) oy 
Fk'=f (3, 52) 143.95** 0.861 78** 
Fk -=2 (3, 52) 30.72** l.35 18.05** 
F k =3 (3, 52) 9.68** 0.732 7.29** 
Fk '=4 (3, 52) 3.42* 6 "'4** ._) 4.39** 
Fk'''5 (3, 52) 1.52 1.13 2.84* 
Fall (5, 49) 2.44* 1 "'-. .J) 1.11 
Fare" ( 4 ~ ~ 46) 0.91 1.8 3.51 * 
Fhef (30, 23) 0.77 0.73 1.89 
X"\1(2) 5.78 2.21 42.35** 
tvlultivariate tests: Fall (45. 110) = 1.3, 
Fhet(l80, 1 14) = 0.62, X2n{ 6) = 71.66* * . 
f ~ n ( 4 8 . . 155) = 1430.3** 
Table 5 introduces a significant fifth lagged-value for 01'. therefore five 
lags of all the variables enter into the model. owing to the necessity of a 
similar lag in the cointegration analysis (Harris. 1995: 82). The other diagnostic 
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results introduce an acceptable model with respect to the residuals being \vhite 
noise. Single equation diagnostics indicate the nonnality problem for oy. oil-
GDP. However, according to the argun1ent of Johansen and luselius (1992) 
non-normality of a variable is not ilnportant if its weak exogeneity can be 
proved, as is the case for oy (See below). Applying the Johansen approach to a 
reduced rank regression leads to the results cited in Table 671 . This Table 
shows the various hypotheses tested, from no long-run relationship or no 
cointegration, r = 0, to the highest rank. r = 2 which means that there are two 
cointegration vectors. The rank hypotheses are represented in column 1. The 
Table 6 : Tests of cointegration rank on )', oy, (g-p) 
Ho:r "').... I "')...max Adjusted 95 4% " ' ) . . . I r : l n ~ ~ Adjustd 95% 
r =n-3=0 0.265 22.21 * 17.58 22.0 46.89** 37.12* 34.9 
r <n-2=1 0.239 19.69* 15.59 15.7 24.68* 19.54 20.0 
r <n-l=2 0.067 4.993 3.953 9.2 4.993 3.953 9.2 
various characteristic roots (eigenvalues) corresponding to three combinations 
of I( 1), levels of the underlying variables. are ordered from highest to smallest 
in column 2. The nlaximal eigenvalue statistics are reported in column 3 and 
their adjusted values (described below) are reported in the next column. The 
corresponding critical values of ~ ~ ma, are shown in column 5. Columns 6-8 are 
related to the trace statistic. 
The associated eigenvectors (P') are represented in the rows of Table 7. 
and the corresponding adjustment coefficients (a) are reported in the colUlnns 
of Table 8. 
Table 7 : Normalised Characteristic \' ectors, P' 
y (g-p) 0)' constant 
r3 1 ' 1.000 -0.278 -0.191 -6.794 
~ 3 2 2 ' -5.099 1.000 1.272 ..,.., 1 .... -,_. -) 
r3J' -0.18 -0.394 1.000 -S.245 
71 Here PcFiml 8.0 is used. the approach in which determining [he rank and related 
cointegrating vectors is based upon Johansen ( 1988). 
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Table 8: Adjustment Coefficients, u for y, (g-p) and oy 
u) a., a3 
y -0.066 -0.003 -0.004 
(g-p) 0.474 -0.268 0.02 
oy 0.226 -0.011 -0.045 
Table 6 indicates that the ~ ~ and 
max 
statistics are significant at 50/0 
level testing the null hypotheses r =0 and r S; 1 but insignificant for r S; 2. In 
other words, r < 1 is rejected while r S; 2 is not therefore it seems there may be 
two cointegration vectors. However. Reimers (1992) by Monte Carlo 
investigation points out that in small sanlples the Johansen approach over-
rejects null hypotheses and states that this prohlem can be remedied by a 
tTIodification proposed by Reisel and Ahn (1988). Their suggestion of using (T 
- nk ) rather than T adjusts the test statistic consistent with small samples, 
where, T is sample size, n is number of the underlying variables and k is lag 
order. Using the adjusted values of the test statistics. only r = 0 is rejected 
according to the trace-test statistic whilst r S; 1 is not that Ineans there is one 
cointegration vector. Consideration of the columns of u reported in Table 8, 
confirnls this conclusion. As nlentioned ahove if r = 1 the last n - r = 2 
colunlns of u should be insignificantly small. \\hich is the case in the columns 
U2 and (13 in Table 8. Moreover, imposing a restriction r = 2 changes the 
impact matrix, n more than when r = 1 is inlposed. that implies that r = 1 )s 
preferable (Doornik and Hendry, 1994b: 78). 
The approach terminates with exogeneity tests 011 (g-p) and oy which 
implies the uniqueness of the cointegration vcctor. Imposing the two rows 
restrictions Uj = 0, for i = 2 and 3 gives rise to a LR-kst. (:!(2) = 1.09 which 
strongly contimls the validity of the restrictions. Thus. real national income in 
the long-run is described by real governnlent expenditure and the real oil sector 
IIlcome as: 
y = 6.95 + 0.3 (g-p) + 0.17 oy 
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with a new restricted value of adjustment coefficient all = -0.07. The details of 
the tests are provided in Appendix 6. 
Long-run Relationship Betweell rr, ror and y 
Analogous to the previous section. equation (5.15) with an intercept 
imposed onto cointegration space has been llsed to exan1ine whether any 
cointegration vector exists for real government total revenue (rr), real 
government oil-induced revenue (ror) and real income (y). A zero mean of the 
first-differenced variables (Figure 2) confirms the appropriateness of the model 
(Harris, 1995:96). The lag-length is k = 4. determined by diagnostic checking. 
It seems there is a structural break during 1974. The earlier break time in the 
path of real oil revenue and total revenue relative to the previolls model is not 
unexpected. As discussed in the theoretical analysis, in developing countries 
there are credible reasons why increasing price affects revenue faster than 
expenditure. In developing countries. the tax system has a low nominal income 
elasticity and taxes are paid with long lags (Aghevli and Khan, 1978). 
Furthermore, in Iran's case, a considerable part of the revenue is oil revenue 
which is an exogenous variable (as discussed below). In consequence. the 
impact of increasing pnces on revenue commenced earlier than other 
variables like income and government expenditure (Figure 3). 
The model evaluation diagnostics are set out in Table 9. Single equation 
tests indicate plausible results. Although the income equation shows 
autocorrelation even with four lags the desired outcomes of the multivariate 
tests introduce uncorrelated nonnaHy distributed residuals for the whole 
systeln. The significant fourth lagged-value for y persuades us to enter the 
SaIne lagged values of the two other variables into the model in keeping with 
the need for equal lag-lengths in a cointegration context. 
Cointegration tests generate the outcomes summarised in Tables 10-12. 
Table 10 indicates that by examining the adjusted maximal eigenvalue test 
statistic ( ~ ~ ) and the adJ' usted trace statistic ( i ~ ~ . . ) at the:) percent level the 
max ", I( ( 
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Table 9: Model Evaluation D i a g n o s t i c s ~ ~ rr. r o r , ~ ' '
Statistic rr ror \' 
Fkoo , (3.56) , , 3.-1- 7" 180.8-1-** -.-
Fk=2(3,56) 1.1 1.92 ~ 8 . 7 3 * * *
Fk=3 (3, 56) 2.74 1..18 1:'.59** 
Fk=,,, (3, 56) 0.77 0.052 9.02** 
Fall (4, 54) 0.85 0.28 3.7-1-** 
Farch (4, 50) 0.12 0.48 2.-1-4 
Fhc' (24, 33) 0.74 1.55 0.64 
XL Jl(2) 8.27* 4.07 1.99 
Multivariate tests: F(I/((36. 130) = 1.27. 
'1 
F"e,( 144, 171 ) = 0.84. j("Jl{ 6) =:: 6.9 
Fu,,(39, 166) = 384.64* ':' 
1...-
hypothesis of no cointegration vector. r = 0, is strongly re.iected but r :S; 1 is not. 
Thus. it can Ix: concluded that there is one c(lintegration \ ector among the three 
~ ~ ~ ~
variables justi fied by the two last relativel) small I..'igenvalues (A:2' A J ). The 
small magnitudes of the elements of a ( o ~ ~ ~ and « ( ~ ~ in Table 12) is another 
reason. 
Table 10 : Tests of co integration rank on IT. ror, Y 
-Hf):r /\ )'i /\ /\.111:1\ Adj listed 95"/" ,,-1"'11 :Ill' .\djusted 95% 
r =n-3=0 0.38H .15.85** 29.96** 22.0 "'8 ( ,** - .)- -1-8.98** 34.9 
-
r :S;n-2'=1 0.195 15.85* 1 '1 -)-1- I - 7 I, 77* 19.02 20.0 .L _ ). ' 
--. 
r :S;n-I =2 O.OC)O 6.917 5.78 9.2 6.917 5.78 9.2 
According to Table 11 and corresponding to the tirst eigenvalue, the 
long-run relZitionship is : 
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Table It : Normalised Characteristic Vectors, P' 
rr ror y constant 
Pl ' 1.000 -0.300 -0.697 4.456 
P2' -1.466 1.000 1.791 -14.67 
J3/ 0.499 -0.527 1.000 -9.250 
Table 12: Adjustment Coefficients, a 
al a2 a3 
rr -1.353 0.059 0.0017 
ror -1.464 -0.181 0.473 
Y -0.007 -0.021 -0.015 
and the adjustment coefficient in the short-run model is all = -1.35 (Table 12). 
The results are consistent with the predicting of the theoretical analysis. 
Testing for weak exogeneity of y and ror in this model shows that y is 
weakly exogenous but ror is not. In other words, the row restriction aij = O. 
for i = 3 and j = 1,2 is not rejected while the two rows restriction aij = 0, for i = 
2,3 and j = 1.2 is rejected. Likewise, thr row restriction for i = 2 and j = 1.2 
corresponding to weak exogeneity of ror is rejected, that in turn nleans, the 
weak exogeneity assumption about y is valid \vhile as for ror weak exogeneity 
does not seen} acceptable. In other words, in the long-run the real oil-induced 
revenue depends on total revenue. 
However, actual evidence confirnls that government oil-induced 
revenue should be exogenous in this ITIodel. As mentioned in chapter 3 the oil 
revenue of the governnlent is the oil export earning equivalent in Rials. Oil 
production of the country is limited by the decision of the Organization of 
Petroleunl Exporting Countries. OPEC, and oil prices are deternlined in world 
markets. Therefore, in a fixed exchange rate regime. which was the case in 
Iran. it is obvious that oil revenue has been determined exogenously. Here. it 
seenlS worth considering a question about the production of oil. that is whether 
the government has decided the volume of oil production according to its 
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earning policy based on the OPEC Quota system. In that case the oil revenue 
would have depended on total revenue. Howe\'er. the government during the 
period, had continuously attemped to produce as much as possible up to Quota 
amount, though in some periods the Iraq - Iran war presented new limitations. 
The reason was that even with full production a high budget deficit was 
experienced owing to the huge expenditure. In consequence. the weak 
exogeneity of oil revenue can confidently be concluded analytically. 
Sonle reason can be proposed in order to interpret the contradictory 
econometric result. Total revenue defined as a sum of non-oil revenue and oil 
revenue in other words, there is an identity like: 
R = Y1 OR + Y2 NOR 
In an identity it is not surprising that the variables show two sides dependent in 
an econometric sense. Appendix 7 proposes detai led associated tests. 
Long-run Relation Alnollg (m-p), 7t and y 
In this section the existence of a long-run relationship between real 
Inoney balances (m-p). the expected rate of inflation (7t) and real income (y) is 
investigated. Following the proposed procedure, equation (5.15) is applied but 
with an unrestricted constant and a trend imposed onto the cointegration space. 
the fourth model suggested by Harris (1995: 96). This is preferred because 
contrary to the two previous cases the first-differenced series do not have a zero 
mean but show a downward trend. Additionally. since 7t is 1(0) it is regarded 
non-modelled and entered in the cointegration space (Banerjee et al, 1994). 
Diagnostic checking of the Inodel indicates a high serial correlation between 
the residuals. 
However. inspecting the path of real money balance and also the long-
run graph (Figure 4) persuades one to consider a structural break around 1980. 
There seems to be some acceptable reason for this suspicion. After the Islamic 
revolution. the new government caine into power in 1979. Revolutionary 
circumstances with signiticant implementation like comprehensive 
nationalisation induced uncertainty to dominate pri \'ate c ~ ( l n o m i c c activities. 
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Figure 4: Real Money Path and Cointegration Vector (First Model) 
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Iraq's invasion in 1980 and the partial occupation of several border provinces 
including the inlportant oil province, Khozestan, worsened the uncertainty. In 
addition, as vital military and non-military merchandises had to be met by 
ilnport, real foreign assets decreased more than 5-fold during the post-war 
period. The banking systenl's claim on the private sector retlects uncertainty. 
In real terms clailns were Rials 40.4 bn at the first quarter of 1971, increased at 
an average rate of 15.5 per cent per year to 148.1 bn the first quarter of 1980 
but decreased during the following decade ending 1990, at an annual rate of 
171 
Chapter 5: Econometric inl'esriRation 
-3.7 per cent to Rials 101.8 bn. Regarding narrowly detined Inoney, M) which 
is the definition used inthe model, Table 13 illustrates the growth rate of high-
powered lnoney's components in the two subperiods. The clainls of central 
bank on the banking system and foreign assets display negati\'e changes and 
government obligations, although remaining positive. decline sizeably. That is 
why a structural break in 1980 seems acceptable. 
Table 13 : Annual growth rate of MI 's components 1980-1988 (%) 
1\1. Pre-war Post-war 
Period Period 
] 97] -] 980 1980-1990 
Banks Obligations 18.1 -12 
Foreign Assets ,.,,., -16.5 .:'-1 
Go"t. Obligations 16.6 6.7 
Entering the break dumlnies into the n10del reilloves the autocorrelation 
problem. Six lags are chosen for the variables. Although the sixth lag seems 
insignificant. if it is onlitted autocorrelation problen1s again arise. Owing to the 
complex interrelation between the variables. in an unrestricted statistical 
system a low t-ratio does not always mean the corresponding variable is 
redundant and can be elinlinated (Harvey, 1990:113). As Gonzalo (1994) 
points out , choosing too long a lag does not lead to lower efficiency of 
Inaximum likelihood estinlation (MLE) but lIsing too short a lag Inakes MLE 
no longer the best method. The results of the diagnostic checking are 
sun1marised in Table 14. 
The cointegration test results are set out in Table 15-17. According to 
" " 
Table 15 both criteria, Inaxilnal eigenvalue and trace test (A ma:- and A 'run' ) 
strongly reject the hypothesis of no cointegration vector. r = O. and since their 
corresponding values do not reject the hypothesis r = 1 or r s 1 respectively. 
that nleans there is one cointegration vector. Relatively small values for the 
second eigenvalue and the eienlents of the corresponding column of a (u:! in 
Table 17) confirm this conclusion. Tahle 16 r e p r e s ~ n t s s the nornlalised 
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eigenvectors ( ~ ' ) ) associated with the rank of the impact matrix. Uniqueness of 
the cointegration vector is \ alidated by a test of \\'cak exogeneity of real 
income in this context. In other words, one row rc:-;triction is placed on a. The 
Table 14 : Model Evaluation Diagnostics; m-p and y 
Statistic m-p \ 
. 
FA=I (2, 53) 18.975** i'"'-S-7** __ 1,).( ) 
FA=2(2,53) 0.515 52.141** 
FA=3 (2, 53) 0.704 19.675** 
FA" .J (2. 53) 3.034 X.67Q** 
f ~ = 5 5 (2, 53) 2.231 -+'09R* 
FA=6 (2, 53) 0.215 2.177 
f ~ 1 / f f (6, 48) ·-+.02** 0.620 
Farch (4. 46) 0.35R 1.764 
F"er (31, 22) 0.54 0.61 
j 
- 'J) X 11(';'" I'"' '"' i*>l: _.1 .. 1_ 4.57 
Multivariate tests: I ~ I I ( ( 20. B6 )-= 1.22. 
) 
F"el174, 137) = 0.63. ~ C n ( 4 ) ) = 2 X . 7 5 ~ ' '
E · ~ 1 f 1 ( 3 2 . . 106) = 573.76* * 
outcon1e indicates the validity of thl;? restriction. Consequently. according to 
the reduced and final fonn of ~ ~ there is a long-run l"L'lalion among the variables 
with an adjustment coefficient a = -0.2X as: 
(m-p) = 0.106 Y - 5.679 IT + 0.05 l T 2.(){) lJU - 0.056 DT 
Table 15 : Tests of cointegration rank on (m-p), 7t and y 
Ho:r "').... ") Adjusted 95°;', " Jot ran' Adjusted 95°;', I " III ax 
2(). 7() ':: * 1 q.() ... L ~ . 5 2 * * * ~ h _ 1 6 * * * ..., - '"' r = n - ~ ~ () (), ~ ~ ()) ~ 2 . 2 * * * -),. ) 
r sn-\=\ O . l - ~ ~7 1 1 . ~ n n l) .-lO 1 ~ . . ~ ~ ~ I 1 .31 9.'+0 1 2 . ~ ~
,\PJ1L'ndi\. 8 ddai Is thl;? related tests. 
1 7 _ ~ ~
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Concluding the cointegration discussion. it seems that there is a long-
run relationship aJTIong every set of the variables involved in each equation of 
the model. Thus. the whole model can he estimated without \\orrying about 
spurious regression problems. 
Table 16 : Normalised Characteristic \' cctors, ~ . .
(m-p) y 7r trend DlJ DT 
~ 1 1 ' 1.000 -0.062 5.734 -0,05 ' 0--' --. ) ) 0.056 
~ 2 ' ' 0.025 l.OOO 1.316 0.001 0.167 -0.008 
Table 17: Adjustment Coefficients, a 
(11 (12 
(m-p) -0,284 (). 04 () 
Y 0.019 - ( L O ~ 8 8
5.6 Model Estimation 
As discussed in chapter 4. the chosen model contains t i \ ' l ~ ~ behavioural 
or definitional equations: 
\\; here 
Pt = - Aao - Aal Yt + Iva2 7rt - ( l - / ~ ) ( m m - P)\_I + 111\ 
Yt = 8bll + 8b , OYt -+- llh2 gt - Ob2 Pt + ( 1-0) Yt-I 
r1 = 'Ito + Tt( Oft + Tt2 (y + p)t + (1-1) r l_( 
m t ~ = = ml11 t + k() + k 1 gt - k2 r t + k, l'l 
1\ = Conslllller price index. C Pl 
\ = real income (GDP) 
g = nominal gl.)\ crnmcnt c\\lL'nditure 
r = nominal go\'crnment revenue 
m = nominal mll11CY :-.l\.Kk 
IT = c\.pl'l'll.'d r"lll.' ()f intlatii.'Il 
p\' - rcal incomc 1.1\ nil -;L'Ctlll' 
1 7 ~ ~
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or = oil-induced revenue of the government 
lnm = money multiplier 
e = remainder elements of high powered money consisting of: change in 
central bank claims on private sector, international reserve change. 
lagged value of high-powered money and error item included because 
~ C G G may differ frotn (G-R) 
All the variables are in logarithtns except 11:. The Jast two are derived by 
definition. The coefficients of the money equation. n1 t are approximated by : 
1 ko = log [exp(g ) - exp(r) + exp(e)] * 
exp(g) - exp(r) + exp(e) 
[exp(g) * g - exp(r) * r + exp(e) * ej 
k _ exp(g) 
I - exp(g) - exp(r) + exp( e) 
k = exp(r) 
2 exp(g) - exp(r) + exp(e) 
k = exp(e) 
3 exp(g) - exp(r) + exp(e) 
Thus the money stock equation is: 
lnt = n1n1 t - 4.34 + 0.19 gt - 0.149 rt + 0.95 ct 
and the equation for expectated inflation. based on Cagan approach (see 5.3), is 
calculated as : 
7t t = O . 9 ~ ~ P 1-\ + 0.1 7t t-I 
[n return, only the first three equations should be estimated. As they depend 
upon one another conten1poraneously. it is a simultaneous equations model. 
The concept of sirnultaneous equations. as Judge et al (1985:563) state. 
has en1erged fron1 the fact that in reality usually all variables are independent: 
it is difficult to isolate a specific relation 'vvhile the associated data are so 
frequently passively generated. Contrary to single equation models, which 
address one-way causality. in a sin1ultaneous equations s ~ ~ stem the variables are 
jointly detennined. In other words a variable which appears in an equation of a 
system as an explanatory variable must contemporaneously be described by 
some other dependent variable(s) of the system. That means the current and 
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past values of endogenous variables of a system have a role in explaining each 
other's behaviour. 
To introduce the Inethod of estimation of simultaneous equations with 
which this thesis is concerned. following Harvey (1990: 280). Hendry and 
Doornik (1994) and D00l11ik and Hendry (1994b:chp8). a general-to-specific 
approach is applied. This approach begins with a statistical system defined in 
terms of all the variables, both modelled and non-modelled, along with their 
lag polynomials : 
r Cf 
(5.18) y, = InI/Y'-1 + L:TI 2 /z,_, + VI' ",- N (0, Q) for 1 =1. .... T 
;=1 1=0 
(5.18) represents a general unrestricted dynamic systelTI which contains all the 
variables of interest. Under certain conditions, this systelTI can be used as a 
baseline to construct the econometric model. An econometric model is a set of 
simultaneous structural equations which are regarded as a descriptive model of 
the system. This structure can be defined as a set 0 f essential invariant 
characteristics of the economic mechanism. The existence and identification of 
such a structure is an unresolved issue in econometrics. However, it is argued 
that the nlodel derived frOlTI the statistical systelTI can describe the structure 
(provided, of course, the reduction procedure is carried out successfully). 
The most inlportant point in the procedure is that the system IS 
congruent. This is necessary for both subsequent simplification and model 
eval uation. 
Congruency for equation (5.18) requires that: 
(i) VI is a homoscedastic white noise process. 
(ii) ZI contains variables which are \veakly exogenous to the paranleter 
of interest. n 
(iii) all parameters of interest are constant (Hendry et aL 1988:207) 
As the systenl (5.18) has only predetermined variables as explanatory 
variables it can be estimated by OLS, obtaining consistent estimates. Then to 
ensure congruency the following procedures must be conducted: 
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1) The first requirement can be Inet by specit\ing a long enough lag 
structure. Selection of lag lengths rand q are data based or a priori 
or a mixture of the two. Here, in a statistical model. parsimony is not 
as ilnportant as ensuring that the residual is a white noise process 
(Hendry et aI, 1988:208). It is worth notting that the system need 
not contain all lagged values (Doornik and Hendry, 1994b: 169). 
2) The weak exogeneity of Zt can be addressed within the cointegration 
discussion. It is necessary to mention that estimation of the system 
by OLS is valid if the variables involved are integrated of order zero, 
1(0) or cointegrated. It is assumed that the integration and 
cointegration issues have already been addressed. 
3) Regarding constancy of the parmneters, Hendry and Doornik 
(1994:3) state that recursive estimation has had a central role in 
many recent enlpirical investigations. In order to avoid a huge set of 
information as a result of recursive estimation, they recommend 
inspection of the associated graphs. Graphical analysis provided in 
this work is used to exanline parameter constancy (Doornik and 
Hendry, 1994a: 141). Harvey (1990: 159, 152-53) suggests 
inspection of the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) plots as a 
way of testing heteroscedasticity and paranleter constancy. This is 
sinlilar to the tests provided in this work (Doornik and Hendry, 
1994b: 268) 72. 
Given congruency of the system, the dilnensioll of the system can be 
reduced. This transformation reduces the dependency of the estimated system 
on the sanlple size and increases its invariance to change (Hendry and Doornik, 
1994:22). 
Once all this is done, the t?conometric model can be constructed to 
separate the autononlOliS relations. based on an economic theory with 
interpretable parameters. This is only possible if SOI11t? restriction is imposed on 
72 Furthermore. Kmenla (1990: 2(9) stales thal .. unlt>ss there are some special 
circumstances or the time period covered IS ~ ' e l ) ' ' 101lg. the assumption of homoscedasticiry in 
aggregate models St'ems plausible ". 
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0) and O2 in (5.18). In other words. a restricted representation elnerging from 
a congruent unrestricted svstem is an econometric model which has an 
. 
economic interpretation and is in harmony with the relevant theory. A 
likelihood ratio statistic of over-identifying restrictions is a powerful way of 
evaluating the validity of the reduced form of the systeln. i.e .. if the LR statistic 
is not rejected in the reduced form, the structural econometric Inodel is an 
acceptable paranleterization elnerging fi'om the V AR system (Hendry and 
1\1izon, 1993: 273)83). 
The progress can be summarised ( Doornik and Hendry. 1994b: 286) as: 
1) Formulation of a dynamic system. 
2) Examining the integration and cointegration features of the data. 
3) Transfornlation to a group of variables \vith low intercorrelations 
but interpretable parameters. 
4) Testing the validity of the system. 
5) Moving to dynamic nl0del fonnulation. 
6) Renloving unintended regressors to obtain a parsilnonious model. 
7) Exarrlining the model's validity by a complete set of tests. in 
particular of parsinlonious enconlpassing through over-identifying 
restrictions. 
5.6.1 Empirical Results 
As the variables of interest are all l( 1). as shown in the preceding 
sections. an eITor correction version of the systeln such as equation (5.15) is 
used: 
l5.19) 
There are two noteworthy issues: 
1. Because of their significant role. integration and cointegration are 
discussed independently in the previous sections and the resulting 
nlodel is used to combine the short-run and long-run. The system 
contains all the yariables of the tirst three theoretical equations. 
which define pnce, income and government revenue. The other 
variables are taken as weakh exogenous with respect to the 
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parameters of interest for the reasons provided in the cointegration 
discussion. 
2. Estimation of the system including expected rates of inflation results 
in a strange magnitude of t-statistic for expected inflation variable (t 
= 154.24). Three reasons lnay be suspected for this exceptional 
characteristic. Firstly, recalling the adaptive expectation fonnation: 
the weight ~ , , based on Cagan approach. is set at 0.9. This leads to 
the expectated inflation series being very close to actual inflation 
( ~ P t ) ) which is itself a dependent variable of the system. In other 
w o r d s ~ ~ we are almost regressing a variable on itself. In such a 
situation a very large t-ratio does not seenl sLlrprising. Secondly. it 
may be associated with a deficiency of the Cagan approach in 
deriving the expected rate of inflation (discLlssed in section 5.3). One 
ilnp0l1ant defect of the Cagan method is that the initial equation used 
to choose lninilllUlll RSS may contain nonstationary time series 
which leads to OLS estimation not being reliable any more. Here, the 
original price equation used for this purpose contains a mixed set of 
l(l) and 1(0) variables. Thirdly, it may have arisen because of the 
semi-logarithmic form of the price equation in Aghevli and Khan's 
nlodel in which price. money and income were presented in logs but 
the expected rate of inflation was in levels. This was necessary 
because expectation of intlation in SOlne quarters was negative. 
F or these r e a s o n s ~ ~ contemporaneous expected inflation is eliminated from the 
right hand side of the systenl. Figure 5 plots the time series for the dependent 
variables. 
The lag length is selected by starting from :) lags for all variables. 
Finally, three lags t'(lr all variables are selectcd (the lowcr lag lengths arsise 
autocorrelation problems) . Dt in (5.19) contains seasonals. ny._1 consists of 
three cointegrated combinations obtained in the pre\'ious sections: 
Clp (m-p)·t- 5,679 1t - 0.106 Y - 2.06 Dt 1 "- 0.056 DT -(LOS t 
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Cly y - 6.95 - 0.3 (g-p) - 0.17 oy 
Clr n + 4.5 - 0.3 ror - 0.7 v 
Figure 5: Endogenous Variables of the Model 
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The outcomes of systenl 1 estimation suggest that the system is 
reasonably well specified. The descriptive power of the system can be viewed 
compactly in Figure 6, which displays fitted and actual values, their cross plots 
and the scaled residuals for the three equations. 
Congruency requirenlents can be checked by considering the statistics 
and graphs resulting fronl the system I estilnation. The statistics presented in 
Table 18 confirnl that the residuals are homoscedastic white noise errors in 
each single equation and vector autoconelation and vector normality tests show 
no problelll 73. Fulfihllent of that requirement can also be justified by 
73 The computer programme used. does not conduct a vector heteroscedasticity test if there 
are not a large number of observations compared with the number of the variables in the 
regression (Doornik and Hendry. I 994a: 336). Ours is such a casco However. according to 
the ARCH tests statistics (Far,h. reported in Table IH) the hypothesis of no autoregresive 
conditional heteroscedasticity fails to be rejected in t ' \ " I . ~ r y y indi\'idual equation. 
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inspection of the graphs of single equation diagnostics for serially correlated 
residuals, correlograms, and normality plotted in Figure 7. 
.1.4 -
Figure 6. Fitted and actual values and scaled residuals 
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Table 18: System 1 Evaluation* 
Statistic Dp Dy Dr VAR 
For (3. 35) 2.60 1.87 0.08 
.. -
Fare/' (4. 32) 0.24 0.86 0.04 
1 X lid (2) 13.77 2.35 1.32 
F'ar (27, 79) 0.88 
" ..... _-
.- ------ ----
----z- .. . __ .. _._. 
X lid (6) 7.20 
* ar. arch, and nd stand respectIvely for autocorretalon, 
ARCH and norrnully distributed. 
The first three graphs in Figure 8 show reasonable constancy for 
parameters and residual standard errors. The other graphs in this Figure 
indicate the individual equation break-point Chow (1960) F-tcsts scaled hy 
their significant lc\'l?ls (l %) : their values do not exceed unity in the price and 
181 
Chapter 5: Econometric Investigation 
revenue equations. Although it slightly exceeds unity in income equation at the 
end of the period, that of the whole system shows reasonable features. These 
Figure 7. Graphical diagnostic information 
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Figure 8 : System 1 recursive evaluation statistics 
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tests also confirm parameter constancy. Since weak exogeneity of non-
modelled variables has been shown in the cointegration discussion section. all 
the congruency requirements of the system 1 seem to be fulfilled. 
By checking the t-values of the estimated coefficients of the first 
unrestricted reduced form (URF), system 1 , it seems that the first lag of oil-
induced governrnent revenue (Dor_l) and the third lag of the all non-modelled 
variables (Dm_3, Dg_3 , Dor_3, and Doy _3) are redundant in all three URF 
equations. Further, all lags of actual inflation (Dp _I, Dp ---.2 and Dp.-3) and those 
of changes in expected inflation (Dn _b Dn-2 and On.-3) seem to have no effect 
on the dependent variables, even in the price equation. However these two sets 
of variables, unlike Dor _I and the third lag of non-modelled ones. have very 
high standard errors. A probable reason for this might be multicolinearity: as 
described above, expected inflation is almost proportionate to actual inflation. 
Using this information, we impose zero restrictions on actual inflation lags 
(Harvey, 1990: 113) along with the other redundant variables and keep the 
lagged values of expected inflation in order to consider the whole impact of 
expectations on price behaviour. Although some other variables (like the 
second lag of government expenditure) are not significant in the system, they 
are kept because their elimination causes autocorrelation. Estimation of this 
new system (system 2), yields more reasonable results with respect to 
congruency. The related statistics and graphs are presented in Table 19 and 
Figure 9-11. This reduction is also validated by a progress test (F mr)' 
Table 19 : System 2 Evaluation 
Statistic Dp Dy Dr VAR 
Far (3. '+3) 0.94 2.04 0.36 
F arch (.+. 38) 0.-+8 1.16 0.-+5 
X-Ill/(2) 0.90 1.5.+ '1 7-_. ) 
F 'llr (27.102) 1.28 
X - fit! (6) ) .57 
System 1 ~ ~ SYstem 2, 
. . 
F mr (2.+. 105) = 1.02 
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Figure 10: Graphical diagnostic information, system 2 
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Figure 11 Recursive estimation statistics, system 2 
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System 2 is accepted as a parsimonious system. and provides the 
baseline for the construction of the econometric model. Then in the light of the 
analysis and the result of estimation of system 2, an econometric model can 
be constructed. 3SLS and 2SLS are used to estimate Model 1 and 2 
respectively. Table 20 cites the outcomes of the relevant tests. The over-
identifying tests (X20i) and model reduction test (X2 mr) are acceptable for both 
models. Likewise, the residuals are consistent with being white noise. The 
results do not indicate any considerable differences using the two different 
methods of estimation. Figure 12 and 13 show the graphical analysis 
associated with 3SLS. 
.14,... 
.1 r 
.95 r-
Table 20 : Model Evaluation 
Far (27, 129) X.tnd (6) X.t oi(27) X"\nr(24) 
3SLS 1.01 5.00 24.65 24.65 
2SLS 1.00 5.43 25 .53 25 .53 
Figure 12 : Fitted and actual values and scaled residuals 
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Figure 13 : Graphical diagnostic information 
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5.6.2 Results Interpretation 
Table 21 portrays the result of the 3SLS estimation method. At the 
outset, there are some points which seem applicable to all three equations of the 
model: 
1. Most of the coefficients are insignificant at the 50/0 confidence level. 
2. Many of the coefficients of the variables and their lagged values 
have opposite signs. Insignificant coefficients can be ignored as 
different versions of zeros, for example income in the revenue 
equation. However. there are some significant cases such as oil 
sector income (Doy) in the income equation which would call for 
interpretation. The discussion is given in the section devoted to the 
income equation (see below). 
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3. Leaving aside a few peculiar coefficients, coefficients in the 
equations for price and government revenue are roughly as expected. 
However, income equation contains more problematic features. 
4. The adjustment coefficients ( the coefficients of cointegration tenns, 
CIs) of price and income are small, which implies that they converge 
to their equilibrium very slowly, while that of revenue converges 
relatively quickly. 
Table 21: Results of 3SLS estimation 
Oy Or 
Coeffs. t-ratio Coeffs. Coeffs. t-ratio 
Regressor t-ratio Regressor 
0.005 0.03 Oy_l 1.602 15.52 Or 1 -0.203 -2.59 
-
-0.419 -1.48 Oy_2 -1.232 -8.29 Or 3 -0.120 - I .88 
0.382 1.48 Oy_3 0.4 I 0 4.88 Op -1.29 -0.99 
-0.032 - I .5 I Op 0.040 0.67 Oy -0.098 -0.05 
-0.015 -1.17 Or 1 0.007 1.76 Ov 1 -2.534 -0.67 
~ ~ -
0.229 2.79 Or 2 0.007 1.62 Oy_2 3.700 1.55 
-
0.080 1.10 Og_1 -0.010 -1.63 Om 0.653 1.57 
0.037 2.24 Og_2 -0.009 -1.47 Og 0.330 3.02 
0.012 1.39 Ooy 0.082 6.48 Og_ 1 0.128 1.07 
0.014 0.93 Ooy_ 1 -0.100 -5.79 Og_2 -0. I 34 -1.37 
-0.394 -2.30 Ooy_2 0.060 4.03 Oor 0.472 8.55 
0.266 1.52 On 1 -0.09 I -1.82 Ooy_ 1 0.396 1.28 
-
0.085 4.10 CI(y)_ 1 -0.014 -2.00 Ooy_2 -0.373 -1.25 
-0.156 -2.97 Seal 0.000 0.03 On 2 -2.605 -2.62 
-0.116 -2.44 Seal 1 0.004 1.00 On 3 2.140 2.01 
-
-0.223 -4.38 Seal 2 0.005 1.57 CI(r)_ 1 -0. 158 -2.37 
-
-0.132 -2.97 Seal 3 0.004 -0.89 Seal -0.006 -0.06 
Seal I O. I 83 1.60 
-
Seal .., 0.035 0.5.3 ... 
-
Seal .) 0.047 0.58 
-
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The equations can be considered individually as follows: 
Price Equation 
With regard to prices, the results suggest that they are determined bv 
- -
money, government expenditure, expected inflation and deviation from long-
run equilibrium as follows: 
~ P t t = 0.23 ~ m t t + 0.04 ~ g t - 2 2 - 0.4 ~ 1 t t - 2 2 + 0.09 [(m-p) - 0.1 Y + 5.7 i1 - 0.05 t 
(2.79) (2.24) (-2.3) (4.1) - 2.06 DU + 0.06 DT]t_1 
Rearranging this equation leads to : 
Pt = 0.77 Pt-I + 0.23 mt - 0.14 (m - P )t-I - 0.009 Yt-I + 0.49 1tt_1 + 0.04 ~ g t - 2 2
- 0.4 ~ 1 t t - 2 2 + deterministic components 
The equation implies that the previous level of actual price has a large 
impact on the current level. This might well be interpreted as prices being 
subjected to control policies implemented during the whole period except for 
the first few years. The signs of money, lagged value of real money, income 
and expected inflation are consistent with the theoretical model and similar to 
the findings of Aghevli and Khan (1978), Makkian (1990) and Tabatabaee-
Yazdi (1993), though it is the lagged values of the latter two which have a 
significant role, not the contemporaneous values. The results suggest that 
changes in government spending (after a lag) affect prices positively. This 
seems not surprising when a government spends much money on goods and 
services in the form of consumption and given the long gestation in investment 
as discussed in 3.2.2. A peculiar outcome is the negative effect of changes in 
expected inflation after two quarters which seems to have no conceivable 
interpretation. Overall, the results concerned with price determination seem 
nenerall v consistent with the theoretical model. c _ 
Government revenue equation 
As regards government revenue, the implications of the estimated 
equation are more or less consistent with the theoretical model: 
~ r t t = - 0.2 ..lft_1 + 0.33 ~ g t t -: 0..+ 7 ..J.ort - 2.6 ~ i 1 t - 2 2 + 2.14 j.1tt_-, 
(-2.59) (3.02) (8.55) (-2.6) (2.01) 
- 0.16[(r-p) - 0.3 (or-p) - 0.7 Y ~ 4 . 5 ] ]
(-2.37) 
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where (r-p) and (or- p) signify real revenue and real oil-induced revenue. 
respectively. Rearranging this equation yields: 
rt = 0.64 rt-1 + 0.2 rt-2 + 0.05 ort + 0.47 ~ o r t t + 0.11 (y + P)t-I + 0.33 ~ g t t
- 2.52 ~ 7 t t - 2 2 ~ ~ 2.1-.t ~ 7 t t - 3 3
This rearranged equation is generally consistent with the model. As 
expected, oil-induced revenue, nominal income and the lagged values of 
revenue, have a significant positive effect on government revenue. Likewise. 
the role of oil-induced revenue is greater than nominal income and nominal 
income affects it after a while. The former reflects the importance of oil 
receipts in government revenues and the latter implies a tax collection lag, the 
two issues emphasised in chapter 3. 
There are two exceptions; government expenditure and expected 
inflation. The positive effect of the former. though not nested in the economic 
model, may occur because an increase in expenditure motivates the 
government to increase its revenue. Another reason may be the new taxable 
sources created by increases in government expenditure. However. expected 
inflation is problematic. bearing in mind that revenue is in nominal terms. The 
anticipated sign on inflation coefficients was positive because it is usual that 
price increases, actual or predicted, magnify the relevant nominal variables. 
While price and the second lag of expected inflation have negati\'e coefficient 
(the former is insignificant) the third lag of expected rate has a positive 
coefficient, so, the aggregate effect, which is close to zero. may be more 
reliable. 
Income equation 
Income depends on just its lagged values. oil income (including lagged 
\'aILIes) and its deviation from long-run equilibrium. while other \'ariables 
seemingly have no significant impact: 
~ Y t t = 1.6 ~ ~ Yt-I - 1.23 ~ ~ YI-2 + O,-.t ~ ~ :'t-3 -+- 0.08 ~ ~ OYt - 0.1 ~ o Y I _ 1 1
(15.52) (-8.29) (-.t.88) (6.48) (-5.79) 
+ 0.06 ~ o Y I - 2 2 - 0.014 eI(y) 
( · + . O ~ ) ) (-2.00) 
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Here, there are some problems which should be considered: 
* The unexpected opposite sign of lagged values of income is a matter 
of importance. It might have been possible to attribute this to some 
seasonal features of the data. However. as shown in section 5.402. 
HEG Y test confirms that these time series have no seasonal 
characteristic. Nevertheless, seasonal dummies were included, so if 
there were any seasonal characteristics they would be removed, 
though theoretical conflict with finite samples can occur (Hylleberg 
et aI, 1990:237). These unusual signs may occur due to the method 
of transforming annual data of income to quarterly figures. because 
the transfer has been carried out assuming a smooth trend (See 
5.2.2). This peculiarity of lagged values has not been faced in the 
previous studies because they have used neither the quarterly data 
nor our estimation procedure. 
* Concerning oil income, the odd signs might arise owing to some 
institutional limitations, in addition to the above discussion. 
Although contemporaneous oil income increases national income, 
this rate of increase can not continue permanently and after a while 
chronic bottlenecks might squeeze the growth rate. The analysis 
provided in chapter 3 supports this view. arguing that in an oil 
export-oriented economy like Iran, such a feature is likely. The 
performance of the government as well as mismatched production 
process has been tied to oil export earnings determined exogenously 
by volatile oil markets. In such a situation there probably are 
negati ve effects on growth. 
* Much less expected is the SIgn of the government expenditure 
coefficients. The a priori expectation for the sign on the coefficients 
of government expenditure is positive. but lagged \O,:liues of Og hJ.\"e 
a negative sign. This erratic and strange feature is clearly 
inconsistent \\ith a generally accepted vie\\ about positi\Oe impact of 
govcrmnent exrenditure on inconle . emphasized for Iran' s case in 
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chapter 3. though insignificance of the individual t-ratios In the 
equation decreases the importance of the matter (Reestimation of the 
model excluding the second lag did not lead to significance of the 
other. Also separate estimation of the income equation shows the 
joint insignificance of the lagged values is not rejected). Makkian 
(1990) also obtained negative correlation between income and 
government expenditure with a significant but small coefficient. 
Although the postulated theoretical relations are confirmed to a large 
extent, there are some results which contradict a large body of applied research. 
The unexpected sign of some estimates may stem from two reasons : 
1. A part of the deficiency might be attributed to data features: firstly. 
quarterly data for income and oil sector income were not available. 
hence they were derived from annual figures based on some simple 
assumptions discussed in section 5.2.2. Secondly, cointegration 
considerations indicated that some of the time series have structural 
breaks. Finally, a common problem in developing countries is data 
inaccuracy, and the data used for the Iran economy are no exception. 
'1 A few large changes in income (see Figure 5) would influence 
results very much. 
A separate problem is the mismatch between econometric and economic 
models. There may be two reasons: 
• The problem may . at least partially, arise due to a deficiency in 
vector autoregressive modeling. V AR, used in this study. There is 
some criticism about the ability of the V AR approach to explain an 
economic mechanism, as well as about that of cointegration 
methodology. For instance. Pesaran (1988 : 337). discussing 
econometric modeling argues that: 
..... neither the l'.·lR approach nor the cointegration approach can 
he tah'!l seriollsly as representing or embodying any kind of theory. 
... neither approach is salisfacro,}, if the aim is to explain or 
understand how the l'conomy/zmctions. " 
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Pesaran and Smith (1995: 65) propose a critical suryey of recent 
studies on this subject and Pesaran (1996) introduces an alternative 
procedure. Hendry and Doornik (1994) who defend the approach, 
consider data and cognitive limitations as effective constraints (p. 
30). 
• Another alternative is to doubt the efficacy of the economic model 
being used. This sounds more reasonable because the model of 
Aghevli and Khan, in spite of having been applied to several 
developing countries including Iran. yielding satisfactory results. is 
for the first time being considered in a new cointegration context. 
The previous investigations (for example Aghevli and Khan, 1978. 
and Makkian, 1990 and Tabatabaee-Yazdi, 1991) have applied 
traditional econometrics based on the assumption of stationarity. 
However, as has already been mentioned stationarity was an issue 
which had to be examined and indeed has been rejected for the Iran 
case. Despite using new econometric techniques in this study, there 
remain some problems to be resolved in the future. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The objective of this study has been to explain price behaviour in the 
Iranian econolny. The essential hypothesis was that the oil-orientated structure 
of the econonlY induced an increase in money supply via government 
expenditure, leading to higher prices. This inflation led to an increase in 
governnlent expenditure while revenues were under pressure due to a sluggish 
tax systeln and negative shocks of oil prices. Since government expenditure 
failed to adjust decreasing revenues, there were widening budget deficits, again 
leading to an increase in money supply, and the process repeated itself. This 
process has been aggravated by a heavy dependence of govermnent revenue 
and production on oil receipts. 
In the light of theoretical analysis a simple dynamic model was 
constructed, nesting the main elements described above. This model was 
estimated using a vector autoregressive model (V AR) and cointegration. The 
following are the conclusions of each of the stages carried out in this study. 
Chapter 2 provides a critical review of thl' l l 1 o n ~ t a r i : - ; t t and structuralist 
perspectives on inflation in the Des. Monclarish e m p h a s i s ~ ~ that it is money 
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supply increases which lead to higher level of prices and its reduction is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for curing inflation. Structuralists make 
emphasis that price rising is an inevitable outcome of structural imbalances 
during the developing process and cannot be primarily removed before 
structural reforms. This chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the 
two views and concludes that inflation cannot be explained appropriately using 
either structuralism or monetarism exclusively. Reconciliation of the two views 
led to a model containing elements of both. With such a model, analysis of the 
causes of inflation seems more plausible. 
A cOlnpromise may be obtained by paying attention to the interpretation 
of the role of money supply in the two camps. Monetarists emphasize that the 
money supply is translated into proportional changes in prices and is neutral 
with respect to output. However, they distinguish between the long-run and 
short-run effects of money supply changes. I n other words they accept that in 
the short-run, which may even last for ten years, ""'he changed rate of growth of 
nominal income typically shows up .first in output and hardly at all in 
prices."(Freidlnan, 1992: 260), but through decades money growth primarily 
influences prices and output is determined by real factors. Moreover, they 
accept that in the short-run there is no theoretical agreement on the division of 
the effects of Inoney growth between prices and output. They also believe in a 
two-way causality between nloncy and inflation in the short-run. As a 
consequence tackling ini1ation by Inoney reduction leads to unemployment 
which Inay be socially intolerable in Des. 
In contrast, structuralists adnlit that nl0ney increases lead to inflation. 
but they emphasize that development requirements oblige the monetary 
authorities to increase the money supply. In other \vords. they accept the 
proxinlateness of Inane), supply but regard money reduction as an obstacle for 
sustained groVv1h. However. increasing inflation may itself beconle an 
ilnpediment for growth. as docunlented by much empirical c\'idence. leading to 
social unrest. 
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As a consequence. the alternative means of curing inflation seems to be 
a balanced option between money reduction and growth rate of the economy. 
For this objective an analytical ITIodel which combines the two kinds of 
elements seems appropriate. This has been docunlented by providing enlpirical 
evidence in the last part of chapter 2. 
The general conclusions of the discussion of the Iranian economic 
outlook, provided in chapter 3, are as follows. The econOlny. in addition to 
traditional dualisln, has suffered from oil/non-oil duality. The 1970s oil 
windfall has increased the role of the oil sector ever since. The salient 
importance of the oil sector can be clearly seen by the data presented in this 
chapter, where oil-induced revenue of the government reached 86.4% of total 
revenues and foreign exchange requirements were met nearly entirely by oil 
export receipts. 
When the governnlent acquired the 1973 \vindfltll. it sharply increased 
the expenditure, even faster than the revenues obtained. In this process the 
absorptive capacity of the econonlY was completely neglected. leading to high 
rates of inflation and worsening structural inlbalances. As a result, inflationary 
pressure and the dependency on the oil sector were aggravated. Such a 
situation, coupled with interventionist economic policies, prevented the post 
revolutionary governnlent trOIn tackling the problems successfully. When oil 
proceeds decreased as a result of the war and/or oil price reduction of the 
1980s, the situation became more unsatisfactory. The nature of the budget was 
expansionary because the govermnent acquired oil receipts exclusively. All the 
receipts were sold to the central bank and equivalently the government account 
was credited, leading to increases of high-pow"ered money. The expansionary 
budget characteristics worsened due to increasing fiscal deficits. Also the 
foreign exchange constraint reduced production and investment which had 
already suffered from otlicial control or resource distribution. This 
enviromnent perpetuated inflation. reflecting the role nf monetary elements in 
the presence of structural bottlenecks. 
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Chapter 4 considers the shortcomings of the single price equation of the 
monetarists, and shows that in empirical attempts proxies for non-monetarist 
elements are often included; a simultaneous equation approach is preferred 
because of its unbiased estimates. Six of the latest models used for Iranian 
inflation case are examined indicating their strengths and weaknesses. Of these. 
four researches used a single equation lllodel, all but one. in a traditional 
econometric context. The hvo others applied a simultaneous equation model. 
the model of Aghevli and Khan (1978) which had been already conducted for 
four non-oil developing countries. They also used a traditional econometric 
procedure. Then, Aghevli and Khan's model is discussed in detail. 
In the light of the discussion in chapter 3 this model is lnodified to be 
consistent with the particular characteristics of the oil-orientated economy. The 
selected model consists of three behavioural equations (price. government 
revenue and incOIlle) and two definitional ones (money supply and expected 
inflation). The overall conclusion of this chapter is that such a frrunework. 
which nests ITIonetarist as well as structuralist factors. represents a lnore 
plausible analysis of inflation in the Iranian econonly. Likewise, it would 
provide more reliable econOllletric results if it is estimated by a simultaneous 
equation approach in the cointegration context. 
Chapter 5 conducts an empirical investigation to exmnine the above 
conclusions. All preliminary tests for stationarity. seasonality and cointegration 
are conducted. The findings illustrate that the all variables are I(l) without 
seasonal feature and there are three cointegrating vectors corresponding to each 
behavioural equation. Following on frOlll this. a V AR procedure is used to 
estimate the lllodel simultaneously. On the whole. the results support our 
predictions about the conlponents of intlation and the direction of their 
illlpacts. The outcolnes also confirm. more or less. the analysis of government 
revenue. In particular the role of oil-induced revenue is significant. Regarding 
income. although tindings sho\\' a strong role it)r the oi 1 sector. the alternating 
coefficient signs and sOIne insigniticant coetlicients raised some doubts. 
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This lilnitation might arise due to different reasons: 
1. The data features might partially be responsible for that deficiency. 
In addition to common problem of data inaccuracy in developing 
countries, quarterly data for income and oil income were not 
available and they were derived based on some simple assumptions 
from annual figures. 
2. The problenl may arise, to some extant due to shOlicomings of the 
simultaneous estilllation method used in this study. using the vector 
autoregressive l1lodel, V AR. Although this procedure is applied by 
some researchers, it is criticised bj some others (see for example 
Pessaran and Smith, 1995 for a survey in this tield). In fact there is 
some doubts about ability of V AR as well as cointegration to 
represent and elnbody economic theories. The difficulties of 
sin1ultaneous equation estinlation persuaded Aghevli and Sassanpour 
(1991) to estimate the equations of a simultaneous lllodel of prices in 
the Iranian econonlY separately. The individual equations were 
relatively more robust and consistent with economic theory than the 
sin1ultaneous equation estimates which convinces us that these 
results should be relied upon when econometric modelling is used to 
influence economic policYlnaking in Iran. 
3. The economic model used is another alternati ve for our limitations. 
Aghevli and Khan' s Inodel is appl ied for several countries including 
Iran successfully. However. they estimated the model using 
conventional econometric nlethods based on stationarity assUlnption 
of variables. While the variables or our model are all nonstationary. 
These are issues for the future debate. 
Some policy ill1plications may he derivcd from these tindings : 
• Prices seem sensitive to delnand-side pol icies more than supply-side 
ones. This is consistent to ollr analysis about the important role of 
g o v ~ r n n l e n t t budgetary performance In anslIlg inflation. As 
mentioned in chapter 3. sharp increasc in goycrnment expenditure by 
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5-fold after the 1970s windfall led to starting of high rate inflation 
era. Continuous over-spending of the government accompanied by 
budget deficit perpetuated inflation. Since government total 
expenditure accounted for about half of nonlinal GNP, the most 
important instrUlnent to manage demand-side policies is government 
expenditure. Thus, price targeting depends on how the government 
tackles the over-spending problem. The largt: impact of previous 
price increases implies that the government may not be able to 
abandon a price control policy and not entirely rely on the market to 
achieve the desired level of prices. 
• Expectation has an important role in detennining prices. Intervention 
policies conducted in particular in the post-revolution era has had 
undesirable efIects on expectation. The govcrnnlent has to avoid 
such measures, particularly unexpected arbitrary interventions 
which leads to nlore uncertainly and hence. higher rates of expected 
inflation. 
• The sensitivity of govemlnent revenue to changes in oil-induced 
revenue is very high, while national income plays a relatively small 
role in obtaining revenues. This is consistent with the fact that the 
tnajor part of the total revenue was accounted for by oil-induced 
revenue, reached even to 86 percent in some years of the period. As 
a result, adverse external shocks can damage the budget considerably 
leading to Illore increase in budget deficit. So the government ought 
to improve its budget structure, constructing an advanced tax system 
and diversifying its revenue sources. It is also important from the 
Inoney reduction point of view" because structural dependency of the 
budget on oil-induced revenue has heen a primary source of money 
supply changes. 
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7.1 Missing Data Estimation 
Table 1 shows the estimates of 11 "Cdt krcd gaps for ~ \ : p e n d i t u r e . .
revenue and oil revenue of the government ( d i ~ c L l ~ : - ) e d d in 5.2.3. p. 125). Sl)J1lt.' 
actual figures are also presented for comparison. 
Tablc 1: Estimates of the :1,1 is sing figures 
Gov. Exp. Gov. Rcv. (;0\,. Oil Rev. 
Estimated Actual Estimated Actual Estimated Actual 
19711Q2 62.3 65.3 (].., ..., L., .. 1 56.5 37 . .+ "''+ -.1 .) 
Q3 85.3 73.1 67.3 5 ().3 ..., 7 -.' .) 35 . .+ 
Q4 56 --- -7 9 ) I. --- 38.6 ---
1972/Q 1 88.3 --- 69.8 --- .+1.8 ---
en ,- 76.6 gO.4 73.8 69.5 '+.2.9 .+5.9 
Q3 104.9 --- 79.2 --- .+3 ---
Q4 68.9 --- 67.6 --- .+.+ .3 ---
1973/Q 1 108.6 --- X1.5 --- .+ 7.9 ---
Q2 102 --- I 11. 7 --- 7'+.9 ---
Q3 139.7 --- 119.8 --- 75 ---
Q4 9l.7 131.4 1 ()2.2 1 13.6 77.3 72.3 
1974/Q1 144.6 128.4 1 'l'" .., _.L.' 1 ().+.6 83.7 153.8 
Q2 229.8 --- 335.2 --- 290 ---
Q3 314.6 --- ~ ~ 5().3 --- 290.8 ---
1979/Q2 475.6 --- 415.6 --- 29).5 ---
Q3 651 --- .+45.5 --- 29.+.3 ---
Q4 427.4 546.1 380.2 '+'+9.5 303 371.1 
-
-----
20) 
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7.2 Estimations for Proper Os in the adaptive Expectation 
Cagan approach is used to determine the w'eight p. in a adaptive 
expectation procedure. The equations are estimated with different expected 
inflation series calculated by assessing r3 = O. 1 to 0.9. 1t I' 1t2 ... 1tg are the 
expected inflation series corresponding to p = 0.1. 0.2 ..... 0.9. Then the J3 
corresponding to the lowest RSS is chosen. The first equation estimated is 
EQ(1) and the others are sinlilar. The results are sUlnmarised in Table 2. 
EQ( 1) Estimating the unrestricted reduced form by OLS 
The present sample is: 1971 (2) to 1990 (1) 
URF Equation 1 for p 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
y -0.080374 0.056237 -1.429 0.1573 
m 0.99002 0.017561 56.376 0.0000 
1t) 1.7858 1.0369 l.722 0.0894 
m-p_l -0.97211 0.036562 -26.588 0.0000 
Constant 0.61874 0.50427 1.227 0.2239 
0' = 0.05879 RSS = 0.2454 
Table 2 : p s and Associated RSS 
J3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 
RSS 0.245 0.232 0.219 0.210 0.204 0.200 0.198 
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7.3 Testing for Seasonality and Order of Integration: HGEY Test 
This test. provided by Hy lleherg d al (1990). examines the order of 
integration as well as the seasonal feature of time se ries. If the coefficients of Y i- I 
and Yi-2 and either Yi-3 or Y I - 4 are significantl y negatin? the null hypothesis or the 
nonstationarity of the variable i is rejected. If the coefficients of Yi-2 and either Y i-
:I or Y i-4 are significantly negative, the null hypothesi s of stochastic seasonality can 
be rejected. The significant cases are shadowed. These results confim1 that all the 
variables are integrated of order 1 and there is no seasonal feature . L stands for 
logarithm. [ ... ] showes probability, D4 stands for seasonl11 difference and L \ 1 (for 
example) means logarithm of M (money) . 
EQ( 1) Modelling D4LM by OLS 
The present sample is: 1972 ( 1 ) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
... 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob PartR:o 
Constant 0.OR8111 0.10204 0.864 0.]911 O.()115 
Trend -0.00095196 0.0015145 -0 .6=:9 0.5319 0.0061 
Seasonal 0 .0638 11 0.018810 3.392 0.0012 0.1524 
Seasonal -0.030637 0.018045 -l.698 0.()(H4 (Ul-+31 
Seasonal 2 0.010813 0.019718 0.548 0.5853 (U)()47 
Yl(MtJ t).4287e-005 0 .0056825 0.017 0.9868 0.0000 
.. ..... f ' ; ' ; : ' ; ' ; ' : - : " : - - Q Q 6 5 6 ~ 9 9 O . 1 0 9 9 : ~ : : : f ' : : -5 _972 :: 0.0000 .. OJ 578 { ~ : :' ' ',@ ' I ) : I ~ ~::::::(::::::::::f::::::::::::: ~ ~ E E J ~ " ' ! I I : : ~ : : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 6 : : ; ~ ~ ; : ~ ~ . ~ ) ) 8 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o O o ~ j ( ( ~ ~ 2 1 7 i 8 8 : ' '•. :.:.:.'.j' .'·::::::·1·: .j ...• ::" .: .. :.::.!,::!!!::::'!: .. !j .. ! : ~ : ! ! . ~ ~
R2 = 0.8472 F(8, 64) = ~ ~ . 3 5 9 9 [0.0000] (J =--= 0.04384 D\V = 2.04 
RSS = 0.1230 for 9 variables and 7] o b s e r \ ' a t i o n ~ ~
Testinl;! for Error AUlocorrelation from lags 1 to 1 
l'hi2 (1) = 1.3977 10.2371] and F-Fonn( 1. 6 ~ ) ) = 1.2298 [0.2717] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 
Coeff. -0.6386 
Testing tor Error Autocorrelation r l ' ~ ) 1 l 1 1 lags I to ~ ~ _ _ "') 
Chi2 ~ 2 ) ) = 3.5327 [0.1710] and l-l·onn(.2 . (2) = 1.)76) \0._149] 
2 ( ) . ~ ~
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Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 
Coeff. -0.8528 -0.6439 
T e ~ l i n g g for Error Autocorrelation from lags ] to : 
ChI (3) = 3.5821 lO.3I03] and F-Forn10 , 6 1) = 1.0-+92 [0.377"] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. -0.8845 -0.6414 0.09102 
Testing for Error Autocorrelation f)'om lags 1 to -+ 
Chi2 (4) = 3.5893 [0.4644] and F-Forn1(4. (0) = 0.77567 [0.5454] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
CoefI. -0.9256 -0.6084 0.1038 -0 .0] 829 
EQ( 1) ModeJlingJ}:ILy by OLS 
The present sample is: 1972 (3) to 1990 ( I) 
Variable Coefficjent Std.Error t-value t-I rob 2 PartR-
Constant 0.26757 0.091149 2.936 0.0047 0.1256 
D4LY 1 -1.2324 0.35603 -3.461 (1 .0010 0.1665 
-
D4LY 2 0.32700 0.1177 - ~ . 7 7 7 7 0.0073 0.1139 
-
YI (Y)_l -0.007229 0.002468 - 2 . 9 ~ 8 8 0.0048 n.1250 
y : 2 ( y y ~ n : : : : : : : : r · t t ~ ' : ' ' ~ ' 9 4 1 9 9 0.46996 .. 8.388 0,0000 0.5397 p . . : . 
Y4(Y) : 1-: .. :.":':' 0).8'132 : 0.11791 " .234 0.0020 0.1484 . ~ . . ~ . ' , , - :', ,', ':;":. 
Y3(Y)_1 -0.18057 0.] 1720 -1.541 0.1287 0.0381 
Trend 3.7514e-005 5.7260e-005 0.655 0.5149 0.0071 
Seasonal -0.0005641 0.0028714 -0.196 0.8449 0.0006 
Seasonal 1 -0.0013882 0.0029121 -0.477 o 6"':;' . ·LL _) 0.0038 
Seasonal 2 -0 .0003938 0.0028710 -0.1 J 7 0.8913 0.000' 
-
R? = 0.9929 1';'(10,60) = 8 4 8 . ~ 1 6 6 [0.0000] 0 = 0.0085 D\ = 1.91 
R S = 0.0044 for 11 variable and 71 ob ' rvation ' 
Te ting tor Error Autocorr lation from lags I to 1 
hi 2 (1) = 1.0831 10.2980] and F-Form( L )9) = 0.9 U 9 [0 ._ -+ '0] 
Error Aut correlation ( ot:rticient : 
Lag 1 
l IT. O. ()g 1 
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T e : ~ i n g g for Error ~ u t o c o r r e ] a t i o n n from lag. 1 to ' 
ChI (2) = 1.8675 [0.3931] and F-Forn1C2. '::8) = 0.78"4 [0.4616] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 
Coeff. 0.1376 -0.3035 
Testing for Error Autocorrelation from laos 1 t ) ., 
.2 b . -
ChI (3) = 3.7837 [0.2858] and F-Form(3. ~ 7 ) ) = 1 . 0 6 9 ~ ~ [0.3693] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. 0.4531 -0.6229 -0.4676 
Testing for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 4 
Chi2 (4) = 3.8829 [0.4221] and F-Form(4. -6) = 0.80993 [0. -].41] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
Coeff. 0.5733 -0.5517 -0 .5441 -0. 1079 
-.E.Q( 1) Modelling D4LP by OL 
The present sample is: 1972 (] ) to 1990 (1 ) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
") 
P a r t R ~ ~
Constant 0.22374 0.063206 3.S L W 0.0008 0.16'7 
Trend 0.0054823 0.0017540 3.126 0.0027 (.1':24 
Seasonal 0.00526:20 0.013698 0.'84 0.7021 0.0023 
Seasonal 1 0.018269 0.015004 1.218 0._:278 0.0:226 
Seasonal 2 -0.059822 0.011251 -5 ~ ~ 17 0.0000 0.J064 
-
Y1(P)_ 1 -0.034945 0.011365 -3 .07- () .oe)] 1 0.1287 
Y2(PtJ :(;, .. ! -0.92] 67 0.11483 -8.026 0.0000 0.5017 
Y3fP) 1 ... : . ~ ' " " o ' ) 8 ~ ~ 8 8 0.092822 ' 0-' 0.00" 0.1271 - .:to, .).) -.). )-),.- . 
Y4(P)..;.. 1 -0.47585 0.09602' -4.956 0.0000 0.2773 
:. 
R2 = 0.8672 F(8. 64) = 52.282 [0.0000] () = 0.0_6_ D\V = 2.1:2 
R S = 0.0441 for 9 variables and 73 ob enatlon. 
Te t i n ~ ~ tor Error utocorrclation from lag_ 1 to 1 
hi 2 (l) = 2.1164[O.145 71 and F-Iorm(1.6"') co I.X811l0.17-l] 
brror Autoc rrclation Coefficients: 
LaQ I 
.... 
oelT. -0.4121 
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Testing for Error Autocorrelation hom laos I to -) 
Chi
2 (2) = 3.7947 [0.1500] and F - - o n ~ l ( 2 . . 62) = 1.6<.)<)8 [0.1911] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 
Coeff. -0.2981 0.3687 
Testing for Error Autocorrelation hom lags I to 3 
Chi2 (3) = 3.8691 [0 .2759] and F-FormU . 61) = 1.13X [0.3409] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
CoetI. -0.2665 0.3457 -0.07864 
Testing for Error Aut.ocorrelation from lags I to 4-
Chi2 (4) = 6.1225 [0.1902] and F-Form(-L 60) = 1 . 3 7 3 ~ ~ [ 0 . ~ 5 4 0 ] ]
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
Coeff. ··0.8505 0.5545 -0.2021 - O A ~ 8 ~ ~
E.Q( 1) Modelling D4LG by OLS 
The present sample is: 191'2 (1 ) to 109() ( 1 ) 
, 
Variable Cocf1icient Std.Error t-\ ',llue t-l'rol1 PartR= 
Constant 0.62313 0.30821 2.022 0.0474 O.U600 
Trend 0.00] 008 0.002273 O . 4 · r ~ ~ 0.6589 0.0031 
Seasonal 0.27268 OJJ95433 ~ . 8 5 7 7 0.0058 0.1131 
Seasonal 0.050990 0.069098 O. 738 0 . 4 ( } 3 ~ ~ 0.0084 
Seasonal 2 0. 19259 0.098803 1.<)49 0.0557 0.0560 
Yl(G)_ l -0.029002 0.015249 - 1 . l ) ( ) ~ ~ 0.0617 0.0535 
::?i.2(GY>f . ;Oj2-17,}.:F:Im:;:::::::::: O.069547 -3.1 ~ ~ n : : ()'0027}0.1 ~ ~ 2 2 2 :.:-:.:.:-:-:.:-:-:.::.:.:-:.:-: 
.: 
••. :•. :i:.:.: •. : :·:.: : •. :••. :.: .: •. :i: : :! ,.:ic: .. : ! . .G G G.:. : : ~ ~ .•. :)); _:.':.: ]1 .'· • .' -0,2 1±4$ jik 0 10 230, :.2 (94 ) 0 04020 064 I : : : I : : ~ ~ ~ ~ •• ,"0. 5 1 ! : ~ ~ : : : : : ~ { : : . : : : () . J 0 2 ~ Q Q ,::::!/:< 5 . () 36 {:. 0 .009.0 0 . .2 8:; 8 
R2= 0.5539 F(8, 64) := 9.935 10.0000] cr = O. I l ) 5 ~ ~ D\\' = 1.90 
RSS = 2.4401 for <.) variables and 73 obsenations 
Testing for Error Autncorrclation f r ~ ) f n n lags 1 ttl I 
Chi 2 (1) = 1.4645 1 1 . 2 ~ ( ( : 2 ] ] and F-Fdfm( 1. (d) = 1 . ~ ~ < . J 8 8 [ [ . ~ h ( ) 4 ] ]
Error A utocorrelation <- '()cfficicnts: 
Lag I 
Coell. O.4{) 77 
2()6 
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T e ~ ~ i n g g for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 2 
ChI (2) = 1.638 [0.44091 and F-FormL2. 62) = ( ) . 7 1 1 ~ ~ ~ [ C L ~ L ) 4 L ) ] ]
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 
Coeff. 0.5196 -0.16:22 
Testing for Error Autocorrelation from labS I to 3 
Chi2 (3) = 2.666 [0.4460] and F -F ofm(3. 61 ) = 0.77071 [0.5149] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. 0.1688 -0.2876 0.3396 
Testing for Error Autocorrelation hom lags I to -+ 
Chi2 (4) = 2.9865 [0.5601] and F -Form( 4, (0) = O.()')L)85 [0 .6361] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag ~ ~
CoetI. 0.08145 -0.4364 0.2169 0.1602 
EQ( J) IVlodcliing D4LOR by OLS 
The present sample is : 1972 (1 ) to 1990 ( I ) 
Variable 
Constant 
Trend 
Seasonal 
Seasonal 1 
Seasonal 2 
Y1(OR) 1 
::: Y2( OR)_ 1 
:: Y :; ( () I ~ ) )_ 1 
Y4(OR)_1 
, 
Coctlicient Std.Error t-\ 'lIllIe t-proh P ; ; r t t ~ ~
0.91958 0.39039 2.35() 0.()216 0.0798 
-0.0020727 0.002379 -O.X71 0.38 70 0.0117 
0.10664 
-0.037955 
0.] 0890 
0.13669 
0.13118 
0.13848 
O.7 XI I 
-0.28<) 
0.786 
O. -L') 82 O. ( ) j ) ( ) ~ ~
O . 7 7 ~ ~ ~ 0.0013 
0 . . t 3 ~ 5 5 ()'O()96 
0.0379 0.0656 
(). 0076 O. 1 060 rI"::·:'::·!!!!.! .. ·:!::l::!!::.·:::!!:::!!! 
0'()001 0.2173 II 
() .0000 O. :2 J <) 9 .::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
R 2 = 0.6 1 95 F ( 8, () -+) = 1 3 . 029 [0.0000 I () = (J. 3 92 7 D \ \ = 1.98 
RSS = 9.8732 for 9 variables and 1'3 ( ) b s c r \ " a t i o n ~ ~
Testing ror Error Autocorrelation from lags I to 1 
Chi 2 (1) == 0.018610.8913] and F-Fonn( L 6 ~ 1 1 = O.OI(d I I . X l ) l l ~ ] ]
I :rn)r .\utocorrclatioll C l 1 L ' n i c i e n t ~ : :
Lag I 
t 'udT. 0.05009 
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Testing for Error Autocorrelation from la(J s I to "'I 
Chi
2 (2) = 0.33626 [0.8452] and F-Fo;m(2. 62) = U . . - + ~ - J . 6 6 rO. 8666] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 
Coeff. 0.02823 -0.1941 
Testing for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to _ ~ ~
Chi
2 
0) = 0.47504 [0.9243] and F- FormO. 61 ) = O . I I ~ _ ~ ~ 18 rO .9399] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag I Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. 0.1231 -0.2131 -0.128 
Testing f()r Error Autocorrelation fl'0111 lags 1 to-+ 
Chi (4) = 0.65152 [0.9572] and F-Form{-L (0) '= ( ( . . ~ ) 0 8 8 [0.9688] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag-+ 
Coeff. 0.4176 -0.1399 -0.1418 -0. 1307 
EQ( 1) lVlodeliing D4LR hy OLS 
The present sample is: 1972 ( I ) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Variable 
Constant 
Trend 
Seasonal 
Seasonal 1 
Seasonal 2 
Yl(R)_1 
Y2(Rt.l 
Y3(Rt.1 
Y 4 ( R ) ~ 1 1
Coefficient 
0.96198 
0.001865 
0.13814 
-0.054850 
0.094780 
-0.042906 
Std.Error 
0.39472 
0.002446 
0.10527 
0.094945 
0.10753 
0.019322 
1 
t-value t-prob P a r t t ~ ~
2,437 0.0176 O.OX-J.9 
0.762 O.-J.4X6 0,0090 
l . ~ ~ I ~ ~ 0. 1941 0.0262 
-0 .57X 0.5(5) () .0052 
O.X81 O . ~ X X I-J. 0.0120 
-2.22 1 0.0299 0.1)"71 5 
-0.21386 {:::ri O.075297 <::=:' 2.g4() 0.0060 0.111 
0.0006 0.16 -0.34861 : ..... j!:.!: 0.097069 :.:'. -3 .59 1 
: : : : : ~ 0 . 4 1 1 OS1 .:.::::i::!i o.097 567 :;;:; -4.207 ..... '. :::::.::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 0.0001 0.2167 : i : ::: : 
R2 = O.S4()5 F(H, 64 ', = 9.7587 [O.OOOOJ CT == O . 2 2 _ ~ S S D\\ = 1.86 
RSS = 5.1460 for 9 variahks LInd 7 ~ ~ l l t b S C I ' ' ' ~ l l i o o s s
Testink! tor Irwr Autocurrelmion 1'1\)111 l l ~ s s 1 to I 
Chi2 (1) = 2.()-l58 rO.1 526] and F-Ionn( 1. (3 ) = I.X I ()S 10.1 :-\26] 
Error ,\utocnrrcldtion Coerticients: 
I .;lt!. I 
('ol'lf. O.-J.hS4 
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T e ~ ~ i n g g t()r Error Autucorrelation from lags 1 to "' 
Chl (2) = 2.0871 r O . 3 5 2 ~ ] ] and F-Form( 2. () 2 ) = n.\.) 124 [0 '-+069] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 
Coeff. 0.4775 -0.06674 
Tes;ing f()r Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to .3 
Chi'- (3) == 2.6899 10.4419] and F-FormC3. ( 1) =: (J.'/ " ) [() .510R] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients : 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. 0 .6134 -0.03576 -0.2459 
Testing for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to .3 
. '} 
Ch( (3) = 2.6899 [0.4419] and F -Form(]. 61) = 0. 7779 [0.5108] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
CoetI. 0.6 134 -0.03576 -0.2459 
EQ(l) MndcBin:,: D4LOy by OLS 
The present sample is: 1972 (4) to 1 ()90 ( I ) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-\,<11 LIe 
Constant 0.37638 0 . 2 2 ~ 7 7 7 IJ)·+5 
D4LOY 1 -1.4540 0.44259 - ~ . 2 R 5 5
D4LOY , 0.80821 o " I ~ " " 2.5-10 
-
. .J ( __ 
-
D4LOY 3 -0.248R6 0.12782 -I .947 
-
Yl(OY) 
_. 
I -0.010928 0.00661-1 - I h52 
Y2(OY) I . ,) I - - ()'""5 01 "', :;:::::< ( ..,.., - _ L Y ~ ~ )) . . _, _«./ -() . ) / _1 
-
.10680 :::·:·;{ -4 .500 Y3(OY) I 
-_. .... :.: .......... 
Y4(OY) 
-
1 O.20R41 O.1210n 1 1 ~ 2 2
I'rend -0.000704 0.000663 -1.061 
Seasonal 0.0028717 0.()22896 0.125 
Seasonal -0.0.30476 00"''''7'-. "':' . ' I ) -1 .282 
Seasonal .., 
-
··O.015R22 O . 0 2 J I 5 ~ ~ -(1 .68 .' 
-
1 
t-prob P a r t t ~ ~
0.1 ())J () .044() 
0.0017 0.1569 
() .O 1 ~ ~ R 0.1001 
O.O :' ()-I 0.0614 
0.10.3 9 0.0449 
0.0000 ;: 0 .'4 J 43 :,:·:·:::·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·: 
0.0000·:;:: 0.2588 
( l.()()()J 0.0487 
o.2<nO 0.0190 
O. <)()06 0.0003 
0.2050 0.(27) 
O.4t>7 1 0.0080 
R2= O.97..t 1 F( II. )8) = I 99 .()() 10.OUOO] () = O.()6 ()9 [)\\ ' = 1.96 
RSS ~ ~ ( ) . 2 ) q ~ ~ for 12 \'ariahles and 70 ( ) h h e r \ " " l l i ( ( n s s
.Testing for Error AUlocorrclation from lags 1 t l1 1 
l ' h h ~ ~ (I) = 0 . .3905 1 1 . 5 ~ 2 ( ) ] ] and F-I 'orl1l( 1. 57) = O , ~ ~ 1 (n 10 .5740] 
I :rrol' :\utlKorrcJatioll ( 'oefticients: 
('hapter 7 .. Appendices 
-.3 HEGJ' Tes' 
Lag 1 
Coeff. 0.3012 
T e s t i n ~ ~ f()f Error Autocorrelation hom l a ~ s s I to 1 
Chi2 (2) = 0.43848 [0.8031] and F-Form(2. ~ 6 ) ) = O . 1 7 6 ~ ~ [ O . 8 ~ 8 7 ] ]
Error Autocorrelation C oetlicients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 
Coetf 0.3926 0.1046 
Testing for Error Autocorrelation from lags I to 3 
Chi23) = 3.5898 [0.3093] and F -F orm( 3. ):"i ) = 0.9910:2 [0.-+0.:19] 
Error Autocorrelation Coetlicients: 
Lag 1 l..Jag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. 0.251 0.8562 0.8477 
Testing for Error Autocorrelation hom lags I to-+ 
Chi2 (4) = 3.8325 [0.4291] and F-Form{-L )-+) = O.7Xl')-+ [ O . ~ - + 1 9 ] ]
Error Autocorrelation Coetlicients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag-+ 
Coeff. 0.1961 0.884] 0.64] 9 - ( ) . 2 3 - ~ ~
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-. -I l Jnir Root Tes! on le \'e!., 
7.4 Unit Root Tests on the Levels 
OF or ADF tests are carried out on the le\ el or the \'ariables of the model. 
According to section 5.4.] and following the general to specific approach 
proposed by Doomik and Hendry (1994a) 7·1 all te sts commence \\"ith a general 
model: 
then tests proceed, if necessary, unti I the most specific model: 
First, by the computer programme (PcCiive 8.UL k. = 12 is selected to determine the 
significant lag at 5%. L refers to logarithm so LfYl (for example) stands for log of 
money. The criterion for test is OF or ADF statistic \\hich tests the null hypothesis 
of nonstationarity . For instance. since none of these statistics reported for moncy 
(LM) does not exceed the corresponding critical \al L1C the null cannot be rejected . 
* and * * refer respectively to 5% and 1 f f / O O contidence !c\·cls. 
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5 IYo:=-3.48 10/0=-4.106; Constan t and Trend and Seasonals 
included 
i-adf () la () t7 t - I<:t (T ~ ~ t - p p ~ ) )
LM -0.49956 0.046470 12 -0.80933 0 . 4 2 2 ~ ~
LM -0.80836 0.046299 1 1 -0.16685 0.8682 
LM -0.90137 0.045828 10 0 . I Y ~ 4 1 1 ( U ~ 9 5 2 2
LM -0.90715 0.045366 9 - - . ~ 2 t ) 0 6 6 0.7-+35 
LM -1.0230 0.044960 8 0 0 _ ~ 8 3 5 3 3 0.7030 
LM -0.97319 0.0445X2 7 -0.90S29 0.3680 
LM -l.1-+22 O.{)4-+507 6 -0.2813=: 0.7796 
LM -1.2324 0.04-+119 
""' 
O. ()-+g29 ( L ~ ~ 196 
LM -1.1-+29 0.043881 -+ -0 3 7 t ) - - _ ~ ~ O.70S0 
-1.2169 ( ) . { ) - + 3 5 ~ 9 9
.., 0.461 3-+ O.h-+h-+ LM , 
I.- f\/l -1 .1887 ( ( . ( ) 4 3 ~ . 1 1 1 ") -1 .809X O.(}7S7 
'4 .. IhL' inilial \!," IIL 'I"U/ mudel should cOl/luin alllhe cI /,'''''s IIke/" Ii) Ill." 1"£:IU\·lIl1l. including 
S/I//itIL '1I1 lugs 10 e nS /II' l ' II;) l"c'siduul (llIl (}c(JI.,.,' lulioll. Ihl'11 he h ·.I/, 'J lor lIs \'ulidily. ( ) I 1 C ~ . . l/7ul has 
/ I I I, ' /1 ' / /1" "II'l'I' 1(' \', in (1, 'd ll nr(}( .. ·('L'd i ll (U/I / U('I/U' Ihul ("IJII/i!d' lI 'i lll/OI (/1"/.1(' (p . :':'7) 1(,,'/1 cs (/ 1 .1 (' . . ,0., f' 
21 1 
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..., -I lJnit Root Te.\! on len'l.' 
LM -l.3260 0.()44086 
LM : : : : : : : " ~ : ' ~ : : : ~ ~ : f ~ ' ' ~ : : L · 3 3 739 }:I{: 0:043948 0 
U nit root tests for LM 
The present sample is: 1971 (2) to 1990 (I ) 
Dickey-Fuller test for Li\1: DLM on 
Variable Coefficient Stcl.Error I-val de 
Constant 0.064435 0.097773 0.659 
Trend -0.0011363 0.0013465 -0 .X44 
Seasonal 0'()46787 0.01 4278 3.277 
Seasonal -·0.047806 0.014335 -3.33:' 
Seasonal 2 -0.0099154 0.014280 -().694 
LM 1 0.0059836 0.020950 0 . 2 ~ 6 6
(J = 0.0440019 D\V = 2.03 DW(LM) = C)'003431 DF( I. \1) = 0.2856 
Critical values used in DF test: 50/0:=-3.469 1 ~ / 0 0 - - t t O g 2 2
RSS = 0.1355319547 for 6 variables and 76 obsen'ations 
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (J) 
Critical values: 50/0=-3.48 1 O / C ) = - 4 . 1 ( ) 6 6 _ i i i u s t a n t t and Trend i n c l u d ( ~ d d
LM 
LM 
t-adf 
-0.82499 
-0.73158 
0.049275 
0.04X877 
LM -O.98X99 O.04X646 
LM -1.0244 0.04X 177 
\ai l 
:? 
12 
1 1 
10 
<) 
t -I ~ l l \ I 
:? I-prob 
0.441 <) 1 0.6605 
-0.72124 0.4741 
0.03 7 6 ( L ~ ~ 0.9702 
-0.66208 0.5108 
: . : : : M : I : : · : : : : : : · : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : · : : : : · · : : : h h l : : g ; ~ ~ { { : : ) : : : : : : : : . : : : · : : q . ; Q 4 ~ ~ ~ 1 1 ..• : : : 2 0 9 7 t ~ ~ : : : Q , ( ~ 4 4 . : · · •.• 
LM -O.83()23 0.04<)371 
LM -1.2156 0.051216 
LM -1.2712 0.050761 
LM -1.2943 0.050315 
LM -1.0 1 ~ 8 8 0.052185 
LM -1.1-+ 15 0.052838 
I .M 
I_M -1.44<)5 
Unit root tests for LJ\t1 
0.055096 
0.055497 
'7 
-2.277R I 
() -OJ)<)61 X I 
) IlO58571 
4 2.321 R 
..., 
-1.:;769 _1 
..., 
-2 .4974 
-. 
-1.3 7 49 
0 
The present sample is : 1973 (2) to 1990 ( I) 
Augmcntcd Dickcy-Fuller k'st for I JvL I)L}vt 011 
Variable Cocfficient Std .IITor t-valul' 
Constant ( ( . 2 1 4 - - - ~ ~ O. 12:;S9 1.703 
Trend O.U00561 06 O . 0 0 2 ( ) 7 ~ C ' ' O.27() 
1.;\1 1 -0.()25U():' O'()29 74h - ( ) ' X X . ~ ~
0.0267 
0.9237 
0.9535 
0.02.18 
0.1203 
0.0153 
0.1743 
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-. -f [ -nil Root Tesl Oil le\'el,\ 
DLM 1 
-0,11135 0_12888 -!).864 
-
DLM 2 
-0.19668 0.12587 -1.)63 
-
DLM 3 0.012171 0.13022 ( H ) 9 ~ ~
-
DLM 4 0.20929 
-
0.12878 1 "') -.(L) 
DLM 5 
-
-OJ)l9353 0.13064 -0.148 
DLM 6 0.044887 0.12906 O . ~ ' + X X
-
DLi\l 7 -0.1741 I 0. 12555 -1. 387 
--
DLM 8 0.33531 0.12512 2.680 
-
(J = 0.0482169 D\V = 1.96 OW(L\1) == 0.00'+ 856 .\01 :( 1.\1) = -0.8426 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5( )/;)==-3.47C> 1 () ()"- - . . . o ~ n n
RSS = 0.1325177641 for 11 variables and ()8 obsl,.'ryat ions 
l Jnit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
_Critical values: 5% =-2.907 1 °1«.=-3.534; Const .. nt included 
t-adf (J 
LM -3 .0914* ()'048780 
LM .) 1462 * - . ) . 0.048401 
lag 
12 
II 
( ) . ' + : ' l ) ~ 5 5
-0. 7 ~ 0 0 ' + +
t-proh 
0.6480 
0.'+685 
LM -3.1099* ()'048 I 84 10 -() .OOI70.:'7 0.9986 
LM -3.1643 * 0.047727 l) -().73471 0.4658 
::::w:I:·'·::·:::::.:: .. : ' · : : : . : : : : : : : : : . ' . : : : · : : t ~ · · : : f : ! : i i , r : : : : : · . : · : : : : : : : ~ ~ ~ : g i i : ~ g g : : ......... . ~ : :•. :,;: :· 2.086] :' (Y; 0417 ,: ;-:-:..:.:-::-.,':' 
LM -3 .7940** 0.048950 7 -2.30()4 
LM -3.2337* 0.c)50803 (1 -(). I ~ ) 2 2 ()C) 
LM -.1.3148* 0.050372 .:; -() .( )40912 
LM -3.4618* 0.049936 4 ") .., 1 X ~ ~_. -' . ) 
-1 .587() LM --+. 7453 * * 0.051754 .., .) 
'") - SX 4 00 _ . ':-' . ( LM --+.4555* * 0.052406 , 
-
LM -3.6122* * 0.054800 -1.5026 
LM -3.2576* 0.055353 () 
Unit root tests for L1VI 
The present sample is: 1973 (2) to 1 9c)O ( I ) 
Augmented Dicke) -Fuller test for L ~ v v ; ; DI .I\1 on 
Variable Cocfficient Std.Error t-valuc 
Constant 0.18()2() 0.069779 2.b69 
L f\,l 1 
DLM 1 
DLi\ 1 2 
DLM 3 
DLl\l -+ 
DI\1 5 
DLM 6 
-() .O 1 7 - : ( ( . ~ ~
-0.122:21 
-() . . 2 0 0 _ ~ 9 9
O . ( ) 0 2 ( ) ~ 2 ~ ~
0. 19980 
- l L O ~ 2 : , - ~ ( ) )
n.o; 161 ~ ~
O.0069() 72 
O.1214() 
O.120()t) 
O.1236S 
O.122W) 
0. 12019 
O. II S . ~ ( ) )
- ~ . 4 7 X X
- 1. ()()() 
-1 .702 
O.OI() 
1.6.2() 
-0 .271 
()2h 7 
2 1 . ~ ~
O.O2'+() 
0.847() 
0.9675 
O.O24() 
0.1177 
0.0121 
0.1381 
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DLM 7 
DLM 8 
-0.18486 
0.32532 
0.11811 
0.11856 
-1.565 
:2 /-+-+ 
- -I lJnit Roo! Tes! on /C'·C/S 
(j = 0.04783 O\V = 1.95 DW(LM) = OJ)04H56 :\[)F( l \ I ) == -2 .-t 78 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5% =-2 .904 11) ( ) = - _ ~ . 5 : 2 X X
RSS = 0.1326871366 for 1 () \ ' a r i a b l e ~ ~ and {)8 I l h s e r \ ' 3 t i o n ~ ~
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5 1/';,:=-1.946 10/0=-2.599 
~ t - ~ a ~ d ~ f f_____ (j ____ . ~ l ~ a g ~ ! !__ - L t - ~ I l l ~ g ~ ~ t - ~ p ~ r u ~ b b
LM 
LM 
0.25627 0.053046 12 0.71310 O.-t790 
0.40958 0.052795 11 - - . ~ ( ) ( ) ( ) 9 9 ( ) . 7 6 ~ 3 3
LM O.3{)220 0.052340 10 0.49878 0.6200 
LM 0.47108 0.051975 9 -0 .20799 O.H360 
: : : : ~ ~ . : . · · · · · : · : · : : : : : . : : : : : · : : : : · : · : : : ) " " g , l , ~ f ~ ~ ~ ~ : : : · : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ( ~ ~ : ~ ) , , · 1 1 : ~ : g : 1 , , . : · : : : : : : : : ~ . · · : : : : : : j . f 4 ~ ~ : q · 9 P 2 2 > >
LM 1.1098 0.055464 7 -1.()X81 0 . ~ ~ X I 2 2
LM 0.89709 0.055553 6 ( J . 7 7 7 5 ~ ~
LM 1.0874 0.055363 ~ ~ 1 '()662 
LM 1.3649 0.055427 . ~ ~ -1.4 1-+ X 
LM 2.9165 0.063396 ..., 1 J61:2 . , 
LM LLO 1 00 0.063837 'J -0 .036775 .-
LM "L7457 0.063321 1 0.71839 
LM 7.0272 0.063077 0 
Unit root tests for LM 
The present sample is : 1 973 (:2) to 1990 ( I ) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for Ltv!; DLT'd PI1 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t- \ ~ d d L1l' 
LM 1 0.000789()0 0.0017575 O. ~ - + 9 9
DLM 1 -0.0078632 0.11941 -(U)hh 
-
DLM , -0.087300 0.1 1798 -0.7-.10 ... 
-
DLM .... 0.14512 0.11710 1. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ <) .) 
-
DLIV1 .:+ 0.32750 0.11892 :2. 7 ~ - + +
. . 
DLM 5 0.069233 O . 1 1 9 7 ~ ~ O.57X 
-
D L ~ \ ' l l 6 o 1'0" ':; • L. .) _ ( ) . 1 1 9 3 ~ ~ l.OOX 
-
DLM 7 -0 .1 1785 0.12125 -0.972 
-
J ) L ~ ~ 1 8 0.39-+29 O . 1 2 1 ~ 7 7 ') ') -+ .., . ) . - .' 
-
(j = 0.0)02513 I)'A'= 1.98 D\\ '(L\I) = O . O ( ) - + X ~ ( ) )
O . . ~ - W W 1 
O.2<)()8 
O.O()()O 
0.17X5 
() .9708 
O.-t752 
"\DI '(\ . \ 1) = ( ( . - + - + l ) ~ ~
Critical v a l u l ' ~ ~ u ~ , - ' d d in .\DF test: ~ ( l I ) ) - 1 . C ) 4 ~ ~ 11)/o"· -2 . )l)7 
RSS = O. 1 4 8 9 ~ ( , ( ) ~ - + +7 for 9 \ ~ l r i a b k ~ ~ and M ~ ~ { ) b s e J ' \ a t i ~ ~ Ins 
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
Chapfer ;. Appendices 7 -to l rnil Root Test Oil !ere!s 
Critical values: 5 ' ~ ) = - 3 . 4 8 8 l ' 1 o = - ~ . 1 0 6 ~ ~ Constant and T r ~ n d d and Seasonals 
included 
t-adf cr la (J t - j i.l (I t-proh ~ ~ ~ ~LP 
-2.7371 0.025721 12 -().50388 (J .n 168 
LP -2 .9576 0.025516 I 1 1.:17 1 ~ ~ O.20c)9 
LP -2.7052 0.025680 10 - - . 0 0 1 . . ( ) 8 5 ~ ~ O. l)() 2 ~ ~
LP -2.8367 0.025416 9 I. () ·ll I 0 .. ~ O 2 l ) )
LP -2.6453 0.025438 8 - 1 . 0 7 ~ 8 8 0.2881 
LP '"' ;'"'67 - _1. _.1 0.025476 7 1 . . ( ) ~ ~ I O.2( ) IS 
LP -2.9483 0.025640 6 U.56465 (1.5747 
LP -2.9515 0.025475 ) - - . 6 ~ ~ ( ) l ) ) (L 52<)() 
LP '"' 6'">71* -.). )". 00')':;3'"''"' 
. -- .).) 4 1.6114 0.1129 
LP - '"' J(P9 .1._ _) . :'; 0.025698 3::.: .. ::.,':'::::: 3 .537 0.000 
... 
LP -1.9170 0.028217 1 - - . 6 : ~ 5 ( ) ) I 0.5148 
-
LP -2.2322 0.028075 I .2.2913 (UJ257 
LP -1.7510 0.029086 0 
Unit root tests for LP 
The present sample is: 1972 ( 1 ) to I <)9() ( I ) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for L P; D L P un 
Variable Coefficient Stcl.Error t-\aluc 
Constant 0.22374 0.063206 3.540 
Trend 0.0054823 0.00 17540 ~ . . 12h 
Seasonal 0.0052620 0.013698 0.384 
Seasonal 0.018269 0.015004 1.21 X 
Seasonal 1 -0.059822 0.011251 -5 .317 
-
-
LP 1 -0.13978 0.045460 -:") . () 7 _"' 
--
DLP 1 0.30989 O . 1 1 1 0 : ~ ~ 2.79() 
-))LP 2 -0 .17087 0.11701 -1.460 
-))LP 3 0 4 3 2 . . : ~ ~7 0.12050 3 . ~ 8 9 9
_ .. 
cr = 0.0262762 D\\ ' ::: 2.12 D\V( LP) = O.0047()2 .\J)F( LP) = - ~ . 0 7 5 5
Critical values used in ADF test: 50,'0=: -3.47 1 11'0- --+087 
RSS = O . 0 4 4 1 8 8 0 5 8 ~ ~ 2 2 for 9 variables and 73 ubscl'\'ations 
II nit root tests 1974 (2 ) to 1990 (l) 
('ritical values: 5'Yc)=-JAS 1 1 Y . , = - ~ . 1 1 ( ) 6 ~ . .CO.Hstan t and. T r ~ n d d included 
t-adf () lag t -I \,1 .. ? t-prob 
LP -2.(lX'--;5 O . . U ( ) ( L ~ ~ ~ 12 1 . ( ) ( ) ) _ ~ ~ 0. 10:4 
LP - 2 . 4 0 ~ N N ( ( . O ~ O ~ ( l ( ) ) 1 1 -().XI1-+S5 ( ( . . ~ t ) 1 2 2
LP - "') ()()S7 O . ( ) ~ O - + S 4 4 10 -0.1 7 7 . ~ O O O . S ~ ( ) 2 2
215 
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- -! r -nil Root Test on fen'/.' 
LP 
LP 
-2.9399 
-2.7116 
0.030199 9 
0.030272 g 
1.1216 0.2672 
1.3()OX {J.1701 
LP -2.4253 0.030533 7 -1.5()()1 0.122:' 
LP ·-3.2605 0.030936 6 ( 1 . 5 7 l ) k ~ ~ O.:'h..j.l) 
LP -3.3374 0.030752.5 -O .··U7:26 ( ) . 6 6 ~ 6 6
: : : ~ 8 ~ : : : : : : · · · · · : : : : : · . : : . : : · : : : : : · : : . . ~ ~ . . ~ g g : ~ i i : . : . : : : : 9 ; : R ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ : : 4 4 .:: ;/:< 6. 1 f 6 :0 ,{H) 
LP -l.8922 0.038980 3 ( ) . 9 2 . 5 ~ 2 2 () .. ~ . 5 W ; ;
LP -1.6973 0.038933' -3 .5129 O.O()OX 
LP -2.8790 0.042474 1. 13 83 0.1595 
I.JP -2.65]4 0.042577 () 
U nit root tests for LP 
The present sample is: 1972 (2) to 1990 ( I ) 
Augn1ented Dickey-Fuller test for LP; DLP on 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-\Jluc 
Constant 0.30887 0.076564 · ~ . 0 3 4 4
Trend 0.00814 (l0021270 3.X3() 
LP 1 
DLP 1 
DLP 2 
DLP 3 
DLP 4 
-0.20952 
0.16408 
-0.10994 
0.11890 
0.59455 
0.05 5127 
0.10268 
0.10594 
0.10467 
0.10.526 
-3 .XO 1 
1. 59:\ 
-l.03H 
1. 136 
~ ~ (4X 
" .) ( 
. <J : ••• · •. 0;03055 . DW ::"" 1 . 8:S D \ \ ! ( I J J ( ~ " " \ ) ' ( ) ( ) - + ~ 5 5 t AD,F( I . p) = = = ~ ~ ~ .80* 
. . . . ... :.:.;.;..' , , ", . ','.' ... . ......... . 
Critical values used in ADF test: S'!lo=-3.472 1 ' ' : O = = 4 . 0 X 9 9
RSS = 0.06070177547 for 7 variables and 72 obser\'ations 
lJnit n)()t tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5cYo=-3.48 1 0/0=-4.1 0 6 ~ ~ Cu.nstant and Trend and Seasonals 
included 
t-adf (j' lag t- tau ? t - pro h 
LG -4.8703 ** 0.18100 12 0.1 O . ~ 9 7 7 ().91 7 () 
LG -.:1-. 9X97* * 0.1 7909 1 1 O. ()-l.2.5 ~ ~ ( L L 2 3 ( ) )
LG -'-k l ) 7 l ) ) ~ ; ; * 0.17799 10 O.2h III 0.79) I 
LG -).0384* * 0.17629 l) () --"-1 . . ) . ~ ) ) 0.5824 
LG - ~ ~ O'i1" ** ~ . . _ ., 0.17506 8 -0.1-l267 0.8871 
\,(j - 1 "'7** -) . .1_ O . 1 7 ~ ~ 7 7 7 O.I-l(1()6 O.X840 
LG -5. 1831 ** 0.1717-+ 6 ( ( . 1 0 ~ - l 1 1 0.016) 
LG - ,'" 1"' ** - ) . . . ~ ~ . ~ ~ ().l 70 1 ~ ~ "" - ( ) . ~ 1 ) ~ 2 - + + O . ~ ~ 2 q q
LG - " 70** - ).- .. 0.16911 -l I ~ ~ 7 ~ ~. - ( , . O . l l : \ ~ ~
LG - "'81' ** O . 1 7 1 - - . ~ ~ " 1 \IX ~ q q () . ()()-ll) - ) .. ' - ~ ~ - . ('I ( . ~ ~
I. ( , < : ; ; . - l l 2 1 1 ** 1 1 . 1 1 ~ . 2 9 9 ") - ( ) . ~ l ) 5 ( ) - l l O . 6 t ) ~ ~ ~ ~
-
~ ~ 1 (1 
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- -: L;nif ROOf res! on !('re!.' 
n: LG . ~ 5 . 5 3 5 1 1 ** 0.17399 1 - ~ . 0 0 9 9 0.003 
LG -6.4378** 0.18568 0 
U nit root tests for LG 
The present sample is: 1971 (3) to It)9() (1) 
Auglnented Dickey-Fuller test for LG: DLG on 
Variable Coefficient Stet. Error t-\'alue 
Constant 0.4 7458 0.29186 1.626 
Trend 0.839 0.001855 0.0022128 
Seasonal 4.-+ 76 0.36190 0.080847 
Seasonal 1 
Seasonal 2 
LG 1 
DLG 1 
0.10229 
0.25681 
··0. ] 0973 
-0.42296 
0.067267 
0.078778 
0.058638 
0.10820 
1.521 
~ . 2 ( ) O O
- 1 . ~ 7 1 1
-3.90C) 
(J=0.199673 DW=2.07 DW(L(i) = O.182 .\DF(LG) = -1.871 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5 5 ~ ; ( ) = - ) . 4 7 7 1 Il/I)c=--LOR-+ 
RSS = 2.711 ] 146 for 7 variables and 75 ohservatiol1s 
lJnit root tests 1974 auo 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5 fYo:=-3.48 101.)=-4.106; Constant and Trend included 
i-adf () lao C? t-lap C? t-prob 
LG -5.0081 ** 0.18159 1:2 O.6XX3() 0.4945 
LG -4.9X93 ** 0.18063 1 1 O. I ()-+6() 0.8465 
LG -5.0681 ~ ; * * 0.17892 10 O.3502() O.T27h 
LG -5.1059** 0.17740 9 0.-+ 3807 O . ( ) ( ( _ ~ 2 2
LG -5.1300** 0.17604 8 ( ) ) _ ~ - + ( ) 9 7 7 0.73-+5 
LC, -5.1611 ** 0.17460 7 -O.302R9 O. 7()3 1 
LG -5.2430** 0.17315 6 O.2-t15:2 (L X 1 ()() 
LG -5.2X.f4** 0.17169 ) - ( ) , ~ ~ 1378 O. -+ 1 ():2 
L(j - ~ ~ ., ~ ~ 1 6 * * ?«(: 0 1 7 1 1 8 ~ : : : : ') .:+-,q O.(ll ~ n n
...... 
-' .. - ~ ~ ::;:;:::::::.: .. , , ~ ~ . . \ ..:.. - ' 
LG -5.4485 * * 0.17827 
.., 
-].2910 eU)() 17 
-
, 
LG - -; - (n 8 * * 0.19255 
-, 0.73903 u - + ( , ~ g g
- .) - -
LG -5.-+909** 0.19182 1 - <) - -, 1 -). )- (). UOOO 
LG -7.9X02** 0.2.3 t)92 0 
Unit root tests for L(; 
The present sampk is: 1972 (:2) to 1l)9() ( 1 ) 
Augmented I >ickcy-Fulkr t".'st ror LG: DLG lHl 
Variahle C ~ i l i c i e n t t Std. L:rror t -\'a 1 1 I ~ ~ ~
Constant ( J : - : - + q ~ U U O ~ O R R 16 ~ . . 75() 
.21 7 
Chapter 7: Appendicn 
- -i ( Tni! Roo! Te.\! on len'/., 
Trend 0.002261 0.002270 0.<)96 
LG 1 
-0.1 ,+270 0.061760 -2 .] I I 
-
DLG 1 
-0.46570 0.1 1729 
-J .970 
-
DLG 2 
-0.] 3154 0.12778 -1.02() 
-
DLG 3 
-0.] 5470 0.12705 
-l.218 
-
DLG 4 0.34300 0.11091 3.093 
-
cr = 0.191487 OW = 1.97 DW(LG) = 0.2269 ADf( L(J) = -2 .. ~ ~ 11 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5()';)=:-3.-J.72 Ill o" --1.0X9 
RSS = 2.383361338 for 7 variables and 72 ohsen'(Itions 
Unit nwt tests 1974 ( 2 ~ 1 9 9 0 0 (l ) 
Critical values: 5(Yo=-2.907 1 ( y ' , = - 3 . 5 3 4 ~ ~ Constant included 
t-adf cr lag t- l(l(l t-proh • t;> 
LG -4.0930** 0.1963 1 ]2 -0. 1 () I 7:' 0.91 l)-J. 
LG -4.1406** 0.19440 II - O . ) ] 7 2 ~ ~ 0.:'93-J. 
LG -4.1363** 0.19306 10 O·"-'-J. - .. , -, ) j 0.7387 
LG -4.1614** 0.19144 <) -0 .OgXX82 ( ) . 9 2 < ) ~ ~
LG -4.2454** 0.18967 8 -0.23123 O.XIRO 
LG -4.3044** 0.18803 7 -().X3756 O.-J.()5() 
LG -4.2:186* * 0.18753 6 -i). 1 <)()-J. 5 O.X49() 
LG -4.3] 12** 0.18594 5 - l . : ~ 2 9 1 1 O . : 2 2 ~ 1 1
LG .:J 1 4 1 0 * * « ~ ~ 0 0 18676) 4 :}}}/') OX' o ()41 ·}: 
- " . ::{{{ . ( :{ /? ..... . '\:: ' ':::' 
LG -4.8H91 ** 0.19197 ... -3.ROOO () . 000:; 
" 
LG -4.0715** 0.21238 ! O.143-J.<) 0.8864 
LG -4.1 747* * 0.21067 -X.I228 O.OOO() 
LG -4.1662** 0.30149 0 
llnit ."oot tests for LG 
The present sample is: 1972 (2) to 1990 ( I ) 
~ J n e n t e d d Dickey-Fuller test for LG; DLG un 
Variable Codfic iellt Std. Error t - \ Llluc 
Constant O . 6 ~ ( ) 4 47 0.20536 :; .021 
1.(1 1 -0.090169 0.032126 - - . 8 0 7 7
DLG I -0 .51 ~ ~ 4 4 0.10758 -4.76-:' 
DLG ~ ~ -0 .16933 0.1 2201 -1 .3gg 
DLG 3 -0.18873 0.12236 - I : ; - J . ~ ~ ~
DLG 4 0.3:2-J.87 0.10939 2.(nO 
a = O.191475 0\\1 = 1.95 D \ \ , ( L ( i i = ( ) . ~ ~ ( ~ ( ) ) :\1)1 (L(i) = - - . X ( ) 7 7
Critical values used in .\I)F test: ~ I ( ( = - - - _ ~ . C ) O ~ ~ 1110 =-3 . . 5 ~ ~ ~
RSS ::c ~ . 4 1 9 7 3 6 S l ) - J . . for () \'arinbks and 7 ~ ~ ()hscn ~ l t i ( ) I 1 S S
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Unit root tests 1974 (2) to J990 (l) 
Critical values: 5cYo=-1.946 I c Y o = ~ 2 . 5 9 t ) )
t-adf () la ll eo 
LG 0.68598 0.22557 12 
- -I ["nit Root Test on /el'ds 
t-Ia(l 
? t -prob 
0.28130 0.7796 
LG 0.74979 0')"-6 . .:.._.)) 1 I -O'()68505 (). 94:' () 
LG 0.75590 0.22146 iO 0.20858 O.H35h 
LG 0.81005 0.21949 9 O.60(v:+ I ( L ' : : 4 M ~ ~
LG 0.94846 O . = ~ ~ 1822 8 O . - + « ( ~ ) l ) ) ( ) . 6 2 - + _ ~ ~
LG 1.0672 0.21674 7 - ( ( . l l ~ 2 4 4 o. ()] 02 
LG 1.0746 0.21485 () 0.58981 O.S57h 
LG l.2394 0.21364 :l -() .. ~ 3 6 8 0 0 ( ) . . ~ / ) )
LG 1.2049 0.21203 '.' .:1 ~ . 2 4 ~ ~ O.O() 2 
LG 2.0955 0.22822 " -2.6920 O.O()92 ) 
LG 1.5070 0.23962 I 0.76540 0.-+470 ~ ~
LG 1.7458 0.23882 -8 .071 7 ().OOO() 
LG 0.51500 0.33928 0 
U nit root tests for LG 
The present sample is: 1972 (2) to 1990 ( I ) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for LG; DLe, Ull 
Variable C o e f l ~ c i e n t t Std.Error t - \ ( d q ~ ~
LG I 0.0061 186 0.0042953 1 1 - + 2 ~ ~ ~
DLG 1 -0.46706 O. I 1281 -4. 14(1 
OLG 2 
OLG 3 
DLG 4 
-0.079901 0.1253-+ 
-0.094656 0.12531 
0.41126 (1 .11181 
- - . . ~ ~ 7 
-0.755 
~ . 6 7 8 8
(J = 0.202758 OW = 1.97 DW( LG) = O.22h() .\\)F( L< r) :=- 1..+24 
Critical values used in ADF kst : 5°·() =- 1.945 11)'·o::: -2 .SQ) 
RSS = 2 . 7 5 ~ ~ 4 1 7 0 9 5 5 for 5 variables and 72 nb :.; cnations 
Unit .-e)()t tests 1974 (2) t9 1990 (n 
Critical values: 5 % =-3--'8 111.1=-"'.106; Constant and Trend and Seasonals 
included 
t-adf () 1a(1 eo l-Id ll ? t-prob 
LR -.5.0699** 0.26201 12 1 . ~ 4 3 7 7 O.I X.56 
LR --L8607* * O.2h-l2-l 11 0 . · · 2 ; - l ~ ~ 0.6710 
LR --1.9646** 0.26198 10 I ")(r' X .- .) ( 0.2019 
LR --1 .7"7 I -+ * * O.:2()37X l) 1.:::O3() o. 2 _ ~ · · L : ; ;
LR --+ .6312 ** O . ~ ( ) - + l ) 6 6 X ( ) . 1 ~ ) 1 ( ) 9 9 ().X-lSX 
LR --t6 l» 3** ( L L ( ) 2 4 - + + 7 1 . ~ 7 3 0 0 O.20XX 
11l) 
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-:. -I Unit Root Tesl on IlTCls 
LR 
-4.5998 ** 0.26401 6 -0.524-+5 0 . 6 ( t ~ 2 2
LR 
-4.7210** 0.26219 5 0.38984 O.69S:2 
LR 
-4.7426** 0.:26013 4 1.67()1 0.1007 
LR 
-4.6374** 0.26432 ~ ~
-1.8294 0.0728 
-' 
LR 
-5.3112** 0.26981 2 O . l) X--L29 
LR 
-5 .2562** 0.26973 
-0.62936 
LR 
-6.2699** 0.26832 0 
Unit root tests for LR 
The present sample is : 1971 (2) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Dickey-Fuller test for LR; OLR on 
Variable Coefficient Stcl.Error t-\ 'a lue 
Constant 1.0658 0.36155 2.948 
Trend 0.00487 
Seasonal 
Seasonal 1 
Seasonal 2 
LR 1 
0.29960 
-0 .03479 
0.24011 
-0.22956 
0.002396 
0.098898 
0.098531 
0.099041 
0.070878 
2.036 
).029 
-0.353 
.2.42-l 
-J .:?39 
() .32<)2 
( ) . 5 ~ 1 6 6
(J = 0.303514 DVv = 2.43 DW(LR) = 0.2386 DF(LR) = -3.239 
Critical values used in OF test: S%:=-3.469 I ( ( · ; ; : - - - 0 8 2 2
RSS = 6.44843321 for 6 variables and 76 nhscrvations 
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5 cYt):=-3AS 14Yt,=-..t.106; Constant and Tn'lul included 
t-adf IT la(1 Eo t- Iao 9 t- ,")rub 
LR -5.0439** 0.26409 12 1.6542 0.1045 
LR -4.731 0** 0.26863 I 1 0.1-+302 0.8869 
LR -4.9167** 0.26604 10 I ( , -.., . )-)-) 0.1 103 
LR -4.6236** 0.27021 9 0.80718 0.4232 
LR --L5704* * 0.26932 8 O.S6959 0.5714 
LR 4 - " C; * * - .)(u_ 0.26763 7 O.LJ8S26 (L32S9 
LR -4.5151 ** 0.26756 () - ( ( . ~ 2 6 1 7 7 0.7455 
LR --4 .61 ,+ 7* * O.:2()541 .) 0.16807 (L8671 
LR :':': : ~ : ~ : : : :; ' ) * * :,:,:,:::::,: 0 ' . .., 14 };: ~ ~ }'::;"?':. ") ( 9 ( 0.040 ::.4 ()I)(){ :.::::::::::::: ::. 6 1 .. :.:. :::·:·:.:::.:<: · t ) 
. . • ~ ~ , .:::::;\::::::: .... • - .. , ..... .:::: ........ ?:' ....... -. 
LR A.4S78 ** 0.:27073 ..., -2. 5() 19 O . O L ~ O O) 
LR -5. 2971 ** 0.:2X321 , 1 .., ( - ..., O.OX27 
-
. I )).) 
LR ---L 9179* * 0.28816 -1.86()4 0.0677 
LR -6.7006* * 0.:2()391 () 
Unit n)()t tl'Sts for LR 
T h ~ ~ prl'Sl'lll sample is : 1972 (:2) io 199() ( I) 
Chapter 7: Appendices 
A U ~ l n e n t e d d Dickey-Fuller test for LR: DLR 011 
Variable Coefficient Stcl.Error t-value 
Constant 1.1170 0.]9911 2.799 
Trend 0.0029406 0.00245 1.199 
LR 1 
DLR 1 
DLR 2 
DLR 3 
DLR 4 
-0.19979 
-0.25604 
-().065955 
-0.26250 
0.25103 
0.078932 
0.12560 
0.12366 
0.12310 
0.11787 
., -" 1 
-,.;. .J .' 
-2.038 
o -" "I 
- .)_·U 
-2.1 ]2 
2.130 
- -/ Unit Root reSl on h:1 'els 
(J = 0.279143 D\V = 2.00 DW(LR) = 0.3471 ADFiI.IO = -2 .531 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5 ~ / o = - ) . 4 472 1 ( ~ / o = = ... L()X() 
RSS = 5.064851826 for 7 variables and 72 ( ) h ' i ~ n a t i o l l ' i i
lJnit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5'X):=-2.907 1 u/o=-3.534; Constant included 
t-adf u 
--
1(1(' ~ ~ t-l<.1 o 6> t-prob 
LR -3.6761 ** 0.28677 12 () .7-+X6() 0.4) 7() 
LR -3.6944** 0.28553 I 1 -n.7240() 0.472-+· 
LR -3.7667* * 0.28422 10 0.K279() 0.4115 
LR -" 71")'1 ** -). ._- 0.28338 9 n.18973 O.85()2 
LR -3.8141** 0.28084 8 -0.049 I 15 0.961 U 
LR ; X- ')"" * * - j. .'1. _ _ ) 0.27828 7 O.-t·,fl)77 0.6546 
LR ,.., 9( .... 6** --). )., O.27()29 6 -0.84-+75 0.401X 
LR " 9)6"" * * 
- -'. ~ ) j j o '7 - -9 ._ . )) 5 -() .. ~ ~ 81 54 0.7(142 
LR - 3 . 9 ~ 7 6 * * * 0.27356 4 l.h5() 1 0 . 10] 1 
LR -4.1007** 0.27757 Y :·:::::,.': -3 .2 1 80 O.()O21 
LR "-I ""91 ** 0.29842 , 1.()512 O.2()74 -.j .) 
-
LR -4.2219* * 0.2()868 1 -2 .771 7 0.0074 
LR .. 5 . 5 . ~ 8 4 * * * 0.] 1436 0 
lJnit root tests fo." LR 
The present sample is: 1972 ( I ) to I t)9U ( I ) 
A U ~ l 1 1 e n t e d d Dickey-Fuller test for LR: DLI{ on 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t -yaluc 
Constant 0.85627 O . 3 0 ~ ~ 2 2 ~ ~ . X ~ ~ ~
LR I - 0 . 1 3 2 ~ 7 7 0.05079] -2.()\)4 
DLR I - - . · H ) ~ 3 9 9 0.10820 -] .719 
DLR 2 -0 .1520 I 0.11 766 _1.2l)2 
DLR 3 - - . . ~ ~ III I 0.1 ()()l)7 -] .843 
Chapter 7: Appendices 
- -I Unit Root Test on h'\'c/s 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5(//(1=-2.901 ] II r,=-3.52] 
RSS = 5.492803716 for 5 variables and 73 o h , ~ r \ \ ations 
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (0 
_Critical values: 5 IYo=-1.946 1°"{)=-2.S99 
t-adf cr lag t- Ia!l t-proh :0; 
LR 0.67618 0.32097 ] 2 0.70X24 O.4X20 
LR 0.79446 0.31943 1 1 -() .8·4147 ( ) . - t o . ~ ~ 9 
LR 0.69177 0.31855 10 0.7·+357 (L'+hIJ4 
LR 0.81139 0.31723 9 O.3046X O.761X 
LR 0.87446 0._) 1460 g O.175X5 0.8611 
LR 0.91592 0.31187 7 0.8()O50 0.3932 
LR 1.0629 0.31 116 6 ··0.4859 1 0.6289 
LR 1.0096 0.30910 5 -0.034176 0.9729 
LR 1.0240 0.30647 4 1.9522 0.0557 
.. .. -....... 
LR 1.3930 :::::.: O. J I 357 :::::: 3:U::U{:::::. J. 4,+ <) 0.0010 
':':'.':':':'. :,:,:-:,:"';,: 
LR 0.91291 0.34043 2 O.J38()4 O. 7 3 ( L ~ ~
LR 0.97708 0.33799 -4 .3 107 () .OOOI 
LR 0.45562 0.3 8225 0 
U nit root tests for LR 
The present sample is : 1972 ( I ) to 19c)() ( I ) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for LR: DLR on 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t - \ a l l l \ ' ~ ~
LR 1 0.010717 0.0060296 1.777 
DLR 1 -0.45690 0.11176 --LOS8 
DLR 2 -0.15954 0.12347 -1.292 
DLR 3 -0.4111S 0.112:29 -3 .662 
cr = 0.298335 D \\1 = 1. 77 D \\' ( L R) = (L 3 I ~ ~6 ! \ D F ( L R ) = 1. 777 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5 ~ ; ; ) = - - . 9 4 5 5 I I ) ) : - 2 . 5 ( ) ~ ~
RSS = 6.141251751 for 4 variables and 73 observations 
Unit nwt tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1 ) 
Critical \alllcs: 5 1%=-3.48 10/0=-4.106; Co.nstant and Trcnd and Seasonals 
included 
t-adf () la!2 
" 
t-Ian l:> t-prob 
LOR - ~ . X X O S * * 0.40186 12 -0. 9T7() " o ..,..,..,...., .. , _,_, I 
LOR -4.()509* 0.40167 1 I U . ~ 7 : ~ 7 7 O.7S:27 
LOR -4.0989* 0.39779 10 ( L - \ ( ) ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.57(14 
LOR -4.lHN:2 * U.39500 9 O.29X23 O.7()()X 
1 ()R --+.1190** 0.39139 S (l.32()50 ( ) . 7 ~ 5 4 4
,..." 
Chapter 7: Appendices 
- . .j. [ 'Ilif Rool T£!\/ Oil hTeI" 
LOR 
-4 .1431 ** 0 . 3 8 7 l ) ~ ~ 7 - ( ( . ( ) 2 ( ( 5 5 9 9 O.9l() 7 
LOR 
-4.2092** 0.38420 6 0.26447 O . 7 ( ( ~ ) )
LOR 
-4.2407** 0.38081 5 0 . 1 - + ~ ~ 0 0 ( U H ; ; ~ ~ ~
LOR 
-4 .2866* * 0.37735 ~ ~ o .·f 7003 (J.64()2 
LOR 
-4.2920** 0.37466 ~ ~ 1 - ..,.., ~ ~ 0. 131 () J - . ) _ ' J ~ ~
LOR 
-4.9949** 0.37916 , l . ~ ~ 714 0.1 ~ h S S
-
LOR 
-4 .7260** 0.38301 -0 . 7 ~ - + + 9 '-) O O ~ 5 < ) . ; ;
LOR 
-5.6535 ** 0 . 3 8 1 5 ~ ~ 0 
Unit root tests for LOR 
The present sample is: 1 971 (2) to 1 990 ( I ) 
D i c k e ~ - F u l l e r r test for LOR; DLOR on 
Variable Coefficient Sld.Error t-valLle 
Constant 0.95968 0.35225 2.724 
Trend 0.000384 0.0023569 0.163 
Seasonal 0.26128 0.13572 1.925 
Seasonal 1 -0.026286 0.13551 -() . 1 ' . ) ~ ~
Seasonal J 0.23564 0.13581 I 7"'-.. J) 
-
LOR I -0.20321 0.067903 -2.993 
-
(j == 0.41745 D\V = 2.-+ 7 D\V(LOR) = 0.3 7X9 DF( LOR) = <2 .99] 
Critical values used in DF test: 5% :=-3.469 1 1 1 / ; ; c : : - ~ ~ ( ) X 2 2
RSS = 12.19848822 for 6 variables and 76 observations 
Unit 14 00t tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (0 
Critical values: 5 c ~ o : = - 3 A 8 8 1 °;')=-4.1 06; Constant and Trend included 
t-atit' (J 1,.11 I b t -lao t> t-proh 
LOR -3.9082* 0.39889 12 -0 .78170 O . ~ 3 8 1 1
LOR -4.0709* 0.39733 1 1 0.1 ~ ~ 2 ( ) ) 0.8859 
LOR -4.1401** 0.39350 10 o 9' I -.6 _ ) 0-+920 
LOR -4.1075** o "'91 -', .. ) )- '-) (I. 13 96() O . 8 X 9 ~ ~
LOR --+ . 1573** 0.38789 8 0 . .53855 0.5925 
LOR --+ . 1517** 0 ~ 8 5 ~ ' " ". . ) JJ 7 -0.19408 O.8-+()8 
LOR 4 C) " 1 -** - ._.) ) 0.38194 6 u..+ 1 066 0.6829 
LOR --+ .2431 * * 0.37910 ) -0 .0 I I : ( ~ 5 5 O.9l)O6 
LOR -4 .. ~ ( ) 6 6 * * * 0.37576 ~ ~ O. 71 ( ) ~ 6 6 ( l . ~ ~76() 
LOR -4.2767* * 0.37-+1S ..... -1. 9506 0.0559 ) 
LOR -5.U775** 0.38297 .) 1 l ) ~ 5 1 1 (U)5()5 
-
I_OR ·-4.6231 * * 0 .. -;9175 -1.527() ( ) . l . ~ I X X
LOR -5.9X3()** 0 .. 19h()1 0 
Unit root tests for LOR 
The preSl'nt sample is: 1 ~ n n 1 ( ~ ) ) to I 9t)() ( I ) 
Chapler 7: Appendices - -r Unit Root Tes( on len)s 
Dickey-Fuller test for LOR; DLOR on 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-yalue 
Constant 1.] 539 0.3-J.6() 1 ~ ~ . ~ ~ < ) )
Trend 0.00077289 0.0024221 0.319 
LOR 1 -0.22065 0.069628 -3 .169 
(j = 0.4 3002 1 0 \V = 2.5'7 0 W (L 0 R) := O. ~ ~ 7 X () f) F ( LOR) = - . ~ . . 1 69 
Critical values used in OF test: 50/0=-3.469 1 I)'(J '= _-J. . O X ~ ~
RSS = 13.49902182 for 3 variables and 76 obsen'ations 
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (J) 
Critical values: 5 ' ~ . = - 2 . 9 0 7 7 1 %=-3.534; Constant included 
t-adf (J lag t - I ~ l < l l t-proh :::> 
LOR -3.7268** 0.40943 12 -O .. ~ ( ) 9 . . · . j . . O . / ' 1 . ~ ~ ~
LOR 
-3.8597** 0.40595 1 1 O . 4 X I 4 ~ ~ () . . , ' ' ' ~ ~.h .)_.) 
LOR -3.8638** 0.402()4 10 1 1 ( ) 4 6 ~ ~ O .. ~ O O 2 2
LOR -3 .7493** 0.40330 9 0.52270 0 . 6 ( ) . ~ - 1 1
LOR -3.7380** 0.40058 8 1.0 1 ~ 4 4 O . ~ ~ 1 54 
LOR -3.6308** OA0067 7 (J.2() 1 14 O.7()50 
LOR -3 .6623** 0.39733 6 0)n447 () . -J.O 7 () 
LOR -3.5899** 0.39627 5 0.·.j.1952 0.6764 
LOR -3.5937** Cl.39344 
"+ 1.()920 ( L ~ ~ 7()4 
LOR -3.4691* 0.39408 .., - 1 . 8 ~ 2 ~ ~ O. ()690 .) 
LOR -4.2727** OAO 199 ! 1 . ( ) 2 5 ~ ~ O.O59() 
-
LOR -3.7<)79** O.-+IOSI 1 -I ' ( ) . ~ 9 7 7 O. I(J()2 
LOR -5.1209** 0.-+ 1 6 ~ 6 6 () 
Unit nwt tests for LOR 
The present sample is: 1971 (2) to 199() ( 1 ) 
_Dickey-Fu ller test for LOR; OLOR on 
Variable Coefficient Std. I ~ r r o r r t-value 
Constant 1.1409 0 .. ~ 4 2 1 2 2 ~ ~ .. ~ 3 5 5
LOR 1 -021239 O.06424() -3.306 
(J ::::: 0 . 4 2 7 7 ~ ~ ~ ~ D\V ~ : : o o 2.59 D\\"(LOR\::::: 0.378 DF(LOR) = -3.306* 
Critical values used in DF test: 5(%:=-2 .9 1 () ( ( : : - . ~ . ~ ~ 17 
RSS = 13.517X5151 for 2 variahks and 76 ohsen'ations 
Unit root tests 197 ... Cillo 1990 (1) 
Critical values: S(Yc.=-3A8 I 'Yc,=-.... l 0 6 ~ . . ('onstant and Trend alld Sl'aSOI1;t I, 
included 
Chapter 7 .. Appendices 
-. -I L 'nil Rool Te." Oil len!!" 
LY 
-3.0884 0.0090574 12 
-0.47106 ( ) . ( ) ~ 9 : - : :
LY 
-3.2861 0.0089821 1 I 1 ~ 0 9 0 0 0. 1380 LY 
-3.0027 0.0091008 10 -0,(144816 0.0644 LY 
-3.1453 0.0090077 9 0.30073 n.7(I-F) 
LY 
-3.2089 0.0089254 8 1. 19()2 1 ) . 2 ~ 6 1 1
LY 
-2.9935 0.0089636 7 ( ) . 8 4 ( ) ~ - 1 1 0. -1- 1)1 4 
LY 
-2.8813 0.0089391 6 - O . ~ ( ) - 1 - ~ 8 8 O.():23 I 
LY .' . .;.:.;. -, )" 7 ::;:;:;:;:?; , ' - '::::::. - :::::::::::: :.;. 0.1)0-1-- )) 7 :::::::::::::: 0 00887 "l } :::: :=::y :::::::::::: ) 996 
.... - . - - "':'/::::: ., ' - - '::: { : . ) } } ~ { { ...... . 
LY 
-2.4652 0.0095081 4 - : 2 . ( ) ) L ~ ~ ( ) . . q ) \ ~ ~
LY 
-3.3082 0.0097712 .... 5. 791 :2 0.0000 ,) 
LY 
-1.9094 0.0] 2286 ') - - . C ) ( ) C ) ~ ~ 0.0000 -
LY 
-3.4848* 0.014565 12.3()8 O. ()O()() 
LY 
-] .3560 0.0276] 4 0 
lJ nit root tests for L Y 
The present sample is: 1972 (3) to I t)90 ( I ) 
A u ~ n 1 e n t e d d O i c k c c ' - F L l l l e r r test for I. \{; DLY Ull 
Variable Coetlicient Std.Error t - - ' ' d l l ~ ~
Constant 0.26757 Cl.091149 :2. ()3 6 
Trend 3.75 I 4e-005 5 . 7 2 6 0 ~ - O 0 5 5 (l.t:)) .5 
Seasonal 
-·0.000564 I 0.00287 1-+ -0 .1 t)() 
Seasonal -0.0013882 0.0029121 -0.477 
Seasonal ! -·0.0003938 (),00287I 0 
-0 .1 37 
--
LY ] -0.028916 0.0098746 < ~ . 9 2 X X
-
DLY 1 1.9117 0.11867 16.110 
-
DLY ) -2 .0917 0.24779 - 8 . · · ~ 4 1 1
---
DLY 3 1.6624 0.29948 ~ . 5 5 1 1
-
DLY 4 -0.90539 0.24730 -3 .()61 
.-
DLY 5 0.:;2700 0.1 1775 2.777 
-
<J = 0.00859177 D\V = 1.91 D\\ '( LY) = O.O()2-1-7 :\DI '(I.Yl = -:2.928 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5(1,;) =-3 .--+73 I (Yo=-4 .091 
RSS = 0.004429106917 for I 1 variahks and 71 observations 
lJnit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (I) 
C"itical values: 5%=-3.48 I ·Yc)=-4.1 06; ('..illIS':lI1 t and Trend included 
[-adr 0 1(1( ' C> t - I ~ l " "? t-proh 
LY - . : ~ . . 1621 O.OOX8161 I ~ ~ -O.:)O __ ~ 9 ~ ~ O.()16() 
LY < ~ ~ 3 ( ) 4 7 7 O . ( ( O X 7 ~ 0 0 I 1 I 1 . ~ 4 7 - - + + O. 12S I 
LY - ~ . 0 7 ~ ( ) ) O,OOX8689 10 -O.040X9() ( , . l ) ( 1 7 ~ ~
LY .., "') I -I - - ~ . . - ) 0.0087833 9 () .. ~ ~ ()S--+--+ O.75 l )() 
LY "' "7--_'._ 1 ) O,OOX7080 )\ I .2:227 ()':22()l) 
",;;; 
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L Y -3.0572 0.0087478 7 0.86272 0.3921 
L Y -2.9420 0.0087275 6 -0.52366 0 . 6 0 ~ 6 6
: ::p:¥ti :: . < · : : · : : : / : : t ~ f ~ 9 § I · n n::o.:.9{)867{)1 • ':5' 3.075 0.003 
.. .:.:-:.:-::. :.:. 
L Y -2.5180 0.0092918 4 -2.0954 0.0406 
L Y -3.3817 0.0095595 3 5.9429 0.0000 
L Y -1.9373 0.012022 2 -5.0332 0.0000 
L Y -3.5447* 0.014253 1 12.574 0.0000 
L Y -1.3821 0.026952 0 
Unit root tests for L Y 
The present sample is: 1972 (3) to ] 990 ( 1 ) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for LY: DLY tJIl 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 0.26868 0.088984 3.019 
Trend 3.7816e-005 5.5978e-005 0.676 
L Y 1 -0.029099 0.0096398 -3.019 
DLY 1 l.9124 0.11576 16.520 
DL Y 2 -2.0950 0.24181 -8.664 
DL Y 3 l.6683 0.29241 5.705 
DLY 4 -0.90969 0.24154 -3.766 
DL Y 5 0.32859 0.11501 2.857 
0"= 0.00840145 OW = 1.91 OW(L Y) = 0.06247 ADF(L Y) = -3.019 
Critical values used in ADF test: 50/0=-3.473 1 (%=-4.091 
RSS = 0.004446817512 for 8 variables and 7] observations 
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5%=-2.907 1 %=-3.534; Constant included 
t-adf a lag t - · l a ~ ~ t-Drob 
LY -3.1503* 0.0087489 12 -0.65641 0.5146 
L Y -3.3242* 0.0087000 11 1.4543 0.1520 
LY -3.0802* 0.0087927 10 -0.10446 0.9172 
LY -3.2252* 0.0087103 9 0.15219 0.8019 
L Y -3.2988* 0.0086345 8 1.2011 0.2350 
L Y -3.0867* 0.0086691 7 0.86172 0.3926 
LY -2.9722* 0.0086492 6 -0.53214 0.5967 
! : ! : ! f f l : ! : ! : ! : : : ! : ! : ! : : : : ! ! : : ~ : : ! : : : : · : : : : : ~ ~ : : ~ : : ~ t ~ ~ i ! ~ : I : ~ : : ~ : : ! ' : : : : : : : : : : : 9 J ~ 9 : Q I I ~ f l ~ : ~ ~ : : : : : ~ $ : : : : : : ~ t ~ : · : ~ : : : : : ~ : 1 : . 1 : : H t : \ O : ~ Q Q ~ ~ : : :
L Y -2.5197 0.0092187 4 -2.0915 0.0409 
L Y -3.4494* 0.0094786 3 6.0167 0.0000 
L Y -1.90S3 0.011940 2 -5.0569 0.0000 
LY -3.6131** 0.014141 1 12.762 0.0000 
L Y -1.2369 0.026872 0 
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Unit root tests for LY 
The present sample is: 1972 (3) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for L Y; DL Y un 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 0.25811 0.087224 2.959 
L Y 1 -0.027779 0.009399 -2.955 
DLY 1 1.9116 0.11526 16.585 
DL Y 2 -2.0945 0.24078 -8.699 
DLY 3 1.6551 0.29052 5.697 
DL Y 4 -0.89448 0.23946 -3.735 
DL Y 5 0.31094 0.11153 2.788 
. g : ~ F : q : i q p ~ ~ ~ · · ~ : m M 0 : : : : : H ~ : · ; 9 q . : J l . ) W ' ( P ' ~ ' X ) · · .. :. 0.062 AD F (L '() ::::::::::: -6.955 * 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5%=-2. 9 0 ~ ~ 10/0=-3.524 
RSS = 0.004479031036 for 7 variables and 71 observations 
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 50/0=-3.48 10/0=-4.106; Constant and Trend and Seasonals 
included 
t-adf cr lag l-lao ~ ~ t-prob 
LOY -1.6480 0.071920 12 -0.29830 0.7668 
LOY -1.8273 0.071220 1 1 0.82273 0.4148 
LOY -1.6698 0.070979 10 -0.31422 0.7547 
LOY -1.8708 0.070324 9 1.6138 0.1130 
LOY -1.4576 0.071443 8 0.15715 0.8758 
LOY -1.4863 0.070757 7 0.44814 0.6560 
LOY -1.4292 0.070211 6 -1.9297 0.0591 
LOY -2.1503 0.071992 5 1. 7324 0.0890 
.14QY··· :.::: .. ;.":: > q : . ~ 8 , ~ 4 : : 0'<)73314 4:.:: .... ~ : : : -2.263 0.027 '.' 
LOY -2.6609 0.076014 
., 
., -6E ., 0.0008 
-' 
- ' . ~ ~ )-' 
LOY -1.6135 0.083589 2 -2.9356 0.0048 
LOY -2.7450 0.089000 1 8.2656 0.0000 
LOY -0.84103 0.13082 0 
Unit root tests for LOY 
The present sanlple is: 1972 (2) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
A u ~ n l e n t e d d Dickey-Fuller test for LOY; DLOY on 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 0.41332 0.21099 I. 959 
Trend -0.000812 0.000614 -1.322 
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Seasonal 0.0028229 0.023415 0.121 
Seasonal 1 
-
-0.021286 0.023836 
-0.893 
Seasonal 2 
-0.012557 0.023428 
-0.536 
LOY 1 
-0.048217 0.024440 
-1.973 
OLOY 1 1.2813 0.11550 1l.094 
-
OLOY 2 
-l.0222 0.17799 
-5.743 
-
OLOY 3 0.76342 0.17297 4.-l13 
-
OLOY 4 
-0.29025 0.12216 
-2.376 
-
cr = 0.068827 o\V = 1.86 OW(LOY) = 0.04642 ADF(LOY) = -1.973 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5 ~ / o = - 3 . 4 7 2 2 10/0=-4.089 
RSS = 0.293703529] for 10 variables and 7'Y.. observations 
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5%=-3.48 1 %=-4.106; Constant and Trend included 
t-adf 
-
cr lag t - I a ~ ~ t-prob 
LOY -1.6418 0.071706 12 -0.43350 0.6666 
LOY -1.8625 0.071121 1 1 0.98042 0.3316 
LOY -1.6526 0.071094 10 -0.070946 0.9437 
LOY -1. 7724 0.070410 9 1.3604 0.1796 
LOY -1.4460 0.070973 8 -0.019879 0.9842 
LOY -1.5266 0.070313 7 0.57906 0.5650 
LOY -1.4317 0.069887 6 -1.8144 0.0751 
LOY -2.1 153 0.071303 5 1.5835 0.1189 
:i,J,4@M:;'( .>':::: •• ::,:'h:l:./rQ73 : •• ' Q •. () 72240 4 ... .. 2::48') 
·'.:t::.:: ~ ~ 0.016 
LOY -2.7705 0.075386 3 .., 94':;':; 
-'). - - 0.0002 
LOY -l.5918 0.084180 ..., -3.0105 0.0038 
-
LOY -2.7262 0.089658 1 8.1261 0.0000 
LOY -0.86712 0.12887 0 
Unit root tests for LOY 
The present srunple is: 1972 (2) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
A u ~ n 1 e n t e d d Dickey-Fuller test for LOY: OLaY on 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 0.40018 0.20763 1.927 
Trend -0.000777 0.0006061 -1.283 
LOY 1 -0.047714 0.024124 -1.978 
DLOY 1 1.2860 0.11221 11.461 
OLOY 2 -1.0543 0.17137 -6.152 
OLOY 3 0.80372 0.16645 4.829 
OLOY 4 -0.30744 0.11886 -2.587 
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0'= 0.067949 DW = 1.86 DW(LOY) = 0.04642 ADF(LOY) = -1.978 
Critical values used in ADF test: 50/0=-3.472 1 'Yo=-4.089 
RSS = 0.3001096165 for 7 variables and 72 observations 
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 50/0=-2.907 1 %=-3.534; Constant included 
t-adf cr lag t - I a ~ ~ t-prob 
LOY 
-1.5204 0.071696 12 -0.66522 0.5090 
LOY 
-l.7035 0.071303 11 0.74201 0.4615 
LOY -1.6048 0.070995 10 -0.30666 0.7603 
LOY 
-l.7031 0.070385 9 1.1638 0.2497 
LOY 
-1.5470 0.070616 8 -0.19140 0.8489 
LOY -1.6062 0.069995 7 0,42217 0.6745 
.. .... . 
>+1 . .5@$7.·. :OW69479 •• :EOY. (5 ···?Oc;79 0.043 .. ::: -:,'-:,' . '". ..:.. . .............. :-: " ~ ~ ~.. : ';.::;:: ,'-:-:.,'-:.:.;.-:: -:-: .. >.,' ........ 
LOY -1.9648 0.071448 5 1.3449 0.1840 
LOY .. 1. 7628 0.071944 4 -2.8420 0.0062 
LOY -2.4345 0.076137 3 3.6639 0.0005 
LOY -1.7545 0.083649 2 -3.3029 0.00] 6 
LOY -2.4717 0.090188 1 7.9896 0.0000 
LOY -1.4786 0.12797 0 
Unit root tests for LOY 
The present sample is: 1972 (4) to 1990 (1 ) 
Augnlented Dickey-Fuller test for LOY: OLOY on 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 0.16504 0.12282 1.344 
LOY 1 -0.021719 0.01578 -1.376 
DLOY 1 1.4042 0.12009 11.693 
DLOY 2 -1.3971 0.20509 -6.81:2 
OLOY 3 1.2814 0.24424 5.247 
DLOY 4 -0.90672 0.24584 -3.688 
DLOY 5 0.52631 0.20342 2.587 
OLOY 6 -0.26002 0.12214 -2.12l) 
cr = 0.0667789 OW = 1.97 OW(LOY) = 0.04745 AOF(LOY) = -1.376 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5 ~ 1 o = - 2 . .903 10/0=-3.525 
RSS = 0.276484202 for 8 variables and 70 observations 
Unit root tests 1974 (2) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5%=-1.946 1 %=-2.599 
__ ~ t w - a ~ d ~ f f_____ cr ______ ~ I ~ a ~ ~ J - - - ~ t ~ - I ' ~ ' l g _ J ~ t - ~ p ~ r o ~ h h
LOY -0.67937 0.072530 12 -O,9R74 7 ( L ~ 2 8 1 1
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LOY -0.62253 0.072513 11 0.44136 0.6608 
LOY -0.65646 0.071960 10 -0.59976 0.5512 
LOY -0.62598 0.071532 9 0.91142 0.3661 
LOY -0.69737 0.071422 8 -0.41879 0.6770 
LOY -0.67445 0.070894 7 0.20594 0.8376 
':'JiQ)J'.:'::.) · .•.•. < + Q · ~ ~ 7 : ~ 4 : : . · : : · · . ( ) ~ 0 1 0 2 9 6 : : ',6·" -2 . .394 q ~ p ~ ~ . t t
LOY -0.56488 0.073108 5 1.0227 0.3107 
LOY -0.62405 0.073136 4 -3.3475 0.0014 
LOY -0.49490 0.079112 3 3.2186 0.0021 
LOY -0.63875 0.084965 2 -3.8017 0.000] 
LOY -0.46789 0.093731 1 7.5694 0.0000 
LOY -0.95032 0.12898 0 
Unit root tests for LOY 
The present sample is: 1972 (4) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Augmented O i c k e ~ - F u l l e r r test for LOY; DLOY on 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
LOY 1 -0.00055983 0.0010397 -0.538 
OLOY 1 1.4184 0.12039 11. 782 
OLOY 2 -1.4373 0.20420 -7.038 
OLOY 3 1.3070 0.24505 5.334 
OLOY 4 -0.95287 0.24499 -3.890 
DLOY 5 0.54523 0.20422 2.670 
DLOY 6 -0.29471 0.12014 14-'" -_ .. :U 
(j = 0.0672045 OW = 1.98 DW(LOY) = 0.04745 ADF(LOY) = -0.5385 
Critical values used in ADF test: 50/0=-l.945 1 (%=-2.596 
RSS = 0.2845357474 for 7 variables and 70 observations 
1'0 _J 
Chapter 7: Appendices 
-.5 Unit Root Tests on Differences 
7.5 Unit Root Tests on the Differences 
DF or ADF tests are carried out for the differences of the variables 
similar to the previous section. The results show that the first differences of all 
the variables are stationary. D and L respectively reter to difference and 
logarithm so DLM (for exalnple) stands for first difference of log of money. 
The criterion for test is DF or ADF statistic which tests the null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity. For example, since the statistics reported for money (OLM) 
exceeds the critical value [ADF(OLM) = -6.913**] the null is rejected at 10/0 
confidence l e v e l ~ ~ the first difference of log 0 f 1110ney is stationary. 
Unit root tests 1974 (3) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5%=-3.4811 %=-4.108; Constant and Trend and Seasonals 
included 
t-adf cr lag t-lag t-prob 
DLM -3.4802 0.046490 12 0.5] 236 0.6109 
DLM -3.4914* 0.046116 1 1 1.1558 O . 2 ~ 3 7 7
DLM -3.2959 0.046280 10 0.48132 0.6325 
DLM -3.3082 0.045908 9 0.23787 
DLM -3.4358 0.045464 8 0.70171 
DLM -3.4224 0.045233 7 -0.11646 
DLM -3.8462* 0.044793 6 ] .0766 
OLM -3.7045* 0.044862 5 0.58880 
DLM -3.8063* 0.044584 4 -0.37529 
DLM -4.6264** 0.044228 " 0.5957] -' 
DLM -5.1268** 0.043968 2 -0.29739 
DLM -7.2898** 0.043609 1 2.0076 
DLM -8.4614** 0.044753 0 
Unit rOQt tests for DLM. 
The present salnple is: 1971 (4) to 1 990 ( 1 ) 
Augnlented Dickey-Fuller test for DLrv1: DDLM on 
Variable Coellicient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 0.10403 0.018131 5.737 
Trend -0.00096256 0.00027306 -3.525 
Seasonal 0'()53043 0.015007 3.534 
Seasonal_l -0.035737 0.017061 -2.095 
Seasonal_ 2 0.0052553 0.018779 0.280 
DLM 1 -1.1819 0.17096 -6.913 
DDLM_l 0.15875 0.11974 1.326 
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cr = 0.0439534 DW = 1.95 DW(DLM) = 2.088 ADF(DL!\1) = -6.913** 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5%=-3.47 1 ~ / ( ) = - 4 . 0 8 5 5
RSS = 0.1294372742 for 7 variables and 74 observations 
Unit root tests 1974 (3) to 1990 (I) 
Critical values: 5 fYo=-2.908 1010=-3.536; Constant included 
t-adf cr lag t-Iag t-12rob 
DLP 
-2.6197 0.031926 12 1 '"' -4 ~ ~ 0.1819 ._)) .' 
DLP 
-2.3276 0.032191 11 
-1.4309 0.1587 
DLP 
-3.0494* 0.032520 10 1.1501 o ~ ' - " ' ~ ~._). -
DLP 
-2.8156 0.032621 9 0.92656 0 .. ")584 
DLP 
-2.6624 0.032578 8 
-0.26667 0.7908 
DLP 
-2.9632* 0.032296 7 -0.92411 0.3595 
DLP :/:>'H::-3.7274 * * 0.032253 6 2.2932 0.0257 
DLP 
-2.9804* 0.033457 5 0.76178 0.4494 
DLP 
-2.9108* 0.033334 4 2.1l)42 
DLP 
-2.2863 0.034412 '"' -4.7255 .) 
DLP 
-5.2214** 0.040154 2 -0.60348 
DLP 
-9.0005** 0.039941 4.1970 
DLP -7.4872** 0.045053 0 
Unit root tests for DLP 
The present sample is: 1973 (1 ) to 1 990 ( 1 ) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for DLP: DDLP 011 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 0.040320 0.011054 3.648 
DLP 1 -1.0485 0.26884 -3.900 
DDLP 1 
DDLP 2 
DDLP 3 
DDLP 4 
DDLP 5 
DDLP 6 
0.18287 
-0.08408 
0.08753 
0.63316 
0.34837 
0.33898 
0.25102 0.729 
0.23618 -0.356 
0.23362 0.375 
0.20541 3.082 
0.16689 2.087 
0.13070 2.594 
0.0323 
0.0000 
0.5485 
0.0001 
cr = 0.0318397 DW = 1.90 DW(DLP) = 1.915 ADF(DLP) = -3.9** 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5 ~ / 0 = - 2 . 9 0 4 4 1 (Yo=-3.527 
RSS = 0.06183960197 for 8 variables and 69 observations 
Unit root tests 1974 (3) to 1990 (I) 
Critical values: 5 fYo=-3.481 10/0 =-4.108; Constant and Trend included 
t-adf a lao e t-Iao e t-prob 
DLG -2.2467 0.20584 12 o 7 ~ ( ( 4' .. ) - 0.4531 
DLG -2.1250 0.20494 1 1 -0.11743 0.9070 
DLG -2.3234 0.20291 10 0.2 5()() I O.79h2 
"", 
-.,-
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DLG 
-2.3992 0.20104 9 
-0.05576 0.9557 
DLG 
-2.6119 0.19911 8 -(>.(}8712 0.9309 
DLG 
-2.8755 0.19723 7 -0.16491 0.8696 
DLG 
-3.2539 0.19545 6 0.37866 0.7064 
DLG 
-3.4261 0.19392 5 -0.39810 0.6921 
DLG 
-4.0798* 0.19246 4 1.0916 0.']. 7<)7 
DLG 
-4.0193* 0.19278 ,., 
-2.6850 0.0095 -' 
DLG 
-7.9767** 0.20284 2 ""0'1-
-' . -' .;...) 0.0016 
DLG 
-7.1776** 0.21921 1 -0.76395 0.4479 
DLG 
-21.581 ** 0.21845 0 
Unit root tests for DLG 
The present sample is: 1972 (2) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for D L G ~ ~ DDLG on 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 0.15104 0.062286 2.425 
Trend -0.0022193 0.001219 -1.820 
DLG 1 -1.5783 0.37620 -4.195 
-
DDLO 1 0.032727 0.30258 0.108 
-
DDLO 2 -0.14476 0.21940 -0.660 
DDLO 3 -0.33608 0.11445 -2.936 
cr = 0.197681 DW = 1.94 DW(DLG) = 3.464 ADF(DLG) = -4.195** 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5% =-3.472 1 ~ / o = - 4 . 0 8 9 9
RSS = 2.579129113 for 6 variables and 1'2 observations 
Unit root tests 1974 (3) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5cYo=-2.908 10/0=-3.536; Constnnt included 
t-adf (J" lag t-Iag t-prob 
DLR -2.3304 0.29608 12 0.58896 0.5586 
DLR -2.2697 0.29414 1 1 o -9"'''''' 0 ~ - 6 " "- .) - - ~ ~ .))-) 
DLR -2.5490 0.29226 10 0.85059 0.3990 
DLR -2.4184 0.29148 9 -0.88990 0.]776 
DLR -2.7987 0.29091 8 -0.18285 0.8556 
DLR -3.0390* 0.28829 7 -0.19754 O.844:::! 
DLR -3.3494* 0.28576 6 -0.77254 0.4431 
DLR -4.0810* * 0.28473 5 0.51691 0.6073 
DLR -4.3142** 0.28290 4 O.J3047 0.74:::!] 
DLR -4.8123** 0.28072 
.., 
-1. 5766 0.1 '].1)] 
-' 
DLR -8.2199** 0.28423 '1 '"' 7-"'8 -'. )-' 0.0004 
DLR -6.8853 * * 0.31371 1 -0.4890] O.626() 
DLR -14.491 ** 0.31174 0 
Unit root tests for DLR 
The present sanlple is: 1972 (1 ) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for DLR; DDLR on 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error i-value 
Constant 0.074306 0.035580 2.088 
DLR 1 -2.0393 0.25014 -8.153 
DDLR 1 0.58167 0.]9774 2.942 
DDLR 2 0.41569 0.11135 3.733 
cr = 0.29588 D\V = 1.77 DW(DLR) = 2.925 :\OF( DLR) = -8.153** 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5%=-2.901 10/0=-3.521 
RSS = 6.040597648 for 4 variables and 73 observations 
Unit root tests 1974 (3) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5cYo=-1.946 10/0=-2.599 
t-adf (j lag t-lao :a t-prob 
DLOR -2.5585* 0.42450 12 -0.73433 0.4662 
DLOR -2.9287** 0.42258 11 1.0284 0.3086 
DLOR -2.7506** 0.42281 10 0.] 8418 0.8546 
DLOR -2.8371 ** 0.41894 9 -0.48433 0.6301 
DLOR -3.1702** 0.41596 8 0.05354 0.lJ575 
DLOR -3.3738** 0.41217 7 -0.4848 ] 0.6297 
DLOR -3.8700** 0.40935 6 0.37177 0.7115 
DLOR -4.0924** 0.40624 ) -0.27686 0.7829 
DLOR -4.7885** 0.40300 4 OJ] 892 0.7509 
DLOR -5.4449** 0.39992 3 -0.16063 0.8729 
DLOR ';":: -7.4713** 0.39666 2 3.1910 0.0023 
DLOR -6.5085** 0.42546 1 -0.63761 0.5261 
DLOR -13.074** 0.42342 0 
Unit root tests for DLOR 
The present satnple is: 1 972 (1) to 1 990 ( 1 ) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for DLOR: DDLOR on 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
DLOR 1 -1. 7164 0.23712 -7.239 
DDLOR 1 0.38143 0.19117 1.995 
DDLOR 2 0.34470 0.11313 3.047 
(j = 0.403902 DW = 1.94 DW(DLOR) = 2.805 ADF(DLOR) = -7.239** 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5%=-1.945 11'10=--2.595 
RSS = 11.41955048 for 3 variables and 73 observation 
Unit root tests 1974 (3) to 1990 (1) 
Critical values: 5cYo=-1.94() 1 cYo=-2.599 
t-adf (j t - 1 a ~ ~ l-rro!1 
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DLY 
-2.5438* 0.0094615 12 0.64905 0.5193 
DLY 
-2.4802* 0.0094076 1 1 1.2183 0.2287 
DLY 
-2.2796* 0.0094514 10 
-0. 79254 O A ~ ~ 16 
DLY 
-2.5390* 0.0094181 9 0.77737 0.4404 
DLY 
-2.4407* 0.0093836 8 0.56692 0.5731 
DLY 
-2.3904* 0.0093255 7 
-0.32345 0.7476 
DLY 
-2.5564* 0.0092506 6 -0.0330 0.9738 
DLY 
-2.6845** 0.0091692 5 1 -7'"'1 
.) -'- 0.1212 
DLY 
-2.3552* 0.0092851 4 -2.1562 0.0352 
DLY 
-3.2607** 0.0095679 ..., :'.1565 0.0025 
-' 
DLY 
-2.3353 * 0.010258 2 -5.0079 0.0000 
DLY 
-4.8055** 0.012114 6.2815 0.0000 
DLY 
-2.4427* 0.015420 0 
Unit root tests for DLY 
The present salnple is: 1972 (3) to 1990 (1 ) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for DL Y ~ ~ DOL Y 011 
Variable CoeHicient Std.Error t-value 
DLY 1 -0.11053 0.047271 -2.338 
-
DDLY 1 1.1128 0.11017 10.100 
-
DOLY 2 -1.1079 0.16266 -6.811 
-
OOLY 3 0.63873 0.15462 4.131 
ODLY 4 -0.30261 0.11642 -2.599 
-
a = 0.00878893 O\V = 1.90 DW(DL Y) = 0.3171 ADF(DL Y) = -2.338* 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5°11)=-1.945 1 (Yo=-2.595 
RSS = 0.005098187784 for 5 variables and 71 observations 
Unit root tests 1974 (3) to 1990 (l) 
Critical values: 5cYo=-1.946 1 C%=-2.599 
t-adf cr lap S' t-Ia p S' t-prob 
OLOY -2.2598* 0.073517 12 0.051245 0.9593 
OLOY -2.3873* 0.072795 11 0.95936 0.3419 
OLOY -2.2044* 0.072739 10 -0.46878 0.6412 
DLOY -2.5111* 0.072202 9 0.57163 0.5700 
OLOY -2.4728* 0.071750 8 -0.95143 0.3456 
OLOY -3.0766** 0.071688 7 0.37561 0.7086 
OLOY -3.2126** 0.071136 6 -0.25544 0.7993 
OLOY -3.7446** 0.070551 5 2.3597 0.0217 
OLOY -2.9821 ** 0.073276 4 -1.0506 0.2978 
OLOY -3.8629** 0.073341 
.., 3.3283 O.OO}5 , 
OLOY -2.7080** 0.079261 
...., - 3 . ~ 3 9 8 8 0.0020 
-
OLOY -4.8316** 0.085207 1 3.7782 0.0004 
OLOY -3.3096** 0.093887 () 
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Unit root tests for DLOY 
The present sample is: 1972 (4) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for DLOY: DDLOY on 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-\'a1ue 
DLOY 1 -0.40902 0.10442 -3.917 
DDLOY 1 0.83069 0.12704 6.539 
DDLOY 2 -0.60824 0.14179 -4.290 
DDLOY 3 0.70100 0.15654 4.478 
DDLOY 4 -0.25217 0.12682 -1.988 
DDLOY 5 0.29325 0.11944 2.455 
cr = 0.0668306 DW = 1.98 DW(DLOY) = 0.6049 ADF(DLOY) = -3.917** 
Critical values used in ADF test: 5 ~ / o = - 1 . 9 4 5 5 1110=-2.596 
RSS = 0.2858452264 for 6 variables and 70 observations 
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7.6 Cointegration Tests for Income Equation 
These tests are conducted to seek long-run relationships among real 
incolne (y), real government expenditure (g-P) and oil sector income (oy). The 
first equation with a constant restricted into cointegration space and 5 lags 
leads to a well-behaved residual (with 4 lags there is autocorrelation problem. 
EQ(2» but does not confirm the presence of any cointegration vector. Adding 
dummies for a structural break around 1976 introduces EQ(3). With this model 
the existence of one cointegration vector is not rejected. Uniqueness tests show 
that oy and (g-p) are weakly exogenous, hence the unique cointegration 
relationship is : 
y = 6.95 + 0.3 (g-p) + 0.17 oy 
s 1 976p2 and ts 1976p2 respectively refer to step dummy for the second quarter 
1976 and trends multipied by that dumlny. 
EQ( 1) Estimating the unrestricted reduced form by OLS 
The present sample is: 1972 (2) to 1990 (1) 
URF Equation 1 for y 
Variable Coel1icient Std. Error t-yOalue t-prob 
y_l 2.9808 0.15813 18.851 0.0000 
y_2 -3.8509 0.43441 -8.865 0.0000 
y_3 2.7284 0.57332 4.759 0.0000 
y_4 -1.0067 0.44125 -2.281 0.0263 
v 5 0.12469 0.15785 0.790 0.4329 
,,-
0.8345 g-1 0.001105 0.005266 0.210 
g_2 -0.002459 0.004865 -0.506 0.6152 
g-3 -0.001456 0.005236 -0.278 0.7819 
g-4 0.0037706 0.004892 0.771 0.4441 
g-5 -7.7 444e-005 0.005311 -0.015 0.9884 
oy_l -0.041468 0.019960 -2.078 0.0423 
oy_2 0.075975 0.045131 1.683 0.0979 
oy_3 -0.007334 0.055513 -0.132 0.8954 
oy_4 -0.061951 0.046773 -1.325 0.1907 
oy_5 0.034083 0.019988 1.705 0.0937 
Constant 0.22272 0.10261 2.170 O . 0 3 4 ~ ~
cr = 0.00841141 RSS = 0.003962097849 
URF Equation 2 for g-p 
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Variable 
y_l 
y_2 
v 3 
"'-
v 4 
,,-
v 5 
,,-
g_l 
g_2 
g_3 
g_4 
g_5 
oy_l 
oy_2 
oy_3 
oy_4 
oy_5 
Constant 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
1.4751 3.8791 0.380 0.7052 
-3.7157 10.657 -0.349 0.7286 
5.3590 14.065 0.381 0.7046 
-4.9600 10.825 -0.458 0.6486 
1.5708 3.8724 0.406 0.6866 
0.37052 0.12919 2.868 0.0058 
0.36918 0.11936 3.093 0.0031 
-0.054117 0.12846 -0.421 0.675:2 
0.51425 0.12001 4.285 0.0001 
-0.24770 0.13030 -1.901 (l0624 
0.14115 0.48966 0.288 0.7742 
-0.40419 1.1072 -0.365 0.7164 
0.63449 1.3618 0.466 0.6431 
-0.44305 1.1474 -0.386 0.7009 
0.17514 0.49036 0.357 0.7223 
1.8510 2.5173 0.735 0.4652 
cr = 0.206348 RSS = 2.384457895 
URF Equation 3 for oy 
Variable CoeJ1icient 
y_l 2.7826 
Std.EITor t-value t-prob 
1.2038 2.312 0.0245 
v 2 -4.4620 3.3071 -1.349 
4.3646 0.136 
,,-
v 3 0.59179 
,,-
v 4 
,,-
v 5 
,,-
g _1 
g_2 
g_3 
g_4 
g_5 
oy_l 
oy_2 
oy_3 
oy_4 
oy_5 
Constant 
2.6237 3.3592 0.781 
-1.5181 1.2017 -1.263 
-0.005236 0.04009 -0.131 
0.00034752 0.03704 0.009 
-0.031355 0.03986 -0.787 
0.0076117 0.03724 0.204 
0.018702 0.04043 0.463 
1.9649 0.15195 12.93] 
-1.9174 0.34358 -5.581 
1.8412 0.42261 4.357 
-1.4860 0.35607 -4.173 
0.56163 0.15217 3.691 
O. 1281 1 0.781 1 9 O. 164 
cr = 0.0640347 RSS = 0.2296248] 16 
v 
" g 
oy 
correlation of URF residuals 
g o\' 
1.000 
0.04832 1.000 
0.5869 0.1096 1.000 
0.1827 
0.8926 
0.4380 
0.2117 
0.8966 
0.9925 
0.4349 
0.8388 
0.6455 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0005 
0.8703 
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standard deviations of URF residuals 
Y g oy 
0.008411 0.2063 0.06403 
loglik = 698.33392 loglel = -19.3982 lei = 3. 76257e-009 T = 72 
logIY'Y/TI = 1.58902 
R2(LR) = 1 R2(LM) = 0.940877 
F-test against unrestricted regressors, F(48, 161) = 3897.7 [0.0000] ** 
No variables entered unrestricted. 
F-tests on retained regressors, F(3. 54) 
y_l 151.887[0.0000]** ) 2 32.5931 [0.0000]** 
y_3 10.8184 [0.0000] ** )_4 3.99879 [0.0121] * 
y_5 1.77305 [0.1633] g _1 2.76283 [0.0508] 
g _2 3.21436 [0.0299] * g _3 0.250915 [0.8603] 
g _4 6.17890 [0.0011] ** g _5 l.35763 [0.2655] 
oy_l 100.179 [0.0000] ** oy_2 22.1126 [0.0000] ** 
oy _3 9.64938 [0.0000] ** oy _ 4 6.22146 [0.0010] ** 
oy _5 4.48406 [0.0070] ** Constant 2.31027 [0.0866] 
correlation of actual and fitted 
y g oy 
0.9978 0.9226 0.9950 
Vector p0l1tnanteau statistic for 8 lags and 72 observations: 61.3 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 5 
Chi2(45) = 63.363 [0.0368] * and F-Form(45, 116) = 1.1369 [0.2891] 
Vector normality test for residuals 
The present saJnple is: 1972 (2) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Skewness 
l.870 -0.8197 -1.785 
Excess kurtosis 
-0.04904 2.419 7.810 
Vector normality Chi2 (6)= 74.202 [0.0000] ** 
Testing for vector heteroscedasticity using squares 
Chi2(l80) = 196.37 [0.1914] and F-Form(180. 126) ·c::0.71547 [0.9803] 
EQ( 2) Estinlating the unrestricted reduced fOlom by OLS 
The present sample is: 1972 (l) to 1990 (l) 
URF Equation 1 for y 
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Variable 
v 1 
"'-
v 2 
"'-
v 3 
"'-
y_4 
g _1 
g_2 
g_3 
g_4 
oy_l 
oy_2 
oy_3 
oy_4 
Constant 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
2.8076 0.13659 20.555 0.0000 
-3.3411 0.32641 -10.236 0.0000 
2.0648 0.33172 6.224 0.0000 
-0.55899 0.13736 -4.069 0.0001 
0.0019374 0.0048506 0.399 0.6910 
-0.0028559 0.0049843 -0.573 0.5688 
-0.00064353 0.0049646 -0.130 0 . 8 9 7 ~ ~
0.004200] 0.0049529 0.848 0.3998 
-0.047020 0.019694 -2.388 0.0201 
0.092367 0.041174 2.243 0.0286 
-0.042431 0.042015 -1.0100.3166 
-0.0053281 0.019508 -0.273 0.7857 
0.26769 0.097606 2.743 0.0080 
cr = 0.00883993 RSS = 0.004688658905 
URF Equation 2 for g-p 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
y_l -0.38274 3.2192 -0.] 19 0.9058 
v 2 1.8483 7.6930 0.240 0.8110 
"'-
y_3 -1.8490 7.8180 -0.237 0.8138 
y_4 0.0079627 3.2374 0.002 0.9980 
g-1 0.28032 0.11432 2.452 0.0171 
g-2 0.40996 0.11747 3.490 0.0009 
g-3 -0.15353 0.1170 - 1 . 3 1 ~ ~ 0.1945 
g-4 0.45575 0.11673 3.904 0.0002 
oy_l 0.16625 0.46416 0.358 0.7215 
oy_2 -0.44509 0.97039 -0.459 0.6481 
oy_3 0.62380 0.99022 0.630 0.531 1 
oy_4 -0.23213 0.45977 -0.505 0.6155 
Constant 2.6182 2.3004 1.138 0.2596 
cr = 0.208341 RSS = 2.604365268 
URF Equation 3 for oy 
Variable CoeHicient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
v 1 2.5755 1.0863 2.371 (L0210 
"'-
y_2 -4.7110 2.5960 -1.815 0.0746 
v 3 2.4749 2.6382 0.938 0.3520 
"'-
v 4 -0.37132 1.0925 -0.340 0.7351 
"'-
g-1 0.0010825 0.03857 0.028 0.9777 
g_2 -0.0019930 0.03964 -0.050 0.9601 
g-3 -0.0062009 0.03948 -0.157 0.8757 
g-4 0.011409 0.03939 0.290 O. 7T; 1 
ov 
"'-
1 1.8067 0.15663 11.) 3 5 0.0000 
oy_2 -1.4104 0.32745 --t307 0 .O()() 1 
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oy_3 
oy_4 
Constant 
0.92516 
-0.36283 
0.59622 
0.33415 2.769 0.0075 
0.15515 -2.339 0.0227 
0.77626 0.768 0.4455 
cr = 0.0703042 RSS = 0.2965610956 
correlation of URF residuals 
y g oy 
y 1.000 
g 0.09694 1.000 
oy 0.6290 0.1286 1.000 
standard deviations of lJRF residuals 
y g oy 
0.008840 0.2083 0.07030 
loglik = 693.97092 loglel = -19.0129 lei = 5.53097e-009 T = 73 
10g1Y'Y ITI = 1.60916 
R2 (LR) = 1 I ~ ? ? (LM) = 0.936473 
F-test against unrestricted regressors, F(39. ] 72) = 4674.8 [0.0000] ** 
No variables entered unrestricted. 
F-tests on retained regressors. F(3. 58) 
y_l 195.846[0.0000]** y_2 45.3214[0.0000]** 
Y _3 17.2928 [0.0000] ** y_ 4 7.96980 [0.0002] ** 
g _1 2.02661 [0.1201] g _2 4.19708 [0.00931 ** 
g _3 0.554859 [0.6470] g _4 5.12026 [0.0033] ** 
oy._l 92.6871 [0.0000] ** 0)'_2 19.0536 [O.f)OOO] ** 
oy_3 6.54528 [0.0001') ** 0)'_ 4 2.54530 [0.0648] 
Constant 3.22621 [0.0289] * 
correlation of actual and fitted 
y g oy 
0.9976 0.9167 0.9936 
Vector portlnanteau statistic for 8 lags and 73 obser\'ations: 74.3 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation hom lags 1 to-+ 
Chi2(36) = 60.02 [0.0072] ** and F-Form( 36. 136) = 1.519 [0.0460] * 
Vector nornlality test for residuals 
The present sample is: 1972 (1 ) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Skewness 
1.043 -0.27] 5 -1.025 
Excess kurtosis 
1.732 2.451 8.300 
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Vector normality Che( 6)= 80.103 [0.0000] * * 
T e s ~ i n g g for vector heteroscedasticity using squares 
Chi (144) = 166.99 [0.0922] and F-Form(l44. 183) = 0.93677 [0.6581] 
Co integration annlysis 1972 (2) to 1990 (1) 
eigenvalue /J.i 
0.16184 
0.0859211 
0.0479303 
-5.91183e-016 
loglik for rank 
686.976 0 
693.332 1 
696.566 2 
698.334 3 
Ho:rank=p -Tlog(l-/J.) using T-nm 95% - T L I g ( I - ~ l ) ) using T-nm 
p== 0 12.71 10.06 22.0 
p<= 1 6.468 5.121 15.7 
P <= 2 3.536 2.8 9.2 
standardized P' eigenvectors 
y g oy Constant 
1.000 -0.03648 -0.1858 -7.769 
136.9 1.000 54.00 -1681. 
l. 952 - 1. 73 1 1. 000 -21. 1 7 
standardized a coefficients 
y -0.01501-6.028e-005 -0.0002279 
g -0.34876.913e-005 0.03503 
oy 0.07513 -0.0004724 0.003880 
long-run lnatrix Po=apr. rank 3 
y g oy 
y -0.02370 0.0008818 -0.0006958 
g -0.2708 -0.04787 0.1035 
oy 0.01802 -0.009930 -0.03559 
Number of lags used in the analysis: 5 
Variables entered restricted: 
Constant 
22.72 
10 
" -"6 .,,)-, 
Constant 
0.2227 
1.851 
0.1281 
EQ( 3) Estimating the unrestricted reduced form h ~ ~ OLS 
The present sample is: 1972 (2) to 199U (I) 
URF Equation 1 for y 
Variable Coetlicient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
242 
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7.92 
2.8 
950/0 
34.9 
20.0 
9.2 
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v 1 
~ ~
y_2 
y_3 
v 4 
~ ~
y_5 
g_l 
g_2 
g_3 
g_4 
2.8883 
-3.6418 
2.5063 
-0.89493 
0.093228 
3.2537e-005 
-2.4423e-005 
0.00055990 
0.0091759 
0.0072181 
-0.030875 
0.056932 
0.013142 
-0.075570 
0.040349 
0.16045 
0.43060 
0.56527 
0.43535 
0.15981 
0.0055571 
0.0051110 
0.0051688 
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18.000 0.0000 
-8.458 0.0000 
4.434 0.0000 
-2.056 0.()447 
0.583 0.5621 
0.006 0.9953 
-0.005 0.9962 
0.108 0.9141 
0.0052904 l. 734 0.0885 
0.0059626 1.211 0.2313 
0.021297 -1.450 0.1529 
0.045732 
0.055987 
0.047822 
0.022101 
1.245 0.2185 
0.235 0.815:1 
-l.580 O.lllJ9 
1.826 0.0734 
g_5 
oy_l 
oy_2 
oy_3 
oy_4 
oy_5 
Constant 
s1976p2 
ts1976p2 
0.37066 0.20156 1.839 0.0714 
-0.024484 0.010182 -2.405 0.0196 
0.0004705 0'()0027496 1.711 0.0927 
cr = 0.00813616 RSS = 0.003574641168 
URF Equation 2 for g-p 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
y_l 3.6220 3.6539 0.991 0.3260 
y_2 -5.8927 9.8056 -0.601 0.5504 
y_3 9.4589 12.872 0.735 0.4656 
y_4 -10.773 9.9139 -1.087 0.2820 
v 5 5.4200 3.6391 1.489 0.1422 
~ ~ -
g-1 0,17197 0.12654 1.359 0.1798 
g-2 0.22976 0.11639 1.974 0.0535 
g-3 -0.096978 0.11770 -0.824 0.4136 
g-4 0.47424 0.12047 3.937 0.0002 
g-5 -0.18633 0.13578 -l.372 0.1756 
oy_ 1 -0.49788 0.48497 -1.027 0.3092 
oy_2 0.47980 l.0414 0.461 0.6468 
oy_3 -0.44362 1.2749 -0.348 0.7292 
oy_4 0.76327 1.0890 0.701 0.4864 
oy_5 -0.71200 0.50329 -1.415 0.1629 
Constant -11.928 4.5899 -2.599 0.0120 
s1976p2 -0.03179 0.23185 -0.137 0.8914 
ts1976p2 -0.01470 0.00626 -2.349 ()'O225 
cr = 0.185276 RSS = 1.853668647 
URF Equation 3 for oy 
Variable CoeHicient 
v I 3.0613 
~ ~ -
Std.Error t-value t-prob 
1.2604 2.429 O.D 1 X5 
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y 2 
y_3 
y_4 
y_5 
g _1 
g_2 
g_3 
g_4 
g_5 
oy_l 
oy_2 
oy_3 
oy_4 
oy_5 
Constant 
s1976p2 
ts1976p2 
-4.7423 
1.1231 
1.8665 
-1.0158 
-0.031201 
-0.017820 
-0.036916 
0.0024911 
0.026866 
1.8816 
-1.8022 
1.7008 
-1.3286 
0.44584 
-1.6694 
-0.004639 
-0.001912 
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3.3823 -1.402 0.] 666 
4.4401 0.253 0.8013 
3.4197 0.546 0.5875 
1.2553 -0.809 0.4219 
0.043650 -0.715 0.4778 
0.040146 -0.444 0.6589 
0.040601 -0.909 0.3673 
0.04] 555 0'()60 0.9524 
0.046835 0.574 0.5686 
0.16728 11.24 0.0000 
0.35922 -5.017 0.0000 
0.43977 3.867 0.0003 
0.37563 -3.537 0.0008 
0.17360 2.568 0.0130 
1.5832 -1.054 0.2964 
0.079975 -0.058 0.9540 
0.002159 -0.885 0.3799 
cr = 0.0639085 RSS = 0.2205523048 
correlation of URF residuals 
y g oy 
y 1.000 
g 0.03228 1.000 
oy 0.6206 0.01836 1.000 
standard deviations of URF residuals 
y g oy 
0.008136 0.1853 0.06391 
loglik = 714.44801 loglel = -19.8458 lei = 2.40485e-009 T = 72 
10gIY'Y/TI = -1.72441 
R2 (LR) = 1 R2 (LM) = 0.894308 
F-test against unrestricted regressors, F( 48. 155) = 1430 .. 1 [0.0000] ** 
variables entered unrestricted: 
s1976p2 ts1976p2 
F-tests on retained regressors. F(3. 52) 
y_l 143.954 [0.0000] ** y_) 30.718010.0000] ** 
y _3 9.67924 [0.0000] ** \" 4 -' .41988 10.0239] * 
y_5 1.51734 [0.2209] g _1 0.860994 [0.46721 
g _2 1.35244 [0.2676) g) 0.7:229.,9 rO.542()1 
g_4 6.33681 [0.0010]** g_5 1.127411()']465] 
oy_l 78.00121.0.0000] ** 0,".2 18.050110.0000] ** 
0)'_3 7.28708 [0.00041 ** (.1y_ -+ 4.-'91.,0 [0.0079] ** 
oy _.5 2.83920 [0.04681 * Constant 5.8X2ln I o.()O 1(11 * * 
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correlation of actual and fitted 
y g oy 
0.9980 0.9404 0.9952 
Vector portnlanteau statistic for 8 lags and 72 observations: 57.23 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from l a ~ s s 1 to -; 
·2 ~ ~ -
ChI (45) = 73.l39 [0.0050] ** and F-Form(45. 110) = 1.3043 [0.1331] 
Vector normality test for residuals 
The present sample is: 1972 (2) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Skewness 
2.834 -1.405 -1.781 
Excess kurtosis 
0.1452 0.4088 7.635 
.., 
Vector normality Chi""( 6)= 71.663 [0.00001 * * 
Testing for vector heteroscedasticity using squares 
Chi2(l80) = 190.91 [0.2747J and F-Form(l80. 114) = 0.62098 [0.9979] 
Single Equation Diagnostic Tests 
Testing y for Error Autocorrelation [r0111 lags 1 to 5 
Chi2(5) = 14.361 [0.0135] * and F-Form(5. 49) = 2.4.+17 [0.0471] * 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 
CoetI. -0.5026 -0.6749 0.02142 0.211 -0.0467 
Testing g for ElTor Autocorrelation fronl lags 1 to 5 
Chi2(5) = 8.7002 [0.1216] and F-Fornl(S, 49) = 1.347 [0.2606] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag" 
CoetI. 0.005056 0.1896 0.2333 -0.5071 -0.334.' 
Testing oy for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 5 
Chi2(5) = 7.3483 [0.1960] and F-Fonn(5. 49) = 1.1139 [0.3653] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 1 Lag 3 Lag.+ Lag 5 
Coeff. -0.OS242 -0.4355 0.1987 0.08593 O . O . ~ ~ 1)7 
Normality test tor y 
"4-
- ) 
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The present sample is: 1972 (2) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Sample Size 72 
Mean 0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.007046 
Skewness 0.650153 
Excess Kurtosis 1.043605 
Minimum -0.013969 
Maximum 0.023939 
Normality Chi\2)= 5.778 [0.0556] 
Normality test for g 
The present sample is: 1972 (2) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Sample Size 72 
Mean 0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.160454 
Skewness -0.395253 
Excess Kurtosis 0.224157 
Minimum -0.4540] 9 
Maximulll 0.389056 
Normality Chi\2)= 2.2146 [0.3305] 
Normality test for oy 
The present sample is: 1972 (2) to 1990 ( 1 ) 
Sample Size 72 
Mean 0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.055346 
Skewness -0.4461 76 
Excess Kurtosis 4.753846 
Minimum -0.198255 
Maximulll 0.199962 
Normality Chi2(2)= 42.349 [0.0000] ** 
Testing y for ARCH frOlll lags 1 to 4 
Chi2(4) = 4.9733 [0.2900] and F-Fonn(4. 46) = 0.90744 [0.4676] 
Testing g for ARCH fron1 lags 1 to 4 
Chi2(4) = 9.2189 [0.0559] and F-Fonn(4. 46) = 1.8036 [0.1444] 
Testing oy for ARCH fronl lags 1 to 4 
Chi2e 4) = 15.905 [0.0031] ** and F-Form( 4. 46) = 3.511 [0.0139] * 
Testing y for Heteroscedastic errors 
Chi2 (30) = 36.117 [0.2043] and F-Form(30. 23) = ().77165 [0.7503] 
Testing g-p for Heteroscedastic errors 
Chi2 (30) = 35.085 [0.2396] and F-Form(30. 23) = ().72865 [0.7943] 
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Testing oy for Heteroscedastic errors 
Chi
2 (30) = 51.27 [0.0091] * * and F -F orm(30. 23) = 1.8962 [0.0588] 
Cointegration analysis 1972 (2) to 1990 (1) 
eigenvalue /-li loglik for rank 
691.002 0 
0.265436 702.107 1 
0.239262 711.952 2 
0.0669962 714.448 3 
8.15358e-017 
Ho :rank=p -Tlog( 1-J..l) using T-run 
17.58 22.0 
15.59 15.7 
950/0 ·-T2:lg( 1 - ~ l ) ) using T-nm 
P == 0 22.21 * 46.89** 37.12* 34.9 
p<= 1 19.69* 24.68* 19.54 20.0 
P <= 2 4.993 3.953 9.2 4.993 
standardized pI eigenvectors 
y g-p oy Constant 
1.000 -0.2776 -0.1908 -6.794 
-5.099 1.000 1.272 32.13 
-0.1797 -0.3937 1.000 -5.245 
v 
"" 
g-p 
oy 
v 
"" 
g-p 
oy 
standardized a coefficients 
-0.06608 -0.003185 -0.004580 
0.4738 -0.2678 0.02051 
0.2264 -0.01142 -0.04493 
long-run matrix Po=ap'. rank 3 
y g-p oy Constant 
-0.04902 0.01696 0.003978 0.3707 
1.835 -0.4073 -0.4104 -11.93 
0.2927 -0.05658 -0.1026 -1.669 
Number of lags used in the analysis: :) 
Variables entered unrestricted: 
s1976p2 ts1976p2 
Variables entered restricted: 
Constant 
General cointegration test 1972 (2) to 1990 (1) 
y g-p uy Constant 
0.8620 -0.2546 -0.1455 -:'.996 
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a 
y -0.08563 
g-p 0.0000 
oy 0.0000 
standardized W eigenvectors 
y g-p oy Constant 
1.000 -0.2954 -0.1688 -6.955 
standardized it coefficients 
y -0.07382 
g-p 0.0000 
oy 0.0000 
Restricted long-run matrix Po=apr, rank 1 
y g-p oy Constant 
y -0.07382 0.02180 0.01246 0.5134 
g-p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
oy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Reduced form W 
g-p oy Constant 
.• : ~ n n :?::. : } : ) : : : ' : Q ' ~ ' z 9 $ W H : : ? : : · Q j } 6 ~ $ : : . .U } 6'955 .' 
loglik = 701.559 unrloglik = 702.107 
LR-test, rank=l: Chi2 e'2) = 1.0954 [0.5783] 
24X 
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7.7 Cointegration Tests for Government Revenue Equation 
EQ( 1) is built to exalnine the presence of long-run relationship between 
real government revenue (rr), real income (y) and real oil-induced revenue of 
the government (ror). The equation contains the structural dummies and a 
constant inlposed onto cointegration space. The lag length is selected at 4 
because decreasing the number of lag to 3 leads to the autocorrelation problem 
(EQ(2)). The test for cointegration confirms that there is a long-run 
relationship. The joint restriction test (General coint. ... 1) for weak exogeneity 
of y and ror is rejected. The test for y being weak exogenous is not rejected 
(General coint. ... 3) but that of ror is rejected (General coint. ... 2). The 
acceptable cointegration vector is the first standardized P eigenvector 
(shadowed)(See page 164): 
rr = - 4.5 + 0.3 ro r + 0.7 Y 
s1974p2 and ts1974p2 respectively refer to step dummy for the second quarter 
1974 and trends nlltltipied by that dunllny. 
EQ( 1) Estimating the unrestricted reduced form by OLS 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
URF Equation 1 for IT 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
IT] -0. ]0043 0.19536 -0.514 0.609:2 
rr 2 -0.27]49 0.20178 -1.345 0.1837 
rr 3 -0.39344 0.19903 -1.977 0.0:;28 
rr4 0.32576 0.21256 1.533 0.1308 
ror 1 0.085644 0.14465 0.592 0.5561 
ror 2 0.28140 0.15743 1.787 0.0791 
ror 3 0.0758]2 0.15649 0.484 0.6299 
ror 4 0.021770 0.15808 0.] 38 0.8909 
v 1 3.2984 2.5522 1.292 0.20] 4 
,,-
-0.243 0.8090 v 2 -1.5083 6.2107 
,,-
6.2573 0.276 0.7833 v 3 1.7285 
,,-
2.5836 -0 .{)5 5 0 . ~ ~ L ' ' ~ ~y_4 -2.4676 
Constant -6.9181 3.4724 -1.992 lJ.()511 
s1974p2 1.1854 0.21865 5.421 0.0000 
ts1974p2 -0.020080 0.00409 -4.906 0.0000 
cr = 0.213927 RSS = 2.65-t354888 
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URF Equation 2 for ror 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
IT1 
-0.58179 0.27908 
-2.085 0.0415 -
IT2 
-0.53384 0.28825 
-1.852 0.0691 
-
IT 3 
-
-0.14289 0.28431 
-0.503 0.6172 
IT4 
-
0.29632 0.30365 0.976 o '" '" '" 'l 
.-'-'-'-
ror 1 0.52840 0.20664 2.557 0.0132 
-
ror 2 0.54553 0.22490 2.426 0.0184 
ror 3 
-0.12451 0.22355 -0.557 0.5797 
-
ror 4 0.059243 0.22582 0.262 0.7940 
-
v 1 2.7992 3.6459 0.768 0.4457 ,,-
v 2 
,,- 4.8758 8.8720 0.550 0.5847 
y_3 -8.9817 8.9386 -1.005 0.3192 
y_4 2.4745 3.6908 0.670 0.50:'2 
Constant -8.2357 4.9603 -1.660 0.1023 
s1974p2 1.4891 0.31235 4.76 0.0000 
ts1974p2 -0.02970 0.00584 -5.079 0.0000 
cr = 0.305597 RSS = 5.416588187 
URF Equation 3 for y 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
IT 1 0.0014371 0.0086845 0.165 0.8691 
-
IT 2 0.0026944 0.0089699 0.300 0.7650 
-
rr 3 0.0097420 0.0088475 1.101 0.2754 
-
IT4 0'()014321 0.0094490 0.152 O.S80 1 
-
ror 1 -0.0001114 0.0064302 -0.017 0.9862 
ror 2 -0.0005910 0.0069984 -0.084 0.9330 
-
ror 3 -0.007349 0.0069567 -1.056 0.2952 
ror 4 -0.002392 0.0070273 -0.340 0.7348 
y_l 2.5941 0.11345 22.86 0.0000 
v 2 -2.9784 0.27609 -10.78 0.0000 
,,-
y_3 1.9358 0.27816 6.960 0.0000 
v 4 
,,-
-0.59851 0.11485 -5.211 0.0000 
Constant 0.41019 0.15436 2.657 0.0102 
s1974p2 0.008805 0.0097198 0.906 0.3687 
ts1974p2 -4.8543e-0050.0001819 -0.267 0.7906 
cr = 0.00950974 RSS = 0.005245239125 
correlation of lJRF residuals 
n' ror y 
rr 1.000 
ror 0.7322 1.000 
v 
" 
O 1 -'")c; 0.04698 -. )-- 1.000 
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standard deviations of URF residuals 
rr ror y 
0.2139 0.3056 0.009510 
loglik = 595.13515 loglel = -16.3051 lei = 8.29463e-008 T = 73 
logIY'Y/TI = -3.23332 
R
2(LR) = 0.999998 R\LM) = 0.611157 
F-test against unrestricted regressors, F(39, 166) = 348.64 [0.0000] ** 
variables entered unrestricted: 
s1974p2 ts1974p2 
F -tests on retained regressors, F(3, 56) 
rr_l 2.l9670 [0.0985] rr_2 l.10406 [0.3552] 
rr 3 2.74229 [0.0516] rr 4 0.770930 [0.5151] 
ror 1 3.47126 [0.0219] * ror_2 l.92146 [0.1366] 
ror 3 1.38228 [0.2576] ror 4 0.0519085 [0.9842] 
y 1 180.840 [0.0000] ** y 2 38.7298 [0.0000] ** 
y_3 15.5958 [0.0000] ** y_ 4 9.02397 [0.0001] ** 
Constant 3.79244 [0.0151] * 
correlation of actual and fitted 
rr ror y 
0.9506 0.9597 0.9974 
Testing rr for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 4 
Chi\4) = 4.3135 [0.3652] and F-Form(4, 54) = 0.84781 [0.5012] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
Coeff. 0.298 0.01007 -0.2747 -0.1076 
Testing ror for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 4 
Chi\4) = 1.4948 [0.8276] and F-Form(4, 54) = 0.28221 [0.8883] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
CoetT. 0.0763 0.0449 -0.03899 -0.192 
Testing y for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 4 
C h i ~ ( (4) = 15.847 [0.0032] ** and F-Form( 4, 54) = 3.7431 [0.0093] ** 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
Coeff. 0.4572 -0.5638 -0.02148 -0.3014 
Nomlality test for IT 
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The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean 0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.190686 
Skewness -0.755165 
Excess Kurtosis 0.421943 
Minimum -0.615781 
Maximum 0.334896 
Normality Chi2(2)= 8.2748 [0.0160] * 
Normality test for ror 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean 0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.272396 
Skewness -0.425428 
Excess Kurtosis 0.766690 
Minimum -0.847720 
Maximum 0.533253 
Normality Chi\2)= 4.0752 [0.1303] 
Normality test for y 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean 0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.008477 
Skewness 0.118929 
Excess Kurtosis 0.391707 
Minimum -0.022570 
Maximum 0.025249 
Normality Chi2(2)= 1.9916 [0.3694] 
Testing rr for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
.., 
Chi"(4) = 0.67579 [0.9543] and F-Form(4, 50) = 0.12364 [0.9733] 
Testing ror for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi\4) = 2.536 [0.6382] and F-Form(4, 50) = 0.47696 [0.7524] 
Testing y for ARCH from lags 1 to 4-
Chi2( 4) = 11.261 [0.0238] * and F -Form( 4, 50) = 2.4378 [0.0591] 
Testing rr for Heteroscedastic errors 
Chi\24) = 25.51 [0.3785] and F-Form(24. 33) = 0.7386 [ 0 . : ~ ~ 5 ] ]
Testing ror for Heteroscedastic errors 
Chi2(24) = 38.632 [0.0298] * and F -F orm( 24. 3 _ ~ ) ) = 1.5456 [0.1218] 
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Testing y for Heteroscedastic errors 
Chi\24) = 23.153 [0.5108] and F-Form(24, 33) = 0.63867 [0.8714] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 4 
Chi2(36) = 53.537 [0.0301] * and F-Form(36, 130) = 1.2666 [0.1700] 
Vector normality test for residuals 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Skewness 
-1.883 -0.9656 0.1245 
Excess kurtosis 
-0.5881 0.9137 1.107 
Vector normality Chi2( 6)= 6.9001 [0.3302] 
Testing for vector heteroscedasticity using squares 
Chi2(144) = 162.75 [0.1358] and F -Form(144, 171) = 0.84316 [0.8548] 
Cointegration analysis 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
eigenvalue).li loglik for rank 
565.827 0 
0.388049 
0.195155 
0.0903972 
1.64803e-0 15 
583.753 1 
591.677 2 
595.135 3 
Ho:rank=p -Tlog(1-I-l) 
p = 0 35.85** 
p <= 1 15.85* 
P <= 2 6.917 
using T-nm 
29.96** 
13.24 
5.78 
standardized W eigenvectors 
rr ror y Constant 
950/0 -TIlg(l-).l) 
22.0 58.62** 
15.7 22.77* 
9.2 6.917 
using T-nm 950/0 
48.98** 34.9 
19.02 20.0 
5.78 9.2 
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rr 
ror 
\' 
IT 
-1.-+66 1.000 1.791 -14.67 
0.4992 -0.5274 1.000 -9.250 
standardized a coefficients 
-1.353 0.05948 0.001699 
-1.464 -0.1814 0.-+726 
-0.007419 -0.02066 -0.01516 
lona-run matrix Po=aW. rank 3 e 
rr ror \ Constant 
-1.440 0.4646 1.051 -6.918 
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ror 
-0.9622 0.008659 1.168 
y 0.01531 -0.01044 -0.04699 
-8.236 
0.4102 
Number of lags used in the analysis: 4 
Variables entered unrestricted: 
s1974p2 ts1974p2 
Variables entered restricted: 
Constant 
General co integration test 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
W 
IT ror y Constant 
1.629 -0.8235 -0.9981 6.699 
a 
IT -0.6050 
ror 0.0000 
y 0.0000 
standardized W eigenvectors 
IT ror y Constant 
1.000 -0.5055 -0.6127 4.112 
standardized a coefficients 
IT -0.9856 
ror 0.0000 
y 0.0000 
Restricted long-run matrix Po=aW, rank 1 
IT 
ror 
y 
IT 
IT ror y 
-0.9856 0.4982 0.6039 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Reduced form W 
ror 
0.5055 
v Constant 
o . 612 7 -4. 112 
loglik = 575.629 unrloglik = 583.753 
Constant 
-4.053 
0.0000 
0.0000 
LR-test. rank=l: Chi2(-7-2) = 16.248 [0.0003] ** 
General cointegration test 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
W 
IT ror v Constant 
1.558 -0.7941 -1.000 6.836 
[1] 
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a 
IT -0.6278 
ror 0.0000 
y 0.002357 
standardized ~ ' ' eigenvectors 
IT ror y Constant 
l.000 -0.5097 -0.6421 4.388 
standardized a coefficients 
IT -0.9781 
ror 0.0000 
y 0.003673 
Restricted long-run matrix Po=aW, rank 1 
IT ror y Constant 
IT -0.9781 0.4985 0.6281 -4.292 
ror 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
y 0.003673 -0.001872 -0.002358 0.01611 
Reduced fonn W 
ror y Constant 
IT 0.5097 0.6421 -4.388 
loglik = 575.639 unrloglik = 583.753 
LR-test, rank=l: Chi(-7-l) = 16.227 [0.0001] ** 
General cointegration test 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
IT 
ror 
y 
IT 
ror 
\' 
W 
IT ror Y Constant 
1.058 -0.3366 -0.8077 5.394 
a 
-l.350 
-1.474 
0.0000 
standardized W eigenvectors 
IT ror v Constant 
1.000 -0.3180 -0.7631 5.096 
standardized a coefficients 
-1.429 
-1.560 
0.0000 
255 
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Restricted long-run matrix Po=aW, rank 1 
IT ror y Constant 
IT -1.429 0.4545 1.091 -7.284 
ror -1.560 0.4962 1.191 -7.951 
Y 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Reduced form W 
ror y Constant 
IT 0.3180 0.7631 -5.096 
loglik = 583.55 unrloglik = 583.753 
LR-test, rank=l: Chi2e-l) = 0.40543 [0.5243] 
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7.8 Cointegration for Price Equation 
Seeking a long-run relationship between real money (m-p). real income 
(y) and the expected rate of inflation (n = p*) the following tests are conducted. 
Trend and structural dummies are imposed onto cointegration space. The 
cointegration test shows the existence of a cointegrated vector among the 
variables. The assumption that y is weak exogenous is not rejected. So. the 
unique long-run relationship is : 
(m-p) = 0.106 y - 5.679 n + 0.05 t + 2.06 DU - 0.056 DT 
s 1980p2 and ts 1980p2 respectively refer to step dummy for the second quarter 
1980 and trends multipied by that dummy. 
EQ( 1) Estimating the unrestricted reduced form by OLS 
The present sample is: 1972 (3) to 1990 (1) 
URF Equation 1 for m-p 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
m-p_l 0.76988 0.12447 6.185 0.0000 
m-p_2 0.099089 0.13925 0.712 OA798 
m-p_3 -0.13193 0.13800 -0.956 0.3433 
m-p_4 0.34729 0.13967 2A87 0.0160 
m-p_5 -0.33402 0.15818 -2.112 0.0394 
m-p_6 0.089913 0.14234 0.632 0.5303 
y_l -0.27185 0.72332 -0.376 0.7085 
y_2 1.2290 2.1236 0.579 0.5652 
y_3 -2.4262 3.2066 -0.757 OA526 
y_4 2.5433 3 " " "j 0.787 0.4350 . ~ - ' - ' '
y_5 -1.4330 2.1861 -0.656 0.5149 
y_6 0.35116 0.76419 0.460 0.6477 
p* -0.93662 0.25499 -3.673 0.0006 
Trend 0.0080471 0.00449 1.790 0.0790 
s1980p2 0.32420 0.19638 1.651 0.1046 
ts1980p2 -0.0088149 0.00442 -1.990 0.0517 
Constant 0.57396 0.88225 0.651 0.5181 
cr = 0.047809 RSS = 0.1234279614 
URF Equation :2 for y 
Std.Error t-value t-prob Variable Coefficient 
In-p_l 0.010457 0.022897 0.457 0.6497 
m-p_2 -0.015257 0.025615 -0.596 0.5539 
" 0.013778 0.025386 0.543 0.5896 n1-p_-' 
'':;7 __ I 
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m-p_4 
m-p_5 
m-p_6 
y_l 
y 2 
y_3 
y_4 
y_5 
y 6 
p* 
Trend 
s1980p2 
ts1980p2 
Constant 
0.010322 0.025692 0.402 0.6894 
-0.019292 0.029097 -0.663 0.5101 
-0.0021457 0.026184 -0.082 0.9350 
2.8624 0.13306 2l.513 0.0000 
-3.9180 0.39065 -10.030 0.0000 
3.5721 0.58986 6.056 0.0000 
-2.3366 0.59476 -3.929 0.0002 
1.0679 0.40213 2.655 0.0104 
-0.27314 0.14057 -l.943 0.0572 
-0.042253 0.046906 -0.901 0.3717 
4.2330e-005 0.00082689 0.051 0.9594 
-0.0011592 0.036125 -0.032 0.9745 
8.7131e-005 0.00081488 0.107 0.9152 
0.24219 0.16229 l.492 0.1414 
cr = 0.00879458 RSS = 0.004176608176 
correlation of URF residuals 
m-p y 
m-p 1.000 
y 0.1757 1.000 
standard deviations of URF residuals 
m-p y 
0.04781 0.008795 
loglik = 572.51138 loglel = -16.1271 lei = 9.91055e-008 T = 71 
logIY'Y/TI = -5.80654 
R2 (LR) = 0.999967 R2 (LM) = 0.994207 
F-test against unrestricted regressors, F(32. 106) = 573.76 [0.0000] ** 
variables entered unrestricted: 
Constant 
F -tests on retained regressors, F (2, 53) 
m-p_l 
m-p_3 
m-p_5 
v 1 
~ ~ -
y_3 
y_5 
p* 
s1980p2 
18.9750 [0.0000] ** 
0.704298 [0.4990] 
2.23154 [0.1174] 
235.857 [0.0000] ** 
19.6754 [0.0000] ** 
4.09809 [0.0221] * 
6.65421 [0.0026] ** 
1.39002 [0.2580] 
correlation of actual and fitted 
m-p \" 
0.9967 0.9974 
m-p _ 2 0.511497 [0.6025] 
m-p_ 4 3.03486 [0.0565] 
m-p_6 0.214664 [0.8075] 
y _ 2 52.1407 [0.0000] * * 
y _ 4 8.67864 [0.0005] ** 
y_6 2.17756 [0.1234] 
Trend 1.60783 [0.2099] 
ts 1980p2 2.04876 [0.1390] 
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Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 1 
Chi
2 
(4) = 8.1308 [0.0869] and F-Fonn(4, 102) = 1.5845 [0.1841] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 2 
Chi
2 
(8) = 18.327 [0.0189] * and F-Fonn(8, 98) = 1.9137 [0.0663] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi
2 
(12) = 23.246 [0.0257] * and F-Fonn(l2, 94) = l.6278 [0.0969] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 4 
Chi
2 (16) = 28.507 [0.0275] * and F-Fonn(l6, 90) = 1.5202 [0.1099] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 5 
Chi
2 (20) = 29.514 [0.0781] and F-Fonn(20, 86) = 1.2164 [0.2614] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 6 
Chi2(24) = 42.682 [0.0108] * and F-Form(24, 82) = 1.6298 [0.0545] 
Vector normality test for residuals 
The present sample is: 1972 (3) to 1990 (1) 
Skewness 
4.689 1.304 
Excess kurtosis 
1.437 1.732 
Vector normality Chi2( 4)= 28.755 [0.0000] ** 
Testing for vector heteroscedasticity using squares 
1 s ~ u a r e s s removed 
Chi (93) = 94.575 [0.4350] and F-Form(93. 60) = 0.54192 [0.9961] 
Testing m-p for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 6 
Chi\6) = 23.755 [0.0006] ** and F-Form(6. 48) = 4.0225 [0.0024] ** 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
Coeff. -0.2612 -0.6934 0.3683 -0.5641 0.25·+3 -0.3396 
Testing y for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 6 _""' ""' 
Chi2(6) = 5.1032 [0.5307] and F-Form(6, 48) = 0.6192'-' [0.71-,6] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 lag 6 
Coeff. 0.2235 0.02543 0.5296 0.1295 -0.5013 -0.476 
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Normality test for m-p 
The present sample is: 
Sample Size 71 
1972 (3) to 1990 (1) 
Mean 0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.041694 
Skewness 1.616783 
Excess Kurtosis 6.638667 
Minimum -0.077493 
Maximum 0.205594 
Normality Chi2 (2)= 23.326 [0.0000] ** 
Normality test for y 
The present sample is: 1972 (3) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 71 
Mean -0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.007670 
Skewness 0.226549 
Excess Kurtosis 0.840207 
Minimum -0.022932 
Maximum 0.020409 
Normality Chi2 (2)= 4.5721 [0.1017] 
Testing m-p for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi\4) = 2.0227 [0.7316] and F-Form(4. 46) = 0.35798 [0.8372] 
Testing y for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi2(4) = 8.9113 [0.0634] and F-Form(4. 46) = 1.7642 [0.1523] 
Testing m-p for Heteroscedastic errors 
Chi2(31) = 30.56 [0.4885] and F-Form(3 L 22) = 0.53631 [0.9455] 
Testing y for Heteroscedastic errors 
Chi2(31) = 32.911 [0.3736] and F-Form(3 L 22) = 0.61319 [0.8966] 
Cointegration analysis 1972 (3) to 1990 (1) 
eigenvalue J.li loglik for rank 
550.754 0 
0.364622 566.854 1 
0.147312 572.511 ') 
4.75653e-016 
7. 9846ge-0 1 7 
-1.28252e-0 17 
-2.16577e-0 16 
Ho:rank=p -Tlog(1-J.l) using T-nm 9 5 ~ i O O - T ~ l g ( 1 - ~ l ) ) using T -nm 
p = 0 32.2** 26.76** 19.0 43.52** 36.16** 
p<= 1 11.31 9.402 12.3 11.31 9.402 12.3 
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standardized W eigenvectors 
m-p y p* Trend 
l.000 -0.06161 5.734 -0.05064 
0.02458 l.000 l.316 0.001339 
standardized a coefficients 
m-p -0.1594 -0.01739 
Y -0.001511 -0.02552 
long-run matrix Po=aW, rank 2 
7.8 Co integration , Price Equation 
s 1980p2 ts 1980p2 
-2.053 0.05605 
0.1669 -0.006731 
m-p y p* Trend s 1980p2 ts 1980p2 
m-p -0.1598 -0.007571 -0.9366 0.008047 0.3242 -0.008815 
Y -0.002138 -0.02543 -0.04225 4.233e-005 -0.001159 8.713e-005 
Number of lags used in the analysis: 6 
Variables entered unrestricted: 
Constant 
Variables entered restricted: 
p* Trend s 1980p2 ts 1980p2 
General cointegration test 1972 (3) to 1990 (1) 
P' 
m-p y p* Trend 
0.9991 -0.1062 5.673 -0.05070 
s 1980p2 ts 1980p2 
-2.060 0.05635 
a 
m-p -0.1580 
y 0.0000 
m-p 
y 
m-p 
y 
standardized P' eigenvectors 
m-p y p* Trend 
1.000 -0.1063 5.679 -0.05075 
standardized a coefficients 
-0.l578 
0.0000 
s 1980p2 ts 1980p2 
-2.062 0.05640 
Restricted long-run matrix Po=ap'. rank 1 
m-p Y p* Trend s 1980p2 ts 1980p2 
-0.1578 0.01678 -0.8963 0.008010 0.3255 -0.008902 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Reduced form P' 
" :,,: .', ~ ; ' « f j j ~ ~ ~ ~ f ~ ~ l j ~ i : i : : : : : { j : . : t : : : P * * t ~ ? t T r e ~ ~ ~ t t ~ ~ j : \ : ~ : ~ ! ! 980p2 ts 1980p2 
::\n-p " :,:' .,.' b.l 0 6 3 ' : l : ~ [ : [ r : : : , - 5 : ; . 6 7 9 9 ,:::.0.05075 :::;:::;:::: .. 2.062 -0.05640 
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loglik = 566.822 unrloglik = 566.854 
LR-test, rank=l: Chi2 e-I) = 0.063444 [0.8011] 
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7.9 Model Estimation 
EQ(l) is an unrestricted statistical system consisting of all the 
dependent and independent variables of the model. All relevant tests show an 
acceptable result. Regarding parsimonious principle the variables Dp_l. Dp_2. 
Dp _ 3, Om _ 3, Dg_ 3, Doy _ 3, Dor _3 and Dor _1 are omitted to build system 2. 
This system which has reasonable features is used as a base for an econometric 
model. Then this model is estimated by 3SLS (Modell) and 2SLS (Model 2). 
System 1 
EQ( 1) Estimating the unrestricted reduced form by OLS 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
URF Equation 1 for Dp 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value t-prob 
Dp_l 0.23466 3.3801 0.069 0.9450 
Dp_2 -1.0865 3.5331 -0.308 0.7601 
Dp_3 1.0590 3.4491 0.307 0.7605 
Dy_l -0.14267 0.50456 -0.283 0.7789 
Dy_2 0.26190 0.77251 0.339 0.7365 
Dy_3 -0.24695 0.51091 -0.483 0.6316 
Dr 1 0.021511 0.035949 0.598 0.5531 
Dr 2 -0.074236 0.041714 -1.780 0.0831 
Dr 3 -0.069731 0.036324 -1.920 0.0624 
Dm 0.25966 0.10876 2.387 0.0220 
Dm 1 -0.13047 0.10387 -1.256 0.2168 
Dm 2 0.085375 0.10475 0.815 0.4201 
Dm 3 -0.17763 0.09627 -1.845 0.0728 
Dg -0.026929 0.02437 -1.105 0.2761 
Dg_l -0.0041964 0.03863 -0.109 0.9141 
Dg_2 0.058813 0.038380 1.532 0.1337 
Dg_3 0.030779 0.029042 1.060 0.2959 
Dor 0.0064805 0.012922 0.502 0.6189 
Dor 1 -0.021394 0.022657 -0.944 0.3510 
Dor 2 0.034193 0.025714 1.330 0.1915 
Dor 3 0.028528 0.023849 1.196 0.2390 
Doy 0.024337 0.062987 0.386 0.7014 
Doy_l -0.014539 0.097699 -0.149 0.8825 
Doy_2 -0.043520 0.10779 -0.404 0.6887 
Doy_3 0.077877 0.075796 1.027 0.3107 
Dp*_1 0.076375 5.5870 0.014 0.9892 
Dp*_2 1.5206 5.0161 0.303 0.7634 
Dp*_3 -0.091588 2.3176 -0.040 0.9687 
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CI(P)_1 0.042838 
CI(y)_1 0.0073293 
CI(r)_1 0.017277 
Seasonal -0.061582 
Seasonal_l -0.016042 
Seasonal_2 -0.13704 
Seasonal_3 -0.039781 
0.05199 0.824 0.4151 
0.082414 0.089 0.9296 
0.023060 0.749 0.4583 
0.10124 -0.608 0.5466 
0.099524 -0.161 0.8728 
0.096005 -1.427 0.1616 
0.099554 -0.400 0.6917 
cr = 0.0283004 RSS = 0.0304346376 
URF Equation 2 for Dy 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Dp_l 0.43386 0.89005 0.487 0.6287 
Dp_2 -0.32763 0.93035 -0.352 0.7267 
Dp_3 -0.23788 0.90823 -0.262 0.7948 
Dy_l 1.4937 0.13286 11.243 0.0000 
Dy_2 -1.2277 0.20342 -6.035 0.0000 
Dy 3 0.46013 0.13453 3.420 0.0015 
Dr 1 0.020471 0.00946 2.163 0.0369 
-
Dr 2 0.016375 0.01098 1.491 0.1443 
-
Dr 3 0.0013669 0.00956 0.143 0.8871 
-
Dm 0.014212 0.02863 0.496 0.6226 
Dm 1 -0.0017206 0.02735 -0.063 0.9502 
-
Dm 2 -0.0026929 0.02758 -0.098 0.9227 
-
Dm 3 0.011357 0.02535 0.448 0.6567 
-
Dg -0.0017542 0.00641 -0.273 0.7861 
Dg 1 -0.022539 0.01017 -2.215 0.0328 
Dg_2 -0.015242 0.01010 -1.508 0.1398 
Dg_3 -0.0021435 0.00764 -0.280 0.7808 
Dor 0.00045989 0.00340 0.135 0.8932 
Dor 1 -0.0034876 0.00596 -0.585 0.5623 
-
Dor 2 -0.0029982 0.00677 -0.443 0.6604 
-
Dor 3 0.0013570 0.00628 0.216 0.8301 
-
Doy 0.083836 0.01658 5.055 0.0000 
Doy_l -0.097088 0.02572 -3.774 0.0005 
Doy_2 0.062185 0.02838 2.1910.0347 
Doy_3 -0.016110 0.01995 -0.807 0.4246 
Dp*_1 -0.98619 1.4712 -0.670 0.5067 
Dp*_2 -0.014648 1.3208 -0.011 0.9912 
Dp*_3 0.16058 0.6102 0.263 0.7939 
CI(p)_1 0.038131 0.01369 2.785 0.0083 
CI( \') 1 -0.066283 0.0217 -3.054 0.0041 
CI(r)_1 -0.016385 0.00607 -2.698 0.0103 
Seasonal -0.063011 0.0266 ' ... 64 0 0'" " -_.J . __ L'
Seasonal 1 -0.062296 0.0262 -2.377 0.0226 
-
Seasonal 2 -0.063371 00'-' -2.507 0.0166 . -)-
Seasonal 3 -0.070612 0.0262 -2.694 0.0105 
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cr = 0.0074521 RSS = 0.002110285534 
URF Equation 3 for Dr 
Variable 
Dp_1 
Dp_2 
Dp_3 
Dy_1 
Dy 2 
Dy_3 
Dr 1 
Dr 2 
Dr 3 
Om 
Om 1 
Om 2 
Dm 3 
Og 
Og_l 
Og_2 
Og_3 
Oor 
Oor 1 
Oor 2 
Oor 3 
Ooy 
Ooy_1 
Ooy_2 
Ooy_3 
Op*_l 
Op*_2 
Op*_3 
CI(p)_l 
CI(y)_l 
CI(r)_l 
Seasonal 
Seasonal 1 
-
Seasonal 2 
Seasonal 3 
Coefficient 
-28.425 
35.325 
-8.0636 
0.83407 
-2.6042 
3.3071 
-0.40304 
-0.33858 
-0.22015 
0.35979 
0.28884 
0.40353 
0.12712 
0.34818 
0.34336 
0.019698 
0.14289 
0.46768 
0.12766 
0.23634 
0.070074 
0.026173 
0.043519 
0.51650 
-0.62822 
45.871 
-32.590 
7.7152 
-0.17515 
0.43541 
-0.090026 
0.36390 
0.35069 
0.38912 
0.22350 
Std.Error t-value t-prob 
1 7.3 1 1 -l. 642 O. 1 088 
18.095 l.952 0.0583 
17.665 -0.456 0.6506 
2.5842 0.323 0.7486 
3.9565 -0.658 0.5144 
2.6167 l.264 0.2140 
0.18412 -2.189 0.0348 
0.21364 -l.585 0.1213 
0.18604 -l.183 0.2440 
0.55704 0.646 0.5222 
0.53200 0.543 0.5903 
0.53647 0.752 0.4566 
0.49309 0.258 0.7980 
0.12482 2.789 0.0082 
0.19789 l. 735 0.0908 
0.19657 0.100 0.9207 
0.14874 0.961 0.3428 
0.066181 7.067 0.0000 
0.11604 l.100 0.2782 
0.13169 l.795 0.0807 
0.12215 0.574 0.5696 
0.32260 0.081 0.9358 
0.50038 0.087 0.9312 
0.55206 0.936 0.3554 
0.38820 -l.618 0.1139 
28.614 l.603 0.1172 
25.690 -l.269 0.2123 
11.870 0.650 0.5196 
0.26628 -0.658 0.5147 
0.42209 1.032 0.3088 
0.11810 -0.762 0.4506 
0.51852 0.702 0.4871 
0.50973 0.688 0.4956 
0.49170 0.791 0.4336 
0.50988 0.438 0.6636 
cr = 0.144944 RSS = 0.7983315751 
correlation of URF residuals 
Op O\' Dr 
Op 1.000 
O\' -0.3302 1.000 
Dr -0.06665 0.2389 1.000 
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standard deviations of URF residuals 
Dp Dy Dr 
0.02830 0.007452 0.1449 
loglik = 836.73024 loglel = -22.9241 lei = 1.1 070ge-0 1 0 T = 73 
10gIY'Y/TI = -14.9692 
R
2
CLR) = 0.999649 R\LM) = 0.915649 
F -test against unrestricted regressors, F(l05, 108) = 13.713 [0.0000] * * 
No variables entered unrestricted. 
F-tests on retained regressors, FC3, 36) 
Dp_l 
Dp_3 
Dy_2 
Dr 1 
Dr 3 
Om 1 
Om 3 
Dg_l 
Dg_3 
Dor 1 
Dor 3 
Doy_l 
Doy_3 
Dp*_2 
CI(p)_1 
CICr)_1 
Seasonal 1 
Seasonal 3 
1.13339 [0.3486] 
0.0916791 [0.9642] 
12.6895 [0.0000] * * 
4.57255 [0.0082] ** 
1. 72492 [0.1792] 
0.690031 [0.5641] 
1.09428 [0.3640] 
3.53510 [0.0242] * 
0.701076 [0.5576] 
1.09423 [0.3641] 
0.669483 [0.5763] 
5.52734 [0.0032] ** 
1.10158 [0.3611] 
0.572120 [0.6370] 
4.13512 [0.0128] * 
2.31081 [0.0926] 
2.64098 [0.0641] 
3.28516 [0.0317] * 
Dp _2 1.49976 [0.2311] 
Dy _1 46.0303 [0.0000] ** 
Dy_3 3.90603 [0.0163] * 
Dr 2 2.52836 [0.0727] 
Dm 2.46595 [0.0779] 
Dm_2 0.416124 [0.7425] 
Dg 3.29123 [0.0315] * 
Dg_2 1.16428 [0.3368] 
Dor 16.6517 [0.0000] * * 
Dor 2 1.74759 [0.1747] 
Doy 10.0123 [0.0001] ** 
Day _2 1.60766 [0.2046] 
Dp* _1 1.20202 [0.3229] 
Dp* _3 0.137868 [0.9367] 
CI(y)_1 4.29982 [0.0108] * 
Seasonal 3.00131 [0.0431] * 
Seasonal 2 4.46356 [0.0092] ** 
correlation of actual and fitted 
Dp Dy Dr 
0.8776 0.9804 0.9565 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 1 
Chi2 (9) = 17.731 [0.0384] * and F-Fonn(9. 80) = l.0145 [0.4357] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 2 
Chi2 (18) = 41.86 [0.0012] ** and F-Fonn(l8, 85) = 1.2762 [0.2243] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi2 (27) = 46.112 [0.0124] * and F-Form(27. 79) = 0.87676 [0.6401] 
Vector normality test for residuals 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Skewness 
0.4813 1.410 -1.111 
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Excess kurtosis 
1. 761 0.7194 0.3605 
Vector normality Chi2 (6)= 7.2014 [0.3026] 
Testing Dp for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi2 (3) = 13.305 [0.0040] ** and F-Form(3. 35) = 2.6004 [0.0676] 
Testing Dy for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi2 (3) = 10.097 [0.0178] * and F-Form(3. 35) = l.8727 [0.1522] 
Testing Dr for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi2 (3) = 0.50919 [0.9169] and F-Form(3, 35) = 0.08195 [0.9694] 
Normality test for Dp 
The present sample is: 1972 (l) to 1990 (l) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean -0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.020418 
Skewness 0.079056 
Excess Kurtosis 0.695572 
Minimum -0.050007 
Maximum 0.063592 
Normality Chi2(2)= 3.7673 [0.1520] 
Normality test for Dy 
The present sample is: 1972 (l) to 1990 (l) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean 0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.005377 
Skewness 0.417101 
Excess Kurtosis 0.152685 
Minimum -0.012992 
Maximum 0.014288 
Normality Chi:! (2)= 2.3525 [0.3084] 
Normality test for Dr 
The present sample is: 1972 (l) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean 0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.104576 
Skewness 
Excess Kurtosis 
Minimunl 
Maximum 
-0.304930 
0.006996 
-0.273606 
0.208428 
, 
Normality Cht (2)= 1 . 3 ~ 1 8 8 [0.5164] 
267 
Chapter 7: Appendices 
-.9 At/odel Estimation 
Testing Dp for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi
2 (4) = 2.1556 [0.7072] and F-Form(4, 30) = 0.24186 [0.9123] 
Testing Dy for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi2 (4) = 7.0871 [0.1314] and F-Form(4, 30) = 0.85852 [0.5000] 
Testing Dr for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi2 (4) = 0.36091 [0.9856] and F-Form(4. 30) = 0.039435 [0.9969] 
System 2 
EQ( 2) Estimating the unrestricted reduced form by RLS 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
URF Equation 1 for Op 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Dy_l -0.030243 0.43374 -0.070 0.9447 
Dy_2 -0.43205 0.60084 -0.719 0.4757 
Dy_3 0.37713 0.34365 1.097 0.2782 
Dr 1 0.0048941 0.022752 0.215 0.8306 
-
Dr 2 -0.041409 0.031391 -l.319 0.1937 
-
Dr 3 -0.012658 0.015649 -0.809 0.4227 
-
Om 0.20076 0.099123 2.025 0.0487 
Dm 1 -0.05908 0.096906 -0.610 0.5451 
-
Dm 2 0.l0435 0.094711 1.102 0.2763 
-
Dg -0.023402 0.023428 -0.999 0.3231 
Dg_l -0.0074633 0.035967 -0.208 0.8365 
Dg_2 0.039123 0.027999 l.397 0.1690 
Dor 0.016333 0.011663 1.400 0.1681 
Oor 2 0.021341 0.019409 l.100 0.2772 
Doy 0.021605 0.057658 0.375 0.7096 
Doy_l -0.012820 0.079683 -0.161 0.8729 
Doy_2 0.0077125 0.067081 0.115 0.9090 
Dp*_1 0.25877 0.30283 0.855 0.3973 
Dp*_2 -0.35128 0.23774 -l.478 0.1463 
Dp*_3 0.37052 0.24897 1.488 0.1435 
Seasonal -0.10693 0.090040 -1.188 0.2411 
Seasonal 1 -0.07100 0.088712 -0.800 0.4276 
-
-2.049 0.0462 Seasonal_2 -0.17813 0.086937 
Seasonal_3 -0.084972 0.090693 -0.937 0.3537 
CI(p )_1 0.063923 0.044531 1.435 0.1579 
Cl(y)_1 0.011710 0.069648 0.168 0.8672 
CI(r)_1 0.0073579 0.019762 0.372 0.7114 
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cr = 0.0287458 RSS = 0.03801069831 
URF Equation 2 for Dy 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Dy_1 l.5560 0.l0889 14.290 0.0000 
Dy_2 
-1.2224 0.15084 
-8.104 0.0000 
Dy_3 0.42963 0.086271 4.980 0.0000 
Dr 1 0.015072 0.0057117 2.639 0.0113 
-
Dr 2 0.011401 0.0078805 l.447 0.1547 
-
Dr 3 0.00055415 0.0039287 0.l41 0.8884 
-
Dm 0.0037662 0.024884 0.151 0.8804 
Dm 1 -0.015481 0.024328 -0.636 0.5277 
Dm 2 -0.0023664 0.023777 -0. 1 00 0.9212 
-
Dg -0.0048798 0.0058816 -0.830 0.4110 
Dg_1 -0.023585 0.0090294 -2.612 0.0121 
Dg_2 -0.014204 0.0070290 -2.021 0.0491 
Dor -0.00033342 0.0029279 -0.114 0.9098 
Dor 2 -0.00065536 0.0048725 -0.135 0.8936 
Doy 0.082298 0.014475 5.686 0.0000 
Doy_1 -0.097371 0.020004 -4.868 0.0000 
Doy_2 0.049412 0.016840 2.934 0.0052 
Dp*_1 -0.18049 0.076025 -2.374 0.0218 
Dp*_2 -0.024975 0.059683 -0.418 0.6776 
Dp*_3 0.011459 0.062502 0.183 0.8553 
Seasonal -0.038653 0.022604 -l.710 0.0940 
Seasonal 1 -0.037880 0.022271 -1.701 0.0957 
-
Seasonal 2 -0.040510 0.021825 -1.856 0.0699 
Seasonal 3 -0.048255 0.022768 -2.119 0.0395 
CI(p)_l 0.024565 0.011179 2.197 0.0331 
CI(y)_l -0.055728 0.017485 -3.187 0.0026 
CI(r)_l -0.011713 0.0049611 -2.361 0.0225 
cr = 0.00721648 RSS = 0.002395568778 
URF Equation 3 for Dr 
Variable Coefficient 
Ov 1 -1.9963 
Oy _2 3.3997 
Oy _3 0.17432 
Dr 1 -0.24212 
Dr 2 -0.064758 
Dr 3 
Om 
Om 1 
Om 2 
Og 
-0.13438 
0.61050 
0.46276 
0.40266 
0.34404 
Std.Error t-value t-prob 
2.2343 -0.893 0.3762 
3.0951 1.098 0.2777 
1.7702 0.098 0.9220 
0.11720 -2.066 0.0445 
0.16170 -0.400 0.6907 
0.080612 
0.51060 
0.49918 
0.48787 
0.12068 
-1.667 0.1023 
1.196 0.2380 
0.927 0.3587 
0.825 0.4134 
2.851 0.0065 
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Dg_l 
Dg_2 
Dor 
Dor 2 
Doy 
Doy_l 
DoY_2 
Dp*_1 
Dp*_2 
Dp*_3 
Seasonal 
Seasonal 1 
Seasonal 2 
Seasonal 3 
CI(P)_1 
CI(y)_1 
CI(r)_1 
0.20304 
-0.13017 
0.42615 
0.037359 
-0.13779 
0.50999 
-0.35428 
-0.93857 
-2.4702 
1.5842 
0.061177 
0.19991 
0.18829 
0.085246 
-0.083818 
0.12338 
-0.18093 
0.18527 1.096 0.2788 
0.14423 -0.903 0.3715 
0.060078 7.093 0.0000 
0.099979 0.374 0.7104 
0.29700 -0.464 0.6449 
0.41046 1.242 0.2204 
0.34555 -1.025 0.3106 
1.5599 -0.602 0.5503 
1.2246 -2.017 0.0495 
1.2825 1.235 0.2230 
0.46381 0.132 0.8956 
0.45697 0.437 0.6638 
0.44783 0.420 0.6761 
0.46717 0.182 0.8560 
0.22939 -0.365 0.7165 
0.35877 0.344 0.7325 
0.1 0 180 -1.777 0.0821 
cr = 0.148075 RSS = 1.008600537 
correlation of URF residuals 
Dp Dy Dr 
Dp 1.000 
Dy 
-0.3219 1.000 
Dr -0.09977 0.1911 1.000 
standard deviations of URF residuals 
Dp Dy Dr 
0.02875 0.007216 0.1481 
-.9 ,\fodel Estimation 
loglik = 814.5023 loglel = -22.3151 lei = 2.03546e-Ol0 T = 73 
logIY'Y/TI = -14.9692 
R2(LR) = 0.999355 R2(LM) = 0.895174 
F-test against unrestricted regressors, F(81, 132) = 17.433 [0.0000] ** 
No variables entered unrestricted. 
F-tests on retained regressors, F(3. 44) 
Dy _1 76.3125 [0.0000] ** Dy_2 
Dy_3 10.6819 [0.0000] ** Dr_l 
Dr 2 1.09520 [0.3612] Dr 3 
Dm 2.05973 [0.1193] Dm 1 
Dm 2 0.672729 [0.5734] Dg 
Dg_l 3.36309 [0.0269] * Dg_2 
Dor 17.7231 [0.0000] * * Dor 2 
Doy 12.7395 [0.0000] ** Doy_1 
Doy_2 3.93134 [0.0143] * Dp* 1 
Dp* _2 2.31427 [0.0889] Dp*_3 
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26.9586 [0.0000] * * 
4.73643 [0.0060] * * 
1.20182 [0.3202] 
0.705901 [0.5536] 
3.68470 [0.0188] * 
1.57823 [0.2081] 
0,468103 [0.7060] 
10.0770 [0.0000] ** 
1.80682 [0.1599] 
1.39376 [0.2573] 
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Seasonal 
Seasonal 2 
CI(p)_1 
CI(r)_1 
2.05579 [0.1199] Seasonal_l 1.73348 [0.1740] 
3.73495 [0.0178] * Seasonal_3 2.45385 [0.0757] 
3.33228 [0.0279] * CI(y)_1 3.77912 [0.0170] * 
2.42831 [0.0780] 
correlation of actual and fitted 
Dp Dy Dr 
0.8444 0.9777 0.9447 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 1 
Chi2(9) = 20.372 [0.0158] * and F-Form(9, 99) = 1.4943 [0.1605] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 2 
Chi2(l8) = 40.027 [0.0021] ** and F-Form(l8, 107) = 1.4681 [0.1162] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi2(27) = 52.845 [0.0021] ** and F-Form(27. 102) = 1.2828 [0.1871] 
Vector normality test for residuals 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Skewness 
1.093 0.2234 -1.489 
Excess kurtosis 
0.4328 1.187 0.7137 
Vector normality Chi\ 6)= 5.5672 [0.4734] 
Testing Dp for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi2(3) = 4.4924 [0.2130] and F-Form(3. 43) = 0.9399 [0.4297] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. -0.2361 0.4016 0.2061 
Testing Dy for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi\3) = 9.0912 [0.0281] * and F-Form(3, 43) = 2.0389 [0.1226] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. 0.1737 -0.3803 0.2043 
Testing Dr for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi2(3) = 1.7861 [0.6180] and F-Form(3. 43) = 0.35948 [0.7825] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
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Coeff. -0.2294 -0.1577 -0.09364 
Normality test for Dp 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean -0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.022819 
Skewness 0.198109 
Excess Kurtosis 0.070058 
Minimum -0.055947 
Maximum 0.059491 
Normality Chi\2)= 0.8969 [0.6386] 
Normality test for Dy 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean -0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.005729 
Skewness 0.110117 
Excess Kurtosis 0.296669 
Minimum -0.016042 
Maximum 0.014545 
Normality Chi2(2)= 1.5352 [0.4641] 
Normality test for Dr 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean -0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.117543 
Skewness -0.443793 
Excess Kurtosis 0.320037 
Minimum -0.322852 
Maximum 0.283839 
Normality Chi2(2)= 2.754 [0.2523] 
Testing Dp for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
-.9 .\.1odel Estimation 
Chi2 (4) = 3.3094 [0.5075] and F-Form(4. 38) = 0.47859 [0.7512] 
Testing Dy for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
., 
Chi-(4) = 7.5044 [0.1115] and F-Form(4. 38) = 1.1593 [0.3440] 
Testing Dr for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi2(4) = 3.0988 [0.5414] and F-Form(4. 38) = 0.44671 [0.7741] 
Progress to date 
system T p log-likelihood Schwarz Hannan-Quinn 
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2 73 81 RLS 
1 73 93 RLS 
814.50230 -17.55 
-19.08 
825.50540 -17.15 
-18.91 
Tests of model reduction 
System 1 --> System 2: F(l2. 106) = 1.0673 [0.3950] 
Modell 
EQ( 3) Estimating the model by 3SLS 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Equation 1 for Dp 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Dy_2 -0.41913 0.28254 -1.483 0.1437 
Dy_3 0.38195 0.25866 1.477 0.1455 
Dr 2 -0.031508 0.020842 -1.512 0.1363 
-
Dr 3 -0.014501 0.012366 -1.173 0.2460 
-
Dm 0.22919 0.082144 2.790 0.0072 
Dm 2 0.080894 0.073306 1.104 0.2746 
Dg_2 0.036649 0.016400 2.235 0.0295 
Dor 0.011515 0.0082991 1.388 0.1709 
Dor 2 0.013669 0.014717 0.929 0.3571 
-
Dp*_2 -0.39380 0.17088 -2.305 0.0250 
Dp*_3 0.26578 0.17436 1.524 0.1332 
Seasonal -0.l5607 0.052485 -2.974 0.0044 
Seasonal 1 -0.11599 0.04747 -2.443 0.0178 
-
Seasonal 2 -0.22283 0.05083 -4.383 0.0001 
-
Seasonal 3 -0.13205 0.04442 -2.973 0.0044 
-
CI(p)_l 0.085206 0.020807 4.095 0.0001 
Dy 0.0049031 0.l5466 0.032 0.9748 
cr = 0.026994 
Equation :2 for Dy 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Dy _1 1.6022 O.l 0323 15.521 0.0000 
Dy _ 2 -1.2319 0.14864 -8.287 0.0000 
Dy _3 0.40973 0.084009 4.877 0.0000 
Dr 1 0.0067397 0.003828 1.760 0.0839 
Dr 2 0.0072544 0.004476 1.621 0.1108 
Dg_l -0.010498 0.006448 -1.628 0.1092 
Dg_2 -0.0093632 0.006352 -1.474 0.1462 
Doy 0.082359 0.012711 6.479 0.0000 
Doy _1 -0.10012 0.017298 -5.788 0.0000 
Doy _2 0.060684 0.015074 4.026 0.0002 
Op* _1 -0.091259 0.050105 -1.821 0.0740 
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Seasonal 0.00013301 0.0043657 0.030 0.9758 
0.0037748 0.999 0.3221 
0.0029376 l.572 0.1218 
0.0046045 -0.894 0.3751 
0.0068612 -2.000 0.0504 
Seasonal_l 0.0037713 
Seasonal_2 0.0046167 
Seasonal_3 -0.0041170 
CI(y)_1 -0.013722 
Dp 0.040448 0.060524 0.668 0.5067 
cr = 0.00768371 
Equation 3 for Dr 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Dy_l 
-2.5339 3.7849 
-0.669 0.5060 
Dy_2 3.6995 2.3935 1.546 0.1279 
Dr 1 
-0.20308 0.078291 
-2.594 0.0121 
Dr 3 
-0.11850 0.063155 
-1.876 0.0659 
-
Dm 0.65252 0.41481 1.573 0.1214 
Dg 0.33062 0.10964 3.016 0.0039 
Dg_l 0.12752 0.11948 1.067 0.2905 
Dg_2 
-0.13439 0.098159 -1.369 0.1765 
Dor 0.47227 0.055233 8.550 0.0000 
Doy_l 0.39629 0.31077 1.275 0.2076 
Doy_2 -0.37257 0.29759 -1.252 0.2159 
Dp*_2 -2.6047 0.99584 -2.616 0.0115 
Dp*_3 2.1385 1.0658 2.006 0.0497 
Seasonal -0.0060141 0.099950 -0.060 0.9522 
Seasonal 1 0.18382 0.11489 1.600 0.1153 
-
Seasonal 2 0.035285 0.066757 0.529 0.5992 
Seasonal 3 0.046840 0.080758 0.580 0.5643 
-
CI(r)_1 -0.15768 0.066551 -2.369 0.0214 
Dp -1.2885 1.3020 -0.990 0.3267 
Dy -0.098334 2.0471 -0.048 0.9619 
cr = 0.140627 
-:.9 Afodel Estimation 
loglik = 802.17952 loglel = -21.9775 lei = 2.85288e-0 lOT = 73 
LR test of over-identifying restrictions: Chi2(27) = 24.6456 [0.5943] 
correlation of residuals 
Dp Dy Dr 
Dp 1.000 
Dy -0.4292 1.000 
Dr 0.1328 0.07601 l.000 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 1 
Chi2(9) = 16.567 [0.0559] and F-Form(9. 121) = 1.4365 [0.1799] 
Testing for n ~ c t o r r error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 2 
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Chi2(18) = 27.311 [0.0733] and F-Form(18, 133) = l.171 [0.2941] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi2(27) = 36.972 [0.0956] and F-Form(27, 129) = l.013 [0'-+568] 
Vector normality test for residuals 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Skewness 
1.116 -l.244 -l.164 
Excess kurtosis 
0.08652 0.7420 0.5482 
Vector normality Chi2( 6)= 5.0068 [0.5429] 
Testing Dp for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi2(3) = 9.5292 [0.0230] * and F-Form(3, 43) = 2.1519 [0.1076] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. -0.2934 0.5266 0.1832 
Testing Dy for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi\3) = 20.812 [0.0001] ** and F-Form(3, 43) = 5.7161 [0.0022] ** 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. 0.2653 -0.2537 0.2795 
Testing Dr for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi\3) = 6.8395 [0.0772] and F-Form(3, 43) = l.4817 [0.2329] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. -0.2349 -0.206 -0.1403 
Normality test for Dp 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean 
Std.Devn. 
Skewness 
-0.000000 
Excess Kurtosis 
0.023421 
0.167688 
0.006133 
Minimum -0.053205 
Maxin1um 0.059019 
Nom1ality C h i 2 C ~ ) = = 0.65411 [0.7210] 
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Normality test for Dy 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean -0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.006322 
Skewness -0.298126 
Excess Kurtosis 0.333474 
Minimum -0.020729 
Maximum 0.014689 
Normality Chi\2)= 2.0111 [0.3658] 
Normality test for Dr 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean 0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.121674 
Skewness -0.309128 
Excess Kurtosis 0.100765 
Minimum -0.320748 
Maximum 0.287646 
Normality Chi\2)= 1.4635 [0.4811] 
7. 9 Afodel Estimation 
Testing Dp for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi2(4) = 3.0091 [0.5563] and F-Form(4. 38) = 0.43318 [0.7838] 
Testing Dy for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi\4) = 6.1887 [0.1855] and F-Form(4. 38) = 0.93601 [0.4535] 
Testing Dr for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi\4) = 4.502 [0.3423] and F-Form(4. 38) = 0.6631 [0.6215] 
Progress to date 
model T P log-likelihood 
1 73 54 3SLS 802.17952 
system T P 
2 73 81 RLS 
log-likelihood 
814.50230 
Tests of model reduction 
Schwarz Hannan-Quinn 
-18.80 -19.82 
Schwarz Hannan-Quinn 
-17.55 -19.08 
System 2 --> Modell: Chi2(27) = 24.646 [0.5943] 
Model 2 
EQ( 4) Estimating the model by 2SLS 
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The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Equation 1 for Dp 
Variable 
Dy_2 
Dy_3 
Dr 2 
Dr 3 
Dm 
Dm 2 
Dg_2 
Dor 
Dor 2 
Dp*_2 
Dp*_3 
Seasonal 
Seasonal 1 
Seasonal 2 
Seasonal 3 
CI(P)_1 
Dy 
Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
-0.40313 0.28596 -1.410 0.1642 
0.37753 0.26270 1.437 0.1563 
-0.033063 0.022080 -1.497 0.1400 
-0.013681 0.013185 -1.038 0.3040 
0.23068 0.086095 2.679 0.0097 
0.091060 0.078663 1.158 0.2520 
0.036873 0.016660 2.213 0.0310 
0.013265 0.0087816 1.511 0.1366 
0.015194 0.015847 0.959 0.3419 
-0.46464 0.18046 -2.575 0.0128 
0.21990 0.18276 1.203 0.2340 
-0.15165 0.053908 -2.813 0.0068 
-0.10797 0.049232 -2.193 0.0325 
-0.21338 0.052562 -4.060 0.0002 
-0.12384 0.045792 -2.704 0.0091 
0.081299 0.021403 3.798 0.0004 
-0.035532 0.15587 -0.228 0.8205 
0' = 0.0268082 
Equation 2 for Dy 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Dy_l 1.6100 0.10804 14.902 0.0000 
Dy_2 -1.2405 0.15372 -8.070 0.0000 
Dy _3 0.41497 0.085472 4.855 0.0000 
Dr 1 0.0070271 0.0040654 1.729 0.0895 
Dr 2 0.0075012 0.004652 1.612 0.1126 
Dg_l -0.011077 0.006915 -1.602 0.1149 
Dg_2 -0.0096185 0.006573 -1.463 0.1491 
Doy 0.082343 0.013635 6.039 0.0000 
Doy_l -0.10074 0.018403 -5.474 0.0000 
Doy_2 0.060419 0.016123 3.747 0.0004 
Dp* _1 -0.1 0298 0.052501 -1.962 0.0549 
Seasonal 0.00067654 0.004413 0.153 0.8787 
Seasonal 1 0.0045082 0.0038289 1.177 0.2441 
Seasonal 2 0.0042946 0.0029691 1.446 0.1537 
Seasonal_3 -0.0042082 0.0046916 -0.897 0.3737 
CJ(y)_1 -0.012495 0.0070884 -1. 763 0.0835 
Dp 0.032019 0.061060 0.524 0.6021 
0' = 0.0075835 
Equation 3 for Dr 
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Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Dy_l 
-2.9088 3.8061 
-0.764 0.4480 
Dy 2 3.9347 2.4060 1.635 0.1077 
Dr 1 
-0.19205 0.078925 
-2.433 0.0182 -
Dr 3 
-0.11820 0.063314 
-1.867 0.0672 
Dm 0.63927 0.41632 1.536 0.1304 
Dg 0.30467 0.11108 2.743 0.0082 
Dg_l 0.11520 0.12051 0.956 0.3433 
Dg_2 
-0.13678 0.098348 -1.391 0.1699 
Dor 0.47418 0.055481 8.547 0.0000 
Doy_l 0.40706 0.31304 1.300 0.1989 
Doy_2 
-0.39435 0.29966 -1.316 0.1936 
Dp*_2 
-2.5004 0.99872 
-2.504 0.0153 
Dp*_3 2.1878 1.0683 2.048 0.0453 
Seasonal 0.0030545 0.1 0025 0.030 0.9758 
Seasonal 1 0.17797 0.11526 1.544 0.1283 
-
Seasonal 2 0.039249 0.066857 0.587 0.5596 
-
Seasonal 3 0.039644 0.081039 0.489 0.6266 
-
CJ(r)_1 
-0.16163 0.067287 
-2.402 0.0197 
Dp 
-1.2366 1.3056 
-0.947 0.3477 
Dy 0.14540 2.0566 0.071 0.9439 
cr = 0.140151 
loglik = 801.73754 loglel = -21.9654 lei = 2.88764e-Ol0 T = 73 
LR test of over-identifying restrictions: Chi2(27) = 25.5295 [0.5448] 
correlation of residuals 
Dp Dy Dr 
Dp 1.000 
Dy -0.3766 1.000 
Dr 0.1210 0.06424 1.000 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 1 
Chi\9) = 16.819 [0.0516] and F-Form(9, 121) = l.4617 [0.1698] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 2 
Chi\ 18) = 27.153 [0.0762] and F-Form(l8, 133) = l.1643 [0.2998] 
Testing for vector error autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi2(27) = 36.688 [0.1010] and F-Form(27. 129) = l.0037 [0.4691] 
Vector normality test for residuals 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1 ) 
Skewness 
1 . ~ - + 4 4 -1.285 -1.261 
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Excess kurtosis 
0.1684 0.6154 0.4864 
Vector normality Chi\ 6)= 5.4343 [0.4894] 
Testing Dp for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi\3) = 8.6076 [0.0350] * and F-Form(3, 43) = 1.916 [0.1413] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. -0.232 0.4999 0.142 
Testing Dy for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi\3) = 20.677 [0.0001] ** and F-Form(3, 43) = 5.6644 [0.0023] ** 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. 0.2526 -0.2657 0.251 
Testing Dr for Error Autocorrelation from lags 1 to 3 
Chi2(3) = 6.6978 [0.0822] and F-Form(3, 43) = 1.4479 [0.2421] 
Error Autocorrelation Coefficients: 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Coeff. -0.2143 -0.1867 -0.1383 
Normality test for Dp 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean -0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.023332 
Skewness 0.207433 
Excess Kurtosis 0.073457 
Minimum -0.054774 
Maximum 0.060073 
Normality Chi\2)= 0.93637 [0.6261] 
Normality test for Dy 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean -0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.006332 
Skewness -0.318256 
Excess Kurtosis 
Minimum 
Maximum 
0.265638 
-0.020730 
0.013698 
") 
Normality Chi-(2)= 1.8739 [0.3918] 
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Normality test for Dr 
The present sample is: 1972 (1) to 1990 (1) 
Sample Size 73 
Mean 0.000000 
Std.Devn. 0.121754 
Skewness -0.342055 
Excess Kurtosis 0.136644 
Minimum -0.320450 
Maximum 0.287977 
Normality Chi2(2)= 1.7275 [0.4216] 
-.9 .\Jodel Estimation 
Testing Dp for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi2(4) = 2.4518 [0.6533] and F-Form(4. 38) = 0.35 [0.8424] 
Testing Dy for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi2(4) = 6.0719 [0.1938] and F-Form(4. 38) = 0.91664 [0.4642] 
Testing Dr for ARCH from lags 1 to 4 
Chi2(4) = 4.3371 [0.3623] and F-Form(4. 38) = 0.63719 [0.6392] 
Progress to date 
model T p log-likelihood 
2 73 54 2SLS 801.73754 
system T p 
2 73 81 RLS 
log-likelihood 
814.50230 
Tests of model reduction 
Schwarz Hannan-Quinn 
-18.79 -19.81 
Schwarz Hannan-Quinn 
-17.55 -19.08 
System 2 --> Model 2: Chi2(27) = 25.530 [0.5448] 
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